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Preface 
 
The study examines an important question in relation to internal conflicts i.e 
the problem of protection of civilians.  It intends to find solutions to 
humanitarian problems resulting from weaknesses in the regime of 
protection under Geneva law by suggesting that their protection must be 
seen in a broader context of human rights law.  In light of the above, the 
study discusses some legal aspects of the international humanitarian law 
regime of protection of civilians in non-international armed conflicts. The 
study shows how the law has been influenced by new developments. These 
were in the decade of the 20th century both in the field of international 
humanitarian law and more closely related fields of human rights and 
international criminal law. In particular it examines how human rights law 
has influenced the historical development and contributed in strengthening 
the regime of protection under Geneva law. It shows how the concept of 
state sovereignty may place obstacles rendering such regime ineffective. In 
this connection the study attempts to discuss and examine different issues in 
relation to the subject matter. Darfur conflict is taken as a case study to 
apply the rules discussed. The text of chapter on Darfur conflict reflects 
events and materials available at the close of October 2006. 
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   ﺹ ﺨﻤﻠ
 
ﻀﻭﻋﺎﹰ ﻤﻬﻤﺎﹰ ﻫﻭ ﻤﺸﻜل ﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺘﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻤﻭ  
ﻭﺘﻨﺒﻊ ﺃﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻤﻥ ﻜﻭﻥ ﺍﺴﺘﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻡ ﻭﺍﻷﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﻴﻥ .ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻏﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ
ﺍﻟﻴﻭﻡ ﻤﺭﺘﺒﻁ ﺍﺭﺘﺒﺎﻁﺎﹰ ﻭﺜﻴﻘﺎﹰ ﺒﺎﻵﺜﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺘﺭﺘﺏ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻨﺘﺸﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﻨﻑ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﻅﺎﺌﻊ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ 
 ﺍﻟﻀﺤﺎﻴﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﻫﻲ ﺇﻥ ﻤﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ.ﺘﺭﺘﻜﺏ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻨﻁﺎﻕ ﻭﺍﺴﻊ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ
ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﺍﻷﺴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻗﺩ ﺘﻌﻁﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺒﻌﺩﺍﹰ ﺩﻭﻟﻴﺎﹰ، ﻭﻗﺩ ﺘﻔﺘﺢ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﺴﻌﺎﹰ 
  .ﻟﻠﺘﺩﺨل ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ
ﺍﻥ ﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺘﻡ ﺘﺒﻨﻴﻪ ﺒﻤﻭﺠﺏ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻨﻲ ﺒﻤﻭﺠﺏ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ   
 ﺍﻟﻤﻁﺒﻕ ﻓﻲ 7791 ﻭﺍﻟﺒﺭﻭﺘﻭﻜﻭل ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ 9491ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺘﺭﻜﺔ ﻻﺘﻔﺎﻗﻴﺔ ﺠﻨﻴﻑ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺒﻌﺔ 
ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻏﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻴﺘﻀﻤﻥ ﻋﺩﺓ ﺜﻐﺭﺍﺕ ﻭﻗﺼﻭﺭ ﻨﺘﻴﺠﺔ ﺍﺼﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻭل ﻋﻠﻰ 
ﻜﻤﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺘﺠﺎﺭﺏ .ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻅﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺴﻴﺎﺩﺘﻬﺎ، ﺍﻷﻤﺭ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺃﺩﻯ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺍﻀﻌﺎﻑ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ
ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻏﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺃﻅﻬﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﺩﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﻭﺍﺠﻬﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻨﻲ  
ﻲ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻓﺎﻥ ﺘﻨﻭﻉ ﻭﺘﻁﻭﺭ ﺍﺴﺘﺨﺩﺍﻡ ﺍﺴﺎﻟﻴﺏ ﺍﻟﻘﺘﺎل ﻭﺍﺯﺩﻴﺎﺩ ﻭﻓ. ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻀﺭ
ﻋﻼﻭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻓﺈﻥ ﻫﻨﺎﻟﻙ ﻋﺩﺩ ﻤﻥ .ﻋﺩﺩ ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﻗﺩ ﺘﻐﻴﺭ ﻤﻨﺫ ﺘﺒﻨﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ
ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻭﻗﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﻌﺘﺭﺽ ﺘﺒﻨﻲ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﻟﻬﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻅﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻓﻘﺩ ﺒﺎﺕ ﻴﻨﻅﺭ ﺍﻟﻰ ﻫﺫﺍ 
ﻭﻗﺩ . ﻭﻗﻴﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺴﻴﺎﺩﺓ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭلﺍﻟﺘﻨﻅﻴﻡ ﻜﺫﺭﻴﻌﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﺩﺨل ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺸﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﺍﺨﻠﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺩﻭل، 
ﻨﺘﺞ ﻋﻥ ﻜل ﺫﻟﻙ ﺒﺭﻭﺯ ﻤﺸﻜﻼﺕ ﺍﻨﺴﺎﻨﻴﺔ ﺨﻁﻴﺭﺓ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺁﺜﺎﺭ ﻤﺒﺎﺸﺭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﻭﻗﺩ 
  .ﺘﻁﻠﺏ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺒﺫل ﺍﻟﺠﻬﻭﺩ ﺒﻐﻴﺔ ﺍﻴﺠﺎﺩ ﺤﻠﻭل ﻟﺘﻌﺯﻴﺯ ﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﻭﺠﻌﻠﻪ ﺃﻜﺜﺭ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ
ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﻐﺭﺽ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﻫﻭ ﻤﺤﺎﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻴﺠﺎﺩ ﺤﻠﻭل ﻟﺒﻌﺽ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻭﻗﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺘﺠﺔ   
 ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻅﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻏﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻤﻥ ﻀﻌﻑ ﻭﻗﺼﻭﺭ
  .ﺒﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﻤﻭﻀﻭﻉ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﺒﻤﻔﻬﻭﻡ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﺴﻊ
ﺘﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻤﻭﻀﻭﻉ ﺍﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﻤﻥ ﺨﻼل ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻤﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ   
ﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺒﻤﻭﺠﺏ ﻫﺫﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻤﻴﻥ ﻭﻴﻌﺯﻯ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﻟ. ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻨﻲ
 ﺘﻨﺸﺄ ﻤﻥ ﻤﺼﺩﺭ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻲ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻨﻲ ﻭﺍﺤﺩ ﻫﻭ ﺍﺤﺘﺭﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﻜﺭﺍﻤﺔ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﻸﻓﺭﺍﺩ ﻓﻲ ﻜل 
  .ﺍﻟﻅﺭﻭﻑ
ﻭﻗﺩ ﺃﺒﺭﺯﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﺃﻤﺎﻜﻥ ﻭﺃﻭﺠﻪ ﺍﻟﻘﺼﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺍﻋﺘﺭﺕ ﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺴﻭﺍﺀ ﻓﻲ   
ﻤﺠﺎل ﺘﻁﺒﻴﻘﻬﺎ ﺍﻭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺃﻗﺭﻫﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ، ﻭﻤﺩﻯ ﻤﺴﺎﻫﻤﺔ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ 
ﻲ ﺘﻁﻭﻴﺭ ﻭﺴﺩ ﺃﻭﺠﻪ ﺍﻟﻘﺼﻭﺭ ﻭﺘﻌﺯﻴﺯ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻅﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻭﺠﻌﻠﻪ ﺃﻜﺜﺭ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﻓ
ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ، ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﺘﻨﺎﻗﺵ ﻋﺩﺓ ﻤﺴﺎﺌل ﺘﺘﻌﻠﻕ ﺒﻤﻭﻀﻭﻋﻬﺎ ﻜﻤﺎ ﺘﻭﻀﺢ ﻜﻴﻑ ﺃﻥ 
ﺴﻴﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻭل ﻭﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻌﻭﺍﻤل ﺍﻷﺨﺭﻯ  ﻗﺩ ﺘﻀﻊ ﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻭﻗﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺴﺒﻴل ﺘﻁﺒﻴﻕ ﻫﺫﺍ 
 ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻉ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺢ ﻓﻲ ﻭﻗﺩ ﺘﻡ ﺘﻁﺒﻴﻕ ﻨﺘﺎﺌﺞ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ.ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺼﻭﺭﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﺩﺩﺓ
  .ﺩﺍﺭﻓﻭﺭ
ﻴﺴﺎﻫﻡ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﻓﻲ ﻭﻀﻊ ﺍﻁﺎﺭ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻨﻲ ﻋﺎﻡ ﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﻓﻲ   
ﺒﺤﻴﺙ ﺘﺘﻔﺎﻋل ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻜِل ﻤﻥ ﻨﻅﺎﻤﻲ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻥ .ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻏﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ
ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻨﻲ ﻻﻴﺠﺎﺩ ﺤﻠﻭل ﻟﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺎﺌل ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺘﻌﻠﻕ ﺒﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ 
  .ﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕﺍﻟ
ﺘﺤﺘﻭﻱ ﻫﺫﻩ  ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﺸﺭﺓ ﻓﺼﻭل ﺘﻨﺎﻗﺵ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﻭﺍﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﻀﻭﻋﺎﺕ 
  :ﺍﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ
ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺭﻴﺔ ﺒﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻨﻲ ﻭﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻥ، ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻁﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻴﺨﻲ 
ﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﻭﺃﺜﺭ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺘﻁﻭﻴﺭ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ؛ ﻜﻤﺎ ﺘﺘﻨﺎﻭل 
ﻴﻡ ﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﺭﺩﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ ﺍﻟﺨﺼﺎﺌﺹ ﺍﻟﺭﺌﻴﺴﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ؛ ﺘﻘﻭ
ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺘﺭﻜﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﺭﻭﺘﻭﻜﻭل ﺍﻻﻀﺎﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ، ﻭﺘﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻭﺠﻪ ﺍﻟﻘﺼﻭﺭ ﻭ ﺘﻨﺎﻗﺵ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ 
ﺍﻟﻤﻀﻤﻨﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﺘﻔﺎﻗﻴﺎﺕ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻁﺒﻘﺔ ﻭ ﻁﺒﻴﻌﺔ ﻭﻤﺩﻯ ﺃﻭﺠﻪ ﻤﺴﺎﻫﻤﺔ ﻫﺫﻩ 
ﻴﻑ؛ﻤﻨﺎﻗﺸﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺴﺩ ﺍﻟﺜﻐﺭﺍﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺼﻭﺭ ﻭﺘﻌﺯﻴﺯﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺒﻤﻭﺠﺏ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺠﻨ
ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺎﺌل ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺒﺘﻨﻔﻴﺫ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻁﺒﻕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﻭﻯ ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻨﻲ ﻭﺩﻭﺭ 
ﺁﻟﻴﺎﺕ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ ﻀﻤﺎﻥ ﺍﻻﺤﺘﺭﺍﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻁﺒﻴﻕ ﻟﻬﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ؛ ﻜﻤﺎ ﺘﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ 
ﻤﻔﻬﻭﻡ ﻭﻤﺸﺭﻭﻋﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺩﺨل ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻨﻲ ﺘﺤﺕ ﺴﺘﺎﺭ ﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻷﺴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﻓﻲ 
ﻤﻭﻗﻑ ﺍﻟﻔﻘﻪ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻁﺒﻴﻕ؛ﻜﻤﺎ ﺘﻁﺭﻗﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ، ﻭ
 ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺅﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻷﻀﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺭﺘﺒﺔ ﻤﻥ ﺠﺭﺍﺀ ﺍﻹﻨﺘﻬﺎﻜﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺠﺴﻴﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺭﺘﻜﺏ 
ﻀﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻏﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻭ ﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﺘﻔﺎﻗﻴﺎﺕ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻥ  
ﻟﻙ ﻓﻘﺩ ﺘﻨﺎﻭﻟﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﻜﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺘﻁﻭﻴﺭ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ؛ ﺒﺎﻻﻀﺎﻓﺔ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺫ
ﺍﻟﺠﻭﺍﻨﺏ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﺯﺍﻉ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺢ ﻓﻲ ﺩﺍﺭﻓﻭﺭ ﻭ ﻤﺩﻯ ﺘﻁﺒﻴﻕ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺃﻋﻼﻩ 
ﺃﻤﺎ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺘﻤﺔ ﻓﺘﺤﺘﻭﻱ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻫﻡ ﺍﻟﻨﺘﺎﺌﺞ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻭﺼﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﻤﻜﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺘﺴﺎﻫﻡ ﻓﻲ .ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻉ
ﺭ ﺘﻌﺯﻴﺯ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻅﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﻴﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻏﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻭ ﺠﻌﻠﻪ ﺃﻜﺜ
  .ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
The study is intended to address an important issue i.e. the problem of 
protection of civilians in non-international armed conflicts. The importance 
of the topic arises from the fact that today stability of international peace and 
security is a matter which is closely related to the effect of violence and 
atrocities committed on wide scale in such conflicts. The question of 
protection of civilian victims is the main issue which may give such 
conflicts an international dimension and may open the door for international 
interference. 
The regime of protection adopted under humanitarian law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts i.e. common Article 3 of Geneva Convention 
IV 1949 and Additional Protocol II, has its own shortcomings and lacunae as 
a result of insistence of States to preserve sovereignty which rendered it 
weak.  In addition, experiences of recent and present conflicts show that the 
law is exposed to various challenges today. In fact the number, nature and 
conduct of hostilities have all changed since adoption of such rules. 
Moreover, there are a number of obstacles to the general adoption of such 
regime. It is seen as a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of States 
and is a restriction to their sovereignty. All these resulted in serious 
humanitarian problems, which has a direct impact on civilians. This required 
 efforts to be made to find solutions in other branches of international law 
with a view to strengthen weakness and render the regime more effective. 
The purpose of the study is to find solutions to some of the problems by 
approaching the issue of protection within the broader context of human 
rights law. The study approaches the issue basically from the stand point of 
the contemporary international rules of the two bodies i.e. humanitarian law 
and human rights law. The reason being that protection under such bodies 
originates from one source of legal philosophy i.e. the respect of human 
dignity of persons in all circumstances.  
In view of this, the study shows how and to what extent human rights norms 
and their mechanisms influenced development of such rules and contributed 
to rendering the regime more effective.  
In this connection, the study discusses and examines different issues in 
relation to the subject matter while showing how State sovereignty and other 
factors place obstacles on the way of implementation of such rules in various 
forms. The finding of study has been applied to current Darfur armed 
conflict. 
The contribution of study is seen in attempting to highlight a legal 
framework of an international regime of protection within which both 
humanitarian and human rights norms may interact to provide solutions on 
 current and emerging issues as far as protection of civilians in non-internal 
armed conflicts is concerned. 
The study contains ten chapters which discusses respectively: the theoretical 
relationship between human rights and humanitarian law and its impact on 
the notion of international protection of civilians in non-international armed 
conflicts; it traces the impact of human rights on the historical process of 
development of the law; examines the main specifities of the law; identifies 
areas of weaknesses by analyzing provisions of common Article 3 of Geneva 
Convention IV 1949 and Additional Protocol II 1977; it discusses the nature, 
extent and forms of contribution of human rights norms to various situations; 
discusses various issues in relation to implementation of the law on national 
level and the role of human rights mechanisms to ensure respect and 
implementation of such rules; discusses the question of legality of notion of 
“humanitarian intervention” justified on the protection of basic rights of 
civilians and controversary as to its lawfulness and related issues; it shows 
how the development of concept of individual criminal responsibility for 
crimes committed in such conflicts enhanced the system of protection and 
discusses the role of international tribunals and human rights norms in 
developing rules in this area. The study in applying the rules discussed, 
examines various legal aspects of Darfur conflict. The conclusion 
summarizes main findings of research, recommends a set of proposals and 
 suggested reforms to render the international regime of protection of 
civilians in such conflicts more effective.      
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Notion of “International Protection of Civilians and 
the Relation between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law”: 
Theoretical Aspects 
Introduction 
International humanitarian law (IHL) is defined as that branch of international 
law which provides for rules (conventional and customary) aiming at the 
protection of victims of armed conflicts i.e. international and non-international 
armed conflicts, by mitigating their sufferings and regulating the conduct of 
hostilities1.  However, humanitarian law which is applicable to non-international 
armed conflicts embodies a set of rules seeking to protect victims from the effects 
of armed conflicts which take place in the territory of a state between its armed 
forces and opposing forces or between non-state forces.  International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) rules extend to cover a wide range of victims, of all 
range of persons protected civilians who are considered the most to suffer as 
victims of internal armed conflicts, have been subject to a system of protection 
which has developed gradually. 
This notion of protection of civilians as victims of armed conflicts is considered 
to be the bedrock of modern international humanitarian law.  However, the 
                                                 
1 Hans Haug “Humanity for All” The International Red Cross And Red Crescent Movement – Henry Dunant 
Institute – Paul Haupt Publishers Berne. Stuttgart Vienna 1993, p. 491. 
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notion of international protection of civilians in internal armed conflicts is a 
recently new phenomenon which has developed and greatly influenced by 
changes of basic doctrines and principles in international law mainly the doctrine 
of state sovereignty and the principles relating to it.  These changes which took 
place after the Second World War, have contributed greatly in developing 
humanitarian law (being a branch of international law) from a law governing 
relations between states, parties in international armed conflicts to a law 
embodying rules governing protection of victims in internal armed conflicts.  
This situation which was before under the classic doctrine of state sovereignty 
was an internal matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of sovereign 
states. 
This notion is also closely bound and has been influenced by the rise of 
international protection of human rights under international instruments.  These 
instruments confer basic rights on individual citizens and impose obligations on 
their states to protect them in all circumstances.  As a consequence, these changes 
brought with them major developments in the scope of application of 
international law, from a law in which states are the only subjects, to a law which 
provides for rights to individuals and imposes obligations on states to guarantee 
the protection of such rights.  A fact which raises a question as to what extent 
such changes have contributed in developing a notion of international protection 
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of civilians in non-international armed conflicts and their juridical status  in 
international law.  This question cannot be answered in isolation of the 
development of basic doctrines and notions of international law closely related to 
the issue .This chapter examine these issues, it is divided into four parts. Part 1 
examines the legal status of individual in international law. Part 2 examines the 
doctrine of state sovereignty and its impact on the protective status of civilians. 
Part 3 examines the theoratical relation between human rights and humanitarian 
law and shared concepts. Part 4 discusses human rights standards to be protected 
in time of armed conflict. 
1. The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law 
The status of the individual in International law has always been an issue of 
debate as to whether individuals are subjects or objects of International law.  
Different theories have been advocated on the subject; however two basic 
theories governing the issue may be examined in this connection. 
i. The Objective Theory 
This theory which prevailed in the nineteenth century reflects the classic doctrine 
of international law when law had been regarded by positivists as the law which 
regulated relations between sovereign states only.  As such, states are the only 
subjects of international law addressed by its rules and enjoy rights enforceable 
before it.  As a result of this theory, individuals who may benefit from rules of 
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international customary law (e.g. rules on the minimum standard of international 
law regarding the treatment of foreigners) and under treaties, in each case remain 
an object of International law2.  
Advocates of this theory are of view that individuals are not directly addressed by 
rules (being objects of international law); still states may agree to confer certain 
rights on them under treaties.  In such a case, the obligation to grant such rights 
to individuals lies on states that are addressed as such rules, by incorporating or 
transforming such rules within its domestic laws.  As such, advocates of this 
theory support the school of thought reflected by the Dualistic doctrine which 
regard international law and municipal law as two independent legal systems 
which regulate different subject matters.  International law regulates relations 
between states while municipal law applies within a state and regulates the 
relation of its citizens with each other and with the governing authority. 
One practical conclusion of this theory is that, since civilian individuals are not 
recognized as subjects of international law, they do not possess rights or 
protection under international law applicable in armed conflicts.  That the rights 
and duties involved under international law are those of states with only domestic 
law applying to individuals.  According to this theory which is based on the 
centrality of sovereignty, a state has no international duty to treat its own 
                                                 
2 Oppenheim, “International Law and Treaties”. Ronald F. Rox burgh (third edition) London, Longmans, Green 
and Company 1920 p. 17; George Schwarzenberger, Fourth edition, volume 1. “A Manual of International law”, 
Stevens & Sons limited, London, 1957 p. 79.  
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nationals in acceptable manner and that an individual could not appeal to 
international law for protection in case of mistreatment by his own government3. 
Schwarzenberger described this position of the individual by stating that 
“sovereign states the predominant bearers of rights and duties under international 
law have so far succeeded in maintaining a practically unchallenged monopoly of 
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over the individual”4. 
This objective theory has been criticized by various classic writers like Kelsen 
who is of the opinion that the ultimate subject of the legal order was always the 
individual and that the rights and duties of legal persons were always rights and 
duties of individuals belonging to the legal person in the capacity of either its 
members or members of the organs concerned.  To Kelsen individuals are 
subjects and the only subjects in all fields of law5.  Other scholars rebutted this 
classic object view by adducing evidence pointing to the fact that international 
law has always been concerned with interests of both states and individuals.                         
To them the objective theory as far as protection of individual is concerned is not 
practical6. 
                                                 
3  Ian Brownlie “Principles of Public International law”, Fourth Edition, Clarendon Press.  Oxford 1972, p. 33 
R.St. J. Macdonald I.D.M. Johnston (Editors), The Structure and Process of International law, Marinus N. Jhoff 
Publisher, 1983, p. 411. 
4  Georg Schwarzenberger “The Protection of Human Rights in British State Practice, current legal problems”, 
1948 p. 153 Vladimir R. Idelson “The law of Nations and the Individual” 30 Transactions, Grotious Society, 
1944, p. 50. 
5  Kelsen, “General theory of law and state”, New York: Russell, 1961 p. 342. 
6  Bengt Broms, Subjects: Entitlement in the International legal system, in R.St. J. Macdonald, D.M. Johnston 
(Editors) “The Structure and Process of International law”, 1983 Martinus Nighoff Publishers, pp. 411-412.  
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ii. The Subjective Theory 
This theory which prevailed in the second half of the nineteenth century adopted 
a contrary view by affirming the importance of individual in the legal order 
whether national or international.  According to this theory individuals are the 
real subjects of International law.  Dunn goes further by taking it for granted that 
states are not subjects of international law but individuals alone are subjects of 
this law.  Kelsen, one of the promoters of this theory, to him the law regulates the 
relation between individuals in a society (whether national or international).  He 
takes this extreme view to point out that International law ultimately addresses 
individual and imposes sanctions on them alone and that they alone posses the 
capacity to create legal norms or rules.  To Kelsen states are not natural persons 
and as a result cannot be real subjects of the law, states consists of individuals 
and its object  is to serve the interest of individuals, without individuals the state 
does not exist in reality7.  Some writers described Kelsen’s theory as a 
philosophical theory which lacks sufficient ground.  One cannot ignore the role 
of the states in international law8. 
Jurists, who advocate this theory that individuals were the real subject of 
international law, reach this conclusion from a natural law approach which has 
been inspired by two ideas: the first of a universal order governing all men and of 
                                                 
7 Hans Kelsen, “Principles of International law”, New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc. (1952) p. 113, Kelsen, 
“Law and Peace in International Relations”, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1942, p. 88.  
8 Macdonald, op.cit p. 413. 
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the inalienable rights of the individual which he enjoys by virtue of being a 
human being not as a citizen.  It is here that international law intervenes to 
protect such inalienable rights, but as far as he is a citizen in relation to his state, 
he is subject to national laws.  This theory rests in a basic assumption that 
international law and national law emanates from one system of legal order and 
that international law being a branch of this legal order addresses individuals 
directly9.  According to monistic approach international law directly confers 
rights and imposes obligations upon individuals without the need to implement 
such rules within the municipal systems.  As such individuals possess rights 
directly under international law which is supreme10. 
In such a situation, rights of the individual denied by his own government, as he 
possess the procedural capacity, can be directly enforceable against his state 
before international institutions.  This theory which places the individual on 
equal footing with states as a subject of international law has been rejected by 
those advocating notions of sovereignty which regard its individual citizens as 
subjects to the sovereign powers of their state11.  To them international law rules 
conferring rights on individuals can not be directly applied and enforced unless 
accepted by their states under a treaty and being incorporated or transformed in a 
                                                 
9 George White Cross Paton, “A Text Book of Jurisprudence”, Fourth Edition, Oxford At the Clarendon Press, 
1972 p. 391 – W. Friedmann, “Legal Theory”, Fifth Edition, London, Stevens & Sons, 1967, p. 268. 
10 Malcom V. Shaw, “International Law”, Third Edition, Grotious Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1994 
p. 120. Hersch Lauterpacht, “The subjects of the law of Nations” Law Quarterly ReviewLXIII (1947) p. 458. 
11 Lauterpacht, ibid, p. 460. 
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municipal legal system.  As such the protection of civilians in non-international 
armed conflicts is not a duty of each state unless a state had voluntarily agreed 
under a treaty to implement this obligation within its national laws. 
iii. Developments in Light  of States Practice 
Any attempt to evaluate the position of the individual in International law at 
present, has to be made in the light of the recent development in International 
law, taking into consideration the practice of states.  Recent developments and 
changes that have taken place in the field of international law and international 
relations make it clear that the position of the individual is being strengthened 
and that the trend is to protect the individual under international treaties. 
After the beginning of the twentieth century, concepts of natural law were 
revived.  Many of the principles of modern international law are rooted in the 
notions of natural law and the importance of ethical standards and rules to the 
international legal order. A general review to legal provisions stipulated in 
international treaties and customary law after the Second World War reflects one 
fact that international principles in most cases are addressing directly individuals,  
in particular those provisions and rules of a humanitarian nature aiming at the 
protection of the individual’s human life and human dignity12. 
                                                 
12 An example of such International rules are those prohibiting piracy on High seas, rules prohibiting use of toxic 
gases and other weapons causing unnecessary sufferings to individuals during armed conflicts and rule prohibiting 
slavery.  Herbbert W. Brigss, The law of Nations, cases, Documents Notes, Second Edition, Appleton Century 
Grofts, 1952, p. 94. 
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As far as the procedural capacity of the individual is concerned, the twentieth 
century witnessed a number of treaties concluded under which individuals were 
allowed to present claims against their home state and foreign states before 
International institutions13, a fact which greatly strengthened the protective 
position of individual.  Two conventions in this connection are to be mentioned 
the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 and the United Nations 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights 196614.  Other development has been 
with respect to crimes of individuals in international law and the application of 
the notion of international responsibility of individuals whose conduct may 
violate standards of international law.  The rule had been that the acts of officials 
are to be imputed to the state in cases in which the state failed to punish or give 
redress against acts committed by such officials.  The only means of redress has 
                                                 
13 Example of such treaties are the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, where a system of Mixed Tribunals was created, 
under which individuals were entitled to bring claims before such tribunals.  Also Peace Treaties after the Second 
World War which contained provisions concerned with protection of minorities. This protection which entitled 
individuals to appeal to particular international courts – Briggs, op.cit., pp. 94-95 –  Bochard, “the Access of 
Individuals to international courts”, 24 Am. J. law 1930 (359). 
14 “Human Rights, A Compilation of International Instruments”, United Nations Publications, Sales No. E. 
88.X1v.1, BN 92-1-154066-6.  The Optional Protocol authorizes the Human Rights Committee to take up 
complaints by individuals in case of violations of civil or political rights provided for in the Covenant.  Under the 
European Convention, a system of individual petitions is stipulated.  Any person, non-governmental organization 
or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the parties to the Convention are entitled 
to present petition to the European Commission of Human Rights, which may receive such petition addressed to 
the Secretary General of the Council (however, the individual right of petition does not apply to the European 
court of Human Rights under the convention) H. Lautherpacht, “International law and Human Rights” (1950) – 
Shaw, op.cit, - chapter Six, p. 187. The European Convention – the International and Comparative law Quarterly, 
supplementary publication No. 11 1965)  The British Institute of International and Comparative law, International 
Law series No. (5). 
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been to bring a claim on behalf of its nationals against responsible state before 
international tribunals15. 
The exception to the above rule has been violations of the International law of 
war.  The judgment of the International Military tribunals at Nuremberg and 
Tokoyo laid down the accepted principle that, individual members of belligerent 
armed forces are criminally responsible for acts in violation of international law 
of war and human rights law16.  The recent adoption of the notion of international 
individual criminal responsibility to try individuals for crimes committed against 
civilians in international and non-international armed conflicts (before the 
international Criminal Court established in 1998) is considered to be a great 
development in International Criminal law towards the international protection of 
civilians in armed conflicts17.  In considering whether an individual is a subject of 
modern International law it is clear that, as a result  of recent developments in 
states practice, the trend is to recognize the individual as subject of international 
law by conferring on them rights and duties under customary and treaty law.  
                                                 
15 Brownlie, “Principles of Public International Law”, op.cit, ch. xxiv at p. 580. O’ Connell, “International law”, 
2nd ed., 1970 vol. 1 –  Macdonald, op.cit, p. 412. 
16 Schwarzenberger, “Responsibility of the Individual under International Law”, 35 Geo. L. J. 481 (1947) – also 
F.V. Gracia Amador, “State responsibility in the light of new trends of international law”, Am. J. of International 
law xix (1955) p. 345. 
17 The notion that individuals are capable of violating international law has long been accepted, whether being 
punished before state authority or recently international tribunals.  A number of international crimes for which any 
state may try and punish them, are piracy, white slavery and counterfeiting.  However these crimes are defined in 
national laws and tried before national courts (i.e. exercising universal jurisdiction) – Korowiz, Problem of the 
international personality of individuals, 50 Am. J. International law 533 (1956) –  Lauterpacht, subjects of law of 
nations, 63 L. Q. Rev. 438 (1947).  M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal law, 2nd ed., New York, 
Transnational Publishers International 1998 p. 32. 
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However, as Shaw pointed out when it comes to the determination of the nature 
and extent of his personality it appears that as a subject, the individual possesses 
a limited legal personality18.  It has also been shown that the rights and 
obligations stipulated in the treaties for the individual operate indirectly by 
incorporation of their rules within municipal law.  This means that it is not the 
treaty as an international instrument which confers rights or imposes obligations 
directly on individuals.  In reality, it is the treaty as implemented in national laws 
which serves to confer rights and imposes obligations.  However, in exceptional 
cases by agreements states have made international law directly applicable to 
individuals. 
It has also been shown that the individual lacks procedural capacity to enforce 
such rights before International law mechanisms against his home state or foreign 
state except when it is conferred upon him by treaties or customary rules. 
Thus, it is clear that an individual whether a civilians or otherwise, does not 
possess the capacity for rights and the procedural capacity to enforce such rights 
                                                 
18 Shaw, op.cit, p. 181 – to some writers like Verzijh, a subject of the law is an entity capable of possessing 
International rights and duties and having capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims in 
respect of breaches of International law.  Added to this, others see the capacity to make treaties valid on 
International law as a requirement to possess legal personality.  If any of these    is not met then the entity is said 
to have legal personality of a restricted kind.  J.H.W. Verzijl, “International law in Historical Perspective”, vol. 1., 
A.W.  – Legden 1968.  Brownlie – op.cit – pp. 58-59 – Jessup is of view that International law may address 
directly individuals and that it is a law which is binding on individual and states and that a day will come when 
individuals will conclude treaties with states.  Philip Jessup, “A modern law of Nations”, New York: The 
Macmillan Company 1948, p. 2. 
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on International level unless his sovereign state agrees to confer on him such 
rights and capacity under a treaty or customary rules. 
As long as individuals do not possess direct rights under International law and as 
long as they lack legal procedural capacity, one can hardly say that international 
rules conferring rights aiming at the protection of the individual as such has 
achieved its purpose.  Fear by states on conferring such rights that their internal 
sovereignty will be restricted by international rules, is a main factor in 
determining the nature and extent of legal personality of the individual in 
International law and thus the protective status of the individual civilian. 
iv. The Judicial Status of Civilians in International Humanitarian Law 
           (IHL) Applicable in Non-international Armed Conflicts 
Jean Pictet defined international law in a general form as a law which protects the 
individual in time of armed conflict19.  Civilians as victims of such conflicts are 
one of the main protected groups as individuals under the law.  A fact which 
raises an enquiry as to whether provisions of international law by such rules 
confer on individual civilians direct rights and direct protection.  This depends on 
the determination of the legal status of civilians under the law and the nature and 
extent of legal personality possessed by them under Common Article (3) to 
                                                 
19 Pictet, Jean, “The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Significance of the Principles for the Spirit of 
Peace”, Geneva.  International Review of the Red Cross, No. 746 (March – April 1984) p. 1. 
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Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 and Protocol II which are the basic international 
legal instruments applicable in non-international armed conflicts. 
The status of civilians is to be determined by examining the provisions of 
international humanitarian law applicable, as the subjects of any law are 
determined by that law.  It is the applicable law which determines the nature of 
legal personality of its subjects for it will determine the scope and nature of such 
personality.  However being a branch of International law, general theories and 
principles related are applicable.  An entity possesses a legal personality under a 
particular law if it possesses rights and can enforce them on international level20.  
The humanitarian protection of civilians has been influenced by developments 
regarding status of the individual in International law mentioned above.  After the 
Second World War, states have agreed to confer rights on civilians under 
common Article 3 Geneva Convention IV 1949 and Protocol II Additional 1977 
to Geneva Conventions containing rules of their protection in internal armed 
conflicts.  As such states accepted to waive part of its sovereignty or right to have 
exclusive jurisdiction regarding treatment of its national civilians.  Under such 
rules it accepted the obligation to observe certain standards of treatment and 
protect rights conferred on civilians.  However, to implement such obligations, 
states are required to incorporate such rights and rules within their national laws 
                                                 
20 Briggs, op.cit, p. 94. 
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military or otherwise, and to punish persons committing breaches of such rules21.  
These rights which include the right to be treated humanely without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour or religion or otherwise, their right to have 
their life respected and human dignity, are not conferred directly on civilians.   
In addition unlike Human Rights instruments, civilians do not possess the 
procedural capacity under the law to enforce or submit claims on International 
level in case of violation of such rights by parties to the conflict.  In any case, 
states may make individuals direct bearers of rights and duties in international 
law if they wish and thus within such limits invest them with international 
personality.  As such, the determination of the international personality of an 
individual is not a principle but a matter of fact depending on the intention of 
states parties to a treaty22.  From this one may conclude that on national level, 
civilians may be able to possess such rights and enforce them only when 
embodied as part of the national law a fact depending on the will of their 
sovereign states. 
As a result of conferring indirect rights while lacking procedural capacity to 
enforce such rights on International level, one can hardly say that civilians as 
                                                 
21 The effect of international law generally and of treaties in particular, within the legal order of a state, will 
always depend on a rule of domestic law i.e. whether a treaty forms part of that state’s law.   The Effect of 
Treaties in Domestic law, United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, vol. 7.  Edited by Francis 
G. Jacobs & Shelleg Roberts, London Sweet and Maxwell, 1987. 
22 Schwarzenberger regards individuals as objects of international law and in cases where treaties confer on them 
rights, he prefers to regard the individuals as beneficiaries of International treaties.  Schwarzenberger, op.cit, vol. 
1, p. 142.  
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such posses International legal personality under the law.  Though legal 
personality and protected status are connected, however, as Brownlie pointed out, 
they are by no means identical23.  Civilians under the law may receive guarantees 
of standards of treatment under humanitarian law instruments; this may mean that 
they possess limited international legal personality especially when they have no 
procedural capacity on international level to enforce such rights. 
2. The Notion of State Sovereignty and its Impact on the International  
     Protective Status of Civilians 
The question of treatment and protection of civilians as individuals in non-
international armed conflicts was considered in international law till nearly the 
first half of the twentieth century, a matter falling within the area of exclusive 
jurisdiction which international law designates as sovereignty.  According to this, 
a sovereign state exercises absolute jurisdiction or power over all persons 
property and incidents within its territory24.  It has the discretion to take all 
measures necessary to maintain its internal sovereignty to the extent of using 
force to restore order and security in case of occurrence of any internal armed 
conflict, regardless of its intensity.  In fact this notion of sovereignty and its 
development have greatly affected the protective status of civilians in 
international law during different periods of its development i.e. from an absolute 
                                                 
23 Brownlie, op.cit, p. 60. 
24 Schwarzenberger, op.cit, p. 53. 
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to a restrictive notion of sovereignty.  The acceptance of the idea of subjecting or 
imposing limits upon sovereignty from an outside legal system as far as its 
citizens are concerned has been one of the characteristic changes which affected 
such development, a fact leading to great controversy among legal scholars and 
politicians.  The notion of sovereignty is regarded by some scholars as a 
fundamental guarantee for peace, while modern writers see sovereignty as 
basically against the idea of humanity; to them as long as sovereignty exists, 
there is no hope for the protection of human dignity and human rights25.  This 
fact makes it worth to examine in brief this notion and trace its theoretical 
development to see how far it affected the protective status of civilians as 
individuals in international law. 
i. The Importance and Historical Development of the Notion of  
            Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is a generally recognized principle of contemporary international 
law.  It is one   of the basic principles upon which most of the rules of 
international law are rationalized.  Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter 
declares that the Organization “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality 
of all its Members”26.  This principle determined the nature of most of the rules 
                                                 
25 Bouzid Lazahri, “The role of sovereignty in the contemporarily world order”, The African Society of 
International and Comparative Law, September 1993, p. 212. 
26 The importance of the Principle has been declared also by the United Nations’ Resolution (XXV). The 
Declaration on Friendly Relations Resolution on Sovereignty and Equality of States.  Ian Brownlie, Principles of 
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governing protection of individual civilians in internal conflicts.  The notion is 
closely connected with other notions in International law such as territorial 
jurisdiction, non-intervention in other’s internal affairs, mutual respect for 
territorial integrity, equality between states and peaceful existence27.  However, 
as a notion sovereignty has been the subject of theoretical controversy among 
jurists of international law, with regard to its meaning, nature and extent.  It has 
evolved and been shaped as a result of political and legal developments in the 
structures of international society. 
The evolution of the notion of sovereignty goes back to the feudal era of the 
sixteenth century which expressed the concept of centralized power of individual 
feudal lord.  He was considered as supreme, unrestricted and independent of any 
temporal or church power internally and externally.  The feudal system was 
replaced by a centralized national kingdom especially in France in the 
seventeenth century.  The word ‘sovereign’ was used in France for an authority 
political or other which had no other authority above itself.  This concept was 
introduced by the French jurist Jean Bodin28; to him no restrictions whatsoever 
could limit the authority of the sovereign except the Commandments of God and 
                                                                                                                                                          
Public International law, Fourth Edition, Clarendon Press – Oxford 1994 – p. 287 – also M. Whiteman Digest of 
International law, US Department of State, Washington D.C., 1963, p. 238. 
27 Malcolm N. Shaw, “International Law”, Third Edition, Grotious Publications, Cambridge University Press, 
1995, p. 395. 
28 The absoluteness of the sovereignty claimed on behalf of the ruler has been invoked by Bodin who supported 
the growing nation state and its authority by means of the notion based on sovereignty. Jean Bodin, (15-30 – 
1596), Six Books of the Common Wealth 25 (M. Tooley trans, 1967). 
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the law of Nature.  As a result no constitution can limit sovereignty which is an 
attribute of the king in a morality and the people in democracy29.  As such at this 
stage the notion of sovereignty was considered personal, referring to the king 
being supreme inside and independent outside. Sovereignty is regarded as the 
superior power over the citizens who are not subject to the limitations of the 
positive law.  It can neither be delegated nor divisible30. 
This medieval concept considered the original subject of all public power the 
ruler, not the state thus the ruler is sovereignty.  However legal orders of that era 
defined the boundaries of the right to be determined by Divine and Natural law31.  
At that period, it was taken for granted that man lived in a pre-existing good 
order which had to be maintained or restored.  The notion of a social contract of 
Rosseau, between ruler and subjects expressed a moral obligation which obliged 
the ruler to observe certain ethical limits.  This traditional notion which prevailed 
in the seventeenth century was later used as a claim to justify absolute 
sovereignty of the state32.   
Jurists of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, though accepted Bodin’s concept 
or idea of sovereignty, however they thought that sovereignty could be restricted 
                                                 
29 Lazius Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International law, J. Macdonald / D.M. Johnston (Editors). The structure 
and Process of International law, Martintes N, jhoft Publishers 1983, p. 425. 
30 To John Austin Sovereignty must have the attributes of continuity, indivisibility and illimitability, Dias, 
“jurisprudence”, Fourth edition, Butter Worths, London, 1976, p. 475. 
31 Frederick Grosson, “Religion and Natural law”,The American Journal of Jurisprudence, (1988) vol. 33, p. 1. 
32 L.H.W. Verzijl, “International law in Historical Perspectives”, vol. 1, A.W. Sijthuff – Levden, 1968, ch.vl, -  
Macdonald, op.cit, p. 440. 
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by the Constitution and by positive law.  A fact led the way later to the 
appearance of a relative notion of sovereignty, when distinction is made between 
an absolute full sovereignty, attributed to those rulers who enjoyed unqualified 
independence with and without their states, and restricted sovereignty.  To some 
scholars like Pufendrof, sovereignty is the supreme power in a state but not 
absolute and may well be constitutionally restricted but not to be restricted by 
outside laws33.  Classical philosophers of international law like Grotious and 
Vattel laid down the general features of the relative character of state sovereignty 
in the face of higher rules.  Grotious defined a ‘sovereign’ as that power whose 
rules are not subject to the control of another.  However he related the right of 
passive resistance against orders and laws contrary to the law of Nature and of 
God and the law of Nations, by defining the right to war unless there is a just 
legal cause.  As such, Grotious added the law of Nations to the rules limiting the 
power of sovereign in addition to Divine and Natural law.  Vattel built his law of 
nations on the foundation of popular sovereignty, equality, liberty and humanity.  
He viewed sovereignty as not absolute by distinguishing between internal and 
external sovereignty34. 
                                                 
33 Bodin who affirms state power, denies custom the force of law until it has received the confirmation of the 
sovereignty. Hobbes who affirmed Bodin’s theory recognizes no limitation upon the absolute make – law power 
of the sovereignty, not even natural law can limit such power. Friedman, “Legal Theory”, fifth edition, (London 
Stevens & Sons) 1967, p. 574. 
34 The classic definition of external sovereignty meant that the state has over it no other authority. Max Haber 
defined it as “Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies independence” – Luzius Wildhaber, op.cit, p. 
428.  
 20
By the beginning of the twentieth century and with the rise of completely 
independent states, sovereignty as a notion assumed different aspects.  
Sovereignty instead of being referred to the head or ruler, it was regarded as an 
abstract manifestation of the existence and power of the state35.  After the two 
World Wars, changes in the structure of international society occurred like the 
establishment of the international organizations i.e. the League and the United 
Nations, and the more towards closer interdependence between states, and the 
conclusion of multilateral treaties imposing obligations on states.  All these have 
substantially restricted the freedom of action of state externally and internally, 
including the way to treat its nationals in time of peace and war i.e. under human 
rights and humanitarian law instruments36.  This led to a controversy among legal 
scholars as to whether the traditional notion is to be preserved and the impact of 
such international obligations on the notion of sovereignty.  A fact led to the 
evolution of a legal doctrine parallel to the political notion of sovereignty. 
ii. The Impact of International Obligations under Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law Instruments on the Notion of Sovereignty 
An international commitment, whether its source is a treaty or custom, entails 
restrictions to the freedom of the state to act internally or externally in relation to 
                                                 
35 George Schworzenberge, “International law”, vol. 1. 3rd edition, (Stevens & Sons Ltd) 1957, p. 115. 
36 As Schacter pointed out that “the international legal system is continuously being forced to meet the problems 
brought about by the conflicts to the human species”. Oscar Schacter, “The Nature and Process  of legal 
development in International Society”, in Macdonald & Douglos, op.cit, p. 745 – W. Friedman, the changing 
structure of International law, Stevens, London, 1964. 
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other states.  These commitments led to changes in the meaning of sovereignty 
from absolute to a restricted notion, a fact which was not accepted by supporters 
of traditional notion of sovereignty37.  As a result a controversy arose as to how 
to reconcile the co-existence of international law obligations with the notion of 
state sovereignty. 
Different theories have been advocated to justify the co-existence of national 
sovereignty and International law in an attempt to compromise between the 
sovereignty of national state and the respect to international obligations.  
According to Jellinek theory of self-limitation of the state, in cases of conflict 
between state sovereignty and international law, the state can revoke its voluntary 
self-limitation, i.e. state consents to observe rules of international conduct by 
custom or treaty.  To him, only considerations of ethics or otherwise may impose 
restrictions on the state sovereignty.  But he does not speak about state’s 
responsibility in such cases.  Anzilotti and Grotious theories, which recognize a 
legal value superior to the will of states upholds the validity of international law 
by the universal recognition  of the principle of pacta sunt servanda; according to 
which states once concluded an international agreement are no longer free to 
repudiate38.  However, advocates of unrestrictive notion of sovereignty denied 
any influence of such obligations on sovereignty.  They argued by stating that 
                                                 
37 Schwarzenberger op.cit, p. 183 –  Verzijl, op.cit, p. 261. 
38 Friedman, op.cit, p. 576. 
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international rules, as a principle, are not binding unless the state consents to it or 
by its free will exercise such right by entering into a treaty which is an aspect of 
sovereignty.  In such case, treaty obligations do not abrogate the very essence of 
the notion of sovereignty of states39.  The Court in Wimbeldon case affirmed this 
view by stating:- 
“The court declines, to see in the conclusion of any treaty by which a state 
undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act an 
abandonment of its sovereignty; any convention creating an obligation 
places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the state in 
the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way.  But the 
right of entering into international engagement is an attribute of state 
sovereignty”40. 
Another aspect of this traditional notion of sovereignty is that it concentrates on 
protecting the jurisdictional sovereignty of states inside their territories.  
However, modern developments have rendered sovereignty relative in relation to 
its territorial jurisdiction41.  This relative nature may be illustrated by reference to 
the question of protection of its nationals by accepting obligations under human 
rights and humanitarian law treaties.  The absolute exercise of power and 
jurisdiction internally under the traditional meaning of sovereignty, led to the 
                                                 
39 infra. 
40 S. S. Wimbeldon, PCIJ Ser. A.No. 1 (1923) at p. 25. 
41 Schwarzenberge, “International Law”, op.cit, pp. 121, 181.  
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evolution of concepts like non-intervention in internal affairs and matters referred 
to as “reserved domains” under which fall the issue of treatment and protection of 
nationals.  It also led to the concentration of all authorities on national 
governments which in some states facilitated the abuse of power.  A fact 
necessitated the need of a higher law or rules to check such abuses. 
International law responded to this by imposing obligations and providing for 
substantive rules under human rights and humanitarian law instruments 
applicable in internal armed conflicts.  These obligations states owe to the 
international society and which every state has a legal interest in their 
fulfillment42.  Though these obligations limited the freedom of exclusive exercise 
of power of state, none the less it left the basic structure of notion of sovereignty 
unchanged; states retained their independence and sovereignty.  As such, it is not 
the meaning of sovereignty that changed but the content of the notion.  One 
major consequence of this, is that under modern International law sovereignty 
can only be accepted as a ‘legal notion’ if it is used to mean the right of states to 
regulate their internal and external affairs freely and independently, but within 
the limitations of rules of International law.  The mere fact that states accept 
obligations under international treaties is an implied readiness by such states to 
accept the fact of being subject to international rules.  However, the main issue is 
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International law, 18 Forham, Int..L. J. (1955) p. 1686. 
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how far states are willing to accept the extent of such restrictions in treating their 
nationals in time of peace and armed conflicts i.e. as far as sovereignty is 
involved.  In practice, the development of the international protection of civilian 
individuals in internal conflicts is often hindered by the opposition of states to 
international commitments.  States who fear that their sovereignty is being 
limited and that their internal affairs will be subject to international interference 
if they accept such obligations which seek to protect the human dignity of 
civilians during armed conflicts. 
iii. The Protection of Human Dignity of Civilians versus State Sovereignty 
The question of protection of individuals in time of peace or armed conflicts in 
international law has been greatly influenced by the development of the notion of 
sovereignty from absolute to restrictive sovereignty.  Legal scholars have always 
criticized this notion as being an obstacle of effective application of International 
rules protecting human dignity of individuals in all circumstances.  As a result, 
some scholars rejected the whole notion of sovereignty43.  Some contemporarily 
legal commentators regard the notion as obsolete as it puts states above the law.  
To Falk, if sovereignty of states remains the organizing center of political life in 
International affairs, the outlook for human affairs is a bleak.  To him problems 
which face humanity such as violence, internal conflicts, violation of human 
                                                 
43 Brierly sees sovereignty as a false doctrine which the facts of international law do not support.  J. L. Briely, 
“The law of Nations”, H. Wadlock (ed.), Clarendor, Oxford, 6th ed. 1963, p. 47. 
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rights and human dignity have to be dealt by a universal government.  Others see 
that it is necessary to abolish sovereignty in order to assert the supremacy of 
individuals.  To them, the question of protection of human dignity is extensively 
depending upon the actions taken by the government.  Supporting this view, the 
humanist school regards sovereignty as a real obstacle against the full realization 
of human rights of individuals.  To this school, all individuals are supposed to be 
treated the same and equally protected but actually the notion of sovereignty 
separates them44. 
However, other scholars do not reject the notion by itself, but, are of the view 
that sovereignty could be positive or negative as far as protection of human 
dignity of individual citizens in time of peace and conflict is in issue.  
Sovereignty could act negatively i.e. be a barrier to effective protection of 
humanity and human dignity, when governments are reluctant to undertake or 
commit themselves by rules under treaties that may confer rights on individual 
citizens.  In some cases the state may accept such commitments, under 
international treaties, but do not fulfill their obligation, by refusing to implement 
such rules within their national legal system or act in violations of such 
obligations.  Moreover, Sovereignty acts negatively when used by governments 
as a pretext for violations of human rights and basic standards for the protection 
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of human dignity under human rights or humanitarian law are committed and 
justified or hidden.  In such cases, sovereignty constitutes an obstacle to 
protection of human dignity of civilians45 in time of internal armed conflicts. 
On the other hand, state sovereignty could act positively as far as protection of 
individuals is concerned.  The state could act as a guarantor for respect and 
protection of human dignity of its nationals in all circumstances.  Thus, on the 
whole the operation of the notion of protection of civilians in international 
conflict is based on the nature of the role to be played by sovereignty i.e. 
positively or negatively46.  It is evident from above, that human rights norms and 
humanitarian law standards of treatment to which states are bound to recognize 
have added a new meaning to sovereignty, as far as protection of civilians in 
internal conflicts is concerned.  Sovereignty does no longer mean exclusive 
internal independence in exercising jurisdiction over its nationals.  It means the 
freedom of states to act in the interests of its society.  The protection of human 
dignity as such constitutes one of the basic elements on the way to achieve the 
best interests of its society.  It will not be in the interest of society that the 
individual basic rights are denied and violated whether in time of peace or 
conflicts.  Thus, sovereignty of a state internally is required to guarantee 
protection of human dignity of its nationals in all circumstances by protecting 
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 27
their rights.  In such a case, the individual is said to be a sovereign as a human 
being, achieving as such the ultimate purpose of both human rights and 
humanitarian law.  As one commentator pointed out that “sovereignty must not 
be used as a tool or weapon of killing freedom and human dignity,  sovereignty 
must protect human rights and human dignity of Man in all circumstances.  It 
should protect the very humane existence of the individual and not be used as a 
shield to protect governments that trespass on such humanity”47. 
iv. Internationally Protected Rights and State Sovereignty 
As has been mentioned, the modern notion of sovereignty is expected to protect 
rights of individuals.  And that the main function of states is to act as guarantor to 
such rights in all circumstances.  However, the developed notion of “International 
protection of individuals” in modern international law distinguishes between two 
classes of rights of individuals.  In the light of this distinction the application of 
international law protection is determined. 
In the first case, the individual is regarded as a citizen in a sovereign society.  As 
such, he enjoys specific rights by virtue of his status of a citizen of that state.  In 
the second case, the individual is to be regarded as a person, irrespective of any 
other characteristics, i.e. as a human being.  In the first case he enjoys as a citizen 
a set of rights guaranteed by the constitution of his state including his right to 
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equality with other citizens, his right to vote etc.  All these rights are regarded as 
falling within the field of politics48.  In the second case, his rights include what he 
needs as a human being, e.g. right to have his dignity respected, right to respect 
his life, freedom, non-discrimination etc.  These are rights which are not 
supposed to be influenced by any political consideration.  They are referred to 
under human rights law as fundamental or basic rights and under humanitarian 
law as humanitarian or humane rights49.  The responsibility of their protection in 
all times rests on civil society.  To some commentators, violation of such rights 
justifies intervention e.g. humanitarian intervention50.  However, it is accepted 
that the violation of individual rights as a citizen does not justify intervention 
because these rights fall within the ambit of sovereignty of the state over its 
citizens.  But, their violation gives rise to international responsibility51.  Thus one 
may conclude that, when it comes to the protection of rights conferred on 
individual civilian by virtue of his humanity, then the issue falls outside the ambit 
of states sovereignty, as the protection of such rights is the concern of all states.  
In such a case, sovereignty means the obligation of states to respect civilian 
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rights, those basic rights the enforcement of which concerns the international 
community52. 
3.  The Theoretical Relation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law:  
            Shared Legal Concepts 
The adoption of the developed notion of international protection of individuals to 
civilian victims in non-international armed conflicts has been faced with 
theoretical problems which were presented by two conflicting views.  The first 
view supports the respect of national sovereignty and the duty of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of the state.  The second is advocated, by those 
who are against the view that international community might overlook violations 
of human rights in internal conflicts, on the justification of its inability to 
intervene pursuant to the principle of national sovereignty.  Later developments 
supported the second view, which is represented by modern schools of thought.  
It denies the personality of the state and refuses to accept the concept of absolute 
sovereignty when the issue comes to the protection of individual’s basic rights as 
human beings under human rights or humanitarian law. 
By the beginning of the 1960’s respect for individuals human rights became the 
concern of international community, which has been clearly reflected in the 
United Nations Resolutions passed after that period relating to certain situations 
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of non-international armed conflicts.  These resolutions condemned violations of 
human rights against civilians in internal armed conflicts and called upon parties 
to conflict to respect human rights53.  This encouraged and inspired the adoption 
of the notion of human rights as a basis for applying international rules aiming at 
the protection of civilian victims of internal armed conflicts.  The Preamble of 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, relating to the protection of victims of non-
international armed conflicts stated that the High contracting Parties “… 
Recalling … that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic 
protection to the human person …” Since then, rules and principles adopted 
under international human rights and humanitarian law instruments, as Lord 
Koroma pointed out, interacted with each other in such a way as to further their 
common goal i.e. the protection of basic rights of the individual in time of peace 
and during armed conflicts54. 
This fact raised an ongoing controversy among scholars as to the nature of the 
relation between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law.  These two branches of 
international law are admitted to be different and distinct in several respects55.  
However, they share in theory some basic notions and principles which turn to 
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act as a common denominator underlying the system of protection of individual 
under each law.  Two basic notions have affected this theoretical relation i.e. the 
shared notion of humanity and respect to inherent human dignity of persons, and 
the principles of respect of basic rights of individuals in all circumstances.  It 
would be rather useful to examine the principle in relation to these notions which 
are closely related, in an attempt to reveal the theoretical link between the two 
branches of international law as far as protection of civilians in internal armed 
conflicts is concerned. 
i. The Doctrinal Development of the Principle of Basic Rights in  
International Law 
Basic rights are generally defined as those rights which are inherent in human 
nature and without which one cannot live as a human being.  They are based on 
mankind’s increasing demand for a life in which the inherent dignity and worth 
of each human being will receive respect and protection. 
The doctrinal development of this principle of basic rights of individuals in 
international law is derived from the concept of “rights” which persons posses by 
virtue of their humanity, which is often rooted in basic classical theories.  The 
theory is based upon Christian religious assumptions that human beings were 
created in the image of God, according to which each human being deserves 
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inherent dignity originating from the existence of divine law56.  Other theories 
which have greatly influenced the formulation of this principle are the natural 
law and positivist theory. 
a. The Natural Law Theory and Basic Rights of Individuals 
This theory dates back to ancient times of philosophers like    Aristotle and 
continued in medieval times by Thomas Acquinas.  According to this theory the 
individual has, independent of any positive legal order, some rights which can be 
deduced from nature in general57.  This concept of natural rights has been used by 
political philosophers like Locke in the seventeenth century who reformulated 
general norms of Natural law in forms of the rights of the individual, 
emphasizing the natural inalienable rights to life, freedom and to property.  Later 
in the eighteenth century Rosseau in his Social Contract, like Locke, mentioned 
that government held power only to guarantee these inalienable natural rights for 
their citizens58.  Thus with the emergence of social contract, the concepts of both 
natural rights and the state acquired a new relation under which the state was 
regarded as the protector of such rights.  Natural law and natural rights continued 
to be regarded as independent of any order, be political or otherwise.  The origin 
is natural law and the role of the state is to ensure that the natural rights of the 
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citizens are not violated.  All prevailing theories of Natural law shared the 
common feature of turning away from the realities of actual law, in order to 
discover in nature or reason principles of universal validity like the principle 
which developed later to respect of basic rights. It is this political theory of 
natural rights which provided for the source of basic rights of man in European 
national laws later. 
The British and the French revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
witnessed an important change in relation to natural rights which existed, 
basically as a political concept by providing for them in their municipal laws.  
The natural rights claim which was set out in the American Declaration of 
Independence was transformed into legally enforceable rights through the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights.  The French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizens adopted by revolutionaries in 1789 contained a conception of basic 
rights of man.  Both Declarations, provided for one principle that “an individual 
enjoys rights by virtue of his humanity which are not granted to him by law or 
state”.  The source of such rights being Natural law, they have an obligatory 
nature which persons cannot be deprived of arbitrary by their government and are 
binding irrespective of any legal order59.  The eighteenth century, Bills of Rights 
constituted the beginning of an era of legal protection of Human Rights.  
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Constitutional guarantees of Human Rights were widely then incorporated, 
though varied from state to state. 
b. The Positivists Doctrine of Basic Rights 
Legal positivists’ theory which came as a reaction to Natural law theory rejected 
the idea of inherent natural rights to individual.  To this school of thought the 
sole source of law and so rights is the will of the state.  To them it is impossible 
to deduce from “nature” any rights.  The nature of rights advocated by Natural 
law school of thought which prevailed during the second half of the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century did not last long.  When positivists 
maintained that international law was a law regulating relations between states 
only as subjects of international law and that treatment of individual, and the 
determination of their rights is an internal affair of sovereign state.  To this 
doctrine, the right of an individual presupposes the duty of another individual.  
And as such, nature does not impose duties or confer rights upon individuals.  
Duties and rights presuppose the existence of a legal system consisting of norms 
which requires certain behaviour of persons.  This legal order to positivists can 
be established by acts of persons who are the only entities capable of creating 
rules conferring rights and duties on individuals.  To them the state is the only 
entity which has the competence to create and guarantee individual rights and as 
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such responsible for the treatment of its citizens60.  Thus to positivists basic rights 
are rights of individual civilians so far as they have been stipulated by positive 
law whether national or international law. 
However this theory of positivists rights has been criticized in that they are 
neither practical nor universal.  As such they are rights against one’s government 
and not rights against all mankind, unlike natural rights which must be rights that 
impose obligations on everyone61. 
ii. Basic Rights as International Law Principles 
It was not till after the mid twentieth century that this notion of natural rights 
shifted to an international concept referred to as “Human rights”62.  By the 
adoption of the Declaration of Universal Human Rights 1949, the individual 
human being whose rights have been established over the long evolution of 
constitutional history, was now regarded as a central point of reference within the 
international legal system under various instruments.  In fact this concept of 
human rights became, under contemporary international law, one of the basic 
concepts which promote the protection of rights of individuals at the international 
level.  Human Rights which historically evolved from the provisions of various 
constitutional laws, in their development have generally been incorporated into 
treaties and recognized as customary law after the Second World War. 
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Unlike human rights, humanitarian law principles which emerged from 
traditional manuals of humanitarian law, originated early in notions of 
honourably and civilized behaviour expected from combatants.  It grew out of old 
customary laws of war.  The early philosophy underlying such customs which 
later influenced humanitarian law development was based on what was 
considered necessary to defeat the enemy and render illegal what was seen as 
unnecessary cruelty.  Like human rights, religion and moral values also 
constitutes a source for its principles which were in a later stage codified into 
conventions applicable during armed conflicts63.  However, it was not till after 
the mid of nineteenth century that concern about protection of individual in war 
was realized.  By the adoption of the First Geneva Convention 1864 which 
contained rules aiming at the protection of wounded military personnel, an era 
began which gave primacy to the individual and to the respect of principle of   
humanity and dignity began to develop. 
Humanitarian Law which throughout its development was concerned with the 
protection of the humanitarian aspects of the individual in time of conflict as a 
human, it was natural to be inspired and influenced by human rights principles.  
In particular those which address the humanity and dignity of persons, from 
which basic and inalienable natural rights, necessary for the very existence and 
                                                 
63 Louise Doswald – Beck and Sylvain vite’, International Humaniitarian Law and Human Rights , IRRC, March 
– April 1993, No. 293 pp. 95-101. 
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survival of individual civilians and persons no longer taking part in hostilities 
area derived. 
iii. Basic Rights and the Shared Notion of Humanity and Respect to 
Inherent  Human Dignity 
The idea that basic rights of individuals are based on their humanity and inherent 
dignity under human rights and humanitarian law seems to lay down a modern 
theory of civilian’s protection as individuals.  According to this theory, the basic 
rights of the individual can be deduced from the nature of his personality and his 
human condition.  By virtue of this nature, he is to possess certain basic rights in 
cases of emergency being a civilian victim of internal armed conflict.  The so 
called basic rights of the individual as a citizen or a victim are rights so far as 
they are stipulated under human rights and humanitarian law.  
This reflects the view of legal positivists’ on one hand.  On the other hand in 
trying to deduce the basic rights of the individual from his nature as a human 
being i.e. based on his humanity and inherent dignity, then we are maintaining 
here the concept of natural law theory of rights.  As such, this notion of humanity 
constitutes the bedrock of a system of protection of individuals in all times in 
international law, from which other principles of law are derived.  Pictet 
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maintained this by stating that “…. The principle of humanity stands out on its 
own … and all other principles hang from it”64. 
These basic rights under humanitarian law which are based on humanity vary 
considerably.  Some are based on moral principles,customary rules and others are 
conventional.  These rules are intended to humanize the behavior of parties to the 
conflict by restricting conduct of hostilities.  For example, under humanitarian 
law rules, every person has the right to exist and to protect himself.  However, 
this right does not imply or justify the commission of prohibited acts against 
innocent civilian victims such acts which affect their humanity65.  It is this notion 
of ‘humanity’ which is as old as the existence of human being which has 
appeared and developed as a source from which rules aiming at the protection of 
individuals are derived66. It has been integrated into modern concepts such as 
human rights and humanitarian principles, from which basic rights necessary for 
the existence security and well being of persons in all circumstances is derived.  
However, this notion is regarded by some scholars as ambiguous67.  In this 
connection one scholar commented by stating that “….. It is sometimes 
                                                 
64 J. Pictet, Red Cross Principles, “International Review of the Red Cross” (IRRC), Geneva, 1956, p. 14. 
65 The two Protocols of 1977 Additional to the Geneva Conventions 1949, contain rules restricting the use of 
violence in armed conflicts. For example Protocol I expressly prohibits the use of certain weapons which may 
cause unnecessary injury, Protocol II prohibits attacks against civilian population and civilian property essential to 
survival.- Commentary on  The two Protocols, Additional to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
International Committee  of the Red Cross 1977, Geneva. 
66 I. Brownlie, “Principles of Public International law”, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 28. J. Pictet, 
“Development and Principles of International Humanitarian law”, Martinus Nijhoff, Henry Dunant Institute, 
Dordrecht, 1983. 
67 Robin Coupland, Humanity: “What is it and how does it influence International law?” IRRC, December 2001 – 
vol. 83 No. 844 at pp. 969-989. 
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understood but not actually expressed”68.  In all cases, this notion of humanity 
acts as a notion which restricts the capacity for armed violence against civilians 
and limits its effects on them.  Article (3) common to Geneva Convention IV of 
1949 provided for the application of the rules of humanity in internal armed 
conflicts for the protection of civilian victims. 
One other principle which is closely connected to this notion of humanity is the 
principle to “respect human dignity of persons”.  This principle extends to 
embody a number of acts and values constituting human rights of persons and 
rights of civilian victims of armed conflicts.  Various definitions have been 
advocated by different scholars regarding the term “human dignity”.  However, 
some scholars described dignity as an abstract universal notion69.  While Rhoda 
Howard defined it as a relative notion by stating: “I define human dignity as the 
particular cultural understanding of the inner moral worth of the human person 
and his or her proper political relation with society.  Dignity is not a claim that an 
individual asserts against a society, it is not, and for example, the claim that one 
is worth of respect merely because one is a human being.  Rather dignity is 
something that is granted at birth or on incorporation into the community as a 
concomitant of one’s particular ascribed status, or that accumulates and is earned 
during the life of an adult who adheres to his or her society’s values, customs and 
                                                 
68 Pictet, op.cit (at footnote No. 12) p. 31. 
69 Donnelly, Jack, “Human Rights and Human Dignity. An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of 
Human Rights”. The American Political Science Review, vol. 76 (1982) p. 303. 
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norms ….”  She continues by asserting that “human dignity is not private, 
individual or autonomous.  It is public, collective and prescribed by social  
norms ….”70 
Moving from the theoretical relativism of humanity described above by Rhoda, 
all international instruments under human rights law demand respect for human 
dignity of all persons in all circumstances.  However, none of these instruments 
specifically define the principle.  The Charter of the United Nations is the first 
international instrument which referred to this principle in the preamble by 
stating that the determination of the United Nations is to “Reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women”71.  A few years after the adoption of the Charter, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 provided for the equality in 
dignity of all persons by stating in Article (1) that: “All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.  This 
equality in dignity asserted by the Declaration maintains the view that dignity is 
an abstract universal notion. 
                                                 
70 Rhoda E. Howard, “Dignity, Community and Human Rights, in Human Rights in Cross – Cultural Perspectives, 
A Quest for Consensus”, edited by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, University of Pennsylvania Press 1991 – at p. 
83. 
71 The Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco 1945. 
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This content of the notion of dignity expressed by the Declaration has influenced 
subsequent instruments e.g. the two Human Rights Conventions of 1966 and 
common Article (3) to Geneva Convention IV 1949 and Additional Protocol 11 
1977, all provided for the same.  By such incorporation, the notion became a 
principle and a legally binding rule72. 
From all the above, it is evident that these notions of humanity and inherent 
dignity constitute the backbone of a set of rules and basic rights deriving from 
them, which constitutes a system of protection of individuals in all times73.  It is 
this basic rights concept based on human dignity which is considered to form a 
theoretical basis for a universal common notion for the international system of 
protection of individual in time of peace and armed conflicts.  In asserting this, 
Hans pointed out that the Conventions relating to human rights are derived from 
the same source as the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, 
namely the concept of human dignity and that they seek to protect human 
beings74. 
                                                 
72 General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December, 1948 –  Morsink, Johannes, “The Philosophy of the 
Universal Declaration”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 6 (1984) p. 309. The Declaration is declared to be a 
statement of human rights, providing for rights which all persons have equally because of their humanity 
regardless of any differences based on race, religion sex etc. It enumerates a set of principles and rights which 
presuppose the value, and institution of certain kind of social and political i.e. liberal, democratic and industrial 
society. These requirements are not provided for under Humanitarian Law instrument i.e. Convention of Geneva 
and its protocols, states signing these instruments are concerned about the protection of victims of armed conflicts 
as human beings in all states and in their own territory. 
73 All Four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols 1977 (Article 75 of Protocol I, Article 4  of Protocol II 
expressly prohibits the infringement of human dignity by prohibiting certain acts against civilians during armed 
conflicts –  Schindler D., “Human Rights and Humanitarian law”, 31 American University Law Review 1982 p. 
936. 
74 Hans Haug, “Can the Red Cross contribute to safeguarding Peace”, IRRC, May-June 1984 N. 240 p. 127. 
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iv.  The Meaning of the Concept of “Basic Rights” 
One cannot consider the meaning of the phrase ‘basic rights’ which is usually 
referred to under human rights law as “fundamental rights”, without asking what 
is intended by describing a ‘right’ as basic or fundamental. Various qualities, 
pertaining to it, have been advocated by different scholars who referred to 
Natural law as the basis from which any attempt to describe such rights has to 
refer to it.  As such, these rights are described as inherent in human nature.  They 
inhere in human beings by virtue of their humanity alone.  It results from this 
description that there are numbers of qualities pertaining to such rights.  In 
principle, they are rights which all persons, everywhere, at all times ought to 
have.  They are not privileges and no one may be deprived of it without being 
considered a violation to justice as should be75.  A general description may be 
made by stating that these rights are legally basic in the sense that their existence 
and content is essential to the existence of many other lesser rights in a legal 
order.  The idea has been that, there exists a set of ideal norms or principles of a 
higher obligation which are the same for all persons at all times76.  This results in 
having basic rights which involve higher obligations than merely legal rights.  
This is expressly provided for in Article (4) of the Convention on Civil and 
                                                 
75 Donnelly Jack “Human Rights as Natural Rights” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 4 (1982) p. 391. Castberg, 
Frede, “Natural Law and Human Rights”, Human Rights Journal vol. (1968) p. 14. 
76 G.W. Paton, “Jurisprudence”, Fourth Edition, edited by G.W. Paton and David P. Derham, Oxford at the 
Clarendon Press 1972, p. 284. 
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Political Rights 1966.  It states that in cases of emergency, states are not to 
derogate from certain human rights which are considered essential to human 
existence, described as basic, fundamental and core human rights which are 
derived from the nature of their personality as human beings77. 
This classification of rights under human rights law i.e. the idea of core or basic 
rights is not found under humanitarian law.  This concept of ‘rights’ is 
comprehensive under humanitarian law which are protected equally during armed 
conflicts.  However, this does not absolve from them the quality of being basic 
moral rights; a legal right may be a moral right78.  In this sense moral rights are 
described as basic rights, where the moral principles that give rise to them are 
considered to be fundamental principles of the legal system in question.  As such, 
it is referring to those rights under humanitarian law which is based on 
fundamental principles of humanity and respect dignity of persons.  These rights 
entail correlative obligations i.e. others must respect in all times79. 
Another common quality which pertains to these basic rights is their universality.  
Despite, the controversy as to the universality of human rights concepts in 
general, however, the core elements of the concept of human rights referred to as 
                                                 
77 Colin Warbrick, “The Protection of Human Rights in National Emergencies, in Human Rights, Problems, 
Perspectives and Texts”, Edited by F.E. Dowrick, (University of Durham 1979) p. 89. 
78 Human Rights are also described as unviersal moral rights, A. J. Milne, “The Idea of Human Rights: A critical 
inquiry”, in F.E. Dowrick, op.cit, p. 24. 
79 ‘Obligation’ is also a key concept in morality i.e. to say that a person is under a moral obligation, and then he is 
bound to carry such obligation. As such universal moral rights are genuine rights. DL Perrot, “The logic of 
Fundamental rights, in Fundamental Rights”, edited by J.W. Bridge and others, (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1973) 
p. 9. 
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basic rights, are common values in all cultures80.  Most cultures have given the 
greatest importance to the preservation of life and human dignity.  They are 
described by some scholars as universal moral rights81.  It is to be noted here that, 
the idea that human rights are universal moral rights has been criticized by those 
who argue that diversity in moral reflects differences in culture and religions.  
However, those who argue in favour of qualified morality i.e. relativism, state 
that morals are qualified because the diversity of moral cannot be total.  
However, there are certain moral commitments or obligations, e.g. obligations to 
refrain from violence, cruel or inhumane treatment, slavery and torture, are based 
on shared morals and are not relative to culture.  It is this universal core of moral 
rights which are referred to as basic rights.  Under human rights law they are a 
“minimum common standard” of achievement for all people and nations as 
human beings.  Similarly common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions IV, 1949, 
stipulates for prohibitions of certain acts which are substantially meant to protect 
basic rights which are regarded as a minimum standard of treatment82.  Pictet on 
                                                 
80 In the World Conference on Human Rights, “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action”, it has been argued 
that the universal nature of “human rights is beyond question. A/Conf. 157/23, 51, p. 5 – for different views on the 
issue of universality of human rights, in human rights in Cross – Cultural Perspectives. A Quest for Consensus, 
Edited by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. Donnelly, Jack, “Cultural 
Relativism and Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 6 (1984) p. 400. 
81 The Proclamation of Tehran (1968) which required states to respect Human Rights in armed conflicts, in 
paragraph (2) affirmed the universality of basic rights by stating that “… the universal declaration of Human 
Rights states a common understanding of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights 
of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for the members of the international 
community”.  Ian Brownlie, “Basic Documents on Human Rights”,op.cit   p. 253. 
82 A.J. Milne, op.cit, p. 37. 
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maintaining the universality of humanitarian principles which are based on 
morality and humanity stated: 
 “It is then that one realizes that humanitarian principles are common to all and 
that they are deeply rooted in all land.  If we gather together and compare the 
various ethical systems and customs, pour them into the same melting pot and 
remove the dross – in other words the peculiarities of each – what is left is the 
quintessence, the heritage of humanity'83.  Under humanitarian law applicable in 
non-international armed conflict i.e. common Article 3 to Fourth Geneva 
Convention 1949; these basic human rights have been substantially formulated 
i.e. expressed in the form of forbearances or prohibitions.  They include at such, 
the rights to life, the right to respect one’s dignity as a person, the right to be free 
from violence, from all forms of arbitrary or degrading treatment, the right to 
humanitarian aid, the right not to be subject to slavery or taken as a hostage and 
the right not to be subject to collective punishment.  What characterizes basic 
rights is that they are non derogable under human rights law.  Under 
humanitarian law, one of the basic principles governing the protection of 
civilians is that civilian rights are not to be renounced neither by civilians nor by 
parties to the conflict under any agreement.  The prohibition of any renunciation 
of right under Geneva Conventions is described as a logical consequence of 
                                                 
83 Recited by Professor Emmanuel Bello, “African Customary Humanitarian law”, Oyez Publishing limited, 1978, 
p.5 
 46
drafters desire to lay down rules representing the minimum required for the 
preservation of human dignity84.  It is this common notion of basic rights based 
on humanity, which tends to a bridge any theoretical differences between human 
rights and humanitarian law as far protection of civilians in armed conflicts is 
concerned.  Judge Koroma stressed this by stating that “while it is general 
recognized that humanitarian law and human rights norms vary as to their origins 
and the situations which they apply (the former during armed conflicts and the 
latter in peace time), the two not only share a universal value namely that of 
humanity but they also have the common objective of protecting and 
safeguarding rights of individuals in all circumstances85. 
4. Human Rights Standards which are to be Protected in Time of 
Armed Conflicts 
 It has been mentioned earlier that developments of law of human rights brought 
with it changes with regard to the legal status of human rights.  Certain human 
rights have acquired a universal consensus which resulted in the same 
implementation irrespective of particularities pertaining to state application.  
These are inalienable human rights which may not be suspended even in times of 
                                                 
84 Article (7) and (8) of Geneva Convention IV 1949. They are described as such as rights of recipience i.e. what 
one is entitled to expect. In this case, what civilians as victims are entitled to expect of treatment in time of armed 
conflict. J.W. Bridge, op.cit, p. 3 –  Commentary on Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
persons in time of war – International Committee of the Red Cross, op.cit. p. 76.  
85Foreword by Judge Abdul G.Koroma, Quoted from IRRC, September 1998, No. 324 , p. 403. 
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national emergencies including armed conflicts86.  These inalienable or basic 
rights are formulated as express prohibitions under humanitarian law between 
individuals themselves and not only between state and individuals as under 
human rights law.  In other words, these prohibitions i.e. not to subject persons to 
torture or cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment and slavery, are addressed to 
states under human rights law and to states and individuals as parties to the 
conflict under humanitarian law87.  However under humanitarian law, these 
prohibitions have given wider scope with regard to the situation of armed conflict 
and the methods implementing them.  Thus, humanitarian law by the formulation 
of human rights standards, under its own norms and legal order, have provided 
for its implementation regardless of the particularities social, political or 
otherwise of the state party to the conflict.  In fact humanitarian law added to 
implementation of such right what is called “humanitarian considerations”.  By 
this, basic rights are said to be reformulated so as to produce legal effects within 
the contest of humanitarian law legal order.  Example, the right to life88, the right 
to find one’s family, the right to respect one’s human dignity by prohibiting 
torture, slavery and taking civilians as hostages.  Economic rights are also 
reformulated under humanitarian law instruments e.g. the right to assistance i.e. 
                                                 
86 Article (4) of the Convention on civil and Political Rights 1966, I. Brownlie, “Basic Documents on Human 
Rights”, op.cit, p. 213. 
87 Article (3) Common to Four Geneva Conventions 1949, Article (4) of Protocol II, Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. 
88 Legality of Threat  or use of Nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion  of 8 July 1996, I.C.J Reports 1996, p. 225. 
 48
to food , to health care, the right to survival by prohibiting attacks on water 
storages and the right to preserve one’s culture by prohibiting attacks on cultural 
property89. 
The question is then, whether in such cases, humanitarian law formulates the 
internationally recognized human rights standards in equivalent terms or 
according to the spirit of their formulation in humanitarian law, and whether 
humanitarian law as such provide further protection than the human rights 
standards in time of internal conflicts to individuals?  Regardless of any view or 
answer on the issues raised, it is not easy to assess the effects.  For example the 
legal nature of some humanitarian law rights is in general forms linked or related 
to human rights standard since they are associated with civilian nature as 
individual human being.  Example is the principle of non-discrimination, human 
rights standards which are applicable based on the non-discrimination principle 
refer to the national legislation of the state in which they operate.  However, this 
same principle is implemented with regard to internationally recognized rights 
for civilians without changing the substantive meaning resulting from its 
formulation in the human rights instruments90. 
                                                 
89 Article 5(6) of Protocol II Additional 1977. Junod, Sylvie, “Human Rights and Protocol II”, No. 236 IRRC, 
1983, p. 248. 
90 Article (2), (7) of the Universal Declaration and Article 12  of Geneva Convention I and II.   Article 3(2) 
Common and Article (2) of Protocol II. 
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On the whole, humanitarian law norms do not clearly mention human rights 
standards in terms equivalent to the Declaration and Human Rights Conventions.  
They define and formulate such rights within the context of humanitarian law 
which ultimately sets goals implanting human rights standards equivalent to the 
spirit of both human rights and humanitarian law instrument, i.e. based on the 
protection of humanity and inherent dignity of persons as human beings in all 
circumstances. 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that the notion of “International protection of civilians” in 
internal armed conflicts has been greatly influenced by the developments in 
international law which affected the status of individuals in general.  It is clear 
that international law has always been concerned with individuals as human 
beings before the rise of notion of human rights.  This was reflected in the natural 
law origins of traditional international law rules applicable to individuals.  
However, the growth of positivists’ theories particularly in the nineteenth century 
obscured this and emphasized the centrality of the state.  The emergence of 
human rights law after the mid of the twentieth century has affected conceptions 
of international law, in particular the concept of absolute state sovereignty and 
the treatment of its national individuals, which was previously regarded as a 
matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign state, whether in 
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time of peace or civil war.  As a result, individuals were regarded objects of 
international law and not subject to its direct protection.  The impact of human 
rights in developing the status of individuals in international law generally has 
been expressed by Humphrey: “The emergence of international human rights law 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been described as the most 
radical development in the whole history of International law since it established 
individuals as subjects of international law.  Though the individual may also be a 
subject of international law i.e. possessing rights and duties and has procedural 
capacity to maintain his rights by bringing international laws in certain cases, 
however, he does not possess full international personality91.  The emergence of 
the notion of human rights, paved the way for extending the application of 
humanitarian law rules to non-international armed conflicts with regard to 
protection of civilians as victims of such armed conflicts.  The principle “respect 
for human rights” as pointed out by one expert could provide the basis for a 
solution to the problems relating to the protection of victims of non-international 
armed conflicts.  The principle respect for human rights as pointed out by one 
expert (1971) could provide the basis for a solution to the problems relating to 
the protection of victims of non international armed conflicts92.   
                                                 
91 Humphrey “The Revolution in the International law of Human Rights”: 4 Human Rights law Journal (1974-75) 
p. 205 –  Criton G. Tornaroties, “The Individual as a subject of International law and Internal General 
Responsibility”, in M. Cherif Bassiouni (editor “Treaties on International Criminal law”, volume l, p. 106. 
92 Report on the work of the Conference of Red Cross Experts (March 1971) op.cit, p. 44. 
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Thus it is evident that the notion of international protection of civilians in internal 
armed conflicts can only be grasped in connection with common notions of 
human rights and humanitarian law principles which are both universal and both 
seek to protect human persons in all times.  Of all these, is the principle of 
respect of basic rights of individuals in all circumstances.  This principle which 
enjoys the highest ranking status of obligations in both systems of law is based 
on common notions of humanity and inherent human dignity.  This points out to 
one fact, that there is a theoretical link between the two laws as far as protection 
of individual civilians in non-international conflicts is concerned.  And that 
differences in methods of implementation under human rights in time of peace 
and under humanitarian law in time of conflict did not jeopardize the desired 
effect of both laws i.e. protection of human beings in all circumstances in time of 
peace and in time of armed conflicts.      
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CHAPTER TWO 
The History, Development and Sources of the Law 
Protecting Civilians in Non-International Armed conflicts: 
Impact of Human Rights Law 
Introduction 
The protection of civilians in internal armed conflicts has undergone stages 
of development which have been greatly influenced by prevailing concepts 
in international law and efforts made to protect civilian victims in interstate 
armed conflicts.  The protection of civilian victims during armed conflicts 
under an international convention was not made until 1949 when Geneva 
Convention IV was adopted.  Before 1949 some elementary rules of 
protection to civilians in interstate wars were applicable, which were 
embodied in the Hague Regulations of 1899 (revised 1907)1.  The scope of 
application of such rules was in fact limited to their protection in occupied 
territories. 
Several efforts made by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) after the First World War to adopt a convention for protection of 
                                                 
1 The law of the Hague refers to the 1899 and 1907 Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on land 
(with the annexed Hague Regulations). The law of war in the strict sense, lays down the belligerents rights 
and obligations in the conduct of operations and limits the choice of means of inflicting harm. Akheurst 
sees the period of classical international law came to an end with the two Hague Peace Conferences of 
1899 and 1907, Akheurst, op.cit, p. 22. For more information about aspects of the Hague Conferences of 
1899 and 1907, Yves Sandoz: “Unlawful Damages in Armed Conflicts and Redress under IHL”, ICRC, 
May-June 1982, No. 228 p. 134, D. Schindler / J. Toman (ed.), “The laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection 
of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents”, 3rd ed. 1988.     
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civilians in war between nations did not succeed, though a draft was made.  
It was not until after the Second World War that the question of subjecting 
civilian victims to international protection was made.  However, before the 
adoption of Geneva Convention IV relating to the protection of civilians in 
armed conflicts, the whole question of protection of victims of internal 
armed conflicts was considered a matter falling outside the scope of 
application of traditional international law. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) played a prominent 
role in introducing humanitarian rules to protect civilians in internal 
conflicts.  Efforts based on the principle of humanity were made to extend 
relief to victims in need of assistance.  However, it was not an easy task as 
state sovereignty formed an obstacle.  States were reluctant to allow any 
foreign assistance or relief to victims and considered such attempts 
interference in its internal affairs.  The increase of civil wars which resulted 
in inhumane and cruel acts committed against civilians and the primary 
concern of governments to suppress rebels resulted in humanitarian 
disasters.  All these, led the ICRC to increase its efforts and to work for the 
extension and development of humanitarian rules aiming at the protection of 
civilians victims in civil wars.  The origin and development of such rules 
have been greatly influenced by the development of international 
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humanitarian law2.  In fact these rules did not evolve as a separate branch of 
international law, they are considered part of international humanitarian law 
rules which have been extended and developed to constitute a system of 
rules of protection referred to as humanitarian law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts3.  A non-international armed conflict generally 
means an armed conflict which takes place on the territory of a state between 
the regular armed forces and identifiable armed groups, or between armed 
groups fighting one another, and is governed by humanitarian law applicable 
in non-international armed conflicts which is the subject of this study for the 
purpose of protection of civilians.  On the other hand, an international armed 
                                                 
2 International Humanitarian law, in the wide sense of the term comprises all international legal provisions, 
written or unwritten, ensuring respect for man during armed conflicts. It forms a major part of public 
international law and comprises the rules which seek to protect persons who are not or are no longer taking 
part in the hostilities and to restrict the methods and means of warfare employed. It is referred to under 
modern International law as the law of armed conflicts; under traditional international law it was called the 
law of war. It has two branches: First, the law of “Geneva” which provides for rules to safeguard military 
personnel who are no longer taking part in the fighting and persons who are not actively involved in 
hostilities i.e. civilians. Second, “The Law of the Hague” which provides for rules governing the rights and 
obligations of belligerents in the conduct of military operations and rules restricting the freedom of 
combatants regards the means and methods of hostilities. However, with the adoption of the two Additional 
Protocols of 1977, which combine rules of both branches, this distinction is at present of a historical value. 
The ICRC adopts a more precise meaning i.e.: “IHL applicable in armed conflicts is international treaty or 
customary rules which are especially intended to resolve matters of humanitarian concern arising directly 
from armed conflicts, whether of an international or non-international nature, for humanitarian reasons 
those rules restrict the right of the parties to a conflict to use the methods and means of warfare of their 
choice and protect people and property affected or liable to be affected by the conflict. For more 
information on what is humanitarian law (IHL), on www-icrc-org also “International H.L, Answers to your 
questions”. ICRC Publications, Oct. 2002 p. 4. For a more elaborated description of what is IHL, Hans 
Haug, “Humanity for All”, Henry Dunant Institute Paul Haupt Publishers Berne Stuttgart, Vienna 1993 p. 
491 also on same issue Jean Pictet, “Development and Principles of Humanitarian law”, Dordrecht, Geneva 
1985. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International law, vol. 3, 4 –Use of Force, War and 
Neutrality, Peace Treaties, 1982.   
3  Non-international armed conflicts are a term referring interchangeably to internal armed conflicts or 
armed conflicts not of an international character. However under traditional law of war such conflicts were 
called rebellions intrinsic war insurrections, revolutions and civil war. Schwarzenberger, “International law 
as applied by International Courts and Tribunals, vol. II on The Law of Armed Conflicts, (London Steven 
and Sons limited) 1968, pp. 673-674. Pictet, Jean, Commentary outline of a course on International 
Humanitarian Law, Published by Comite International De Las Groix – Rouge 1968, p. 7.  
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conflict means an armed conflict between the armed forces of two states or 
more4.  
Humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts which 
provides for rules protecting basic rights of civilian victims is considered a 
major development of international humanitarian law.  This development 
which resulted in the promulgation of Article 3 Common to Four Geneva 
Conventions 1949, later supplemented by Protocol II of 1977, constituting 
the basic system of protection to civilian victims.  It has also been influenced 
by human rights law in its development.  It is to be noted here that, common 
Article 3 provides for principles similar to the Human Rights Declaration of 
1948 i.e. it does not specify rights to civilians. However after the 
promulgation of Human Rights Conventions of 1966 which provided for 
specific rights to individuals, few years later Additional Protocol II of 1977 
adopted this notion of “rights” to civilians.  In addition efforts made by 
United Nations have also contributed in developing humanitarian law 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts.  In fact the United Nations 
Charter by providing for respect of human rights, it has affirmed the role to 
be played by international law in providing protection of rights of 
individuals as human beings.  As such, the notion of absolute jurisdiction of 
                                                 
4 More information available at website, www.icrc.int International Committee of the Red Cross 
(humanitarian law). For more legal elaboration on the concept of non-international armed conflicts on 
Chapter three of this study. 
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the state over its citizens, in time of peace and conflict is changed.  The 
sovereign state exercises jurisdiction over its nationals within the limits 
which international law prescribes5.  It is worth to trace and examine in this 
chapter the remarkable developments of humanitarian law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts during different historical phases and the 
impact of human rights law in the process of humanizing and paving the way 
for the development of rules applicable to civilians in non-international 
armed conflicts6.  It is also worth to examine the basic sources of the rules of 
protection under the law. This chapter is divided into four parts .Part 1 
examines the applicability of the traditional concept of war to internal armed 
conflicts. Part 2 examines how the notion of humanitarian aid used as a 
contributing factor in extending application of international protective rules 
to civilians in internal armed conflicts. Part 3 discusses the impact of human 
rights law on the process of developing humanitarian law protecting 
                                                 
5  Wilson, Robert R. “Standards of humanitarianism in war”, AJIL, vol. 34, No. 2, 1940, p. 320 –  also 
Best, Geofrey: “Humanity in warfare: The twentieth century’s experience”, Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institute for Defense Studies (London), vol. 122, Sept. 1977 p. 3. On December 1966, the U.N 
adopted two Covenants designed to transform the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
into binding rules of law i.e. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which came into force 1976. Rhona K. M. Smith, 
“Textbook on International Human Rights”, Chapter (4), Oxford University Press, 2003.  
6 The process of humanization of international law of warfare began before the nineteenth century with 
agreements concluded by the military commanders of the belligerent parties concerning prisoners of war, 
the wounded and sick and protection of military hospitals. Developments occurred later after the experience 
of the Grimean war (1853-6) and the American civil war (1861-5). The 1863 Instructions for United States 
Armies in the Field (Lieber Code), followed a year after by the Geneva Convention of 1864 and 1868 the 
Petersburg Declaration prohibiting the use of small exploding projectiles is another development. The 
Hague Convention of 1907 laid the basis for further development. For developments which occurred 
regarding the process of humanization of law of warfare briefly, on Akheurst’s “Modern Introduction to 
International law”, (seventh revised Edition), Peter Malanczuk, 1997 Roulledge p. 21. Also Geza Herczegh, 
“The Development of International Humanitarian Law”, Budapest, 1984. 
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civilians. Part 4 discusses the various sources of international rules 
protecting civilians in non international armed conflicts.  
1. Internal Armed conflicts and the Applicability of the Traditional 
Concept of Law of War 
The history of international rules of protection of civilians in internal armed 
conflicts cannot be separated from the whole conception of the law of war.  
Its applicability to internal armed conflicts and its impact on rules applicable 
to civilians in internal armed conflicts during different historical periods of 
development of the law have influenced it. 
The traditional rules of law of war in international law, distinguished 
between interstate wars and internal armed conflicts in most cases referred to 
as civil war7.  According  to which, the laws of war apply basically to war 
between states while armed conflicts which took place within the boundaries 
of one state in cases where a group of rebels fight against the government or 
when the conflict as between two rebels groups who fight for authority, fall 
outside the scope of application of war.  They were regarded as falling 
within the exclusive authority of the sovereign state including the question 
of treatment of civilians. 
 
                                                 
7  The traditional concept of law of war prevailed till after the Second World War, 1949 when the Four 
Geneva Conventions were adopted by thus establishing a developed system of protection of victims of all 
types  of armed conflicts – Kunz, Joseph: “The laws of war”, AJIL, vol. 50, No. 2, April 1956, p. 313. 
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However, it is not accurate to state that the whole issue of internal armed 
conflicts under this concept was not regulated by rules and principles of 
international customary law.  Rules of traditional International law 
governing the principle of sovereignty had its impact in regulating internal 
armed conflicts and in placing it outside the scope of application of other 
rules of international law.  For example, the principle of exclusive 
jurisdiction of sovereign state over all acts, events, persons and property 
within its boundaries resulted in placing the matter of protection of civilian 
victims outside the ambit of concern of International society and law.  The 
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of the state had resulted also 
in depriving civilians from the application of rules of protection under 
international law.  Other rules of international customary law applicable to 
internal armed conflicts are those governing international responsibility with 
regard to relation between foreign nationals and revolutionaries.  The rule 
provides for the non-responsibility of the recognized government for the acts 
of revolutionaries in areas beyond its de facto control as far as interests of a 
third state were involved. 8 
                                                 
8 In internal armed conflicts, the basic distinction is that of international responsibility for successful and 
unsuccessful revolutionaries. For full discussion of basic rules on this subject Schwazenbereger, 
“International law as applied by International Courts And Tribunals”, volume II, Third Edition, London, 
(Stevens and Sons limited 1957) Chapter 59. 
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i. The Doctrine of Recognition of Belligerency and the 
Application of Traditional Laws of War in Internal Conflicts 
Traditional laws of war distinguish between three classes of fighters against 
the state, each class was determined with regard to the scale and intensity of 
the armed conflict.  The class of rebels was a group from the population 
which carries arms against the state with the aim to control the government.  
This conflict was regarded exclusively falling within the internal authority of 
the state as long as the government could suppress them internally.  In such a 
case international rules restricting conduct of hostilities are not applicable; 
rebels are considered criminals under the domestic criminal laws and are 
punishable without having any rights under international law. 
The second class is insurgents i.e. rebels are recognized as insurgents when 
they are well organized in such a way that constitutes a real threat to the 
government, not merely violators of law.  In such a case third states were 
forced to recognize them as such, in order to protect their interests and to 
treat its nationals humanely be in the part of the territory controlled by 
insurgents.  The third state and insurgents may enter into an agreement 
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which determined the duties and rights of each party.  Outside this 
agreement, few rights and duties existed under customary international law9. 
Insurgents were recognized as belligerents i.e. the third class, when 
recognition was granted either by a third state or the de jure government 
declaring that the conflict had reached a level of intensity that both parties to 
the conflict were to be treated as belligerents treated in an internal conflict.  
Such recognition meant simply acknowledgement of the existence of war as 
a fact however it did not bear any implications with regard to recognition of 
any form of government by the belligerents10. 
Under customary international law, a state is under no legal duty to comply 
with the laws of war in an internal armed conflicts i.e. civil war.  However a 
government is regarded as free in choosing to apply the laws of war in its 
relation with rebels upon recognition of rebels as belligerents11, as such, 
recognition is a discretionary legal act.  The recognition of insurgents by the 
government in authority as belligerents in civil war is granted in cases where 
the government is unable to suppress completely the rebels. Recognition in 
                                                 
9  For example, upon recognition, the insurgents are under duty not to blockade ports, to visit and search or 
capture foreign ships in the high seas on one hand. On the other hand both parties to the conflict had the 
right to prevent supplies from outside to reach the other opposing parts. However in certain cases 
arrangements with the ICRC were made to allow supplies. Lindsay Moir, “The Historical Development of 
the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts to 1949”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly volume 47, April 1998 p. 339.  
10  H. Lauterpactit, “Recognition in international law” (1947) p. 277. 
11 On the problem of recognition and the problem of the application of the laws of war to the case of a civil 
war on H. A. Smith, “Some Problems of the Spanish Civil War”, Year Book of International law, p. 19 et 
seq. 
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such a case means the application of rules of laws of war i.e. the grant to 
them of full rights of belligerents entitled to under the law of war on one 
hand.  On the other hand belligerents were subject to certain duties12.  When 
captured, they are to enjoy the status of prisoners of war and subject to their 
rights under Geneva Convention III of 1929.  A third state is free to 
recognize a state of armed conflict, a situation of belligerency.  By such 
recognition the third recognizing state is deprived from providing assistance 
to both sides and parties of the conflict13.  Recognition as such is not 
considered interference in the internal affairs of the state if the state 
recognized a state of belligerency which objectively exists i.e. certain 
elements exists to declare a situation of civil war.  The existence of a state of 
civil war was purely a question of fact.  However as to whether the 
belligerents’ rights were the consequence of formal recognition or the 
existence of a state of civil war, the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the Prize Case, during the American civil war, observed that: “A civil war is 
never solemnly declared, it becomes such by its accidents – the number, 
power and organization of the persons who originate and carry it on.  When 
the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion 
                                                 
12  On state practice on the recognition of belligerency Schwazenberger, ibid, p. 691 Casten, Erik: 
“Recognition of insurgency”, Indian Journal of International law (New Delhi), vol. 5, 1965, p. 443. 
13  In case of recognition of rebels as belligerents by third state, the third state assumes rights and duties of a 
neutral power. For rules of neutrality on Borchard, Edwin, “Neutrality and civil war”, AJIL, vol. 31, No. 2, 
April 1937, p. 304 also refer to Hague Convention of 1907, which provides for some of the rules of 
neutrality binding neutral states. 
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of territory, have declared their independence, have cast off their allegiance; 
have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former 
sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a 
war”14.  Thus according to this observation of the court, belligerent’s rights 
were the consequence not of any formal recognition but of the existence of a 
state of war i.e. civil war.  As a result of recognition rebels are considered in 
a state of war with the de jure government and thus hostility are conducted 
against them, when captured are to enjoy the status of prisoners of war and 
subject to their rights under Geneva Convention 1929 relating to treatment 
of prisoners of war15.  However it is to be noted that the application of the 
rules of law of war do not deprive the Government from exercising its rights 
in suppressing rebels and subject them to trial under its national criminal 
military laws upon their capture.  On recognition belligerents are bound by 
obligations, customary or conventional, applicable at the time with regard to 
restrictions regarding means and methods of conduct of hostilities e.g. to 
distinguish between adverse party armed forces members and civilians, and 
treatment of sick and wounded members of armed forces.However, under 
customary international, it was uncertain whether the laws of war protecting 
civilians, the sick, wounded and prisoners of war, to be applicable to all civil 
                                                 
14  This judgment of the Prize Cases (1862) is quoted from infra H. A. Smith, p. 20. 
15 The issue of legal consequences of recognition of belligerency is examined more extensively in chapter 
3. 
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wars regardless of recognition of belligerency16.   As a result, subject to 
applicable rules of international law of war referred to in case of recognition 
internal armed conflicts were exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of 
sovereign states i.e. the question of treatment of victims of such conflicts. 
However, states practice during the nineteenth and twentieth century varied.  
Thus one legal consequence of recognition of belligerency in customary 
laws of war when a certain level of intensity of fighting was reached, 
humanitarian rules of war were applicable and the government had right to 
exercise full authority to crush rebels, their treatment when arrested and their 
submission to trial as criminals violating domestic criminal laws.  In fact the 
recognition of belligerency by de jure governments and acceptance by 
belligerents to respect rules of laws of war, not as a result of any legal 
obligation under traditional international law, was due to the fact that both 
parties to the conflict by such accepting to respect certain rules of laws of 
war on reciprocal basis, each party would ensure protection from reprisal 
acts.  A fact indicated that the issue of humanity or humanitarian 
considerations was not taken into account as far as victims of such conflicts 
were concerned. 
                                                 
16 Akheurst, op.cit, p. 352. 
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It is clear from above that international rules of laws of war which were 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts have been first affected in the 
nineteenth century by customary law through the doctrine of recognition of 
belligerency.  However by the beginning of the twentieth century the 
doctrine of recognition started to decline as a result of states practice17 On 
the whole this traditional concept of law of war reflected the prevailing basic 
notions and principles of international law of the period.  That is 
international law which regulates the relation between states according to 
which individuals are objects of international law.  And as a consequence of 
notion of absolute sovereignty of states the protection of civilians as victims 
of internal wars was subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the state which 
deprived them from appeal to any international protective rules18 of 
protection. 
After the Second World War, a number of changes in international relations 
resulted in changes of notions and principles which were considered the 
basis upon which the traditional concept of law of war was established19.  
                                                 
17  For example the United States refused to grant recognition of belligerency in the armed conflicts which 
took place in Cuba, Columbia and Haiti on the pretext that conditions required to grant recognition were 
not satisfied. Lindsay, op.cit, pp. 344. For the position of third states with regard to the Spanish Civil War. 
V.A. O’Rourke “Recognition of Belligerency in the Spanish Civil War” (1937) 31 A.J.I. Law.  
18 For more details and critique of traditional international law in the area of internal war,  Richard A. Falk, 
Janus Tormented: “The international law of internal war” in Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil 
Strife, pp. 185-248. 
19 For an excellent tracing of historical development of International law Akherust, op.cit, from p. 9 to p. 
34. 
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This fact led supporters of this traditional concept of law of war to subject it 
to revision so as to accommodate such changes with a view to fill gaps.  In 
practice a number of factors contributed in effecting the changes.  The 
prohibition in international law of the absolute right of states to resort to war 
and the conduct of hostilities by use of developed means of warfare, made it 
difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians20.  Important of all 
these, was the horrors to civilians and sufferings caused as a result of 
Spanish civil war and the increase of number of occurrences of civil wars 
after the Second World War, which resulted in humanitarians disasters to 
civilians21.  This fact drew the attention of international community to the 
need to take    serious measures to avoid consequences of such conflicts and 
lessen its effect on civilians.  The rise of an era of humanitarian, and human 
rights movements during this period contributed directly in enhancing 
international society in general and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) in particular to increase efforts with a view to seek ways and 
adopt rules of protection to civilian victims, a situation which was not 
possible under the traditional concept of laws of war. 
                                                 
20  Kunz, Josef L.: “Laws of war, in The changing law of nations: Essays on international law”, Ohio, Ohio 
state University Press, 1968, p. 791. 
21  Smith, Herbert Arthuer, “Some Problems of the Spanish civil war BYIL, vol. 18, 1937, p. 17 to 31. Also 
Garner, James Wilford: “Questions of International law in the Spanish Civil war”, AJIL, vol. 31, No. 1, 
January 1937, p. 66. Higham, Robin D.S.”: Civil wars in the twentieth century ed. By Robin Higham, 
lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1972, p. 260.  
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2.   The Notion of “Humanitarian Aid” as a Contributing Factor in       
Extending Applicability of International Protective Rules      to Civilians 
in Internal Armed Conflicts. 
The notion of respect of humanity and dignity of persons in time of war 
forms the basic principle upon which rules of protection of civilian victims 
in interstate armed conflicts is based.  This notion dates back years before 
the adoption of the first Geneva Convention of 1864.  When Henry Dunant 
called states to formulate some international humanitarian principles to be 
embodied in a convention (to be binding) to protect and guarantee a better 
treatment of members of armed forces who were wounded and sick in 
battlefield and medical personnel.  Based on this humanitarian idea of 
protection, Dunant proposed the establishment of a permanent national 
organization to present humanitarian aid to members of armed forces who 
were sick and wounded in battlefield22 and assist them with the medical 
services. 
This humanitarian idea of Dunant which was adopted latter and developed 
from an idea to form, after many years, an international system of protection 
of victims of armed conflicts, did not distinguish between interstate war or 
                                                 
22 Henry Dunant who wrote his famous Book “A Memory   of Solferino” in 1862 and Francis lieber are 
considered the fathers who greatly contributed to the concepts and contents of present humanitarian law by 
expressing old humanitarian ideas. That idea existed in cultures, religions or in rules on the act of law 
during different historical, periods are embodied into specifies binding rules and principles in contemporary 
Humanitarian Law instruments. Richard Shelly Hartigon, “Lieber’s Code and the laws of war”, Chicago 
1983.  Also Henry Dunant “A Memory of Solferino”, published by ICRC in 1986 p. 115. 
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civil war as far as protection of victims as human beings were concerned.  
However, due to prevailing notions and application of traditional concepts 
during that period, the idea was to apply with regard to victims of interstate 
wars only.  It resulted in the adoption of the 1864 First Geneva Convention, 
which provided rules for the humanitarian aid based on medical care to sick, 
wounded and members of armed forces in the field.  The importance of the 
Convention lies on the fact that states for the first time agreed to limit under 
an International Convention their power in favour of the individual23. 
The humanitarian idea of Dunant resulted also in the formation of the Red 
Cross24.  The work of Red Cross had been based at the beginning on the 
principle that members of armed forces sick and wounded, regardless of any 
consideration except their humanity, have the right to humanitarian aid25.  At 
such, this idea of international protection of human personality of victims of 
war as individuals preceded its application under human rights law.  
                                                 
23 And for the first time a law of war written exists which gave birth to international humanitarian law. It 
developed by extending international rules and embracing other victims of war to protection by the revision 
of Geneva Convention of 1864 and the adoption of four Geneva Conventions of 1949 protecting other 
groups of victims including civilians in internal armed conflicts under common Article 3 which was 
developed and supplemented by Protocol II Additional of 1977, Kilgore, K.E.: “Law of war: Geneva 
Conventions signatories clarify applicability of laws of war to internal armed conflict”, Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (Athens, Georgia), vol. 4, No. 4, 1978, pp 941 to 949. 
24 In 1863 Henry Dunant and others, established the “International Committee for Aid to the Wounded” 
with the aim of the creation of national aid societies. The Committee was then named International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). These national societies were later established in nearly every country 
under the name of Red Cross or Red Crescent societies. For history and formation of Red Cross, Andre’ 
Dunant, “History of the International Committee of Red Cross: from Sarajevo to Hiroshima”, Geneva, 
1984. 
25 The idea of humanitarian assistance to victims of war based on their humanity is considered by some 
writers as the first step in the process of humanizing law of warfare: See Akherest, op.cit, p. 21. 
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However, its application to civilian victims in internal armed conflicts has 
been developing with the development of humanitarian law and human 
rights law from mere principles under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights Declaration 1948 to specific rights and obligations in favour of 
individual in times of emergencies like armed conflicts. 
It was not until 1949 that an international convention for protection of 
civilians in all types of armed conflicts was adopted.  The reason was due to 
the fact that under the basic principle of the traditional law of war military 
operations were to be limited against armed forces only.  As a result of this 
principle, civilians in interstate wars were considered not affected by 
military operations.  In practice, under declarations and customary rules, 
states parties to the war were not to direct any military operations against 
civilians26.  However till 1949 no legal provision guaranteeing protection of 
civilians in interstate wars existed, apart from a number of clauses in the 
Hague Conventions of 1907. The Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 
(adopted in 1899) concerning the laws and customs of war on land and its 
Regulations annexed to it relating to warfare, did not provide for rules for 
protection of civilians except in situation of occupation of a region. These 
                                                 
26 For example the Declaration of St. Petersburg of December 1868 laid rules with the aim of regulating 
armed conflicts. The parties to the Declaration considered that “the only legitimate purpose which the states 
should pursue during the war is to weaken the military force of the enemy”. It is understood that weapons 
dangerous to civilians by their nature were not prohibited in the Declaration. For details on the Declaration: 
Leisle, C. Green, “The Contemporary law of armed conflict”, second edition, Melland, 2000 (Manshester 
University Press) p. 29 – http: //www.man.ac.uk/mup. 
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clauses contained few elementary rules providing for respect for family 
rights, for the lives of persons and private property of civilians, it also 
prohibited collective punishment. However it did not prohibit attacks on 
fortified cities till the city surrenders, any damage to civilian person or 
property is justified by the principle of military necessity. The Hague 
Convention of 1907 which regulates the laying of automatic submarine 
mines, laid three basic principles providing protection to civilian population: 
civilian population should not be affected by the hostilities, the weapons 
used must have specific objectives and must not be used without 
discriminations; the parties to a conflict must at the end of hostilities co-
operate to prevent any subsequent civilians injuries. However the application 
of the Convention is limited to sea warfare27.  
Efforts to provide for an international convention rules protecting civilians 
have been taken after the Second World War, when thousand of civilians 
suffered and died and their property destroyed as a result of use of new 
means of war i.e. aerial warfare which rendered it difficult to distinguish 
between combatants and civilians in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts28. 
                                                 
27 There were also some other customary and conventional rules for the protection of civilians property in 
interstate war at the time. For more details on the issue,Yves, op.cit, p. 134. 
28 In fact the Red Cross efforts to provide legal protection to civilians in international armed conflicts is to 
be traced back after the First World War when a great number  of civilians were interned and Red Cross 
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With regard to protection of civilians in non-international armed conflicts, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have played the major 
role in developing humanitarian law rules and extending applicability of its 
principles to guarantee protection to civilians in civil wars based on the 
principle of respect of human person. Two civil wars which resulted in 
severe sufferings and humanitarian disaster to civilians i.e. the Upper Silesia 
civil war in 1921 and Spanish civil war 1934, enhanced efforts by 
Committee to the need to offer humanitarian aid to civilian victims of such 
wars29.  These efforts which were undertaken by the International Red Cross 
Committee at the beginning of twentieth century resulted in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
was unable to visit their internment camps or arrange for exchange of family news. A text convention was 
prepared by Committee in 1921 for protection of civilians and submitted to International Red Cross 
Conference to be examined with The Prisoners of War proposed Convention. The main rules proposed, 
prohibited the deportation of the inhabitants of occupied territories, and prohibited execution of hostages. It 
provided for the right of civilian to exchange correspondence and receive relief civilians internees were to 
receive some treatment as prisoners of war. This attempt failed as Governments were mainly concerned 
about establishing peace however during the Second War the Committee proposed to parties of the 
interstate wars, the application of 1929 Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war by analogy 
to civilians internees. The proposal was accepted by an agreement between the parties fighting. At the same 
time the Red Cross offered its humanitarian aid to them. For more details on efforts made by Red Cross to 
develop humanitarian law rules and extend its application to protective of civilians in international armed 
conflicts, Jean Pictet, “The Formation of International Humanitarian law”, International Review of Red 
Cross, January-February 1985 – No. 244, p. 5. Also “Commentary IV Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War”, published under the general editorship of Jean Pictet, 
Geneva, ICRC 1958 p. 3.   
29  Whberg, Hans: “Civil war and international law”, in: The World Crisis, Symposium of studies published 
on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1937, p. 
160. In May 1937 the Council of the League of Nations had condemned the use of methods of violations of 
international law and the bombing  of open towns Protests made by governments in other states like United 
States, France and Britain against the bombing of unfortified location and areas with large populations were 
made. The bombings were described as barbarous and against principles of humanity. For an excellent 
analysis on the reasons and legal aspects of the civil war in Spain Ann Van Thomas and A.J. Thomas, 
“International Legal Aspects of the civil war in Spain”, 1936-39 in “The International Law of civil war”, 
edited by Richard F. Falk (John Hopkins press 1971) published under the auspices of the American Society 
of International Law. 
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promulgation of two resolutions30.  However the first attempt was taken by 
Committee when it took the initiative by submitting a draft convention in 
1912 on the role of the Red Cross in civil wars, which provided mainly for 
clauses relating to offering humanitarian aid to civilians in civil wars. But it 
was not put to discussion because governments were against the idea of 
allowing foreign aid or assistance to its citizens, a matter which was 
considered interference in internal affairs to sovereign states. 
Few years later in 1921, before the X International Red Cross Committee 
Conference, the Red Cross raised the issue of need to assist civilian victims 
in civil wars by providing them with humanitarian aid. The Conference 
discussed the proposal and passed a Resolution to this effect. It recognized 
and affirmed the right of civilian victims to relief in accordance to 
humanitarian principles and requested the Red Cross to act in accordance to 
these principles in situation of humanitarian crisis affecting certain victims 
in civil war31.  Though the Resolution did not have a binding effect, however 
its importance lies on the fact that for the first time the question of victims in 
civil war to be discussed before an international conference and that victims 
of civil wars were entitled to relief and aid based on humanitarian 
                                                 
30  Jean Pictet, “The Formation of International Humanitarian Law”, ICRC, Review No. 244, January-
February 1985, p. 7. 
31  Jean Pictet: “The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Peace – significance of principles for the 
Spirit of Peace” – ICRC, March-April, 1984 – No. 239, p. 63. 
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considerations, a fact which constituted the first seed of a legal system which 
later grew and developed to embrace other humanitarian rights to civilians.  
It also provided for the duty of National Red Cross societies and 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to provide necessary relief 
to such victims32.  Despite the positive aspects of the Resolution, however it 
was general and did not provide for specific rules of protection or 
obligations.  It was followed in 1938 by the promulgation of another 
resolution passed by which tended to strengthen the first one.  It required the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and national societies to 
endeavor to obtain the application of some humanitarian principles e.g. 
respect of the life and liberty of non-combatants, humane treatment, and 
reunion of families to victims of civil wars33. 
Both resolutions addressed the ICRC and national Red Cross societies and 
not states or Governments. It will be shown that the extension of notion of 
humanitarian aid to victims of civil wars and both resolutions calling parties 
to the conflict to respect certain humanitarian principles of Geneva 
Conventions 1907 and 1929 in civil wars with regard to protection of 
civilians have paved the way for further developments towards the adoption 
                                                 
32 Based on this Resolution, the ICRC requested parties to civil war in Upper Selesia and Spain to allow it 
to undertake relief operations to civilian victims Resolution XIV “Civil War” International Red Cross 
Handbook, 12th ed., 1984, Geneva p. 641. 
33 For text of Resolution on http: www.icrc.org page 3 of 17 –  “The Commentary on the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 12 August 1949”, published under the editorship of Jean Pictet, Geneva 1956, p. 28. 
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of a binding legal rules based on the right of civilians to humanitarian 
assistance or aid34. 
i. The XVII International Red Cross Conference of 1947 and the   
Question of Legal Protection of Civilians35: Stockholm Draft          
Few years later after the adoption of Resolution 1938, the Red Cross 
increased its efforts with a view to insert humanitarian principles in an 
international convention to be applicable to civilian victims during civil wars 
to gain binding effect.  However it was not an easy task due to reluctance of 
governments.  In 1946 it proposed that parties to a civil war were to be 
invited to make a declaration of being ready to apply humanitarian principle 
of 1929 Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war on reciprocity to 
civil war victims.  This proposal was approved by the Preliminary 
Conference of National Red Cross societies in 1946 which recommended the 
insertion of a provision in each proposed Geneva Conventions stating that 
“In the case of armed conflict within the borders of a state, the Convention 
shall also be applied by each of the adverse parties, unless one of them 
                                                 
34  Elder, David A; “The historical background of common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949”, 
Case W. Res. J. of International Law (Heveland), vol. 11, No. 1, 1979, p. 37. also “Humanitarian aid to the 
victims of internal conflicts”: Meeting of a commission of experts in Geneva, IRRC, 3rd year, February 
1963, p. 79 to 91, also on same issue chronicle, IRRC, 3rd year, July 1963 p. 377. 
35  For nature of activities carried by ICRC and development of its practice in internal conflicts e.g civil war 
in Nigeria, in Algeria and in El Salvador, Francais Bugnion, “The International Committee of the Red 
Cross and the protection of war victims, (Mac Millan Publishers limited 2003) pp. 637-650. 
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announces expressly its intention to the contrary”.  The proposal was to be 
discussed in the Conference of Governments Experts36. 
The proposal was not accepted; however after conflicting views presented 
by Government experts, the Conference of 1947 convened by International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recognized the need to insert a 
provision to the Geneva Conventions, under study, relating to protection of 
war victims to be applicable in civil wars.  The consensus was to insert an 
article drafted which spoke of the application of the principles of the 
Convention only on basis of reciprocity.  That is, subject to the adverse party 
to accept to apply the same principles37.   
The draft Article (2) was inserted in a revised and new drafted four 
Conventions for the protection of war victims, the fourth relating to 
protection of civilian victims and submitted to the XVII International Red 
Cross Conference of Stockholm which provided for the application of the 
Geneva Convention IV with its principles to be applicable to all cases of 
non-international armed conflicts.  It read as follows:   
“In all cases of armed conflicts which are not of an international 
character, especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of 
religion, which may occur in the territory of one or more of the High 
                                                 
36  Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, op.cit, 
p. 28. 
37  Ibid, p. 29. 
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Contracting parties, the implementing of the principles of the present 
Convention shall be obligatory on each of the adversaries.  The 
application of the Convention in these circumstances shall in no case 
depend on the legal status of the parties to the conflict and shall have 
no effect on that status”38. 
This draft Article brought with it major developments in the law of armed 
conflicts.  It provided for application of International principles to victims of 
non-international armed conflicts.  It expressly provided for the obligation of 
parties to conflict to be bound by humanitarian principles applicable to 
victims including civil wars.  It brought with it the notion of imposing 
obligations to respect humanitarian principles on rebels’ i.e. non-state 
parties.  It expressly provided that non-recognition of de jure governments of 
its opponents does not release it from its obligation to respect humanitarian 
principles.  And that the rebel cannot plead that by respecting such principles 
he may make a claim for recognition as a regular Government.  However 
after long discussions, the draft Article was modified by omitting the clause 
“especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or war of religion”.  Such 
omission widened the scope of application of the Article.   
                                                 
38  Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
op.cit, p. 30. 
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This revolutionary draft Article was submitted before the Diplomatic 
Conference of 1949 for discussion and adoption.  The scope of application 
of draft Article (2) had been greatly resisted by states delegations at Geneva 
Diplomatic Conference, who rejected the idea of applying all Geneva 
provisions in non-international armed conflicts39.  The Article was subject to 
great controversy in several aspects. 
ii. The Diplomatic Conference of 1949 and the Stockholm Draft Article 
Applicable in Internal Armed Conflicts: Divergent Views 
The wording of Stockholm draft Article tended to create a balance between 
two notions, the notion of preservation of state sovereignty as traditionally 
understood and the notion of respect to humanity and dignity of persons 
victims of civil wars.  In fact all discussions and divergent opinions at the 
Diplomatic Conference revolved around these two notions i.e. the desire to 
protect individual as a human being while at the same time preserving the 
very essence of state sovereignty.  However, this draft text was subject to 
criticism and conflicting opinions as to whether to accept it as proposed or to 
be modified. 
There were two tendencies which appeared during the discussions of the 
draft Article.  The first was in favor of application of all provisions or rules 
                                                 
39 The Resolution adopted by the XVII the International Red Cross which met in Stockholm in 1948, 
approved the Draft four Conventions prepared by the ICRC and submitted before the Diplomatic 
Conference 1949 for discussion and adoption. 
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of protection applicable during interstate armed conflicts to victims of non-
international armed conflicts.  The second was in favor of applying only 
general humanitarian principles. However, the Governments Representatives 
were against the idea of applying the whole provisions of the four Geneva 
Conventions on the basis that attempts to apply all provisions under Geneva 
to individuals would be at the expense of sovereignty of the state which 
would restrict and thus weaken power and jurisdiction of the state within its 
territory.  In addition it will subject states to international obligations. 
The other reason being that Governments feared that application of all rules 
of protection embodied in Geneva Conventions applicable to international 
conflicts and proposed to be applied to civil wars might give rebels the status 
of belligerents and a degree of legal recognition if organized to get the 
benefit of protection of belligerents under the Third Convention Relating to 
Prisoners of War and escape punishment for crimes under domestic criminal 
or military laws, by claiming that their rebel acts are “acts of war”.  
Government feared also that rebels may be entitled under Geneva 
Convention to ask for assistance and intervention of Protecting Power.  
Finally, their fear that by applying all provisions of Geneva Convention by 
recognizing them as belligerents, this might mean that the Government be 
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compelled to release rebels captured when civil war is over, since Geneva 
Convention puts them on status of prisoners of war40. 
Those who supported Stockholm draft Article justified their views on the 
fact that the purpose of applying international rules of protection to victims 
of civil war is on the whole based on the principle of respect to humanity 
and dignity of such victims.  And that rebels who accept to respect 
humanitarian principles under Geneva Convention are to be protected by 
virtue of their humanity.  Besides, the adoption of Stockholm draft would 
not prevent the de jure Government from applying its own laws and 
measures in repressing rebel acts which threaten its order and security41. 
A wide range of divergent opinions resulted in referring the draft Article 2 
for a committee entrusted to draw up a text containing a set of defined 
humanitarian principles applicable to all cases of non-international armed 
conflicts.  The committee prepared a new draft Article based on the 
principles of the Preamble for all Four Geneva Conventions, while Article 2 
remained applicable to internal armed conflicts only42.  This new draft which 
provided for respect of humanitarian principles representing minimum 
standard of treatment for civilian victims was finally adopted as common 
                                                 
40  For divergent opinions in general, “Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference, of Geneva of 1949”, 
vol. 11-B –  also Commentary to IV Geneva Convention, op.cit, p. 31. 
41  Final Record, Ibid, pp. 40 to 95.   
42 The draft Article (2) of proposed Geneva Conventions which provided for the application of principles of 
four conventions in all cases of armed conflicts was strongly resisted by states delegations. This fact led 
finally to the restriction of its applications to International armed conflicts. 
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Article 3 to Four Geneva Conventions43 which reads as follows:  “In the case 
of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any 
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned 
persons: violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; the 
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
                                                 
43  In fact the working committee proposed a number of amendments which gave rise to criticisms. The 
French Delegation proposed that in all cases of non international armed conflict principles of the 
Convention should alone be applicable. The French proposal put an end to diverging of opinions with 
regard to basic controversial issues i.e. the scope of application of the convention to specific internal 
conflicts not of an international character and the application of the principles and not all provisions of the 
Convention to be applicable. A second working committee was appointed entrusted to draw a text defining 
the principles applicable to all cases of non international armed conflicts. For further details, Final Record 
of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol. 11-13, p. 35. Also Commentary on IV Geneva 
Convention, op.cit, p. 31-33.   
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judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the 
present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal 
status of the Parties to the conflict”. 
iii. The Importance of Common Article 3 to the Process of Developing a 
Regime of Protection for Civilians in Non-international Armed 
Conflicts: Critical Evaluation 
Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 Relating to Protection of 
Civilians, is considered a major development in the process of developing an 
international system of protection to civilians in non-international armed 
conflicts.  For the first time a concise set of principles of humanity (which 
are defined) are produced in an international instrument.  It subjects the 
Governments to international obligations without considering it an 
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intervention to internal affairs.  It is to be mentioned here that though by the 
time of drafting Article 3 the notion of absolute sovereignty of states was 
starting to shaken by the acceptance of states to obligations under UN 
Charter, however, under the Charter matters of internal affairs were 
excluded from applications of international rules Article 2(7) of the Charter.  
With the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, 
which spread aspirations of respect in dignity and humanity of individuals, 
the notion of humanizing law of war in generally and rules applicable in 
internal armed conflicts, was more attractive.  Article 3 would not have been 
accepted by states, unless it is based on universal values and supported by 
principles which are really underlying common ground of all human society. 
The importance of common Article 3 lies also on the fact that it led to the 
abolishment of the traditional concept of law of war which excluded the 
issue of all forms of protection of civilian victims of internal conflicts from 
the scope of application of international protective rules.  It paved the way 
for increasing efforts to provide and develop greater guarantees to victims of 
internal conflicts by the extension of applicability of more principles and 
rules of humanitarian law to civilian victims.  The ICRC efforts which 
started earlier in 1912 and even before to extent humanitarian aid and later 
principles to civilian victims in civil wars have succeeded by the adoption of 
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Article (3).  It provides a legal basis for the Red Cross to offer its 
humanitarian aid to such victims. 
Though Article 3 brought a major development in the area of protection of 
civilians in internal armed conflicts, by providing for the first time for a set 
of international principles for such protection, however it is subject to 
criticism by legal scholars.  The principle under common Article (3) applies 
in situations which are characterized as an armed conflict in general without 
specifying criteria or elements constituting a conflict as an “armed 
conflict”44.  However in practice Governments were reluctant to recognize a 
conflict as an “armed conflict” to avoid application of Article 3 by 
recognizing it as internal disturbances or tensions. 
The humane treatment which civilians were to receive from both parties to 
conflict is not clearly conceived as constituting a body of “rights” to which 
they are automatically entitled.  One may say as such, it has reflected the 
notion of principles which are provided for by the Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948, a year before the adoption of Article 3 with a view to protect 
human dignity of civilian persons.  This is reflected in providing for the 
principle of non-discrimination in receiving humane treatment, the 
protection of life, prohibition of torture and preservation of personal dignity 
                                                 
44 The scope of application of common Article (3) was a hot issue of discussion at the Diplomatic 
conference as to what is meant by armed conflict not of an international character.   Article 3is elaborated 
more in chapter three. 
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in Article 3. The scope of application of Article 3 is criticized also as been 
wide it covers all non-international armed conflicts, as such it is vague and 
general45, in addition to the absence of any effective guarantees i.e. 
international monitoring mechanisms to ensure the application of its 
principles46. On and above, these principles which represent minimum 
humanitarian principles resulted in imposing a minimum standard of 
obligations on parties to the conflict. 
The application of common Article 3 to non-international armed conflicts 
which occurred after it entered into force, has uncovered deficiencies and 
gaps in the system of protection to civilians which it tends to establish.  
Basically Article 3 does not prohibit reprisal acts against civilians.  It does 
not contain a clause which protects civilians from consequences of military 
attacks, who are in some cases used as shelter, as long as there are no rules 
which limit the freedom of parties to the conflict with regard to means and 
methods of conducting hostilities.  The Article does not expressly prohibit 
parties to the conflict from using starvation of civilians as a method of 
warfare.  On and above Article 3 does not provide for special protection to 
                                                 
45 One of the weakness of common Article (3) is that it does not provide for protection to rebels 
participating in hostilities because they are regarded by their governments as criminals i.e. violators of the 
national law and if captured are subject to national criminal or military laws for the act of taking up arms, 
unlike the combatants in interstate armed conflicts. 
46 The scope of judicial guarantees Para. 1(1) (d) is not concise but general. The Article has been criticized 
also in that the obligation to protect wounded and sick is general and no rules on protection to members of 
medical units like doctors who carry their duties during armed conflicts, and the absence of any protective 
rules to emblem. Commentary, op.cit, para 1325. 
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vulnerable persons like children, women and displaced persons during such 
conflicts.  Enforced deportation of civilians and indiscriminate attacks 
against civilians is not prohibited under the Article.  It is also silent on 
measures regarding set up of relief actions to reach civilians without 
difficulties. 
The above mentioned deficiencies reflected a system of protection under 
Article 3 which is weak.  This fact required additional efforts to be 
undertaken by the Red Cross to develop and supplement common Article 3 
as far as protection of civilians is concerned. 
iv. The Commencement of the Period of Re-affirmation and 
Development of Law Protecting Civilians in Non-international Armed 
Conflicts 
One has to admit that common Article 3 is advancement with regard to 
situation of civilian protection, though the protection provided for under 
Article 3 represents only a minimum.  However the experiences and effects 
of civil wars which occurred subsequent to its enforcement have shown that 
the principles provided for under the Article are incapable of solving all 
humanitarian problems arising and are not sufficient in handling the matters 
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especially when it comes to humanitarian disasters on civilians47.  War 
experiences have shown that the principle of humane treatment does not 
achieve its purpose as expected.  It has been found that without rules 
regulating conduct of hostilities and restricting use of means of hostilities, 
civilians are the most to suffer as a result of military operations.  In fact, 
efforts undertaken by the Red Cross to develop humanitarian law began by 
the beginning of 1960’s, it took years (1972-77) of discussions to adopt two 
Additional Protocols I, II which contain a number of new rules aiming at 
ensuring protection of civilians in international armed conflict under 
Protocol I and in non-international armed conflicts under Protocol II48.  It is 
useful to show generally the preparatory work preceding the adoption of 
Protocol II 1977, basic issues discussed at the Diplomatic conference 1977 
and the main aspects of regime of protection of civilians under Protocol II. 
                                                 
47 Example of civil wars which took place after the adoption of Common Article (3) and which had a 
serious effects on civilian victims are the Algerian Revolution (from 1954 to 1962) in which the Algerian 
National liberation front (FLN) fought the military forces of France. It is to be mentioned here that such 
wars were regarded internal wars till the adoption of Protocol I 1977 under which liberation wars are to be 
regarded as international armed conflict (Article 1 of Protocol (I) Additional 1977). For more details on this 
war Arnold Fraleigh, “The Algerian Revolution as a case study in international law”, in Richard A. Falk, 
op.cit, p. 179. The post independence war in the Congo started in 1960s is also considered one of the 
longest and most complex independence struggles in African, for history of the war and other issues 
Donald W. Memaran Falk, ibid p. 244. These wars resulted in humanitarian catastrophes; it had a serious 
effect on civilian victims as a result of acts of hostilities which included death and inhumane treatment of 
civilian internees, executions as a result of reprisal acts, torture and other inhumane practices. Also the 
internal war of Yemen began in September 1962 when a group of army officers carried out a palace coup 
against the ruling imam and proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic in place of a kingdom. For a description, 
analysis and evaluation on the role of international law in the international war in Yemen, Kathry Boals, 
and the Relevance of International law to the internal war in Yemen, in A. Falk, ibid, p. 303. One has to 
mention here also the North-South civil war in Sudan which is the longest civil war in Africa which began 
in 1956. 
48  Both Protocols of 1977 Additional to Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, were opened for signature 
December 12, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, for texts reprinted in International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1977), 72 AJIL, 457 (1978). 
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a. The Preparatory Period Starting 1965 
The commencement of efforts by Red Cross and work to develop and 
supplement rules of protection of civilians in non-international armed 
conflicts began earlier than 1977 the year of adoption of Protocol II, with a 
view to strengthen a system of protection to civilians.  The insufficiencies of 
rules of protection under common Article3had directed efforts to two sets of 
rules: the rules relating to relief action and rules protecting them against 
conduct of hostilities.  Two important Resolutions were adopted by the XX 
International Red Cross Conference of 1965 to that effect49. 
In furtherance of its activities, the ICRC called for the First Conference of 
Government Experts held in 1971 which was considered an important step 
on the road towards the reaffirmation and development of that part of 
international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts.  No draft instrument was submitted before it but basic issues were 
discussed.  A consensus that common Article 3 should be developed by 
adopting new rules with a view to guarantee the protection of civilian 
                                                 
49 Two important Resolutions were adopted by Red Cross in this connection i.e. Resolution XVIII 
“Protection of civilian population against the Dangers of Indiscriminate warfare”. The 1949 Geneva 
Convention IV rules applicable in international armed conflicts protects civilians only against abuses of 
power by the enemy authorities. It does not touch upon such matters as the rules of warfare in the use of 
certain weapons and Resolution XXXI “Protection of victims of Non International armed conflicts”. See 
International R.C Handbook, op.cit p. 676 and 643. These two Resolutions were adopted at the XX 
International Conference of the Red Cross 1965. For commentary and more details on the XX Conference, 
Jean Pictet, “The XX International Conference of the Red Cross: Results in the legal field”, Journal of the 
International Commission of Jurists, Summer  1964 vol. II, No. 1, p. 3.  
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victims was reached.  However, a number of basic problems arose and 
different approaches were adopted. 
One approach was favoring the adoption of one international instrument 
containing rules for protection of civilians without distinction between 
international and non-international armed conflicts.  The justification being 
that sufferings inflicted on civilian victims is the same regardless of type or 
nature of armed conflict.  However the majority of experts favored the 
approach calling for developing a separate set of rules to be applicable to 
non-international armed conflicts based on a clear definition of the concept 
of “non-international armed conflict” and to be based on an objective 
criterion.  Since each type of conflict has its own characteristics.  In reality 
the adoption of the second approach i.e. the adoption of two legal 
instruments to be applicable in each case would enable the adoption of rules 
of protection while preserving states sovereignty50. 
The Conference of Government Experts, second session held in May 1972, 
unlike the first, had as the basis of its discussions the draft Protocols and 
annexed documents submitted by the ICRC.  The Conference after two days 
of debate was divided into four commissions51.  Draft Protocol II, relating to 
                                                 
50 For other basic issues discussed “Commentary on Additional Protocols of 1977”, op.cit, p. 1328.  
51 Draft Protocol I which was to be applicable in international armed conflicts was containing provisions 
relating to wounded, sick and ship wrecked, combatants and civilian population, including journalist. For 
discussion and commentary on these issues, held by the Commissions, Fritz Kalshoven, “Re affirmation 
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non-international armed conflicts was assigned in principle to Commission 
II.  A number of issues were discussed; however, specific questions were 
important.  The Draft Protocol II in general contained provisions relating to 
the definition of those conflicts for the purposes of the Protocol, provisions 
with regard to the protection of civilian population, the position of 
combatants and their treatment when captured and the possibility of outside 
supervision.  One basic issue which was subject to great controversy and 
differences of opinion was the scope of field of application of Draft Protocol 
II i.e. the definition of non-international armed conflicts.  Two views were 
held, one view supporting an extensive definition as in Article 3 of Geneva 
Conventions i.e. “armed conflict not of an international character occurring 
in the territory of one of the High contracting parties” or even wider 
including political disturbances below the level of armed conflict.  The other 
view supports a restrictive definition limiting the field of application of the 
Draft Protocol to certain cases of internal armed conflicts.  This view was 
rejected by the majority on the plea that Government should not be given the 
discretion with regard to qualification of a conflict situation like territory and 
intensity of armed conflict.  The majority saw that the Protocol should 
automatically apply when a particular situation objectively exists and that 
                                                                                                                                                 
And Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Conference of 
Government Experts (Second Session)”, May 2 June 1972, NYZL (1972) pp.18-61.  
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Article 3 to remain independent in existence.  It is to be noted that 
governments experts were reluctant to accept a set of rules to be applicable 
without reserve to the entire category of “armed conflicts not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of the High contracting 
parties” to which common Article 3 refers, one main reason being that 
governments were reluctant to accept any additional obligations arising other 
than those under Article 3 for any situation of internal armed conflict.  It is 
to be mentioned here that the ICRC in its text, proposed a field of 
application of Protocol II as wide as that of common Article 3 i.e. shall 
apply to all conflicts not of an international character on one hand.  On the 
other hand, specifying certain situations of armed conflict which fall under 
the definition e.g. “hostilities of a collective nature are in action between 
organized armed forces under the command of a responsible authority”.  The 
ICRC as such left the issue of determination that such a situation exists, to 
remain in principle a power of the state in question.  However one has to 
admit that this would not prevent appraisal of the situation by the outside 
world.  The consequence of this is that it would be possible for entities or 
other institutions other than the territorial state to urge the application of 
Protocol II52.   
                                                 
52 Fritz, ibid, pp. 56-60. 
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Another issue of controversy was with regard to position of captured rebels 
and their treatment i.e. whether to give them the status of combatants.  Those 
who rejected the idea on basis that such status will be incompatible with the 
principle of sovereignty of state and with the domestic laws which consider 
them violators of the law i.e. committing rebellion crime.  However the 
majority view was that they are to be accorded humane treatment similar to 
that accorded to all persons deprived of their liberty with the preservation of 
right of their Governments to subject them to domestic laws for the act of 
rebellion. 
Two other basic issues discussed were humanitarian assistance and the 
protection of civilian population.  The principle that civilian population 
should be under international protection during non-international armed 
conflict has been unanimously accepted.  However the controversy was 
relating to the nature and extent of protective rules to be embodied in 
Protocol II.  It is to be noted in general that the substance of the rules to be 
included in Protocol II with regard to protection of civilians were parallel 
with those in Protocol I53.  In light of these different opinions and 
suggestions the Committee presented in 1973 the text of new draft Protocols 
                                                 
53 With regard to general protection of the civilian population the ICRC has proposed express prohibition of 
terror attacks, in-discriminate attacks and reprisal attacks. These prohibitions in principle had been accepted 
by the majority; however their formulation was a matter of divergent opinions, for such divergent opinions, 
Fritz, ibid. p. 36. 
 91
before Experts Conference which were discussed and new amended drafts 
were submitted finally to the Diplomatic Conference 1977.  
b. Draft Protocol II Discussed at the Diplomatic Conference 1977: 
The Emergence of New Aspects of Humanitarian Law Applicable to 
Civilian in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
In light of the above issues raised discussed and approaches forwarded, the 
1973 draft Protocol II was submitted before the Diplomatic Conference.  
One basic feature of the draft was that common Article 3 and Protocol II 
each remained independent from the other.  Article 3 conferred fundamental 
guarantees upon the victims of all non-international armed conflicts, while 
Protocol II scope of application is specified in the situation defined in 
Article 1.  The controversy on substantive rules in the draft Protocol II was 
revolving around two points: the desire by states to have sufficient 
guarantees to respect and preserve its national sovereignty; and non-
interference with internal affairs.  As a result, states were against any 
proposal requiring them to transfer to others the right to maintain order in 
their territory e.g. other entities or institutions.  In fact states affirmed their 
right to promulgate its own internal humanitarian law and lay down the 
conditions for the application of that law, which would combine the moral 
principles adopted by that country with the requirement of national security.  
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However it should be mentioned here that the tension between state 
sovereignty and international concern prevailed in a number of sessions held 
till Protocol II was adopted in 197754. 
With the adoption of Protocol II in 1977, a new aspects of humanitarian law 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts emerged which formed the 
basis of an international system of protection with common Article (3) of 
Geneva Convention IV of 1949 relating to protection of civilians as victims 
of such conflicts.  The Protocol provided for the fundamental principles 
governing the protection of the civilians in non-international armed conflicts 
in Article 13 which states that “the civilian population and the individual 
civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from 
military operations”.  To give effect to this principle a number of provisions 
are embodied.  The Protocol provides for a number of principles and general 
rules which tend to regulate the conduct of hostilities by parties to the 
conflict by the prohibition of certain methods of hostilities. 
                                                 
54 From 1974 to 1977, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts, discussed two drafts of Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and adopted them by consensus on 8 June 1977. Both Protocols make 
important contributions to the adaptation ofi humanitarian law to contemporary problems in particular 
relating to civilians protection. Protocol I supplemented all the four conventions and its rules applicable in 
interstate armed conflicts. It contained rules improving protection for the civilian population against effects 
of hostilities on civilian population Under Geneva Convention IV, the protection was accorded to civilians 
in the power of the enemy only. The most important development is that provisions of humanitarian law 
applicable in international armed conflicts are to apply in wars of national liberations, by thus it recognized 
such wars as international armed conflicts and not as previous, an internal armed conflict. It also 
recognized certain type of persons who conducted hostilities i.e. Guerrillas who are captured to be subject 
to less restrictive conditions than formerly, be recognized as combatants and to be treated as prisoners of 
war. Mercenaries do not have the right to be treated as prisoners of war. For aspects of Protocol I, 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 1977, editors Yves Sandoz (and others) p.1887. 
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Direct attacks against the civilian population is prohibited, attacks must be 
limited for military objects55.  It contains rules protecting life and means 
necessary for life of civilians i.e. it prohibits the starvation of civilians as a 
method of warfare and the destructions of their means of survival56.  It 
prohibits torture and inhumane treatment, acts of terror against civilians, 
prohibition of enforced movement i.e. displacement of the civilian 
population for reasons related to the conflict unless for their security and 
imperative military demand57.  It also provides for judicial guarantees 
Article 6 and for rules aiming at the protection of vulnerable groups like 
children and women Article 4(3).  As such, Protocol II of 1977 is considered 
the first international agreement which provides for general rules regulating 
the conduct of parties to the conflict in a non-international armed conflict58.  
This added to the law of armed conflicts applicable in internal armed 
conflicts a new dimension of human aspect as a result of influence of human 
                                                 
55 Article (13) of Protocol II Additional to Geneva Conventions 1949. However the concept of 
indiscriminate attacks is not expressly provided for in the Protocol II, also there is no reference to the 
protection of civilian objects in general (only those necessary for their survival) and no provision relating to 
the protection of natural environment is expressed. 
56 Ibid, Article (14). 
57 Infra ibid, Article (17), “Article (18) on “Relief societies and relief actions”, is designed to deal with 
relief actions in favour of the civilian population. 
58 Development in several areas with regard to protection of civilians in non-international armed conflicts, 
occurred after the adoption of Protocol II (1977) as humanitarian law could not develop apart from existing 
rules of International law shaped by the United Nations resolutions and measures adopted under Treaties to 
ensure that the interests of states and individuals are safeguarded e.g. in the areas of conventional weapons, 
weapons of mass destruction and protection of cultural property. Development relating to compliance and 
enforcement in the area of international criminal law is discussed in chapter eight. More details on these 
developments on Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, “Constraints on the Waging of War, An 
introduction to international humanitarian law”, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, March 
2001, (3rd edition), pp. 155-196.  
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rights conventions concluded at the time, a fact which was reflected during 
discussions at the Expert Diplomatic Conferences of 1974-1977.   
3. The Impact of Human Rights Law on the Process of Developing     
Humanitarian Law Protecting Civilians in Non-international Armed 
Conflicts 
i. The United Nations Position and its Role in the Progress of  
     Humanitarian Law Applicable during Armed Conflicts 
 
Historically, the question of developing rules protecting civilians in non-
international armed conflicts cannot be traced without referring to the 
influence of international human rights law on this process.  Humanitarian 
Law developed first as a law applicable in time of armed conflicts between 
states only and was not concerned with armed conflicts occurring between 
government and rebels or between non-state actors.  This was due to 
prevailing principle of absolute sovereignty of the state according to which 
the whole question of armed conflicts was regarded as an exclusive internal 
matter.  However it has been shown that during the nineteenth century and 
early beginning of the twentieth century, certain customary rules of laws of 
war were applicable through the doctrine of recognition of belligerency.  By 
the beginning of the twentieth century this doctrine declined as a result of 
states practice.  One effect of the gradual declining of the doctrine of 
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recognition in states practice was the non-applicability of international rules 
of laws of warfare in internal armed conflicts.  A fact which subjected again 
internal conflicts to the exclusive jurisdiction and authority of state based on 
the absolute sovereignty doctrine prevailing at that time.  Development in 
international law which occurred later as a result of relaxation of doctrine of 
absolute sovereignty in cases granting minorities rights under international 
law, after the First World War paved the way for the evolution of 
international notion of human rights after the Second World War59.  It is to 
be mentioned here that the United Nations since its formation and for a years 
later showed no interest in the law of armed conflicts.  This negative 
position of United Nations with regard to development of the law of armed 
conflict by taking no active role in the process of its development was 
justified.  Since the Charter prohibited resort to war in international relations 
between states, then any form of participation or attention by the United 
Nations to developing humanitarian law, as a branch of international law, 
was feared to be interpreted as informal admission by the United Nations of 
the possibility of use of force and thus failure by the United Nations to 
                                                 
59 On the development of an international legal system of protection of minorities, Centre for Human 
Rights Geneva, “Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and linguistic Minorities”, 
by Grancesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, United Nations, New York, 1991 – Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the 
Rights of Minorities, (Clarendon Press – Oxford) 1992 pp. 25-52. 
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maintain international peace and security60.  This negative position of the 
United Nations justified with regard to international armed conflicts may be 
acceptable since the Charter of the United Nations prohibits use of force in 
international relations61.  However it may not be acceptable in cases of non-
international conflicts since neither international law nor the Charter of 
United Nations prohibited use of force by governments to restore peace, 
order and repress rebels in cases of internal armed conflicts.  Use of force in 
this case and for these purposes is regarded in international law as an aspect 
of state sovereignty62.  In fact this position of United Nations was based on 
Article 2(7) of the Charter63. 
Since the Second World War, there has been an increasing link between the 
law of armed conflicts and human rights law.  And with the rapid progress 
and development of human rights rules under the United Nations system 
                                                 
60 The International Law Commission of the United Nations was reluctant to deal with the issue of revision 
of the law of war despite the fact that voices were raised, after the Second World War, due to the 
insufficiencies of existing rules of law of war. The Commission took this position so as not to shake 
confidence in the areas of pressing peace under the Charter. J. L. Kunz “The Chaotic status of the laws of 
war and urgent necessity of their revision” American Journal of International Law, 1951, p. 37. 
61 Article 2(4) of the Charter of United Nations. 
62 The general rule is that, in international law neither the rebels or insurgents nor the de facto government 
are committing breach of international law by use of force. However an exception to the rule is the case of 
self determination when the use of force to frustrate the exercise of this right of self determination is illegal. 
Under Article 1(4) of Protocol I Additional of 1977, armed conflicts carried by national liberation 
movements towards the achievement of self-determination is regarded as an international conflict. One 
legal consequence of this, is that members of the national liberation movement they acquire the status of 
combatants and if captured they are not to be tried for committing criminal offence for the mere act of use 
of force. For an extensive elaboration on the issue, Leisle, op.cit, pp. 63-65.  
63 Article 2(7) of the Charter provides that “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
…”. The Article continues to provide that “… but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII”.  United Nations practice invoked this part of the Article in cases 
of grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law during non-international armed conflicts to act. 
More details on this issue is examined in chapter seven of this study.   
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which aims at the protection of individuals vis-à-vis their governments based 
on the respect of their human person and dignity and with the promulgation 
of two Covenants of human rights which provide for respect of fundamental 
rights of individuals in all times, the situation rapidly changed. In addition to 
the increase of violations of human rights in internal armed conflicts which 
characterized the 1960’s conflicts onwards period and the grave violations of 
individual’s human rights in such conflicts.  All these, led the United 
Nations to review and revise its position and take a passive position with 
regard to violations committed during such conflicts which in some conflicts 
were regarded as threatening international peace and security.  The year 
1968 marked the beginning of and growing interest of the United Nations in 
the law of armed conflicts and in particular with regard to protection of 
civilians.  In that year the International Conference on Human Rights, 
Teheran, adopted a Resolution XXIII calling for “Respect For Human Rights 
in Armed Conflicts” was made.  The Resolution drew attention to the need 
to control the conduct of armed conflicts and that the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 need to broaden its scope to cover modern forms of 
armed conflicts.  It referred to the need to protect those engaged in struggles 
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against colonial regimes with a view to treat them as prisoners of war or 
political prisoners not as criminals64.   
As far as civilian protection was concerned, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution confirming the Resolution of the 1965 Vienna Conference of the 
Red Cross on the Protection of Civilian Population against the Dangers of 
Indiscriminate Warfare65.  The concern of the United Nations about 
protection of civilians in armed conflicts has been reflected in subsequent 
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly linking the issue of their 
protection with respect of their human rights.  A fact which suggests that 
respect of human rights of civilians during armed conflicts constitutes one of 
the basics of the international system of protection of civilians.  The 
Resolution of the General Assembly adopted in 1970 affirmed “the basic 
principles for the protection of civilian population in armed conflicts, 
without prejudice to their future elaboration within the framework of 
progressive development of the international law of armed conflicts”.  One 
of these basic principles is the principle which provides that “fundamental 
human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in international 
instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict”66.  
                                                 
64 For text of Teheran Declaration of 1968, “Human Rights, A Compilation of International Instruments” 
United Nations pp. 43-46. 
65 Schindler and Toman, op.cit, p. 251. 
66 For more details, Leisle, op.cit, pp. 49-50. 
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There is no doubt that subsequent efforts made by the Red Cross to reaffirm 
and develop humanitarian law, which resulted in the adoption of the two 
Protocols of 1977, was a respond to Teheran Conference and United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions adopted on the subject calling for “respect of 
human rights in armed conflicts”67.  
At the Conference of the Red Cross Experts, held in March 1971, the 
consensus was that the reaffirmation and development of international 
humanitarian law was urgently required and that the rules of humanitarian 
law are to be developed in light of progress achieved in the realism of 
human rights principles, to provide better protection for victims.  They 
mentioned that the active role played by the United Nations General 
Assembly in examining the problem of respect for human rights in armed 
conflicts has its influence and its importance in assuring an effective 
                                                 
67 The importance of taking human rights principles into consideration in attempting to discuss the issue of 
developing rules of protection to civilians is also evidenced by the presence of Representatives of the 
Human Rights Division of the United Nations in the Conference of Red Cross Experts held at the Hague, 
March 1971, besides representatives of the League of Red Cross, delegates and experts of the ICRC,on 
“Protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts”-Report of the ICRC at the XXXI International 
Conference of the Red Cross, Istanbul, Geneva, 1969 p. 11. Also Report of the Red Cross Experts, pp. 16-
17 and Annex III of the Report p. 16. It is to be noted that this was the first conference of Red Cross 
Experts on humanitarian law for twenty-five years ago. The last one was held in 1949 with the purpose of 
revising Geneva Convention of 1929 and the drawing of a Convention for the protection of civilians which 
have resulted on the adoption of common Article (3) which is regarded as a “Mini-Human Rights Treaty” 
in that it provides for principles ensuring respect of human rights of individual civilians being influenced 
by the Declaration of Human Rights of 1949 – Lindsay Moir “The Historical Development of the 
Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-international Armed Conflicts”. International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, volume 47, April 1998, pp. 355-361. Also – Final Record of Diplomatic Conference at 
Geneva 1949, vol. 11-13 (1951). 
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international system of protection68.  Later these aspirations and human 
rights trends have been adopted more specifically in the general debate that 
took place in Government Experts and Diplomatic Conference when 
discussing draft of Protocol II.  These points to one fact that the problems of 
protection of civilians dealt with by humanitarian law are of human rights 
concern also69. 
ii. The Conference of Government Experts and the Question of  
Protection of Civilians against Dangers of Hostilities: A  
Human Rights Issue 
The main task of the Conference of Government experts 1972 was to 
reaffirm and develop rules, which existed as customary or conventional, 
restricting the conduct of military operations in non-international armed 
conflict with a view to provide effective protection to civilians.  The 
Representative of the United Nations Secretary General requested that the 
issue of protection of civilians against dangers of hostilities to be discussed 
and considered in light of the texts adopted by the General Assembly with a 
view to lessen suffering as much as possible in time of conflict i.e. in light of 
                                                 
68 One of the experts proposed on the subject of humanitarian relief that the principle of “fundamental 
human rights should be safeguarded” should be embodied in the legal instrument to be adopted i.e. Protocol 
II – Conference of the Red Cross Experts in the Reaffirmation and Development of international 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (The Hague, 1-6 March 1971) in Report on the Work of 
the Conference, Geneva, April 1971, p. 19. 
69 Draper G. I.A.P: “The relationship between the human rights regime and the law of armed conflicts”, 
International Conference on Humanitarian Law, San Romeo, 1970, Proceeding, Grassi, 1970, pp. 141-156. 
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human rights principles70.  The idea of drafting a Protocol adopting 
principles and rules in light of Human Rights Conventions was not a matter 
to be easily accepted or obtain consensus on.   
Different views were held by experts on the issue, one view that human 
rights concepts and principles are too broad and too vague to serve the 
specific problems which civilians experience as a result of such conflicts.  
The mere reaffirmation of such concepts and principles in a proposed draft 
Protocol II cannot be expected to bring radical improvement to the situation 
of civilian population as victims of such conflicts.  Sharing the same view, 
other experts saw the ambiguity of any formula capable of embodying the 
principles embodied in human rights instruments which go beyond the 
sphere of conflicts.  Though agreed on the principle, experts held divergent 
views as to nature of basic rules and human rights principles to be adopted 
so as to avoid complexities on application.  In contrast, the view expressed 
by several experts who seemed to obtain acceptance was that the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be deemed an instrument of 
customary international law and thus binding on all states.  Those 
                                                 
70 He drew the Conference’s attention to Resolution 2677 (XXV) adopted in December 1970 by the 
General Assembly; this Resolution requested the Secretary General to transmit his two reports on respect 
for human rights in armed conflicts (A/7720 and A/8052/to the ICRC, for consideration by the Conference 
of Government experts and to report in the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session on the results of 
the present Conference – ICRC, Conference of Government of Experts on the Re-affirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict Geneva 24 May-12 June 
1971, Report of the Work of the Conference, p. 19. 
 102
advocating this view were referring to the Declaration made at the 
International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran 1968 to that effect71.  
They saw that in drafting the Protocol, consideration should be given to the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, containing minimum rules for 
protection and not only to the rules of positive law.  Other experts 
advocating this view were of opinion that human rights concepts and 
principles relevant, were in need of elaboration and to be reformulated into a 
set of detailed rules which would result in making a balance between 
humanitarian values at danger and military requirement.  After long 
discussions a set of rules were formulated which purport to achieve this 
balance and to ensure respect for the protection of civilian population.  The 
Draft was presented to the Diplomatic Conference for discussion. 
iii. Draft of Protocol II Discussed at the Diplomatic Conference:    
An Aspiration of Human Rights Basic Principles 
The fundamental task of the Diplomatic Conference (1974-1977) was to 
explore areas of reducing human sufferings of the individual victims of 
armed conflicts and in particular civilians regardless of their race, 
nationality, religions beliefs, class or political opinion.  Basing itself on the 
importance of maintaining the principle of state sovereignty and non-
                                                 
71 ibid, pp. 35-45. 
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interference in the domestic affairs of states, but also taking into account the 
lacunae on the system of protection provided for in common Article 3, the 
Diplomatic Conference made emphasis on the need to create a harmony 
between “the necessity of war” and the requirements of ‘humanity’ in 
enacting any rules of protection.  Some delegates of states saw that it was 
high time that recognition was given to certain values and elementary rights 
which guarantee protection and create harmony72. 
In fact delegates were essentially motivated by two principles during their 
discussion.  First, those basic human rights constituted an integral part of the 
international system of protection and should therefore be respected and 
protected in all circumstances without any restrictions.  Second, that the 
fundamental rule according to which the parties to a conflict did not have 
unlimited rights in their choice of methods of conflicting harm on the 
opposing party, should be defined and elaborated in such a way as to ensure 
better protection and applicable guarantees for the civilian population.  After 
lengthy discussions on how to create this harmony by delegates, a consensus 
was reached that the principle of “respect for human rights”, sanctioned by 
all states, provides the basis for an international system of protection and 
offers a basis for a solution to the problems which arises relating to the 
                                                 
72 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
Editors: Yves Sandoz. Christophe Swinaski, Brceno Zimmermann, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva, 
1987, pp. 1365-1481. 
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protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts.  As a result, the 
Conference decided to set up a system of protection to civilians and victims 
of internal conflicts by adopting rules inspired by basic human rights 
principles73. 
This is reflected in the second paragraph of the Preamble of Protocol II 
which is based on the proposal made by experts, then embodied in the ICRC 
draft adopted.  It states that “…. The High Contracting Parties …. Recalling 
furthermore that international instruments relating to human rights offer a 
basic protection to the human person”. 
The inclusion of references to human rights in the Preamble was radical at 
the time since it is to be regarded as an acknowledgment of the role of 
human rights law in adding to the protection of rights of individuals in 
internal conflicts and adding to the creation of a firm foundation of an 
international system of protection.  In addition the insertion of this clause 
affirms and strengthens the ties between international human rights and 
humanitarian law.  A fact is reflected in the enactment and the formulation 
of a set of rules founded and inspired by basic human rights principles.  The 
legal foundation of this system of protection of civilians is found in identical 
                                                 
73 For an excellent analysis of discussions held by states delegates who attended sessions of the Diplomatic 
Conference of 1977, Fritz, “Reaffirmation And Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts”, The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974-1977, Part 1: Combatants and 
Civilians – 8 NY IL (1977) pp. 107-135. 
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clauses in human rights instruments74.  Jean Pictet in pointing to this 
influence called Protocol II a “Charter for Mankind”, since its provisions 
offer victims of such conflicts rights as a human against the state in time of 
conflict.  It is Pictet who suggested using humanitarian law in the broader 
sense to include both the laws of war and human rights75. 
4. Sources of International Rules Protecting Civilians in Non- 
International Armed Conflicts  
International humanitarian law has developed as a branch of international 
law.  As a result, principal sources of international law provided for in 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International court of Justice determine 
such sources76. 
International humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts which is relatively and recently developed, embody rules providing 
for protection of civilians, which are principally derived from multilateral 
treaties i.e. Geneva Convention IV 1949 Common Article 3 and Protocol II.  
                                                 
74 For example Part II of Protocol II titled “Humane Treatment” provides for basic principles embodied in 
Human Rights instruments aiming at protecting persons who do not or no longer participate in hostilities 
against abuse of power and against inhumane and cruel treatment. Also the “prosecution and punishment of 
criminal offences related to the armed conflict” provided for in Article (6). The standards of “due process” 
laid down in Article (6), have been spared from human rights conventions – Human Rights as the basis of 
International Humanitarian Law: Proceedings of the International Conference on Humanitarian law”, San 
Remo 24-27 September 1970, Lugano – Beltizonia, Grassi, 1970, p. 385. 
75 Pictet, Jean: “New Aspects of International Humanitarian Law”, IRRC, 17th year, No. 99, October 1977, 
pp. 339-401. 
76 The sources as stated by Article 38(1) of the Statute are: (a) international conventions whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states (b) international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principle of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) judicial decisions and teachings  of highly qualified publicists of the various nations. 
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Some of these rules are recognized by international custom, some refer to 
general principles of international laws like principle of humanity and to 
certain principles embodied in international human rights treaties. 
i. Treaty Rules as a Source 
Common Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV 1949 relating to the protection 
of civilians constitutes the main source of rules of protection.  This Article 
has been supplemented with Protocol II of 1977 Additional to Geneva 
Convention IV.  In International Law a treaty is a means by which a state 
can enter into a legal obligation, however Geneva Convention Article (3) 
and Protocol II has departed from the principles of law of Treaties in that 
non-states actors, parties to the conflict are bound by such rules of 
protection77.  Thus the main exception to the general rules of law of treaties 
is that one of the parties to the conflict, not a state, is bound by its rules 
without signing it.  The general rules of treaties, under Vienna Convention 
on Law of Treaties 1969, are applicable in relation to entry into force, 
application, interpretation, and modification etc. to such instruments 
applicable in internal armed conflicts. 
The roots of the present principles and rules of protection of civilians in 
Article 3 and Protocol II are to be considered in relation to the roots of the 
                                                 
77 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties binds only states parties to international treaties. 
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present international humanitarian law78.  Historically, the laws of war are as 
old as war itself.  Legal commentators traced these roots in connection with 
different historical eras.  To Lauterpact “the roots of the present laws of war 
are to be traced back to practices of belligerents which arose during the latter 
part of the middle Ages”79.  These practices (i.e. the rules regulating 
warfare) of belligerents were based and developed on the teachings of 
Christianity, the writings of medieval moralists and Renaissance humanist 
and consideration of Chivalry80.  The relationship which arose between 
Muslim and Christian powers illustrates the Islamic humanitarian rules of 
war81. 
These rules of war developed to elaborate the development of a treaty 
system which appeared after the mid of nineteenth century with the 
conclusion of the 1864 Geneva Convention.  This treaty and subsequent 
treaties in addition to customary rules and general principles of international 
law constitute basic sources of the law protecting civilians.  After the mid of 
                                                 
78 While the rules of laws of war were not applicable in civil wars, however upon recognition of 
belligerency certain rules and principles of laws of war were applicable, this takes place when the conflict 
is so intensive so as not to be mere rebellion or revolution but a civil war, Schwarzenberger, vol.1. op.cit, 
pp. 689-690. 
79 H. Lautherpacht, “International Law”, vol. II (7th Ed.), 1952, p. 226. On more details on the history and 
sources of the law of armed conflict on Leslie C. Green, “The Contemporary Law of armed conflict”, 
Second Edition, Manchester University Press, http://www.man.ac.uk/mup 2000 pp. 20-53. 
80 Ian Harding: “The Origins and Effectiveness of the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war 
victims”, International Review of the Red Cross (ICRC), June 1973, No. 147 pp. 283-290. Also, G. S. A. 
D., Draper: “Penitential discipline and public wars in the Middle Ages (1), ICRC, No. 1 – April 1961, pp. 
4-18. 
81 Dr. Ameur Zemmali: “Iman Al-Awzai and his humanitarian ideas”, ICRC, March-April 1990, No. 275 
pp. 115-123 – Said El-Dakkak: “International humanitarian law between the Islamic concept and positive 
and international law”, ICRC, ibid, pp. 101-114. 
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twentieth century human rights law have influenced rules of protection to 
civilians to the extent that it is to be considered as one of the sources which 
added in making conflicts less inhumane.   
ii. Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law Applicable 
in International Armed Conflicts 
One of the main sources of international law is “International custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law”82.  As such “custom” refers 
to those rules of behavior which emerge and provide for what is permitted 
and what is not in any society.  These rules usually develop within a society, 
are acceptable and maintained with other members of the society whether 
local or international society.  At the beginning these practices or custom 
were not written or codified however this code of behavior may develop and 
be codified in treaties and enforced by courts and legislations.  In certain 
situation custom reflects the needs and values of a certain community at a 
certain time.  In international law, the existence of customary rules is 
deduced from the practice of states83. 
Humanitarian law, a branch of international law, the most important source 
of its rules for centuries was customary law.  At a certain stage of its 
                                                 
82  International custom as a second source of international law is mentioned in the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, Article 38(c).  
83  M.N. Shaw, “International Law”, Third Edition, Grotious Publications, Cambridge University Press, 
1995, pp. 60-78 – The ICJ in the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta) case, stated that the substance of 
customary international law must be “looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinion juris of states” 
– ICJ Reports 1985, p. 29. 
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development, it was regarded as a dynamic process of rules creation and 
even more important than treaties since it is of universal application.  The 
importance of custom to protection of civilians lies on the fact that it 
provides for rules of behavior which reflected the concerns of societies 
irrespective of differences of cultural and political traditions.  The 
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua case confirmed that custom is 
constituted by two elements: the objective one of “general practice” and the 
subjective one “accepted as law”84.  As for the first element the existence of 
customary rules governing the protection of civilians during armed conflicts 
can be deduced from the practice and behavior of belligerents and states 
during armed conflicts, which may be evidenced in numerous sources e.g. 
man official manuals like manuals of military law, orders to naval forces, 
official pronouncements, states legislations, judgments of international 
tribunals, treaties and international instruments like Geneva Conventions 
codifying customary law .As such it can be referred to as evidence of 
customary law even against a state not a party to a treaty e.g. Protocol II 
which partly codifies customary law. 
The second element in the definition of custom, subjective element to accept 
a certain conduct as a law constitutes an important element to customary 
                                                 
84  Nicaragua v. USA (Merits), ICJ Reports, 1986, 14 at p. 97.  O.Elias, “The nature of the subjective 
element in customary international law”, ICLQ. 44 (1995), pp. 501-520. 
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rules protecting civilians i.e. the belief by a state “through its belligerents, 
that behavior in a certain way e.g. not to attack civilians, was under a legal 
obligation to act that way.  One has to mention here, that state sovereignty 
constitutes the main factor in this element i.e. states are only bound by what 
they have consented to85. 
a. International Customary Rules and Protection of Civilians in 
Internal Armed Conflicts 
As has been mentioned earlier, international law distinguished between two 
types of armed conflicts: interstate armed conflicts and internal armed 
conflicts.  Interstates conflicts were regulated by a set of legal rules 
governing the conduct of hostilities and protecting persons not participating 
or no longer participating in hostilities86.  The basic source of such rules is 
custom which have developed progressively since the eighteenth century 
(i.e. The Age of Enlightenment) which were concerned only with the 
                                                 
85  M. Akehurst, “Custom as a source of international law”, BYIL 47 (1974-5) p. 1. 
86  The 1907 Hague Regulations concerning the laws and customs of land warfare, codified customary rules 
of protection to civilians and their property, applied only to wars of international character. Belligerents 
were to accord certain protection to civilians in the fighting zones and in occupied territory. Personal 
protection included basic and fundamental humanitarian requirements protecting civilian population e.g. 
respect for family honor and rights, life and religions convictions, outright killing, wounding and 
maltreating of civilians were prohibited. Compulsion to take part in military operations and labor were 
prohibited. Detention of civilians as prisoners of war in the fighting areas or as occupant of enemy territory 
was prohibited. Now under the 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, common Article (3) requires each party to an armed conflict not of an international 
character to accord the minimum of fundamental rights of humanity to civilians which are similar to the 
humanitarian requirements of customary international law such as prohibition of murder, cruel treatment, 
torture and executions  ,unless imposed by a regularly constituted court – Richard A. Falk – op.cit, p. 128.   
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combatants in battlefield and the conduct of hostilities87.  With the 
development of means and methods of war, military leaders of that time and 
legal writers in Europe called for the development of customary rules of war.  
As a result, a number of restrictions evolved and were imposed on 
combatants prohibiting them from the commission of certain acts during 
hostilities.  One of these basic rules was the prohibition of attacking non-
combatants88.  This principle developed later to constitute a number of rules 
which became binding by international custom.  This development resulted 
in having two sets of rules i.e. a set of rules which is applicable to 
combatants only e.g. with regard to treatment of prisoners of war, wounded 
and sick.  The second set of rules governs protection of non-combatants i.e. 
protection of civilian, and their property. The development of customary 
rules protecting civilians have been influenced by three basic principles i.e. 
the principle of chivalry, the principle of necessity and the principle of 
humanity.  The rules of conduct enacted by states for its armies called 
“Military laws” have contributed also in developing international customary 
                                                 
87  Meron, “The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law”, AJIL 90 
(1996) pp. 238-49. 
88  The rules restricting conduct enacted by states for its enemies called “Military Laws” have contributed 
in developing international customary rules; Lieber Code is considered the first which codified law and 
customs of war. It was addressed to the members of armed forces in U.S. provides for obligations and 
duties which the American soldier should be bound with. Though the code is considered a domestic law, 
nevertheless it influenced most national laws and because of universal application. It provided for 
provisions for protection of civilians – the code reproduced in Schindler and Toman, editions, “The laws of 
Armed Conflicts” Martinus Nighoff Publications, Geneva 1988. Dordecht, Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva 
1988.  
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rules and Lieber Code is considered the first which codified customs of 
war89. 
However, as early as the writings of Vattel in the middle of the eighteenth 
century, it was accepted customary rule that both parties in a civil war had 
an obligation to observe the common laws of war; it took two centuries to 
reduce this customary rule to codification in the Geneva Conventions of 
1949.  This customary rule put an obligation on both parties to the civil war 
i.e. the government and parties seeking to overthrow it, that it was not 
legally permissible to murder, torture or mistreat persons taking no active 
part in hostilities.  Although in many instances of civil war such actions did 
take place.  In civil war, few of the bare requirements of humanity have been 
observed in the twentieth century which witnessed the bitterest armed 
conflicts90.  The reason, being that civil war conflicts were governed by 
domestic laws as states were concerned with maintaining their sovereignty 
rather than humanitarian demands and protection of civilians.  This situation 
did not last long, by the beginning of the twentieth century and with changes 
in international community and evolution of concepts of human rights, the 
situation became different and this distinction began to loose its value as far 
as civilians as human beings were concerned, a fact which contributed in the 
                                                 
89  These principles are examined in Chapter Three. 
90  Emmerich de Vattel, “The law of Nations or the Principles of International Law”, Trans, of 1788 ed. By 
C.G. Fenwith (Washington D.C: Garnegie Institute), 1916, p. 336. 
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extension of application of international customary rules to civil wars in 
states practice.  Spanish civil war (1936-1939), reflected the beginning of 
states practice and its tendencies to extend application of certain customary 
rules applicable in interstate wars e.g. rules forbidding attacks of civilians, 
rules prohibiting international bombing of civilians and their property.  By 
thus, disregarding the distinction between international and internal war in 
applying general rules of protection91. 
The application of international customary rules to internal armed conflicts 
with regard to protection of civilians has been subsequently affirmed by a 
number of resolutions adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations92.  
Besides belligerents states practice, resolutions adopted by United Nations 
General Assembly and the International Red Cross Committee and some 
military manuals, all contributed directly or indirectly in promoting the 
application by the parties to the conflict of the basic principles of 
                                                 
91  On July 17, 1936, the Spanish army revolted against the duly elected government of the Spanish 
Republic. The civil strife in Spain was characterized as an ideological struggle i.e. the Nationalist believed 
that they were fighting what they considered to be “communist” influence in Spain; while on the loyalist  or 
government side all felt they were fighting what they considered to be a “fascist” influence. Once the 
fighting began the Spanish civil strife was quickly changed from an internal civil war to a conflict in which 
international elements intervened. For more details on this point: Arnold Toynbee, “The International 
Repercussions of the war in Spain”, Survey of International Affairs, 1937 (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1938) pp. 2-23.   
In subsequent other civil wars, the tendency to adhere to basic customary principles to protect civilians 
have been applied during the Congo civil war 1960, for an extensive understanding of the Congo civil war 
and legal issues involved, Richard A. Falk, op.cit, p. 244-301.  
92  On September 30, 1938, the Assembly of the League of Nations unanimously adopted a resolution 
relating to the Spanish Civil war providing for the recognition of certain principles and that the bombing of 
civilian populations as a practice, in absence of military necessity, causing needless suffering, was 
condemned under recognized principles of international law. Marco, op.cit, p. 1183.  
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humanitarian law in non-international armed conflicts, by calling parties to 
the conflict to respect as a minimum common Article 3 even if not parties to 
Geneva Conventions by the fact that such principles reflect customary rules. 
Both common Article 3 and Protocol II are regarded as codifying rules of 
customary law which evolved as general principles of humanity, which 
constitutes the minimum protection due to every human being at any time 
and place and during any armed conflict.  This has been described by the 
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua Case as “… these rules reflects 
elementary considerations of humanity applicable under customary 
international law to any armed conflict…”93  The gradual extension of 
applicability of these customary principles relating to international armed 
conflicts to internal conflicts governing the conduct of hostilities and means 
and methods of warfare with the aim of protecting civilians, is being 
justified by the fact that what is inhumane in international armed conflicts is 
also inhumane and prohibited in non-international armed conflicts94.  Two 
Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on human rights affirmed 
                                                 
93 Nicaragua Case, infra, Para. 218. 
94 For example, the use of chemical weapons by central government of a state against rebels or its own 
population is in contravention to the customary international law that is applicable in internal armed 
conflicts. 
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this.  It called for the application of certain customary rules regarding 
protection of civilians in both internal and international armed conflicts95. 
The importance of customary rules also appears in providing protection to 
civilians in absence of a legal rule.  This has been provided for in Martens 
Clause in the Preamble to 1899 Hague Convention IV which states96: “in 
cases not included in the regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and 
the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of 
the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized 
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
conscience”. In fact the principle of humanity and good conscience are but 
representing customary rules which are universally acceptable.  This clause 
has been subsequently embodied in Geneva Conventions 1949 and Protocol 
II of 1977.  By such, customary rules are complementary to international 
treaties in providing rules for protection of civilians; in addition they are 
binding also on non-state parties to such treaties.  The violation of such rules 
is considered a crime which entails international responsibility for both 
states involved and individuals committing acts against civilians and their 
property. 
                                                 
95 The first, Resolution 2444 adopted in 1968 by the General Assembly recognizing the necessity of 
applying basic humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts. The second Resolution, 2675 adopted in 
1970, on basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts. G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. 
GAOR., 23rd session, supp. N. 18 U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) and G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR., 25th 
Session, supp. No. 28 U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
96  Hague Convention IV (Schindler and Toman, op.cit, p. 70).  
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iii. General Principles of International Humanitarian Law Protecting 
Civilians and its Applicability by Analogy to Internal Armed Conflicts 
The General Principles of international law are the third source, as provided 
for in Article 38(1) (c) of the Statute of International Court of Justice.  These 
are “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”.  When 
embodied in Article 38, this clause is meant to provide solutions in cases 
where gaps in treaty law and customary law exist97.  However, there is a 
controversy among legal jurists, about the meaning of “general principles of 
international law” which is reflected by two views.  To one view, it means 
general principles of international law while to the other view, it is meant 
general principles of national law, i.e. gaps in international law may be filled 
by borrowing principles which are common to all national legal system.  
Though specific rules of law may vary from one legal system to another, yet 
the basic principles are often similar98.  As such, general principles of law is 
not a source in a strict sense i.e. extending rules by analogy or inferring the 
existence  of broad principles from more specific rules. 
These general principles have proved most useful in other branches of 
international law like international humanitarian law when the modern 
                                                 
97  M. C. Bassiouni, “A Functional Approach to General Principles of International Law” Michigan Journal 
of International Law II (1990), pp. 768-818. 
98  Akheurst, op.cit, p. 49 – The ICJ had applied general principles of law in a number of cases e.g the 
legality of the threat or use of Nuclear weapons, Advisory opinion, July 8, 1996, ICJ Reports, 1996, p. 226 
– Also in Nicaragua v. US, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14. 
 117
system of international humanitarian law started to develop at the beginning 
of the twentieth century.  Principles on the conduct of hostilities applicable 
in interstate wars which have become customary law and have been 
codified, like the principle  of proportionality and necessity which were 
extended to apply to non-international armed conflict by analogy ,were 
useful in supplementing and implementing such law.  Example of certain 
rules of the law of international armed conflicts applicable to fill gaps in 
non-international armed conflicts are with regard to the adoption of 
definition of military objective and civilian population which the law does 
not provide a definition.  To apply the principle of distinction, the definition 
applicable in international armed conflicts were extended to apply also in 
non-international armed conflicts.  Also in humanitarian law applicable in 
non international armed conflicts no combatant status is recognized and so 
no definition for them is provided for under the law.  However to protect 
civilian in non-international armed conflicts by extending application of 
rules under international armed conflicts, a distinction must be made 
between rebels who fight and civilians.  The solution is found in applying 
rules of distinction provided for in law of international armed conflicts99. 
                                                 
99  Hoffman, M.H., “Declaration on the Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of 
Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts” in IRRC, No. 278, 1990, pp. 404-408 – Pictet, J., 
“Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law”, Geneva, Martins Nijhoff Publishers, 
Henry Dunant Institute, 1985, p. 59.  
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Another basic general principles of international humanitarian law extended 
to non-international armed conflicts, are the “the elementary considerations 
of humanity” and the “Martens clause”100.  Both clauses reflect common 
values in any cultures that it becomes also customary international law.  The 
importance of these two clauses lies on the fact that they provide solutions to 
problems which may arise during armed conflicts.  In fact a number of 
international rules of protection of civilians embodied in common Article (3) 
and Protocol II Additional to Geneva Convention IV of 1949 refer to such 
general principles which inspire the whole system of protection of civilians 
under humanitarian law.  The reason been that they represent common 
values to all civilizations and are applicable in all times and all 
circumstances, as such they may be referred to in providing rules to fill gaps 
in treaty law or customary law.  According to such rules it is prohibited to 
attack civilians based on the principles of distinction between civilians and 
combatants, civilian objects and military objects.  It also provides for the 
principle of necessity and the prohibition of causing unnecessary 
suffering101. 
                                                 
100  Ticehurst, R. “The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict” in IRRC, No. 317, 1997, pp. 125-
134. 
101   Macro Sassoli and Antoine A. Bouvier, “How Does Law Protect in War? International Committee of 
the Red Cross – (Web: www.icrc.org.) April 1999, p. 113 – Also, Greig D.W., “The Underlying Principles 
of International Humanitarian Law” in Australian Year Book of International Law, volume 9, 1985 pp. 46-
85. 
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In practice, reference is made to human rights law for the precise meaning of 
certain principles in some cases, like “the principle of humanity”.  This 
principle which is considered a basis of human rights law has been 
transformed into a number of rules.  Such transformation takes place in 
practice through Common Article 3which provides for the prohibition of 
inhumane treatment, the protection of life and human dignity.  Paragraph 
two of the Preamble of Protocol II affirmed this by recalling that 
“international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to 
the human person”.  Thus, a gap in humanitarian law treaties and customary 
law may be filled by recourse to general principles of human rights 
instruments which embody such principles, when seeking for a precise 
meaning. 
Conclusion 
An examination of the historical development of humanitarian law 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts have shown that the first 
rules were aimed at protecting the civilian population from the hostilities in 
interstate wars and that traditionally as a result of application of the principle 
of absolute states sovereignty, treatment of civilians in internal armed 
conflicts fell within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the state.  
However, a number of factors contributed in developing rules of protection 
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by the beginning of the twentieth century. The occurrence of civil wars and 
severity of its consequences on civilian population led to changes in states 
practice.  However, since the Spanish civil war (1936-39) the distinction 
between international and non-international armed conflicts started to be 
disregarded in states practice.  Certain rules which were applicable during 
international armed conflicts were extended to internal conflicts e.g. the 
prohibition of the international bombing of civilians and attacks on non-
military objects.  Subsequent states practice extended the application of 
some general principles of the laws of interstates war to internal conflict 
intending to protect civilians.  After the Second World War a significant 
development in international law concept took place by providing for 
international principles for protection of individuals under International 
Human Rights Declaration of 1948 in time of peace.  A fact which shook the 
bar of absolute states sovereignty, a year later, when states consented to be 
bound by certain minimum rules and principles to be applicable in internal 
armed conflicts in common Article 3of the Geneva Convention IV of 1949, 
which is considered the first international rules which impose obligations 
upon parties to the conflict requiring them to observe legal norms during 
conflict with the purpose to ensure humane treatment e.g. it prohibited acts 
as cruelty, murder, torture and unfair trial. Subsequent major development 
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has been affected after the adoption of Human Rights Conventions in 1966, 
when specific rules under Protocol II were adopted which tends to protect 
civilians as human beings. Protocol II of 1977 is the first international 
agreement which provides for rules regulating the conduct of the parties in a 
non-international armed conflict. The main sources of rules protecting 
civilians are treaty rules embodied in common Article 3 and Protocol II.  In 
addition to treaty rules, other sources of the law are principles of 
international customary law which developed since feudal times, together 
with considerations of humanity and general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations which reflects basic principles of human rights law.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Specifities of Humanitarian Law Applicable in  
Non-International Armed Conflicts and  
Human Rights Law 
Introduction 
International humanitarian law (HL) applies different rules protecting 
victims during armed conflicts depending on whether the armed conflict is 
classified as international or non-international1.  Though the sufferings of 
victims and the humanitarian needs are the same during armed conflicts 
which suggests by logic to apply the same rules of protection, however 
combined factors have resulted in having a humanitarian law applicable in 
                                                 
1 International humanitarian law differentiate between different types of situations of armed conflicts: 1- 
inter-state armed conflict, as defined in Article 2 common to four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
according to Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions of 1977 Article l para.3.  2- Non-international 
armed conflicts under common Article 3 of 1949 Geneva Conventions and 3- non-international armed 
conflicts under Article (1) of 1977, under Additional Protocol II , internal disturbances and tensions, riots 
falls outside the ambit of application of humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts 
HL(non).  4- And national liberation armed conflicts described in Article l, Para. 4, Protocol I as armed 
conflict in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination as contained in the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.  As such liberation armed conflicts are 
considered international armed conflicts for purposes of applications of the law.  Under Article 96(7) of 
Protocol I by a unilateral declaration, a liberation movement can formally adhere to the Protocol I of 1977, 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Conventional Weapons of 1981.  Example the PLO (Palestine 
Liberation Organization) made several declaration addressed to ICRC – ABI – SAAB, George, "Wars of 
National liberation in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols" Recueil des court (Collected Courses of the 
Hague Academy of International Law, 1979, IV, pp. 353-445.     
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internal conflicts with special characteristics2.  The application of 
humanitarian law to internal armed conflicts requires characterizing an 
"armed conflict" as "non-international armed conflict" according to criteria 
provided for in the Geneva Conventions, Protocol II and customary 
international law.  The status of parties in the conflict in most cases is the 
government of a sovereign state which enjoys under international law certain 
sovereign rights.  These rights include the sovereign rights to use force to 
suppress rebels, to protect its own citizens and take measures it deems fit to 
restore internal order and preserve its sovereignty against the other non-state 
parties to the conflicts who are not recognized as subjects of international 
law.  These among other factors led states to build a bridge between internal 
and the international regulation of armed conflicts balancing between the 
humanitarian needs of victims of such conflicts and the preservation of the 
sovereign rights of states in dealing with its domestic affairs.  Developments 
in international law played a role in the process of creation of universal 
system regulating such conflicts, possessing special characteristics aiming at 
                                                 
2   The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) submitted a report in 1948 recommending that the 
Geneva Conventions apply the whole of international humanitarian law "in all cases of armed conflicts". 
The recommendation was rejected, Macro justified the rejection by stating that "To apply all rules of 
contemporary International Humanitarian Law (IHL) of international armed conflicts to non-international 
armed conflicts would be incompatible with the very concept of the contemporary international society 
made up of sovereign states" in Macro SASSOLI ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, How Does Law Protect in 
War? Cases, Documents and Teaching materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian 
Law, ICRC, April 1999, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 202. 
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the adjustment of behaviour of the parties to the conflict and the 
humanitarian objectives of the law.   
This chapter examines the basic specifities of humanitarian law applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts.  It includes eight parts.  Part 1 discusses 
the relation of international law with internal armed conflicts.  Part 2 
examines the scope of application of humanitarian in non-international 
armed conflicts and problems of qualification.  Part 3 examines the question 
of legal characterization of situation of an armed conflict according to 
criteria of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. Part 4 discusses 
how grave violations of human rights may characterize a situation as an 
armed conflict. Part 5 discusses basic specifities of Geneva Law applicable 
in light of the law of treaties. Part 6 examines the customary status of 
common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. Part 7 discusses the jus cogens 
character of Geneva Conventions protective rule applicable.  Part 8 
examines the specifities of the relation of humanitarian law and human 
rights law. 
1. International Law and Internal Armed Conflicts 
International humanitarian law whether applicable during international or 
non-international armed conflicts is that branch of international law which 
contains international rules aiming at the protection of those who do not or 
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no longer directly participate in hostilities3.  Being a branch of international 
law its development being affected by the development of international law 
and its basic concepts.  It shares with international law its general 
characteristics and operates within the general norms and concepts which 
govern the international legal system4.  However at the same time it has its 
own characteristics and aspects which in some cases make it operating 
within its own norms.  Its rules reflect its humanitarian specifities which 
keeps it away from political or conceptual diversities.  It enjoys universality 
as its rules are based on principles and concepts which all nations, societies, 
cultures and religions accept and recognize.  The humanitarian objects and 
purposes and its principles represent the supreme values and common 
interests of the international community.  In fact it is this notion of "common 
interest" which has formulated the general characteristics of Geneva 
Conventions. 
 
                                                 
3  Efforts to apply international humanitarian law in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts which failed during the Diplomatic Conference by adopting Article 3 and Protocol II continued in 
international practice.  A general tendency  to apply the same legal rules in both armed conflicts in certain 
conventional weapons has broadened their scope of application to apply to international and non-
international armed conflicts e.g. the Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention of 1977 (Article 1).  Different 
International Instruments apply same rules e.g. Protocol on the Protection of Cultural Property (1999).  The 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Enrolment of Children in Armed 
Conflicts prohibits the direct involvement of persons less than 18 years in hostility or their forced 
recruitment into armed forces in both international and non-international armed conflicts.  International 
criminal jurisprudence encouraged such tendency in certain cases by assimilating offences in international 
and non-international armed conflicts – L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 
(Manchester University Press 1993-2000, p. 59).  
4  Akheurst, op.cit. pp. 9-32. 
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Humanitarian Law lays rules and imposes obligations which bind not only 
states but also persons.  However, to apply the whole rules of international 
humanitarian law during internal armed conflicts is in contradiction to the 
very concept of sovereignty, which forms one of the basic pillars of 
international law of which humanitarian law is a branch.  It is this concept 
which justifies use of force by states to suppress rebels and restore order 
while international law prohibits the use of force in interstate relations. 
i. International Law and the Legality of Use of Force in Internal 
Armed Conflicts 
International humanitarian law rules are promulgated when resort to use of 
force or war was lawful under rules of traditional international law and was 
considered an attribute of sovereignty whether used against another state or 
against rebellion nationals.  By the beginning of 20th century use of force 
was gradually restricted in international relations and after 1945 prohibited 
under UN Charter5.  The Charter in Article 2(4) prohibited the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any 
state.  States under the Charter are under obligation to settle their disputes by 
peaceful modes (Article 33 of the Charter), with the exception of two cases.  
                                                 
5  Use of force was restricted by the Covenant of League of Nations.  The first international treaty 
prohibiting use of force in international relation was the Pact of Paris i.e. Briand-Kellog Pact 1928, but its 
effects were limited to states parties to the Pact.  For text, League of Nations, Treaty Series, volume 94. pp. 
58-64. 
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First, in case of collective enforcement action provided for in Chapter VII 
i.e. when the United Nations Security Council orders military or non-
military action to restore peace in areas of conflict.6 Secondly, the exercise 
of the right of individual or collective self defense as provided for in Article 
(51) of the Charter.  Other than these cases, the use of force by a state 
against another state in contravention to the Charter is considered 
aggressive.7 
Modern international law differentiates between rules governing the 
recourse to armed conflict i.e. jus ad bellum and rules governing the actual 
conduct of armed conflict i.e. jus in bello.  Jus ad bellum is the law which 
governs the use of force in international armed conflicts.8  The jus in bello 
i.e. international humanitarian law, is that branch of international law which 
contains principles and rules which set limitations to the use of violence 
during armed conflict to protect those civilian persons (victims) not directly 
involved in hostilities and limit the effects of violence (even to combatants) 
                                                 
6  M. Reismann "Criterion for the lawful use of force in international law" Yale Journal of International 
Law, 10 (1985) pp. 279-285.  On Criticism to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, Akheurst, op.cit. pp. 309-10. 
7   On this issue, Ian Brownlie, "International Law and the use of force by states" – Oxford Clarenton Press 
1968, pp. 406-408, Quincy Wrights "The outlawry of war and the law of war", American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 47, No. 3, July 1953, pp. 365-376 – Krzysztof Skubiszewski, "Use of Force by 
States – Collective Security – Law of War and Neutrality", in: Manual of Public International Law, Max 
Sorensen, ed., Lord, Macmillan, 1968, pp. 739-854 – Yoranm, War, Aggression and Self-defense, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge, Dinstein Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
8  In addition the UN Charter recognizes the use of force by liberation movements for exercise of self-
determination.  The lawful use of force to enforce the right of people to self-determination was recognized 
in Resolution of the UN General Assembly of 2105(XX) passed in 20 December 1965.Is is  also recognized 
in Article (1) of the two UN Human Rights Covenants of 1966, one on civil and political rights, the other 
on economic social and cultural rights. 
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to the amount necessary for the purpose of war.  From the above it is clear 
that the rules governing relations between fighting parties (jus in bello) are 
independent and their application is not conditioned by the rules prohibiting 
the resort to force under jus ad bellum.  Therefore humanitarian law is not 
concerned with the issue of lawfulness or unlawfulness of the use of force in 
international law, its rules operates when armed conflict exist as a fact i.e. 
breaks out.9 
A question then is raised as: to what extent the above rules apply in 
situations of non-international armed conflicts?  Apparently, no rule in 
international law prohibits use of force.  Article 2(4) of the Charter expressly 
prohibits the threat or use of force between states only.  Recourse to use of 
force to repress rebels or restore order within its territory is an exercise of 
right of a sovereign state to deal with its internal matters in situations of 
occurrences of civil wars. 
This principle of prohibition of use of force in international law does not 
apply to states in cases of internal armed conflicts, to restore order.  The 
principle is in consistency with Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which states 
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
                                                 
9  Greenwood, "The Relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello", Review of International Studies 
(RIS) 1983, pp. 221-234. 
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any state”.  This principle which is based on respect of sovereignty of states 
members of UN is subject to an exception when international peace and 
security are threatened.  During the last previous years international 
community and UN Security Council practice have condemned use of force 
by states and non-state actors in cases of commission of grave violations of 
human rights law and humanitarian law as far as civilians are concerned.  
Security Council resolutions passed in connection with such cases, 
condemned such use of force and described it as unlawful since it threatens 
international peace and security.  The Security Council condemned the grave 
violations of human rights and killing of civilians as a result of atrocities 
committed during the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia and during the 
civil war in Rwanda as threatening international peace and exercised its 
power under Chapter VII of the Charter by authorizing the dispatch of 
military forces to stop such use of force.10 This reflects one fact that use of 
force by sovereign state internally (all national laws prohibits the use of 
force against the government) is justified in international law (jus ad 
bellum), as long as it does not violate international rules to the extent to 
threaten international peace and security.  Thus, the lawful exercise of right 
                                                 
10  Security Council Resolutions 827, 1993, 32 International Legal Materials, p. 1203.  The NATO in 1999 
as a result of grave violations of human rights law and humanitarian law as a result of acts committed by 
the Yugoslav authority against rebels in Kosovo who launched a military attack i.e. aerial-bombing raids 
against Serbia.  It justified use of force for humanitarian reasons.  This issue of humanitarian intervention is 
discussed in chapter seven.. 
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of sovereign state to use force to settle its domestic conflicts to suppress 
rebels and restore order is subject to respect of the international rules. 
To conclude, humanitarian law is to be applicable once an "armed conflict" 
international or non-international breaks out whether justified or unjustified 
in international law (jus ad bellum).  Being, a branch of international law, it 
plays an important role and contribute to the achievement of goals of the UN 
Charter in maintaining international peace by ensuring respect of basic 
human rights of individuals and promoting humanity during armed conflicts.  
The basic rules and principles promoting humanity applicable in non-
international armed conflicts are embodied basically in common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II.  Before examining the specifities and main 
characteristics of the law, it is essential to examine first some issues relating 
to the scope of applications of the law and problems of qualification. 
2. The Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law in Internal 
Armed Conflicts and Problems of Qualification 
The application of humanitarian law is based on the existence of a state of 
"armed conflict" whether it is international or non-international armed 
conflict.11  This notion of "armed conflict" adopted by the Geneva 
                                                 
11  Article 2 Common to four Geneva Conventions defines the scope of application to international armed 
conflicts. Common Article 3 of G.C IV defines scope of application of the law in case of internal conflict – 
The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary published under the general editorship of Jean 
Pictet.  
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Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol 1977 which substituted the old 
law "war", gives rise to a number of questions as to what is meant by "armed 
conflict" and what conflicts qualify as an "armed conflict"?12.  The Geneva 
Conventions do not give a definition of the term which created confusion as 
to its meaning and qualification.  There is no common agreement between 
scholars as to the meaning of the term "armed conflict" and "war".  Some 
writers distinguish between "wars" and "armed conflict" on the 
understanding that only states can wage wars based on traditional view, that 
law of war apply only in interstate war and that non-state entities may be 
engaged in civil wars.  Others, consider the term "armed conflicts", to be a 
wider concept to include interstate war and internal armed conflicts, since 
international law now recognizes that non-state entities like rebels can wage 
war and international treaties recognize their status as such.  Some legal 
writers use the term "armed conflict" to refer to a state of situation less than 
war i.e. war imply a more intense or full scale situation than armed conflict.  
                                                 
12  Schwarzenberger "From the law of war to the law of armed conflict" 21 Current Legal Problems 239 
(1968).  Geneva Conventions use both terms i.e. "war" and "armed conflict" in situations of interstate 
conflicts, Common Article (2) defines the cases of application of the Geneva Conventions by stating that it 
should apply "… to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties even if the state of war is not recognizes by one of them".  This 
Article introduced a formula, while before 1949; the law of war applies upon the existence of a formal state 
of war i.e. a situation not expressly recognized as a war did not constitute a war in the legal sense, under 
Article 2.  The Conventions are also applicable in a case where a state declares war but does not engage in 
actual hostilities e.g. if a state captures nationals of enemy states; such internees are entitled to application 
of rules of protection of Geneva Convention IV. Article 2(2) provides that the Conventions also apply 
where the forces of one state occupy all or part of the territory of another state, even if this occupation 
meets with no armed resistance – DIETER FLECK "The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed 
Conflicts" – Oxford University Press 1995, p. 41. 
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As such, war is a wider concept than "armed conflict".  However, the 
distinction will not serve great purpose as Detter pointed "… attempting to 
make a distinction between war and armed conflict is not really fruitful since 
it is not a question of type but one of scale and degree"13.  In practice the 
terms "armed conflict" and "war" are used interchangeably in cases of use of 
force by one party against another party to the conflict.14 
The legal consequence of qualifying a situation of use of armed force as an 
"armed conflict" entails the application of humanitarian law and it depends 
on the intensity of use of violence.  In internal armed conflicts the criteria of 
intensity is crucial since Governments deny the existence of a situation of 
"armed conflict" meeting the criteria of intensity to avoid applicability of 
humanitarian law rules by describing confrontations and the use of force as 
mere disturbances15. 
In absence of a legal definition to the situation of "armed conflict", 
international tribunals’ jurisprudence contributed in clarifying this notion.  
The ICTY in this connection provided for a general definition by stating that 
"an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
                                                 
13  For the confusion created by the use of the term "armed conflict" and different opinions of writers, 
Ingrid Detter, the Law of War, second edition, Cambridge University Press 2000, pp. 17-20. 
14  The Security Council constituted international criminal courts to try persons accused of committing war 
crimes in the conflicts of Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  Some held that wars ceased to exist (i.e. theoretically 
outlawed by the Charter of UN), thus whatever use of force that occur to be given another name i.e. armed 
conflict. 
15  Hans Haug, Humanity for All, op.cit. pp. 510-511. 
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states or protract armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a state"16.  In view 
of this it is evident that use of force is not enough,  the crucial question 
regarding the qualification of a specific conflict as an "armed conflict" is a 
matter of facts depending on the degree of intensity, number of civilian 
victims wounded, killed, detained, displaced and destruction caused as a 
result of use of force.  This factual and objective notion of “armed conflict” 
constitutes a basic factor in determining the scope of application of 
humanitarian law applicable in non international armed conflicts.17 
i. Scope of Application And Problem of Definition 
The definition of the scope of application of common Article 3 in internal 
armed conflicts is absolutely fundamental since the object of international 
humanitarian law is to protect persons and to safeguard the dignity of the 
human person in the extreme situations of war from the consequence of use 
of force.  Common Article 3 in defining the scope of its application provided 
that "in the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring 
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties …".  The Article 
stated, adopts the concept of "armed conflict" as not of an international 
                                                 
16  The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. 1 T-g 1-A, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Jurisdiction ,para. 
70, p. 37. 
17  On the historical development and different uses of the term "armed conflict" and the relation with 
notion of war, K.J. Patrsch, Armed Conflict, in R. Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, vol. 1 (Amesterdam, North Holland) 1992, p. 249. 
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character in defining the scope of its application.  However, it does not 
provide for any definition or meaning as to the concept or for any criteria as 
to what constitutes "armed conflict not of an international character".18 The 
term as such is general and vague.  An attempt to analyze the concept is 
essential in such a case. 
ii. Analysis of the Concept of "Non-international Armed Conflict" 
There is no generally accepted definition of the term as stated in Common 
Article 3.  The issue has been subject to great controversy during the 
proceedings of Diplomatic Conference of 1949 adopting the Geneva 
Conventions.  The preparation of a draft definition capable of being accepted 
by all states representatives was a difficult and complicated task.  The reason 
of this is the number of different aspects to be considered in order to balance 
between rights of states and humanitarian requirements.  Part of the 
complexity arises from the diversity of contexts in which "non-international 
armed conflict" takes place i.e. the various types of internal armed conflicts 
which may take place within the territorial limits of a sovereign state.  
Should the concept be based on objective criteria i.e. to be interpreted to 
mean those types of "armed conflicts" which have a general character of a 
civil war in the technical sense, in which case other types of conflicts are to 
                                                 
18  J. Pictet, Commentary on the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in 
Time of War (Geneva, ICRC1958) pp. 35-37. 
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be excluded? Or should it be interpreted to cover all types of internal armed 
conflicts? Or whether all forms of violence from simple violence to a 
general armed confrontation with all the characteristics of a war can be 
considered a "non-international armed conflict"? 
This issue of defining the term "non-international armed conflict" is 
considered crucial for any attempt to apply international rules of protection 
to civilians under humanitarian law.  This makes it essential to examine the 
meaning of this concept in light of traditional theory of law, international 
jurisprudence and Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
i. The Traditional Approach  
Traditional international law distinguishes between interstate wars and civil 
wars.  The first term refer to war between states as subjects of international 
law and is subject to the regulation of laws of war.  Internal armed conflicts 
were not recognized as war but were described by several terms e.g. 
rebellion, revolution insurrections and in certain specific situations of 
conflicts as civil war.  These were regarded as falling outside the ambit of 
international regulation and of purely domestic jurisdiction.  It was not until 
the 19th century that international rules of law of war were applicable to 
internal conflicts based on the character of the conflict by the doctrine of 
recognition.  The traditional approach of the relevance of international rules 
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to internal war situations were based on the degree of intensity and severity 
of the conflict and relative degree of success achieved by the rebels.  An 
uprising against the government or conflict between armed groups which 
was quickly suppressed was considered an internal affair and rebels were 
subject to national law as ordinary criminals.  The situation was different if 
the rebellions being sufficiently organized, administer a substantial portion 
of national territory and having a military force capable of threatening and 
directing hostilities against the established government for a considerable 
length of time, then it is a situation of civil war.  The laws of war were not 
automatically applicable to civil wars, however, in some cases; states 
observed such laws through the doctrine of recognition of belligerency either 
by the legitimate government of the state or by a third state.19 
Therefore in customary international law an armed force used against the 
established authority within a state was characterized as a civil war 
depending on the scale and intensity of the conflict showing the hostilities to 
                                                 
19  According to classic theory and practice the situation changes fundamentally once insurgents have been 
recognized as belligerents.  The legal consequence of recognition by the legitimate government was the 
application of law of war upon them and rebels possess rights and duties within the limits of law of war.  
The act of recognition of belligerency by a third state in which usually the state chooses to protect its 
interests in the part of the territory under control of insurgents, is a declaration of neutrality and the third 
state has the same obligations of a neutral state in international law i.e. basically not to provide any 
assistance to any of the parties to the conflict.  However if a third state recognizes a situation of 
belligerency which did not objectively exist then such a declarations constituted interference in the internal 
affairs of the state.  This led the Institute of International Law in 1900 to lay down certain criteria to 
determine the existence of a civil war – E.G.W.W Wilson "Recognition of insurgency and belligerency" 
ASIL, 1937 (ASIL) pp. 136-138. 
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be equivalent to a state of war20.  The basic criteria reflecting customary 
rules of international law to determine the existence of a civil war in which 
case a third state may recognize the belligerency of the rebels were codified 
in 1900 by the Institute of International Law. Three conditions which make 
possible to qualify an internal conflict as genuine civil war were that: if the 
insurgents took possession of part of territory, exercise control and 
sovereignty over that part and hostilities are conducted by organized forced 
complying with laws and customs of war.21 
According to classic theory and practice a declaration recognizing 
belligerency was usually issued in situations when hostilities in a state 
reached such proportions that those circumstances cannot be regarded as 
mere insurgency.  That is when the insurgents posses and exercise authority 
within the portion of territory under its control and shows willingness to 
apply and respect the rules of law of war.  Thus one may argue that the act 
of recognition at such placed situation of internal conflicts in a category of 
civil wars22, i.e. the situation which satisfy certain criteria, thereby restricting 
                                                 
20  R.P. Dhokalia, "Civil Wars and International Law" (1971) 11 Indian Journal of International Law, pp. 
219-225. 
21  For text, Commentary on Additional Protocols of 1977, op.cit. p. 1321 . 
22  Recognition of belligerency as a concept has been abandoned in state's practice.  Under Geneva 
Conventions, once an internal conflict is characterized as "non-international armed conflict" the law is to be 
applied, Detter, op.cit. p. 43. 
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the term to one type of internal conflict i.e. "civil war" in its technical 
meaning.23 
ii. The Attitude of International Jurisprudence 
Contemporary legal writers attempted to define the term "non-international 
armed conflict".  Two prevailing schools in this connection exist.  The first 
school which advocates a broad and general interpretation of the term tends 
to include all types of rebellion against the established government or 
between armed groups.  Legal writers who support this broad interpretation 
justifies their attitude by referring to the term as expressed in common 
Article 3 in that the basic idea of humanity of Geneva law aiming at 
protection of victims of war makes it logical to adhere to this interpretation 
i.e. the term includes all types of armed conflicts occurring within territory 
of one of the contracting parties to Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
This interpretation of the term allows for the inclusion of any new situation 
of armed conflict which might arise in the future, besides it covers various 
                                                 
23  Various definitions of the term "civil war" were made by several jurists.  Vattel defined it "where the 
nation is divided on itself into two opponents each carrying arms against the other, then this is a civil war – 
E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations (1760) Book III, chapter X VIII, p. 10 – the 1863 Lieber Code 
distinguishes between three types of internal conflicts, revolution ,civil war and insurrection.  The motive 
from carrying arms and scale of operations carried are basic criteria.  In situations where field of operations 
is restricted it is insurrections, if the motive of rebels to establish a new state, it is considered a revolution 
or if the motive is to establish a new government to replace the existing one then this is to be considered a 
civil war – C. Haverland, Secession, Encyclopedia of Public International Law (EPIL) 10 (1987), pp. 383-
3810 – It is mentioned here that Dr. Francies Lieber was the first to codify the laws of land warfare during 
the American civil war in the form of a military manual for the army in the field.  For commentary on the 
code, Rosemary Abi-Saab, "Humanitarian law and internal conflicts: The Evolution of Legal Humanitarian 
Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour of Fritz Kalshoven (1991).  
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types of internal armed conflict.  The interpretation of the term is left to the 
international community provided that humanitarian considerations are to 
prevail in adopting any interpretation to classify the nature of conflict.  
According to this school, the term "non-international armed conflict covers 
all types of conflicts carried by an armed group, organized at a minimum 
level irrespective of the period of hostilities or control of part of the territory, 
or motive of rebels in conducting such hostilities.  As such the term is 
broader than the technical meaning of "civil war" which requires certain 
material criteria to exist basically the criteria of control over part of the 
territory. 
Pictet, is of opinion that in absence of a general definition of the term which 
may take different forms, situations of "non-international armed conflict" are 
to be characterized in relation to objective criteria e.g. the legal status of 
entities opposing each other and the existence of open hostilities (armed 
conflict) between parties to the conflict.  Within these two limits he defines 
the term broadly as a "non-international armed conflict", as a situation in 
which hostilities breakout between armed forces or organized armed groups 
within the territory of a single state"24.  Shaw defines the term in a more 
general and broader manner in stating that "non-international armed 
                                                 
24  Y. Sandoz,. Swinarski and B-Zinmermann, eds, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva, ICRC 1987) pp. 1319-1320. 
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conflicts could, it may be argued, range from full-scale civil wars to 
relatively minor disturbances”.25 
However, some writers who support this broad interpretation exclude riots, 
violence and internal disturbances from the meaning of the term as long as 
such uprisings could be dealt with quickly and effectively in the normal 
course of maintaining internal security and order.26  Leisle, defines the term 
as "a non-international armed conflict, is one in which the governmental 
authorities of a state are opposed by groups within that state seeking to 
overthrow those authorities by force of arms".  The definition though is 
broad however it is restricted to one situation i.e. when opposing the 
government authorities thereby excluding use of arms between non-
government groups.27 
The second school adopts a restrictive attitude in interpreting the term.  This 
school restricts the interpretation of the term "non-international armed 
conflicts" to certain specific types of armed conflicts which are considered 
the most severe of all internal conflicts referring to the civil war in its 
technical meaning.  Greenwood defines the term by stating that "A non-
international armed conflict is a confrontation between the existing 
                                                 
25  M.N. Shaw, op.cit., Third Edition, p. 737. 
26  Heike Spieker, Twenty-Five Years after the Adoption of Additional Protocol II: Break Through or 
Failure of Humanitarian Legal Protection”.  Year Book of International Law, 2001-volume 4, pp. 142-143. 
27  Leisle, The Contemporary Law of armed conflict, second edition, op.cit., p. 317. 
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governmental authority and groups of persons subordinate to this authority, 
which is carried out by force of arms within national territory and reaches 
the magnitude of an armed riot or a civil war28".  To Greenwood the 
characterization of a situation of an armed force used against established 
government or between armed groups, depends on the scale of intensity to 
the conflict. 
Some modern legal writers like Akheurst use the term "civil war" to describe 
such conflicts rather than "non-international armed conflict" as such 
adopting the earlier term i.e. civil war.29  Hans in describing "non-
international armed conflict" states “war like clashes occurring on the 
territory of a single state are non-international armed conflict, usually known 
as civil war".30  However, the term "civil war" is defined by some writers in 
relation to the motive or purpose of use of armed force as a criterion.  In a 
civil war the rebellion reaches the utmost and the state is divided as a result 
of hostilities between group rebels as in Lebanon civil war of 1975-76 where 
the government remains ineffective or against the governments’ authorities.  
The use of armed force is for control of government or to achieve political or 
social changes or the desire of secession i.e. to separate part of the 
                                                 
28  Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in the Handbook of Humanitarian 
Law in Armed Conflicts, edited by Dieter Fleck, Oxford University Press 2003, p. 47. 
29  M. Akheurst, Civil War, EPIL (1992), pp. 598-603. 
30  Hans, op.cit. p. 509. 
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population from the existing state and form a new state.31  In this connection 
one has to distinguish between civil war, as one type of internal conflict, and 
other types of internal conflicts by applying the criteria of "the motive" from 
using arm force.32  For example, liberation wars were considered for a long 
time non-international armed conflicts until 1977 when under Additional 
Protocol I it is recognized as an international armed conflict.  The purpose of 
these wars is the struggle against racist regimes.33 
From a humanitarian perspective, the criteria of motive of use of force 
should not be taken solely to define the term, in our view.  The criteria of 
intensity, severity are of more importance.  In fact, the only case is national 
liberation wars where the motive of fighting is essential in bringing the 
conflict from an internal to "international armed conflict".34  However, this 
criteria of "motive" answers the question why the armed force by rebels was 
used but it does not provide criteria for when a "non-international armed 
                                                 
31   Separatist or secessionist wars are fought to obtain sovereignty over part of the territory but do not seek 
to challenge the legitimacy of powers of the Government as a whole but merely with regard to a portion of 
it.  Example of secession wars which had taken place in East Timor, Solvenia and Croatia – Detter, op.cit. 
pp. 51-57. 
32  The ICTY Trial Chamber introduced the criteria of the "aim and objective" pursued by the parties to the 
conflict and internal disturbances and tensions – quoted by Heike Spieker, op.cit., p. 140. 
33  Article 1(4) of Protocol I Additional of 1977, recognizes liberation wars "international armed conflicts".  
The United Nations General Assembly passed a number of Resolutions on the legal character of liberation 
wars e.g. Resolution 33103 (XXVIII) of 1973 and Resolution 2592 (XXIV) of 1960 – For further details on 
nature of these wars, K. Ginther, Liberation Movements, EPIL 3 (1982). 
34  A distinction is to be made between internal conflicts i.e. non-international armed conflicts and 
"internationalized armed conflict" where in some situations an internal armed conflict in a state may be 
qualified as "international" in case there is outside support or assistance from other states.  For example the 
NATO action against Yugoslavia with regard to Kosovo in 1999 is regarded as "internationalized" the 
conflict.  This raised several questions as to whether interference in another state by the governments or 
otherwise would "internationalize" an internal conflict.   
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conflict" actually is said to begin and exist for the purpose of application of 
the law. 
According to the restrictive approach not every type of internal fighting or 
use of armed force constitutes a "non-international armed conflict".  To 
some writers only civil war in its technical meaning which require existence 
of certain criteria, may qualify for a "non-internal armed conflict".  However 
this logic creates some enquiries, it is difficult to ascertain at which stage of 
scale of hostilities may reach a point when it may be reasonable to describe 
use of force as "non-international armed conflict".  With regard to intensity 
of hostilities, fighting must exceed a certain threshold in order to constitute a 
"non-international armed conflict". 
The above interpretation creates uncertainty the consequence of which the 
issue of protection of civilians will be closely related or conditional by 
answering the basic question of characterizing the type of internal fighting. 
Therefore, in absence of consensus in international jurisprudence on a 
specific interpretation or definition of the concept of "non-international 
armed conflict" one may support the broad interpretation of the term which 
tends to cover all types of armed conflicts (of which civil war is one type of 
such conflicts).  The nature of armed conflicts has changed with the 
increased number of internal armed conflicts and the broad definition covers 
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them.  In this broad interpretation humanitarian considerations prevail over 
all other considerations e.g. military necessity or state sovereignty.  This 
interpretation provides the framework within which different types of armed 
conflicts can be systematically covered under rules of humanitarian law 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts. 
iii. The Interpretation of the Term "Non-international Armed 
     Conflict" and Geneva Conventions  
a. Common Article 3 to Geneva Convention IV of 1949 
States Delegations attending the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 agreed that 
international rules of protection should extend to cover civilian victims of 
internal armed conflicts.  However, the adoption of Common Article 3 of 
Geneva Convention IV was conducted after great controversies as to the 
meaning or type of armed conflicts covered by it.  The Article, as finally 
adopted does not provide for a definition for the term "non-international 
armed" this gives rise to ambiguities as to its interpretation.  In an attempt to 
uncover the vagueness in interpreting the term and to know the intention of 
the Parties to the Convention, one has to refer to the preparatory work and 
drafting history of the Article.35 
                                                 
35  After the Second World War, the ICRC in 1946 submitted a draft text before the Preliminary Conference 
of National Red Cross Societies reading: "In case of armed conflict in the interior of a state, the 
Conventions shall be equally applied by each of the adverse Parties…".  This draft was amended at the 
meeting of Government Experts Conference 1947 by replacing the general term "… conflict in the interior 
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The draft text of Common Article 3 which was submitted to the Diplomatic 
Conference in 1949 for adoption was subject to hot discussions regarding the 
interpretation of the term.  The issue was referred to a number of working 
groups and committees entrusted to study it.36  Several amendments 
proposed were made, however two conflicting attitudes reflecting the fears 
of states appeared.  The first attitude, opposing the application of the draft 
text as it tends to cover all types of rebellion, insurrection and civil 
disturbances.  It was argued that under such draft Article any small group of 
insurgents would be recognized as combatant in which case governments 
would be under international obligation to apply rules of protection 
embodied in the Article to them.  Besides, states would be compelled to 
apply such rules in cases of crimes, committed by ordinary criminals.  
However, some states delegates proposed certain formal or factual criteria to 
                                                                                                                                                 
of a state…" to be "… in case of civil war in any part of the home or colonial territory of a Contracting 
Party, the principle, of the Convention shall be equally applied by the Said Party…".  However in 1948 a 
new draft proposed by the Red Cross to the International Conference of Stockholm which read: "In all 
cases of armed conflicts which are not of an international character, especially cases of civil war, colonial 
conflicts or wars of religion, which may occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting 
Parties…".  This draft was amended by deleting the clause "especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts 
or wars of religion" and was submitted finally before the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 for discussion – 
For observations on the history of Article 3 D.A. Elder "The history Background of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949" (1979) II Case W. Res. J.I.L. p. 37. 
36  Two crucial issues were subject to controversy, the first whether to apply the whole provisions of the 
Convention to internal armed conflicts and the second in which types of internal conflicts the proposed 
Article is to be applicable.  After several amendments to the draft text, the French Delegate ended the 
deadlock and received great support.  The Delegation proposed that in all cases of armed conflicts not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Party, each Party to the 
conflict shall apply the provisions to the Geneva Convention IV For the Protection of Civilians in Time of 
War" – Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva 1949 – (1951) pp. 82-84. 
 146
be met before the Conventions were applicable to non-international armed 
conflict so as to ensure that it will not apply to cases of mere disorder and 
ordinary crimes.37 
According to the second attitude, the text Article to be accepted as it was 
proposed on the basis that it will provide a comprehensive humanitarian 
protection in internal armed conflicts with the understanding that it will not 
deprive the government from implementing national laws for the repression 
of acts of criminals or restoring order and security.  It was argued by some 
delegates that the text implied already that armed conflicts similar to those 
of international character, and not mere strife are covered by the text 
Article.38 
The above mentioned reflects the attitude of traditional international 
jurisprudence.  The first attitude proposing the limitation of the cases of 
internal conflict covered by the Article is similar to the restrictive attitude 
which limits the application of international rules to situations of civil war in 
its technical meaning.  However, the second who argues for a wider scope of 
                                                 
37  The factual criterion was proposed by some delegates i.e. the possession of an organized military force 
under the control of a responsible authority with capacity to ensure respect of the principles provided for in 
the Article.  France, Australia,, US and Italy disagreed and argues that no preconditions are required to 
apply the principles of humanitarian law to internal conflicts – Final Record 11-B, op.cit., pp. 121-123.    
38  Final Record 11-B, ibid, p. 122. 
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application of the term to cover all forms of internal conflicts reflects the 
broad attitude.39 
As a result of the diversities in attitudes and the fear that all efforts of 
Diplomatic Conference might fail, the draft was adopted in a final text 
without containing any definition of the term thereby seeking to reconcile 
different opinions as a compromise.  The ICRC acceptance of such 
compromise had been inevitable and supported the adoption of the Article at 
such "because this text is simple and clear and has the merit of ensuring in 
the case of all types of civil war at least the application of the humanitarian 
rules which are recognized by all civilized people".40  This would justify the 
humanitarian assistance of the ICRC in all situations of internal armed 
conflicts. 
Common Article 3 tends apparently to adopt the wide interpretation of the 
term to cover all types of "armed conflicts not of an international character", 
however in reality this does not reflect the real intention of states parties to 
G. Convention IV when referring to discussions during the sessions of the 
Conference.  Their intention is to adopt the Article as to cover those types of 
internal conflicts which reaches a certain intensity and severity which show 
the hostilities to be similar to those of international character, thereby 
                                                 
39  The ICRC and Soviet Union supported this opinion – Commentary of IV Geneva Convention, op.cit., p. 
31. 
40  Final Record 11-B of Diplomatic Conference 1949, ibid, p. 337. 
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applying the restrictive interpretation of the term to civil wars in its technical 
meaning.  Besides, the absence of a definition of those situations of a "non-
international armed conflicts" shows that the state delegates intended to 
leave the act of characterizing an internal armed conflict as a "non-
international" and hence apply common Article 3 to be a purely 
discretionary matter for states.  It is a question of fact to be determined by 
the Government of the state in whose territory the conflict has assumed the 
dimension of a civil war according to its interests and political instead of 
legal considerations41.  This view is supported also by some legal writers 
who require the existence of certain conditions when characterizing an 
armed conflict as a "non-international", their arguments based on proposals 
and discussions at the Diplomatic Conference of 194942.  At such, the term is 
defined to cover one form of internal armed conflict i.e. civil war in its 
technical meaning thereby excluding other types of internal armed 
conflicts.43 
Therefore, in contrast to the above, one tends to support the application of 
the broad interpretation of the term meaning to cover all types of "armed 
                                                 
41  This is inferred from discussions during the 3rd and 4th meetings of the Special Committee – Final 
Record, 11-B, op.cit., pp. 44-46. 
42  Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, op.cit. pp. 35-37. 
43  Internal disturbances and tensions are one of the issues which states agreed that it is excluded from the 
application of Common Article 3 as not being classified as "armed conflict".  Rosemary Abi–SAAB, 
Humanitarian And Internal Conflicts: The Evolution of legal concern, in "Humanitarian law of Armed 
Conflict Challenges Ahead, Essays in Honour of Fritz Kalshoven, Edited by Astrid J.M.Delissen, T.M.C 
Institute, Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 212-217. 
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conflicts" for two reasons.  The first is based on the argument that Article 3 
provides for the term in general without imposing any restrictions or 
conditions.  Secondly, applying the general rules of interpretation of treaties, 
the main object of Geneva Convention IV is to ensure minimum standard of 
humanitarian protection to civilian victims during such conflicts.  Common 
Article 3 at such reflects the basic principles of humanitarian law to protect 
victims without distinction to type of conflict or discrimination to victims’ 
sufferings as human beings.  To adopt a restrictive interpretation to the term 
i.e. to cover only civil war in its technical meaning would be inconsistent 
with the general object of the law to protect civilian victims of all types of 
"armed conflicts".   
However, the broad interpretation does not apply in abstract certain 
conditions are required i.e. "an armed conflict" of a minimum intensity is 
required.  International tribunals’ jurisprudence in determining the existence 
of an internal conflict covered by Article 3 applied the criteria of minimum 
intensity of the conflict and organization of the rebel parties.44  Recognition 
of the rebels by the state as combatants is discretionary it is not a 
requirement under Article 3 for its application.45  The Article is applicable in 
                                                 
44  The Prosecutor v. Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interloctory Appeal on jurisdiction, 2 
October, 1995, Case No. 1 T-94-1-AR 72.  (Appeals Chamber ICTY) pp. 37-38, para. 70. 
45  Under traditional laws of war, recognition was a condition which entailed application of whole laws of 
war to civil war. 
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"armed conflict" involving government forces as a party to the conflict and 
non-government forces between themselves as parties to the conflict as in 
Somalia conflict and Lebanon.  Under Article 3 control by the rebels of a 
part of the territory is not a necessary condition for its application, 
conducting large-scale military operations within a specific area suffices for 
its application.46 
In fact, the term being broad and general as adopted, has served the objects 
of Geneva Conventions in theory.  As it gives a wide scope of application of 
minimum standard of humanitarian principles in Article 3 which provides 
protection to civilian victims of a wide range of internal armed conflicts.  In 
practice it served the victims more than states who intended when adopting 
the term as such, to preserve wide sovereign powers by limiting as possible 
the application of international rules of protection to one type of "armed 
conflicts" i.e. having the character of civil war, thereby limiting as possible 
their international obligations.47  As Farer noted that "…the only assured 
thing about the notion of non-international armed conflicts in Common 
                                                 
46  Tadic Case (opinion and judgment), ibid., 7 May 1997, Case No. 1T-94-1-TC, Trial Chamber, ICTY, 
para 564.   
47  It is to be mentioned here that the concept of "civil war" in traditional jurisprudence did not constitute a 
legal problem; civil war was a term which referred to those internal armed conflicts which are characterized 
by their intensity and which satisfy the objective criteria laid by customary international law.  These 
conflicts in case of recognition were subject to rules of laws of war.  In absence of recognition all internal 
armed conflicts and civil wars were subject to domestic laws of the state.  The concept of "civil war" 
acquired complexity after the beginning of 20th Century when different types of internal armed conflicts 
began to occur . – R.P. Dhokalia "Civil Wars and International Law", 1971, 11 Indian J.I.L. p. 219.  
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Article 3 is that no one can say with assurance what it means".48 On the 
other hand, the vagueness or uncertainty of the term in relation to its 
interpretation and conditions of application of Article 3, resulted in an 
inconsistency and conflicting interpretation by states, and other 
institutions.49 This weakness and negative aspect of the term undoubtedly, 
influenced the regime of protection of civilians under the Article. 
In conclusion, to attain objects of Geneva Conventions one may argue that in 
cases of occurrence of an armed conflict and as long as there are human 
victims in need of humanitarian treatment and aid, then Article 3 is to be 
interpreted to apply its basic principles to all "armed conflicts" regardless of 
the scale, duration and shape of organization of rebels.  In our view, the 
number of civilian victims killed and sufferings is to be considered one of 
the basic criteria for the purpose of interpretation and applicability of 
common Article 3. 
b. "Non-International Armed Conflicts” as Defined in Protocol II 
Additional to Geneva Conventions of 1977 
The adoption of Protocol II is considered a significant improvement in the 
situation relating to protection of civilian victims existing prior to its 
                                                 
48   Farer, Tom J. "Humanitarian Law And Armed Conflicts: Towards the Definition of "Internal Armed 
Conflict", (1971) 71 Columbia Law Review, p. 43. 
49  An example of such inconsistencies in Rene Provost, International Human Rights And Humanitarian 
Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 266 – Francois Bugnion, ICRC And the Protection of War 
Victims, op.cit., p. 332. 
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adoption50.  The scope of application of Protocol II is defined by Article I 
which states:  
1- This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to 
Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing 
conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are 
not covered by Article I of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which takes 
place in the territory of a High contracting party between its armed 
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups 
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part 
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concreted 
military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
2- This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other 
acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflict. 
                                                 
50  The text of the Protocol produced in ICRC No. 197-8, August-September 1977, pp. 3.  The draft 
Protocol examined at the Conference of Government Experts 1971 was subject to hot discussions in 
relation to its field of application and the need to define the term "non-international armed conflicts".  Some 
experts feared that a definition might come into conflict with state sovereignty and would avoid invoking, 
in respect of such situations Article 2, para. 7 of the UN Charter.  The discussion was based on two basic 
alternatives in defining the term, the first to adopt an extensive definition as wide as Article 3 common to 
Geneva Conventions or even wider including political disturbances and similar situations below the level of 
armed conflict.  Secondly a restrictive definition limiting its field of application to certain situations of 
internal armed conflict.  For discussions at the first session of 1971 Conference of Government Experts – 2 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1971) p. 80 – ICRC Commentary, op.cit., pp. 1348-1349.  
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The above Article I defined its scope of application by excluding certain 
types of conflicts.  It excluded isolate and sporadic acts which are not 
characterized as "armed conflicts".51  It excluded also international armed 
conflicts from the scope of its application including wars of national 
liberation. However, if it had stopped at that, it would have covered a very 
wide spectrum of situations.  But the spectrum is restricted by providing for 
certain criteria for its application.  Article I, paragraph 1 above, laid down 
four objective criteria in defining a "non-international armed conflict" for 
the purposes of its application.  Therefore providing expressly for a 
restrictive interpretation of the term in relation to its applicability to certain 
types of armed conflicts and limiting its rules to victims of specific 
situations of armed conflicts. 
                                                 
51  The ICRC provided a description of internal disturbances before the Conference of Government Experts 
in 1971 distinguishing such situations from non-international armed conflicts by stating that: "This involves 
situations in which there is non-international armed conflict but exists a confrontation within the country 
involving acts of violence taking various forms from the spontaneous generations of acts of revolt to the 
struggle between more or less organized groups and the authorities in power.  Situations of serious internal 
tensions may occur for political, religious, racial, social or economic causes.  These situations may result in 
large scale arrests, large number of "political" prisoners, inhumane conditions of detention and treatment 
and in cases of emergency suspension of fundamental judicial guarantees and allegations of 
disappearances.  In such situation of violence and internal serious tensions the state uses armed forces to 
maintain order and respect for law.  The above situations being not a "non-international armed conflict as 
defined in Common Article 3 and Protocol II are not covered by humanitarian law as a result of absence of 
element of "armed conflict" and period of duration of violence.  However in most cases human rights 
instruments are the applicable law for the purpose of providing protection to persons, and the ICRC for 
humanitarian aids may offer its services in some cases – ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol of 
1977, op.cit., p. 1355 – Hans Peter Gasser "A Measure of Humanity in Internal Disturbances and Tensions: 
Proposal for a Code of Conduct", International Review of the Red Cross, 1988, pp. 38-58.  Also in this 
connection reference is to be made to the Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards (1991) 
published as a UN document: EICN 4/sub. 2, 1991/55 – Also Theodor Meron, Human Rights in internal 
strife: Their International Protection, (Cambridge 1987). 
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The four objective criteria to be deduced from paragraph of the above 
Article relate to the parties of the conflict, the nature of organization of rebel 
groups, the nature and conduct of military operations and the geographical 
basis of its operation.  The first criteria provides that it shall apply to 
conflicts which take place in the territory of a High contracting party 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
groups.  This criteria narrowed its application as it requires that the conflict 
must involve the state as a party thereby excluding conflicts between armed 
rebel groups in which the government forces are not involved because of its 
weakness as in Lebanon conflict or in case of failure of government as was 
in Somalia.52  Such a situation is covered then by common Article 3.  The 
Protocol specified two situations for its application as in relation to parties of 
the conflict.  The first is where there is a rebellion which involves part of the 
government army i.e. where the armed forces of the government confront 
dissident armed forces.  The second situation where the government armed 
forces fight against rebels organized in armed groups.  In both situations, 
mentioned, the government forces are involved.53 In relation to the 
                                                 
52  The proposal drafted by ICRC provided for its application between armed forces groups without 
requiring government to be a party to the conflict – ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 
1977, p. 1351. 
53  Pilloud etal with the collaboration of Jean Pictet, ICRC Commentary ibid, p. 1353. 
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organization of the rebel groups, the second criterion requires an 
organization which should be under responsible command.  This criteria is 
closely connected with the third and fourth criteria i.e. a minimum level of 
organization, under a command to be able to conduct concreted military 
operations, to exercise control over a specific part of territory and to respect 
rules of the Protocol. 
The third criterion requires that the rebels to be able to conduct "sustained 
and concreted by military operations.  This criteria refers to the continuity 
and planned operations, a characteristics used instead of the criteria of 
intensity and duration of military operations which depend on the subjective 
judgment of the parties to the conflict.  To determine whether the military 
operations are "sustained and concreted" depends on the facts in each 
situation i.e. its determination is an objective judgment, in fact the continuity 
and intensity is an element of a "sustained and concreted" operation.  The 
fourth criterion requires that the rebel groups must exercise control over part 
of national territory.  This notion of "control" is not easy to prove as 
government in whose territory the conflict is occurring usually deny that 
rebel groups "control" part of its territory.  However, the "control" does not 
necessarily involve any actual administration in a government sense of a 
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defined portion of the national territory.54  The criteria of "control" required 
in Article (1) as an element to enable rebel groups to carry out "sustained 
and concreted military operations" which would enable also the rebel groups 
to implement the provisions of Protocol II.  In other words, to enable rebels 
to carry their obligations in relation to victims found in the area of their 
operation like not to attack civilians, take care of wounded, sick and humane 
treatment of detainees.55  However, this element of control may excludes a 
great many internal conflicts, for example those which are basically guerrilla 
conflicts, where the rebels may not control any territory on a regular basis.56 
It is to be noted that the above criteria are closely connected; this means that 
the absence of one of them renders the inapplicability of Protocol II to that 
conflict.57  In essence, Protocol II covers only those internal armed conflicts 
in which the dissident armed forces against which the government is fighting 
                                                 
54 Ibid, p. 1354. 
55 Ibid, p. 1352.  After the break up of the former Yugoslavia, the separatists Serbs exercised control over 
part of the territory with intention to constitute the Republic and concluded international agreements in 
relation to peace settlement.  These agreements’ texts reproduced in 1995, 35 I.L.M., p. 92-93. 
56 Unlike Protocol II, Article 3 has been defined broadly as to include those armed conflicts conducted by 
guerrilla movements that do not control large portion of territory and including the so-called liberation wars 
covered by Article 1(4) of Protocol II.  It is to be mentioned here that guerrillas warfare are characterized 
according to the methods which they employ in conducting their hostilities not used other forms of warfare.  
Their characteristics are: irregularity i.e. decentralization, lack of uniformity, absence of strict discipline 
and simple methods of work,  i.e. guerrilla movement which can only incidentally, now, here, then and 
there carry out actions of the hit-and- run type.  At such they are treated as criminals when captured and 
treated as ordinary prisoners subject to criminal laws of the state.  However, if they are to be classified 
differently they have to become centralized, unified, disciplined and more through in their activities i.e. to 
respect rules of law of war by not attacking civilians or civilian property for purposes of applicability of 
common Article 3 to them – Ingrid Detter, op.cit., pp. 56-59. 
57  For example in Guatemala conflict though the rebels conducted sustained and concreted military 
operations, Protocol II was not applied to the conflict since the rebels were not able to exercise control over 
any part of the national territory, Provost, op.cit., p. 264. 
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have achieved such control over national territory that they are able to 
conduct sustained and concreted military operations and to implement and 
respect the provisions of the Protocol II.  Besides the level of "threshold of 
violence" needed for its application is high and as such it might be difficult 
to find a government that would be willing to apply Protocol II, since they 
could only claim that the threshold had not been reached.  In all cases it 
appears that Protocol II by adopting an objective criteria in defining "non-
international armed conflicts" falling within the scope of its application, left 
the decision whether a situation amounts to a "non-international armed 
conflict" to the government of the territorial state.  By this states wanted to 
confirm that "national security is state's inalienable right".58  As a result of 
this, in practice the decision towards the applicability of Protocol II 
ultimately will be a political rather than a legal decision though the legal 
criteria mentioned are meant to assist the policy makers to decide when 
certain rules apply to a particular conflict.  This would negatively affect the 
protection of civilian victims of such conflicts as few internal conflicts of 
today satisfy all the above criteria.59  Provost commented on this point by 
                                                 
58  David Forsythe, "Legal Management of Internal War, the 1977 Protocol on Non-International Armed 
Conflicts", (1978) 72 American Journal of International Law, p. 272. 
59 These criteria resemble those laid down by customary rules of law of war.  Protocol II provides for the 
same conditions as did recognition of belligerency under traditional laws of war.  However, recognition 
entails the whole application of law of war while the existence of criteria entails the application of Protocol 
II only and not the whole rule of International Humanitarian Law.  At such Protocol II is regarded by some 
writers as a backward step as far as protection of civilians is concerned.  It contains only limited regulation 
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stating that "…. In defending the idea of state sovereignty in the context of 
non-international armed conflicts, governments in effect have required that 
the belligerent party possess all the characteristics of a state-organization, 
population and territory – before accepting any role of International 
Humanitarian Law.  Only the rare "classic" civil war scenarios such as the 
1936-39 Spanish Civil War, the war in El Salvador during the 1980 or 
perhaps the recent conflicts in Bosnia – Herzegovina will meet these 
stringent conditions”.60  In such situations common Article 3 is applicable, a 
fact which makes it essential to examine the relationship of this Article and 
Protocol II. 
                                                                                                                                                 
of specific types of conflicts – G. Abi-Saab, "Non-International Armed Conflicts" in UNESCO, 
International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law (1988). In this connection a question may arise as to 
whether terrorists acts could be covered by Article 3 or Protocol II criteria, in theory the issue is subject to 
great controversy among modern legal scholars as to the applicability of rules of protection in such cases.  
However, in practice members of terrorist groups claim prisoner of war status but there is no armed conflict 
between such groups and the territorial states. Such terrorists normally are subject to criminal laws. To 
subject the acts to international laws of war a number of inquiries arise with regard to satisfaction of criteria 
required under the law with regard to intensity where the threshold of violence high enough so that ordinary 
criminal law is replaced by laws of conflict.  The basic issue with regard to the claim of status of prisoners 
of war is that they do not satisfy the criteria of a combatant under Geneva Conventions and Protocols as 
that of belligerent groups i.e. to be commanded by one responsible for his subordinates, that they have a 
fixed distinctive sign recognized at a distance, that they carry arms openly, and that they conduct their 
operations in accordance with laws and customs of war.  To claim the benefit of prisoner of war status to 
receive certain treatments then have to conform to those obligations as those of combatants mainly to 
distinguish between civilians and combatants.  As such, they do not meet the criteria of lawful combatant.  
In addition terrorists are "civilians" in that they don't qualify as members of military or paramilitary forces.  
In such case, some writers argue that they are protected under human rights law as human beings and under 
humanitarian law as civilians.  For more discussion on the issue, Detter, op.cit. p. 21.  For examination as 
to whether terrorism is covered by humanitarian law, GABORRONA – Interesting Times for International 
Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the "War on Terror".  The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 27:2 
Summer/Fall 2003, pp. 55-73.  More interesting on related issue is that some authors like Gasser  argue that 
states responses to terrorists acts are also regulated by international humanitarian law when carried during 
armed conflict – Hans – Peter Gasser, Acts of Terror, "terrorism" and International Humanitarian Law – 
IRRC, 2002 – No. 847. 
60  R. Provost, op.cit. p. 264, the criteria of Protocol II makes it applicable when rebels are well established 
and had set up some form of de facto government. 
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c. The Relationship of Additional Protocol II to Common Article 
3 of  Geneva  Convention IV 
The relationship is been defined in Article 1(1) of Protocol II, “This Protocol 
which develops and supplements Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of 
Application…"  This means that the regime of protection under Protocol II is 
not intended to be a separate legal regime but to supplement Article 3 by 
providing more detailed rules of protection.  However the said Article 
compared to Protocol II being formulated in a general term is broader in 
scope of application but limited in content of principles of protection, while 
Protocol II limited in scope of applicability but containing more detailed 
rules of protection.  This supplementary is clear when the two are compared. 
Common Article 3 does not distinguish between armed conflicts situation 
below a certain threshold, on the basis of this all internal "armed conflicts" 
without exception are regulated by it, while Protocol II requires certain 
criteria to be met in addition to the situation of "armed conflict" to entail its 
application.  The threshold of application of the Protocol is higher, its scope 
narrower and more restrictive than Article. 3.61  As such, both Article 3 and 
                                                 
61  Although Common Article 3 does not expressly provide for objective criteria for its application 
however, the requirement of "armed conflict" as a basis for its operations means that a minimum intensity 
requirement is necessary for qualification.  The conduct of military operations which requires a minimal 
organization and command structure of the group to respect principles contained in Common Article 3 
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Protocol II apply to the same type of conflict "non-international armed 
conflict", only the quality of hostilities and the threshold of applicability 
differ.  This legal relation is supplemented in one situation i.e. where the 
criteria of application of Protocol II are satisfied; the rules of Protocol II and 
Article 3 will apply simultaneously since the scope of application of 
Protocol II is included within the broader scope of Article 3.  However, in 
other situation, when in an armed conflict the level of intensity is low and 
does not meet the criteria required by Protocol II, only Article 3 applies.  It 
also applies in situations where Protocol II is rendered inapplicable due to 
the absence of the criteria relating to the parties of the conflict.  The Protocol 
applies only in cases where the Government forces are involved; it does not 
apply in cases where rebel groups’ forces fight against each other without 
the involvement of the government forces.62  However, in practice it cannot 
be expected that in such situation the government forces will not intervene to 
restore order and security.  It is to be noted that since Protocol II rules are 
applicable and restricted to specific situations in application, then it is clear 
that Protocol II supplements Article 3 in those situations which meet these 
criteria only.  In other words, Protocol II does not supplement Article 3 by 
                                                                                                                                                 
when compared to criteria of Protocol; Common Article 3 does not require "territorial control or 
recognition of rebels for its application. 
62  Example when the Government is either non-existent as in Somalia conflict or too weak to intervene as 
in Lebanon. 
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providing rules of protection in all situations of armed conflicts covered by 
common Article 3.  Practically Article 3 applicability is independent as it is 
neither limited nor affected by the scope of application of Article Protocol 
II.63 
4.  The Problem of Legal Characterization under Common Article 3 
 And Additional Protocol II 
The application of both common Article 3 and Protocol II is based on the 
existence of a situation of an “armed conflict” characterized a "non-
international armed conflict".  This raises an important question as to the 
entity competent to characterize a certain situation as a "non-international 
armed conflict.  The issue of characterization is important for two reasons: 
first for the purpose of applicability of the law for protection of civilian 
victims and secondly, for purposes of criminal responsibility in cases of 
violation of the law.  Neither Article 3 nor Protocol II mentions who is to 
take the task of characterizing a situation for such purposes.64  This gap in 
the law applicable is considered a weakness, a fact which gave rise to 
                                                 
63  For purposes of application of Protocol II, the criteria whether military operations carried by rebels are 
sustained and concreted, while applying the element of continuity and intensity, normally hostilities rarely 
have such a character, in such a case Article 3 apply to the first stage of hostilities.  Once the higher 
threshold of Protocol II is met, Common Article 3 remains applicable and the situation is governed by both 
Article 3 and Article Protocol II in case the territorial state is a contracting party (ratified) to both Geneva 
Conventions and Protocol II.  However it may be argued that the customary rules of both instruments may 
be applicable in case of non-state party.  The Prosecutor v. Musema (judgment), 27 January, 2000, ICTR – 
96 – 13-T (Trial Chamber, ICTR) para. 252.   
64  Under traditional laws of war, a state alone by recognition of belligerency characterizes the conflict as 
civil war and as a result of recognition all rules of war becomes applicable. 
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divergent views among legal writers as to the entity competent to perform 
the act of characterization.  The issue is whether the act is left to the 
exclusive discretion of the territorial state or other entities could have the 
same.  Among this is Provost who argues that the Additional Protocol II 
leaves open the issue of who is to make the determinative characterization of 
the situation.65  However the question remains which are the competent 
entities to perform the act of characterization. 
Two broad approaches are adopted among legal writers.  The first approach 
which is subjective, maintains that the government of the territorial state in 
which the conflict occur has the exclusive power to determine whether the 
criteria required under the law is met and accordingly characterize the nature 
of conflict for purposes of application of the law.  They support their view 
by stating that states’ delegates at the Diplomatic Conferences (1949, 1977) 
intended to leave the issue to the state's exclusive power to evaluate the 
factual situation based on considerations of sovereignty.66 The second 
approach, which is objective, vests the power of characterization initially to 
                                                 
65  Provost, op.cit. p. 264 – The issue was subject to debate at the Diplomatic Conference of 1977.  Some 
states argued that the Government of the territorial state is to have the exclusive power to evaluate whether 
criteria were met in a specific situation under Article 1(1) of Protocol II.  This was rejected by other states 
and the Article was adopted without determining the issue – Pilloud et al, Commentary on the Additional 
Protocol of 8 June 1977, op.cit, p. 1353. 
66  Thomas Fleiner – Gerster and Michael A. Meyer, "New Developments in Humanitarian Law: A 
Challenge to the Concept of sovereignty" (1985) 35 Int'l & Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 266-278 – 
Also ICRC, Report of the work of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Geneva (1971) pp. 203-204.  
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the territorial state being primarily involved but such characterization could 
be challenged by other bodies or entities if the state does not exercise this 
power in good faith.  It means that the state's characterization may be 
challenged only if the factual situation of the hostilities does not reasonably 
support the state's characterization.  Supporters of this approach maintain 
that when it comes to application of law protecting civilians, then the matter 
concerns other states members of the international community and the 
political organs of international and regional organization concerned.67  
As to the first subjective approach, in which the determination of the nature 
of conflict is seen as an issue falling solely with the state sovereignty, has 
been rejected by several writers and international practice.  It is pleaded that 
the application of humanitarian rules protecting civilians is not a 
discretionary power be its customary or provided for by Geneva 
Conventions (Article 3) and Article Protocol II and that such law creates a 
binding obligation.68 As such, any discretion of states is restricted when 
international competent bodies are ready to characterize the situation for 
purposes of application of the rules of protection of humanitarian law.  
Heike considers this as an exception rather than the rule because in practice 
the question remains dependent on the decision of individual government in 
                                                 
67  Provost ,  op.cit, p. 243. 
68  Provost , ibid, p. 281. 
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whose territory the conflict occurs based on state sovereignty.69  In this 
connection the ICTR in referring to the criteria of intensity of the conflict 
pointed out that ascertaining the intensity of a "non-international armed 
conflict" does not depend on the subjective judgment of the parties to the 
conflict.  The Tribunal referred to the qualification of the Rwanda conflict as 
"a war, an internal i.e. non-international armed conflict by all observers to 
the events, including UN A-MIR and UN Special rapporteurs".70  This point 
to one principle that the issue of characterization is not restricted to the 
government of the territorial state only, other entities may be competent to 
characterize a certain situation.  As to these entities, international practice 
and jurisprudence reveals various entities and bodies.  For example, rebel 
movements party to the conflict, third state, international institutions like the 
UN political organs and international tribunals.71 
                                                 
69 Spieker Heike, "Twenty Years After the Adoption of Additional Protocol II – op.cit., p.142 
70  Akayesu case, 2 September 1998, para. 627. 
71  Compared to armed conflict conducted by liberation movements which were regarded as internal 
conflicts before Protocol II was adopted, the decision as to whether the conditions in Article I(4) of 
Protocol I are met appears to be left to the discretion of the state in whose territory the armed conflict 
occur.  However, in the UN practice regional organizations within the area are allowed to recognize the 
conflict as one for self-determination.  As a result the members of the movement are entitled to privileges 
of legally recognized combatants in international armed conflict i.e. they acquire the status of combatants 
and are not considered to commit any criminal offence in holding arms.  However, in case the state is not a 
party to the Protocol I and even if a party but denies the struggle for self-determination, it may treat 
members of the movement as traitors and subject them to criminal law.  In addition in certain situations 
under Protocol I, unlike regular forces engaged in an international conflict they and members of resistance 
forces are permitted not to wear uniform, do not have to carry their arms openly at all times, do not have to 
wear marks of identification visible at a distance, these are conditions required to recognize the status of 
combatant under Protocol I to enjoy privileges of Protocol I – For further details on the issue L.C. Green 
"The Contemporary law of armed conflict “– (Melland Schill Monographs in international law) Manchester 
University Press (1992) pp. 60-63.  
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As to whether rebel movement is competent to characterize the situation as 
an armed conflict for purposes of applicability of the law, the issue is closely 
related to the attitude of the territorial state.  In most cases, states are 
reluctant to admit the existence of a situation of armed conflict and classify 
the conflict as mere internal riot or violence thus evading application of law 
and recognition of rebels as a movement enjoying certain humanitarian 
under the law72.  This issue of characterization have not been discussed 
extensively by legal writers, however in practice in several situations of 
internal conflicts rebel movements made a declaration of their willingness to 
apply Geneva Conventions of 1949 applicable in such cases73.  The effect of 
such declaration is that rebels impliedly characterize their military 
operations as "armed conflict".  However the legal effect of such 
                                                 
72  In some cases the question of characterization of the specific nature of the armed conflict is problematic 
as a result of intervention from outside.  For example in the Afghanistan conflict, the Soviet Union 
intervention was regarded as changing the nature of conflict from internal to international armed conflict by 
many states and the United Nations. Afghanistan alleged that USSR was giving assistance to the 
Government of Afghanistan in supporting the rebellion – for more details on the issue, Michael Reisman 
and James Silk, "Which law applies to the Afghan Conflict?" 82 American Journal of International Law 
(1988) p. 459. 
73  Example of such declarations is the agreements reached by the various parties to the conflict in Former 
Yugoslavia.  The emergence of entities fighting gave rise to a complex issue of characterizing the nature of 
the conflict.  However, the agreement reached on the implementation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and Protocol I of 1977 was regarded as evidence of the varying nature of conflicts.  The agreement on 
November 27, 1991 by the representations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavia People's 
Army the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia is evidence of the international aspect of the 
conflicts – And the Agreement concluded in May 1992 between the various factions of the conflict within 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  characterize the conflict as internal because the agreement was 
based on common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention which provides that parties to such conflicts may 
agree to bring into force provisions of Geneva Conventions that are generally applicable in international 
armed conflicts. The parties committed to abide by the substantive rules of internal armed conflict in 
Common Article 3 and in addition agreed, under Para 3 of Article 3, to apply certain provisions of Geneva 
Conventions relating to international conflicts – the text of these Agreements in Macro, op.cit., pp. 1112-
1116.  For other example, David Forsythe, Legal management of internal war: The 1977 Protocol on Non-
international Armed Conflicts,( 1970) 72 Am. J. International Law p. 275.  
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characterizations of the situation is not recognized by states as of any weight 
on international level (especially in cases when territorial states recognize 
the situation as of an internal disturbances or violence), the reason being that 
rebels are not subjects of international law and they are recognized of having 
a limited personality under Article 3 and Protocol II.74  In all cases rebel 
groups under humanitarian law enjoy certain rights e.g. to be treated 
humanely and are also subject to obligation to apply and respect rules 
protecting civilians under Article 3 and Additional Protocol II equal to that 
of states parties to the conflict.  As a result, one may argue that a declaration 
by them to respect the law is one form of characterizing the conflict as 
"armed conflict" and such classification should be given some weight when 
debating the issue of characterization in particular in cases where the state 
recognizes the contrary. 
The act of characterization by third states in cases where the territorial state 
is reluctant or does not exercise its power in good faith, has been suggested 
by some legal scholars as a solution in that recognition of belligerency by 
them act as evidence that the situation is "armed conflict" to which 
humanitarian law is to be applicable.75  The basis of such characterization by 
third states evolves from their obligations as contracting parties to ensure 
                                                 
74  Provost, op.cit., p. 284. 
75  Forsythe supports this view, op.cit., p. 288. 
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respect and application of the law during armed conflict.  However, the 
above view that the territorial state does not have an exclusive right to 
qualify the situation is not acceptable to some writers who held different 
view.  They see that the territorial state is the one which is most capable of 
performing the act of characterizing on being aware of all sides of the 
situation surrounding the conflict.  At such they reject the view allowing 
third states to perform the act by alleging that this will create a conflicting 
situation in case of different characterization.  However, practice has shown 
that states in several conflicts have expressed their own characterization of 
the situation contrary to that of the territorial state.76 
As to the legal effect of characterization by third states, several writers see 
that it does not solve the problem in that it binds only that state and not the 
territorial state, the reason being that in most cases the act is made on the 
basis of political considerations.  On the contrary, other modern writers are 
of view that in all cases the act of characterization by third states can have 
significant effects at both the national and international level.  In case it is 
concurrent, it will support the characterization of nature of conflict if 
exercised in good faith.  In cases third states make a different 
                                                 
76  Example, the conflict in Afghanistan of 1979, Castern, op.cit., p. 35 
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characterization from that of the territorial state, it may exercise some 
pressure on the state to review its situation in relation to characterization.77 
Irrespective of any divergent views, under international law and the notion 
of "common interest", the issue of protection of civilian victims, is the 
concern of international community.  That all states have a "legal interest" to 
see rules of humanitarian law are respected during armed conflicts.  
Therefore, in our view, the plea by territorial states or writers that 
characterization by third state is interference in the internal affairs of the 
concerned state, is not to be accepted on this basis. 
i. The Role of United Nations Political Organs And 
Characterization of Situation of an Internal Armed Conflict 
At the Diplomatic Conferences adopting both Geneva Conventions and the 
Protocols a discussion was held as to the possible role of United Nation 
political organs (i.e. the Security Council, the General Assembly and Human 
Rights Commission) in characterizing a situation for purposes of application 
of humanitarian law in particular in relation to internal conflicts.  Some 
states delegates suggested that the UN General Assembly and Security 
Council should have a role in determining the issue by proposing the 
inclusion of a provision in Geneva Conventions and Protocols to that 
                                                 
77 Provost, International  Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, op.cit., pp. 295-296 
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effect.78  However, after great controversy among experts the proposal was 
abandoned.  The rejection was mainly based on the fact that these are 
political organs of the UN which may rely on political factors if empowered 
to exercise characterization of a certain situation of conflict.79 
Despite the fact that neither Geneva Conventions nor Protocols contain a 
provision entrusting such power of characterization to the UN said organs, 
however some legal writers justified such authorization.  Under the UN 
Charter, the Security Council and General Assembly have general powers to 
examine conflicts which may threaten international peace and security, this 
power of examination is a form of characterization of a situation for 
purposes of application of humanitarian law.80  In fact the practice of these 
organs supports this view.  The Security Council in a number of situations of 
internal conflicts passed resolutions pointing to grave atrocities against 
civilians as, threatening international peace and security as in Somalia and 
Rwanda conflicts.  By such resolutions it characterized the conflicts as "non-
                                                 
78  It was argued that the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter could exercise this power, i.e. 
any internaL conflict determined by Security Council as threatening international peace and security is to 
be characterized as a "non-international armed conflict".  However, the Representative of the Secretary 
General commented by stating that” the UN Charter in setting the purposes of the Organization ,the 
promotion of both peace and self-determination of people intended to empower the UN a discretion to 
characterize situations of armed conflicts” – Final Record, 11-B, p. 121. 
79  ICRC, Conference of Experts, 1971, p. 42. 
80  The UN Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter is empowered to determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace or breach of the peace.  The General Assembly under Article II(2) of the Charter is 
empowered to discuss any matter relating to preservation of international peace and security and to 
examine any situation of conflict and make recommendation at such. 
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international armed conflict", and called parties to the conflict to respect and 
apply humanitarian rules of protection to civilians81. 
As to the legal effect of characterization by UN organs, legal writers 
differentiate between the act made by General Assembly and Security 
Council. Boven argues that in cases General Assembly invoke humanitarian 
law in certain situations of conflicts it is merely invoking considerations of 
humanity to which all governments are bound to apply in such situations.  
Boven by this is suggesting that the General Assembly in invoking 
humanitarian law is determining the norms to be legally applicable to the 
facts.82  This raises the issue of legal effect of General Assembly Resolutions 
in such situations.83  As to the Security Council practice, several writers 
argue that the Security Council resolutions in situations of armed conflicts 
are not to be considered as legally binding when characterizing an armed 
conflict, being based on political rather than legal considerations.84  Other 
                                                 
81  David Weissbradt, "The Role of International Organizations in the implementation of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law in situations of Armed Conflicts" – (1988) 21 Vanderbilt J. International Law p. 313 – 
Example of such Resolution is the Security Council resolution on the situation in Bosnia – Herzegovina 
763 C 13 July, 1992) and Resolution 780 on Oct. 1992. 
82  Theo C. Van Boven, "Reliance on Norms of Humanitarian law by United Nations Organs", in Astrid 
Delissen and Gerad Tanja eds. Humanitarian law of Armed Conflict, Challenges Ahead-Essays in Honour 
of Fritz Kalshoven (Dordecht: Nighoff, 1991) p. 205. 
83  S.A. Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-citation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63 AJIL, (1969) 
p. 444. 
84  On this issue, F.L. Kirgis, The Security Council's First Fifty years, - AJSL 89 (1995) p. 506. 
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writers, like Provost fear that this could open the door to UN intervention in 
the form of characterization.85 
However, referring to the above issue, one tends to disagree with the view 
that Security Council resolutions are solely based on political considerations 
because both organs are acting within the general rules of international law 
for several reasons.  As Akheurst pointed, the Security Council is also bound 
by the Charter and has to act within the law86.  Under Article 39 of the 
Charter the Security Council has power to assess what constitutes a threat to 
international peace, referring to "serious violations of human rights and 
killing of civilians” is a legal criterion which Security Council in its 
resolutions has adopted in characterizing a certain situation as an internal 
armed conflict.  Thereafter determining the measures it thinks appropriate 
including application of Geneva Conventions and Protocol II.87  These 
resolutions which are passed under Chapter VI of the Charter, regardless of 
any argument to the contrary are given great weight by international 
tribunals in characterizing a situation of an armed conflict for purpose of 
determining the international criminal responsibility of individuals.88  
                                                 
85  Provost is referring to co-operation with the UN in Article 89 of Additional ProtocoL I which requires 
states to co-operate with the UN in cases of serious violations of Humanitarian Law – Provost, op.cit, p. 
305. 
86  Akheurst, op.cit, p. 426. 
87  Jorge Castaneda Legal effect of United Nations Resolutions (New York: Columbia Up, 1969) p. 130. 
88  For example the ICTY in Tadic Case in characterizing the situation of armed conflict in Bosnia – 
Herzegovina, referred to the resolutions of the Security Council to support its decision – The Prosecutor v. 
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The UN Human Rights Commission has also played a role indirectly in 
characterizing certain situations as armed conflict in the course of their 
practice when examining the human rights situations in certain areas of 
internal conflicts by their Rapporteurs89.  Reports made by such Rapporteurs 
referring to the application of humanitarian law to a specific situation of 
armed conflict pointing to violations committed against civilians implies that 
they have characterized the conflict for purposes of application of  
humanitarian law rules protecting the dignity of civilians and responsibility.  
Example, the Special Rapporteur on Sudan applied common Article 3 to the 
liberation Army (SPLA) and found them responsible for violations of 
humanitarian law in the struggle against government forces90.  It is to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tadic (Decision on the Defense Motive for Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction) Case No. ST-94-1-Article 
72 (Appeals Chamber, SITY) 2 Oct. 1995 p. 44 – Also the International Institute of International Law 
adopted a resolution in August 1999, Article IX providing "should state concerned claim that internal 
conflict has broken out, the authorization should be given to the UN organization to establish impartially 
whether International Humanitarian Law is applicable" – quoted from Provost, op.cit, p. 308 St. 111. 
89  For example a mission sent by the Representative of the Secretary General on Internally Displaced 
Persons carried out in Burundi in September 1994 made report concluding that "some of the events that 
have taken place in Burundi would seem to fall within the ambit of this provision pointing to Article 3 
Common to Geneva Convention IV.  Another example is the special Rapporteur on Executions after 
gathering specific information on the nature and extent of military activities during a mission in Burandi 
concluded that "a low intensity civil war" was taking place in a certain province – EICN. 4/1995/50/Add. 2, 
para 50 – EICN. 4/1996/4/Add. 1, Para. 61, 63 and 64 – For more examples on the issue, Hicks, 
Iimplementation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, International 
Review of the Red Cross (IRRC) March, April 1993, No. 293, p. 128.  
90  The violations included indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population, rape, mutilation and looting, 
the SPLA group was condemned by the Rapporteur for seizing an ICRC aircraft in South Sudan conflict 
and detaining its passengers and crew as hostages, describing this act as serious breach of International 
Humanitarian Law – ECN.4/1997, para. 27 – EICN.4/1994/48, para. 23 and 115 – The civil war in 
Southern Sudan started early in 1990 and ended by Peace Agreement conducted between Sudan 
Government and SPLA in January 2005.  SPLA groups signed an agreement to respect Protocol II 
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noted here that UN Human Rights Rapporteurs rarely describe in detail the 
factual circumstances of a conflict.  They fear the risk that they may arrive at 
a conclusion which is different regarding the issue of whether an armed 
conflict exists in a given country91.  It is to be mentioned here that the efforts 
made by human rights organizations to investigate violation of humanitarian 
law during internal armed conflicts is a subsidiary activity to its main role in 
monitoring human rights.  As such, their role is described as complementary 
to the role of ICRC as both have one goal i.e. to reduce the sufferings of 
civilian victims as human beings during armed conflicts.92 
ii. The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) in Characterizing a Situation of Internal Conflict  
The role of the ICRC during armed conflicts is defined in Geneva 
Conventions, 1949 and two Additional Protocols of 1977.93  Its activities are 
                                                                                                                                                 
Additional 1977 thereafter, though at that time the Government of Sudan had not ratified it – 
E/CN.4./1996/62 para. 83. 
91  Daniel O'Donnell, Trends in the Application of International Humanitarian Law, IRRC, Sept. 1998, No. 
324, p. 493, 94. 
92  The question as to should non-governmental organizations and UN bodies cite international 
humanitarian law in support of their human rights concerns is a debatable question, for discussion on the 
issue – Hicks, op.cit., pp. 129-130. 
93  The ICRC started in 1863 as the result of inspiration of a man, Dunant, whose ideas played the ground 
work for the world's first humanitarian aid organization.  His pioneering vision and ideas gave rise to the 
concept of humanity at a time when there was little concern for the common man.  These ideas which grew 
and expanded across border to form an international organization dedicated to humanitarian services during 
armed conflicts, which possess according to its Statute a legal personality as an association governed by 
Article 60 of the Swiss Code.  The Committee action which is governed by international law has certain 
characteristics: namely its role in drawing up and developing humanitarian conventions, its power in 
protecting war victims, its ability to call belligerents respect humanitarian law during armed conflicts.  
Article 5 para 2(1) of the Statute of the International Cross and Red Crescent Movement prescribes three 
categories of duties for the ICRC in armed conflicts: 1-to undertake the tasks incumbent upon it under the 
Geneva Conventions, 2- to work for the faithful application of International kumanitarian Law applicable in 
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basically to give humanitarian assistance and protect victims of all types of 
armed conflicts and are described as the guardian of international 
humanitarian law.  None of the above referred to the power of 
characterization to the ICRC.94 
However, referring to the practice of the ICRC in internal conflicts, it shows 
that the Committee normally makes its own assessment of the situation as an 
armed conflict for purposes of compliance with humanitarian law 
instruments in the territory which it is to carry its humanitarian activities.  
This act of characterization is made by the Committee independently and 
irrespective of any assessment of the situation by the territorial state or other 
bodies.  In case of a different assessment by the Committee from that of the 
territorial state, the Committee will call the state to comply with rules of 
protection of humanitarian law applicable without pointing to its own 
characterization or assessment of the situation,  the reason being that the 
ICRC as a neutral and impartial body is not to intervene in internal affairs of 
the state but to carry its activities in promoting and supervising the respect of 
                                                                                                                                                 
armed conflicts and 3- to take recognition of any complaints based on alleged breaches of that law.  
Humanitarian Law and Red Cross is unique in that it has transcended geographic, religions, racial political, 
social and other barriers to provide protection where human beings are suffering as victims – For 
comprehensive information on ICRC activities, Francois Bugnion, The International Committee of the Red 
Cross And The Protection of War Victims – MacMillans Publishers limited 2003. 
94  The issue was discussed at the Governments Experts Conference of 1971, some experts proposed to give 
the ICRC the power to characterize the nature of a situation as armed conflict provided that such 
characterization is not binding.  However this proposal was rejected by the ICRC itself – Report of the 
work of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts – second session, Geneva, 1972 (Geneva: ICRC, 1972) 11 p. 44.  
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international humanitarian law by parties to the conflict.95  However, the 
assessment and attitude of the ICRC during conflicts is given weight and 
consideration by international tribunals in determining the nature of a 
conflict for purposes of responsibility for acts in determining violation of 
humanitarian law.  Example in Tadic case, the Tribunal concluded by stating 
that "… The conclusion is therefore warranted that the ICRC regarded the 
conflicts governed by the agreement in question as internal".96 
iii. International Tribunals and Characterization of a Situation as 
an Armed Conflict 
Ad hoc international criminal tribunals has contributed in characterizing a 
situation as a "non-international armed conflict" in certain cases for purposes 
of application and determination of criminal responsibility in particular in 
the case of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia conflicts97.  Their jurisdiction to 
try persons accused of committing serious violations of humanitarian law 
includes impliedly their competence to characterize the situations in 
determining the international criminal responsibility.98 
                                                 
95  ICRC, "Action by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Event of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law" – (1981) 221 International Review of the Red Cross, p. 76. 
96  In this case the Tribunal referred to agreement concluded between the various parties of the conflict in 
former Yugoslavia to apply humanitarian rules, the ICRC endorsed such agreements.  Tadic case, Decision 
on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal Jurisdictions, 2 Oct. 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-April 72. 
97  The International Court of Justice in Nicaragua case reached a conclusion that the hostilities 
             conducted in the territory of Nicaragua is 'non-international armed conflict" – Nicaragua v.   USA   (1986) 
ICJ Reports, pp. 113-114. 
98  UN Doc. SIRES/955/(1994) Annex provide for the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal in 
Rwanda.  As the result of the conflicts resulting in the break up of Yugoslavia and the civil war in Rwanda, 
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In the case of Akayseu, the Tribunal applied the criteria of 'intensity' of the 
conflict and sufficient organization of the conflicting parties thereby 
distinguishing it from acts of banditry or unorganized short-lived 
insurrection.99  A distinction between international and non-international 
with regard to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia has been made by the 
Tribunal in the case of Dusko Tadic.  The Appeals Chamber characterized 
the armed conflict on one hand as non-international armed conflict.100  On 
the other hand, referring to the same situation of conflict, the Tribunal in 
Tadic case came to the conclusion that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
had been rendered international by the involvement of the Yugoslavia 
National Army (JNA) in hostilities in Croatia as met as Bosnia-
Herzegovina.101         
                                                                                                                                                 
the Security Council passed a resolutions deciding that the situation involving as it did extensive atrocities 
against civilians, constituted a threat to peace and security calling for action under Chapter IV of the 
Charter.  The Security Council established two ad hoc criminal tribunals one to try grave breaches of 
Geneva Convention 1949, genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war 
committed in Yugoslavia.  The other tribunal conferred jurisdiction by the Tribunal Statute over genocide, 
crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 since the conflict was entirely non-international, no 
reference to grave breaches or the law and customs of war was made since no foreign interventions in 
Yugoslavia was involved Leisle, op.cit., pp. 60-61.    
99  Akayesu case, op.cit., para 620. 
100  The tribunal has to characterize the different stages of hostilities within the region as to whether it was 
international or internal armed conflict or mere disturbances.  The task of characterization by the tribunal 
was not an easy task as the region witnessed several conflicts – For this issue in Christopher Greenwood, 
"International Humanitarian law and the Tadic Case, European Journal of International law 7 (1996) p. 265 
– Theodor Meron, "Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, Nicaragua Fallout, (1998) 
92 American J. International Law p. 236-Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic – Case No. IT-94-1-A of 15 July 99, 
para. 72. 
101  On this case the Security Council purposely refrained from classifying the armed conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia as either internal or international armed conflict and left the issue to tribunal.  In Tadic case the 
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5. Grave Violations of Human Rights of Civilians and the 
Characterization of a Situation as an Armed Conflict  
The UN Security Council and General Assembly have passed in several 
situations of internal conflicts resolutions that grave violations of human 
rights are conducted against civilian victims resulting in their great 
sufferings and killing.  Example the Resolutions passed by the General 
Assembly and Security Council in relation to the conflicts in Rwanda, 
Yugoslavia and Darfur conflict.  Such resolutions are usually based on 
reports released by international and regional human rights bodies and 
reports made by Rapporteurs of UN Human Rights Commission, uncovering 
atrocities against civilians.102 
The UN, in our opinion, has developed and introduced by such practice the 
criteria of grave violations of human rights committed against civilian 
victims during armed conflicts to point to the intensity of violence.  This and 
recognition of belligerency by UN bodies may be used as an element 
supporting any characterization of a situation as "non-international armed 
                                                                                                                                                 
accused before the ICTY defense was that there was no armed conflict in one case and in other the conflict 
was internal and not international conflict to render the inapplicability of rules which are alleged by the 
prosecutor that the accused violated – For commenting on this issue, Macro, op.cit., p. 1173. 
102  Example the Security Council in Resolution 787 of 16 Nov. 1992 noted that the special Rapporteur's 
report on the human rights situations in the former Yugoslavia had made clear that a massive and 
systematic violations of human rights and grave violations of international humanitarian law continue in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It condemned practice of "ethnic cleaning" and deliberately 
impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilians – David Weissbradt, op.cit, pp. 127-
128. 
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conflict", thus, distinguishing it from mere internal disturbances and tensions 
alleged by governments of territorial states to evade application of 
international rules under Article 3 in certain situations of conflicts thereby 
leaving the situation within its domestic jurisdiction being classified as an 
internal matter.103 
The Diplomatic Conferences of 1949, 1977 have not clarified all the legal 
ambiguities regarding the issue of interpretation of the notion of "non-
international armed conflict".  In addition a significant issue of entities 
competent to characterize a situation of armed conflict is left open, thereby 
increasing the legal political and humanitarian complexity of the situation in 
relation to civilian victims.104  As a result of this, one may argue that the 
characterization of a situation by UN is to be considered as authoritative for 
reasons pointed out by Provost in stating that "…. If the international 
community has the power to create legal norms by consensus, then it should 
also be seen to have the power to interpret norm authoritatively and 
characterize facts by consensus."105 
                                                 
103  The recognition of rebellion (explicit or implicit) by the UN might be other criteria for characterization.  
In fact the ICRC Commentary on the Conventions of Geneva provided for it as a "convenient criteria to 
characterize an armed conflict as "non-international armed conflict – Pictet – Commentary on Geneva 
Conventions IV, op.cit., p. 35. 
104  A refusal by a government to recognize the application of Article 3 so as to withhold political status 
from the rebels, which does not reflect the factual situation, will affect the respectability and credibility of 
the government in the eyes of international community.  On the other hand rebel armed groups who respect 
principles of humanitarian law may improve their image in the country and before international community 
which may support the situation. 
105  Provost, op.cit., p. 341. 
 179
 
Thus in absence of an international body, independent, impartial and neutral 
to perform the act of characterization which is binding, both non-
governmental organizations and UN organs may effectively contribute in 
characterizing the situation for purposes of application of humanitarian law 
rules protecting civilian victims of such conflicts.  Third states may also take 
measures to the same effect.106  When the issue is before international 
tribunal, the act of characterization by all above mentioned entities will have 
weight and considered by the tribunal in reaching a final decision in 
characterizing the situations. 
The characterization in that context may be described by some as critical i.e. 
it means the characterization of a conflict on the part of human rights law.  
However, this is not the case as grave violations of human rights used as an 
element to indicate intensity of violence, referring to those basic human 
rights which are non derogable i.e. to be protected under the human rights 
law in all circumstances.  These basic rights are identical to some rights of 
civilians protected under common Article 3 and Protocol II.107 
                                                 
106  Example of such measures taken against some African states witnessing such conflicts since the 1990's, 
"The causes of conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and sustainable development – Africa", 
Secretary-General Report to the UN Security Council, 16 April 1998, Part, Introduction, this Report is 
available on line at http: 11 www.w,un.org/ecosoc dev/geninfro/a frec/sgreport/report.htm. 
107 The issue of grave violations of human rights as a crime is regulated by human rights law and its norms.  
This might lead to the wide debate as to the relation between human rights law and humanitarian law.  This 
legal problem of characterizing of a situation under humanitarian law may be compared for sake of 
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In conclusion to the above issue of characterization, it is clear that in 
principle the territorial state is given the discretion to characterize the 
situation according to facts.  However, this discretion is not absolute or 
exclusive.  International practice shows that other bodies may be competent 
in cases the territorial state is reluctant or does not exercise such discretion 
in good faith.  However, divergent opinions as to the weight to be given in 
case of contradictory characterization with that of territorial state, rebel 
movement, third state and international bodies like UN, exist.  This situation 
creates a legal problem in that act of characterization at such is valid and 
produces legal consequences only within the sphere of the authority of the 
body which performed the act e.g. the territorial state in characterizing the 
situation as mere internal violence will refuse to apply humanitarian law 
rules protecting civilians. 
                                                                                                                                                 
discretion with the problem of characterizes situations of "state of emergency" under human rights law.  
For an excellent analysis of the issue, Provost, op.cit., pp. 269-323.  It is to be mentioned here that several 
non-governmental organization in their reports relying upon human rights and humanitarian law when 
analyzing human rights abuses in armed conflict situations, recommended in their reports the application of 
Article 3 and Protocol II in certain conflicts.   
David Weiss Brodt.  The Role of International organizations in the implementation of human rights and 
humanitarian law in situations of armed conflicts", 21 Vand. J. Transnut IL (1988) p. 313. 
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6.  Geneva Conventions Applicable in Non-international Armed 
Conflicts and the Law of Treaties108   
The Geneva Conventions have acquired a universal character.  Its 
universality stems from the fact that it contains principles and rules of 
humanity tending to protect victims of armed conflicts.  All states gave their 
consensus to the respect, application and enforcement of such rules 
irrespective of religious, cultural, social or political diversities109.  However, 
because of its specific nature arising from their universality and 
humanitarian objectives, it acquired specific features which are to be 
examined.  The Geneva Conventions are multilateral treaties which are to be 
read within the general context of international law of treaties.110 
Unlike other conventions and international treaties, Geneva Conventions do 
not commence with a statement of motives and detailed definition of its 
                                                 
108  For purposes of discussion of this part of the study, Geneva Conventions include Protocol II as it 
supplements common Article 3 of four Geneva Conventions of 1949 applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts. 
109  For the present number of states parties to Geneva Conventions, on website http:// www.icrc.org – The 
laws of Armed Conflicts: A collection of Conventions, Resolutions and other Documents, edited by 
Dietrich Schindler, Jiri Toman, third edition, Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, and Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordecht, 1988, p. 373. 
110  For the rules of Law of Treaties in International Law, Malcon N. SHAW, International law, op.cit, pp. 
560-601. 
-  S. Rosenne, Treaties, Conclusion and Entry into Force, EPIL 7 (1984), pp. 464-467. 
-  Masayuki Takemoto, "The 1977 Additional Protocols and the law of Treaties" – in Christophe Swinarski, 
Studies and essays on international humanitarian law and Red Cross principles in honour of Pictet, Martins 
Nijhofh Publishers, p. 249-264. 
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objects in its Preamble111.  Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of war, of 1949, which embodies Common 
Article 3 applicable in non-international armed conflicts, contains a general 
statement of the purpose of the Convention i.e. "… for the purpose of the 
protection of civilians in time of war".  Though the Preamble according to 
Geneva rules of Law of Treaties has no legal force, however its importance 
lies on the fact that it defines the motives and the purposes of the adoption of 
the treaty and the spirit in which the various provisions of the Convention 
should apply.  The effect of this is that in cases of vagueness of any specific 
provision, as for example common Article (3), reference may be made to the 
Preamble for purposes of interpretation and to know the intention of the 
contracting parties, as it reflects the main rationale behind them and the 
whole spirit in which such provisions should apply.  However, the ideas and 
general principles contained have been reproduced in Common Article 3, 
which proclaims the guiding principles common to all four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.112 
Common Article 3 and its principles corresponding to the fundamental 
aspirations of the peoples of the world defines the essential principles of 
                                                 
111  The subject as to embody a Preamble to Geneva Convention was discussed, different opinions were 
held as to the content of a preamble.  In view of the impossibility of reconciling the different opinions, the 
proposal to embody a preamble was abandoned at the Diplomatic Conference of 1949.  For discussion on 
this issue ,Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, volume 11-A, at p. 813.  
112  Commentary, Geneva Convention IV, op.cit., p. 14. 
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protection to which every human being is entitled in time of armed conflict 
and peace.  As such it corresponds to Human Rights Declaration of 1948 
principles, basically governed by the principle of humane treatment.  This 
rule of humanity which is common and recognized by all civilized nations is 
affirmed by all human rights instruments.113 
Unlike Geneva Convention IV, Protocol II contains a preamble which points 
out to the sources of rules of humanitarian protection.  It recalls the 
permanent validity of humanitarian principles contained in common Article 
3 of Geneva Convention in internal conflicts.  It recalls that the international 
instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to human 
person and that "in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person 
remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates 
of the public conscience”.114  As such, Protocol II recalled the main sources 
of rules of protection to civilians in non-international armed conflicts. By 
recalling human rights instrument, it is considered the first humanitarian 
convention which refers expressly to the applicability of human rights 
conventions during internal armed conflicts. 
                                                 
113 ibid, p. 34. 
114  Protocol II Preamble by recalling that "… the human person remains under the protection of principle 
of humanity and dictates of public conscience" is referring to the so-called Martens Clause to be discussed 
later in this chapter.  The clause "not covered by the law in force" includes absence of a rule applicable in 
the law, cases where parties to the conflict are reluctant to be bound by Common Article 3, or are not 
bound by Protocol II.  In all above cases, the human person remains under the principles of humanity and 
dictates of public conscience.  Commentary to Additional Protocols, ibid, p. 1341. 
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Geneva Conventions contain a number of provisions to guarantee its 
application and binding force.  For example, when a state engaged in an 
international or internal conflict and notify its accession to the Conventions 
at the start of ordinary hostilities, that notification will take immediate 
effect.115  It widens its scope of application also on condition that non-states 
parties other than those ratifying or acceded to them, declares its readiness to 
accept provisions and did in fact apply them.116  The Vienna Convention on 
the law of Treaties provides a rule allowing a state to suspend the operation 
of a treaty in whole or in part, because of the alleged violations by another 
contracting party117.  However, it excepted humanitarian law instruments 
from this rule by stating that "…the above rules does not apply to provisions 
relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a 
humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form of 
                                                 
115  Common Article 62 of four Geneva Conventions 1948. 
116  Common Article (2) of four Geneva Conventions 1949.  It is to be mentioned here that Geneva 
Conventions include a clause conditioning for early entry into force upon ratification by a certain number 
of states (Article (53 of Geneva Convention IV).  Both Geneva Conventions and Protocol II came into 
force after only two parties deposited an instrument of ratification (Article 23 of Protocol II).  The 
Conventions are to enter into force six months after two instruments of ratification have been deposited.  
For the party ratifying or acceding to the Protocol, it shall enter into force six months after deposit by such 
party.  It is to be mentioned that common Article 3 requires implementation in cases of actual occurrence of 
a non-international armed conflict.  While Protocol II, some of its provisions apply during peace e.g. duty 
of states parties to respect Red Cross emblem.  Protocol II came into force on 7 December of 1978, ICRC, 
No. 207, November-December. 
117  Article 60 of Vienna Convention 1969 on The Law of Treaties – For text of the Convention, Basic 
Documents in International law, edited by Ian Brownlie, fourth edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 
412. 
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reprisals against persons protected by such treaties"118.  This rule is to be 
applicable to Geneva Conventions, are considered treaties of a humanitarian 
character the basis of the binding force of Geneva Conventions is the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
The above is the main exception to the general rules of the law of Treaties 
applicable to humanitarian law treaties. While suspension is not expressly 
considered by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, however the right of 
states parties to terminate the Conventions through denunciation is allowed 
under it.119 Though under the Geneva Conventions one of the contracting 
party may denounce the application of the Convention, however to ensure 
this will not affect adversely protected persons, certain requirements were 
made.  Denunciation will take effect one year after notification to the Swiss 
Government (the depository) provided that if the denouncing party is 
involved in a conflict, the denunciation would not take effect until peace 
concluded and after release and repatriation of all protected person is made.  
Such denunciation would affect only the party concerned and would not alter 
relations between other states120. One specifity of humanitarian law 
                                                 
118  Article 60(5) of Vienna Convention. 
119  Article 158 of Geneva Convention IV, Article 24, Protocol II – since most of the rules provided for in 
Geneva Conventions as customary rules especially those relating to protection of civilian victims as in 
Article 3 and Protocol II, one presumes that these are not subject to suspension or termination in practice. 
(Article 43, Vienna Convention 1960). 
120  Francois Bugnion, The International Committee of the Red Cross And the Protection of War Victims, 
(International Committee of Red Cross, Macmillan 2003) p. 316 – K. Widdows, The Unilateral 
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instruments is that till now no state party made a denunciation to Geneva 
Conventions or its Protocols, the reason being that denunciation or 
suspension by a contracting party as a result of a material breach by one 
party is regarded as an act of reprisal against the other party.  This act of 
reprisal is prohibited under humanitarian law instruments since it adversely 
affects the very objectives of the law i.e. the persons protected under it shall 
be affected by acts of reprisal in particular civilian population.  As a result as 
has been shown earlier, a contracting party is not allowed in whole or in part 
to suspend the application of the Geneva Conventions with regard to an 
adversary who may have violated any of their provisions121.  The purpose of 
such rule is not to safeguard the continued validity and applicability in 
relation between parties but rather to safeguard the continued application of 
rules of protection to victims. 
Under international law of treaties, states may control or limit the extent of 
their obligations by declaration making reservations to certain provisions 
while at the same time giving their general consent to the treaty.  The legal 
effect of such reservation is that it will affect the relationship between the 
reserving state and other states parties to the same treaty.  However the right 
                                                                                                                                                 
Denunciation Clause, BYIL 53 (1982) pp. 83-114. On rules relating to the issue, Brownlie, Principle of 
Public International Law, op.cit, p. 620-626.  
121  However in case of a material breach of Geneva Conventions, the contracting party affected may refer 
to the United Nations or other international organization demanding for reparations or punishment in case 
of criminal responsibility.  On rules of international law on this issue, D.N. Hutcherison, Solidarity and 
Breaches of Multilateral Treaties, BYIL 59 (1988) p. 151. 
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of a state to make reservations under the law of treaties is restricted by the 
principle of compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty122.  
Neither Geneva Conventions 1949 nor the 1977 Additional Protocols 
contain a provision dealing expressly with the right of states to make 
reservations to such instruments or their effect.  This point to the fact that 
states parties are free to make reservations to Geneva Conventions or 
Protocols123.  However, this freedom is restricted by rules of international 
law of treaties (Article 19 of Vienna Convention and customary rules), that 
reservations to be compatible with the object and purpose of humanitarian 
law instruments.  The main objective and purpose of Geneva Conventions 
are to provide protection to victims of armed conflicts by ensuring the 
comprehensive application of its provisions.  Thus a reservation which tends 
to restrict the application of rules of protection or undermine them is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of convention is not permissible124.  
The International Court of Justice in its Advisory opinion concerning 
                                                 
122  Article 19 of Vienna Convention Law of Treaties 1969 – On historical development of the principle of 
reservation in international law, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, ibid, p. 612. 
123  The Geneva Convention IV does not expressly exclude reservations the reason being that the intention 
was to open the door for ratification and accession to the greatest number of states to widen its scope of 
application to cover situations of armed conflicts to ensure wider protection of victims of those conflicts.  
However, it maintains the integrity and effectiveness of such instruments in terms of a firm level of 
obligations. 
124  Example of reservations which were not regarded as restricting the application of the Conventions made 
by some states, are those stating that ratification of a treaty does not imply any recognition that another 
state exists.  Example the reservation made by Israel, 2 August 1984 by Syria, 14 November to the 
Protocols of 1977.  Detter describes such reservations as containing political announcements – Detter, 
op.cit, p. 52 – on Reservations and objections made to Geneva Conventions reproduced in Schindler and 
Toman, Laws of Armed Conflicts. 
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Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, it pointed out to the object of 
the Convention and to other Conventions of similar type ,like Geneva 
Conventions, by stating: 
"The object of such a Convention must also be considered.  The 
Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and 
civilized purpose.  In such a Convention the contracting states do not 
have any interest of their own, they merely have, one and all, a 
common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes 
which are the raison d'etre of the Convention.  Consequently in a 
Convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or 
disadvantages to states, or of maintenance of a perfect contractual 
balance between rights and duties.  The high ideals which inspired the 
Convention provide, by virtue of the common will of the parties, the 
foundation and measure of all its provisions”.125   
The issue of reservation in humanitarian law instruments should be 
considered with cautions as the application of the criteria of compatibility 
with object and purpose of the treaty is a matter left in most cases to the 
                                                 
125 ICJ. Reports (1951) p. 23 – Reservations to certain provisions of Geneva Conventions may have a 
reciprocal effect on the mutual obligations of other states in regard to their relations with the reserving 
state, i.e. those norms of a humanitarian character.  For example the protection against physical or moral 
coercion (Article 31, 1949 G.CIV) and the prohibition against the torture of prisoners of war (Article 17 of 
G.CIII) – Provost, op.cit, p. 149. 
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appreciation of individual states126.  Beside the effect of reservation to such 
instruments alters the substance of the reserving states’ obligations towards 
individuals as protected persons under its jurisdiction127.  Therefore, 
reservations which would undermine the minimum standards representing 
"elementary considerations of humanity" contained in common Article 3 of 
Geneva Conventions, no doubt is incompatible with the object and purposes 
of such Conventions.  Moreover, the substantial norms in Article 3 and 
Protocol II relating to protection of civilians contain as human beings and 
victims have acquired the status to jus cogens norms.  In addition the 
obligations which represent customary international law standards may not 
be the object of reservation and are invalid.  It is to be mentioned in this 
connection that all the states which ratified the Geneva Conventions have 
accepted common Article 3 without reservation as there is a universal 
consensus that Article 3 contains fundamental principles which are 
accepted128.   
Finally, in connection to the problems relating to the question of 
interpretation of Geneva Conventions in cases of ambiguities to some of its 
                                                 
126  Ibid, p. 29 – Gamble, "Reservations to Multilateral Treaties.  A Macroscopic view of State Practice”, 74 
AJIL, 1980 p. 370. 
127  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ.  Reports, at Para. 83 
and Para. 44.  Reservations to norms contained in Article 3 and Protocol II may not affect the relations 
between High Contracting Parties but it may affects persons protected. 
128  Claude Pilloud, "Reservation and the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1), (1976) 180 International Review 
of the Red Cross p. 105 and on the same issue by the same writer,  Reservations and the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions 2, (1976) 181 International Review of the Red Cross, p. 163. 
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provisions, the general rules of interpretation provided for by the Law of 
Treaties are to govern the interpretation and application of Geneva 
Conventions.  Article 31(11) of the Vienna Convention declares that a treaty 
shall be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose"129.  International tribunals have referred to objects and 
purpose of the treaty in interpreting provisions of Geneva Conventions in 
some cases130.  Recourse has been made to the preparatory work of Geneva 
Conventions in cases where the meaning was ambiguous or obscure131.  In 
some other cases recourse has been made to human rights law to provide 
application of certain principles pertaining to the protection of victims as 
human persons.  In all cases, it should be noted that the legal specifities and 
features of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II ultimately derive from 
their object and purpose; as a result an interpretation of any provision is to 
be made in the light of this. 
                                                 
129  The other provisions of Vienna Convention from Article 31 to 33 shall be taken with account in 
interpretation Geneva Conventions.  These Articles reflect basic approaches to treaty interpretation.  The 
first refers to the actual text of the agreement, the second to the intention of the parties, adopting the 
agreement, the third, emphasis the objects and purposes of the treaty as the most important criteria against 
which the meaning of any particular treaty provision should be measured – Shaw International Law, op.cit, 
pp. 583-588. 
130  The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu(Judgment) case No. 171, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998, Para 
603. 
131  Tadic Case,  Case No. IT-94-1-AR 72, October 2, 1995, Para 108. 
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7. The Customary Status of International Humanitarian Law Rules 
Governing Non-International Armed Conflicts  
The emergence and development of international rules governing non-
international armed conflicts protecting civilians has occurred at two 
different levels i.e. at the level of customary law and that of treaty law.  
These two bodies exist as supplementing each other.  In some cases some 
treaty rules have gradually become part of customary law or vice versa i.e 
some treaties have codified customary rules132.  This is applicable to Geneva 
Conventions, Article 3 and Protocol II133. 
The customary nature of common Article 3 principles has been upheld by 
decisions of international tribunals and international jurists.  The 
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua case held that “the great majority 
of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, including common Article 3, 
are considered to be part of customary international law”.134 
 
                                                 
132  R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 BYIL (1965-1966) p. 
289 
133 As to the explanation of why a rule is considered customary in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald – Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 1, Rules, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005 – Besides 192 parties to the Geneva Conventions i.e. they are binding on nearly all states as a 
matter of treaty law. 
134 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States) ICJ Reports 1986 p114,-218.  Meron, Theodor, Geneva ConventionS as customary law, The 
American Journal of International Law, volume 81 (1987). Tribunal’s importance lies on the fact that a rule 
of customary international law exists, constitutes persuasive evidence to that fact.  It may also contribute to 
the emergence of a rule of customary practice of states and international organizations. 
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One of the main features of Common Article 3 is that it codified basic 
principles of which already forms part of customary international law.  One 
of these basic principles is that of respect of humanity.  This principle, the 
basis on which all Geneva Conventions rest is not a product of the 
Conventions.  It is older than that and independent of them.  All human 
beings without discrimination are entitled to enjoy respect for the human 
personality.  This respect for the personality and dignity of human beings as 
specified by Article 3 constitute a universal principle, which is binding even 
in the absence OF any contractual undertaking i.e. it is a customary rule135.  
It requires that in time of armed conflict, all those not actively engaged in 
the hostilities and all those hors de'combat by reasons of sickness, wounds, 
capture or any other circumstances, shall be given due respect and have 
protection from the effect of war and those among them who are in suffering 
shall be protected without distinction of rule, religion, political opinion or 
other quality136. 
                                                 
135  M.H. Hoffman, The Customary Law of non-international armed conflict, Evidence from the United 
States Civil War – in IRCR, No. 277 (July-August 1990) pp. 322-344. 
136   Commentary on Geneva Convention IV, op.cit, p. 13 – There are different evidence of the customary 
status of such principles state practice which must be both extensive and representative i.e need not be 
universal but a general practice is sufficient.  Example is the form of military manuals acknowledged the 
customary status of some of the basic principles embodied in Article 3 Protocol II.  However, the practice 
of armed opposition groups such as codes of conduct and declarations made to observe certain rules of 
international humanitarian law does not constitute state practice.  Such practice may contain evidence of 
acceptance of certain rules in non-international armed conflicts.  Opinion juris is a requirement in 
establishing the existence of a rule of customary law, i.e. whether a particular practice is carried out "as of 
right". 
Jean – Marie, infra, p. 179-180. 
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Unlike Common Article 3, some legal writers argue that none of the 
provisions of Protocol II can be regarded as reflecting customary law137.  
This view does not reflect the reality because Protocol II is a restatement of 
principles protecting victims contained in Article 3, supplements it and 
provides an elaboration of such principles by converting them into rules138.  
For example Article 4(1) and (2) of Protocol II is an elaboration of the duty 
of humane treatment imposed by Article 3(1).  Also Article 6(2) deals with 
due process guarantees which is an elaboration of Common Article 3(1)d. 
These rules and principles which constitute the basic core of Protocol II for 
purpose of protection of civilians, is reflected clearly in Common Article 3 
and therefore as quoted by the tribunal in Tadic case.  "…. should be, a part 
of generally accepted customary law.  This specifically includes its 
prohibitions on violence towards persons taking no active part in hostilities, 
hostage taking, degrading treatment and punishment without due process”139. 
As far as other rules regulating conduct of hostilities in Protocol II, it is 
difficult to say that they reflect customary rules unless state practice proves 
                                                 
137   The reason is that few states ratified Protocol II . 
138  Greenwood, C., Customary Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols in Delissen, J.M., & Tanges G.J.  
(eds.), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts, Challenges Ahead, Essays in Honor of Frits Kalshoven, 
Dordrecht, Martinus Nighoff Publishers, 1991, pp. 100-126. 
139  The Tribunal quoted this statement in para 117 and made a reference to humanitarian law conventions. 
Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, 2 American University Journal of International Law and Policy (1987) at 
430-31. 
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that they are accepted as customary law140.  However a very recent study 
shows that there has been a considerable amount of practice over the last 
decade to the effect that many of the provisions of Protocol II are now 
considered to be part of customary international law141.  Such provisions 
include the prohibitions of attacks on civilians the obligation to respect and 
protect medical and religions personnel, medical units and transports, the 
prohibition of starvations, the prohibition of attacks on objects indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population, the prohibition of forced movement 
of civilians and the specific protection afforded to women and children142.  
In addition, the development in the human rights law that led to the 
emergence of customary norms has influenced the status of identical norms 
in international humanitarian law.  Example is the prohibitions of arbitrary 
taking of life and torture143. Protocol II also contains a basic core of 
elementary human rights which have been recognized as customary in 
human rights conventions, a fact which suggests that they are to be 
                                                 
140  Protocol II was not recognized as reflecting customary rules due to the fact that few states ratify it 
compared to Geneva Conventions of 1949 and there has been little significant practice by non-parties states 
– Greenwood, op.cit, p. 112. 
141  Jean-Marie Henckaerts and louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 
volumes, volume 1.  Rules, volume II.  Practice (2 parts) Cambridge University Press, 2005 – For the 
general content of the study available at, http//www.icrc.org. 
142   Jean-Marie Henckaerts "Study on Customary International humanitarian law: A Contribution to the 
understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict", International Review of the Red Cross, 
vol. 87 November 85 7, March 2005, pp. 175-212. 
143  This has been observed by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226. 
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recognized so when embodied in humanitarian law instruments like Protocol 
II.144 
The importance of characterizing Common Article 3 and basic rules of 
protection of civilians in Protocol II as of a customary status has its 
advantages in that, in accordance with Article 43 of Vienna Convention on 
Law of Treaties, parties could not terminate their customary law obligations 
by withdrawal.  Also reservations to the Convention may not affect the 
obligations of the parties under provisions reflecting customary law.  In 
addition the humanity principles in both Article 3 and the Protocol are 
characterized as being both conventional and customary rules which 
strengthen its effect in providing protection to civilians.  However, as Meron 
stated, if states fail to observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions in 
conflicts in which they are involved this would result in weakening the 
customary status of such norms145. 
                                                 
144  These basic rights include the rights of detainees, the right pertaining to penal prosecutions and to due 
process of law.  The affirmation of customary status of some human rights `reproduced in Protocol II has 
been made by the ICRC by stating that Protocol II contains virtually all the irreducible i.e rights of the 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights.  These rights are based on rules of universal validity to which 
states can be held even in the absence of any treaty obligations or any explicit commitment on their part" – 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, op.cit., p. 1340. 
145 ` Meron, Theodor, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, op.cit., p. 370. 
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8. The Jus Cogens Character of Geneva Conventions Protective Rules 
The rules of Geneva Conventions are characterized as jus cogens norms, 
referring to those rules aiming at the protection of civilians basic rights as 
human persons.146  The development of the concept of jus cogens reflects the 
desire of the international community for a normative order in which higher 
rights are claimed as a binding moral and legal norms which prevents 
derogations from and violations of human rights147.  The concept was 
recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, as 
peremptory norms by defining it in Article 53: 
"For the purpose of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of 
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character".148 
The above Article indicates the existence of certain characteristics of the 
norms to describe it as of jus cogens character without giving example of 
                                                 
146  This has been characterized by the International Law Commission in, “Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its thirty-second session”, UN Document: A/35/10/(1980).  
147  Meron, Theodor, Geneva Convention as customary law, op.cit., p. 350. 
148  Article 35 also provides that a treaty will be void if at the time of its conclusion it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. 
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such peremptory norms.  However examples of the content of jus cogens 
have been given by the International law Commission i.e. prohibition of 
genocide, slave trading, piracy and unlawful use of force149.  The absence of 
a list of international norms and sources which belong to jus cogens 
rendered the concept to be described by some writers as vague.  This fact let 
state practice and international decisions to be cautious in accepting the 
relevance of the concept150. 
However, referring to the test set by Article 53 above; two criteria are 
required to characterize a norm as jus cogens.  The first is the establishment 
of the proposition as a rule of general international law and secondly the 
acceptance of that rule as a peremptory norm by the international law 
community as a whole.  In other words, it should acquire universal 
acceptance as a legal rule by states and acquire recognition of it as a rule of 
jus cogens by an overwhelming majority of states, crossing ideological and 
                                                 
149  These examples were given during discussions in relation to the issue.  It is to be noted no agreement 
was reached on which international norms belong to jus cogens – Yearbook of the ILC, 1966, vol. 11, p. 
248.  In Barcelona Traction case, obiter dictum, in giving examples of obligations which considered to be 
the concern of all states, it referred to basic rights of the human person to include the prohibition of slavery, 
racial discrimination, aggression and genocide – Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports 
1970, 3, Para 33. 
150  This vagueness let some states to propose that in case of a dispute as to the application of Article 53 
referring to disagreement as to the characterization of a norm as jus cogens, to be settled by the 
International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal.  Yearbook of the ILC, infra, p. 250 – For criteria of the 
Concept, Akheurst, Modern introduction to International Law, Seventh revisal Edition, op.cit, pp. 57-58 – 
Sztucki, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1974. 
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political diversities151.  Therefore, according to this, a rule of jus cogens can 
be derived from custom or treaties. 
In light of the above, the question is whether rules and principles of 
humanitarian law applicable in time of non-international armed conflicts 
form part of jus cogens as defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention?  
Regarding the source of humanitarian law rules, in general, they are 
basically derived from practices which form part of customary law of 
civilized people which has been mostly codified in Geneva Conventions.  As 
to the above criteria required in Article 53, the principles of Geneva 
Conventions embodied in Article 3 Common and Protocol II constitute a 
minimum standard of humanity principles applicable to situations of non-
international armed conflicts which has been widely accepted by the 
international community.  Their universal recognition by all states and 
acceptance that no contrary rule or practice is acceptable resulted in 
conferring absolute obligations on states.  Their binding effect does not 
depend on that it has been included in a treaty but from their customary 
character.  In other words these rules are binding on all parties to an armed 
conflict not only to members of armed forces of states which have ratified 
the treaties.  This universally accepted minimum standards of humanity are 
                                                 
151  Shaw, op.cit, p. 99. 
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binding also on irregular armed individuals as well as national armed forces 
during non-international armed conflicts from which there is no possible 
derogation whether ratified or acceded to the treaty or not. 
Therefore the legal characteristics of the just cogens rules of Geneva 
Conventions derive from their object and purposes as Abi-Saab pointed by 
stating that: 
"… It is the humanitarian and civilizing, object and purposes of the 
Geneva Conventions (and Protocols) – representing the superior 
common interests of the international community – which explain 
their exacting characteristic i.e. the jus cogens character of their 
protective rules"152. 
These universally accepted principles of humanity which are characterized 
as jus cogens norms constitute the core or basic rights of human person to be 
protected in all circumstances in human rights instruments.  In this 
connection J. Pictet considers that the standards laid down in humanitarian 
law are of an absolute character i.e. they are jus cogens because they are in 
fact an express of the universal conscience of mankind which has been also 
                                                 
152  ABI-SAAB, George, The Specifities of humanitarian law, in Christophe Swinarski, Studies and Essays 
on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles, in honor of Jean Pictet, ICRC, Martins 
Nighoff publishers, 1984, p. 272. 
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codified in human rights treaties153. A fact which gave rise to a special 
relationship between both systems of law to be examined. 
9. The Specifities of the Relationship of Humanitarian Law Applicable 
in Internal Armed Conflicts and Human Rights Law 
The main characteristics mentioned of humanitarian law protecting civilians 
in internal armed conflicts have been influenced at a certain point of its 
development and application by human rights law.  The Geneva Convention 
IV on Protection of Civilians is the first international instrument to build a 
bridge of relationship to human rights law by extending the scope of 
humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts in 
Common Article 3.  The second paragraph of Protocol II affirms this relation 
by stating that human rights instruments provide a basis for protection to 
victims of such conflicts.  It created a relationship which has its own 
specifities in international law.  This is not strange as both laws though 
distinct two branches of international law in their origins development and 
every instrument specify its own field of application, yet they share common 
characteristics154, to be examined by making some general reflections. 
                                                 
153  J. Pictet: Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims, Leyden, Sijthal, p. 20. 
154  The nature of relationship between human rights and humanitarian law has been subject to divergent 
opinions among writers.  Extracting differences and similarities between the two laws has been the focus of 
most of these opinions.  However, this study examines the common characteristics which may serve the 
purpose of protection of civilians in non-international armed conflicts, to see how far human rights 
influenced such rules by providing for more effective protective rules which are the subject matter of this 
study.  It is this common characteristic which brought the issue of interrelation between these two branches 
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Both laws have common objectives and their instruments are characterized 
as international agreements of humanitarian character containing basic 
principles and norms protecting human dignity and life.  Human Rights 
instruments are not designed to regulate situations of armed conflicts, at 
such it does not contain rules governing hostilities situations, however 
general provisions are applicable to protect individuals e.g. the right to life, 
to be free from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment.  
Similarly Common Article 3 does not provide for rules limiting means and 
methods, of conduct of hostilities, Protocol II contain few rules (Article 13-
17) to that effect.  Both laws contain basic principles and rules which are 
characterized as jus cogens norms conferring mandatory obligations being 
universally accepted by all states.  The principles of humanity and non-
discrimination which are common are essential for ensuring respect under 
                                                                                                                                                 
of international law and not the differences.  However a brief of basic differences between the two laws 
may be needed.  Human rights guarantee fundamental rights of individuals against abuse of power by the 
state it imposes obligations to respect such rights during peace and conflicts on states parties to such 
instruments.  Humanitarian law imposes the obligation to respect basic principles and rights protecting 
civilians on both states and rebel groups and the state is to guarantee all rules of protection to victims 
during armed conflicts.  Human rights provisions are applicable basically in peace; however in state of 
emergency the state may derogate from guarantee of certain rights a fact which reduces individual 
protection.  While humanitarian law applies all rules during armed conflict i.e. all rules are non derogable.  
One basic difference in relation to rules of protection is that human rights law applies to all persons while 
humanitarian law rules apply to "protected persons" defined under the law.  As to their historical 
emergence on international level, humanitarian law applicable in internal conflicts rules which mostly 
codify customary principles, began by enacting internal Lieber Code drafted by an American lawyer in 
1863 during American Civil war, its basic rules were reproduced in Common Article 3 of Geneva 
Conventions IV in 1949 followed by Protocol II 1977.  The Codification of human rights at international 
level emerged after the Second World War by promulgation of 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights followed in 1966 of the two Covenants, and other covenants.  
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both laws.  The wordings of para. 2 of Protocol II Preamble is an express 
indication that, humanitarian law norms alone do not operate during armed 
conflict and that human rights treaties also applicable.  In fact, Part II of the 
Protocol  embodies identical provisions of the United Nations Covenant in 
Civil and Political Rights of 1966, but reformulated to be adopted to the 
specific situation of armed conflict e.g. on detention on judicial guarantees 
including independence of judiciary and special treatment for children and 
women.   
Both laws caused a break in the wall of sovereignty surrounding the issue of 
treatment of individual citizen, during time of peace and armed conflict by 
imposing obligations on states to guarantee international rules of their 
protection.  Both laws apply to all persons in the territory of a contracting 
state party falling within its jurisdiction be citizen or aliens.  Under both 
laws, persons are to enjoy basic rights i.e. humane treatment of a person 
deprived of one's freedom and detained the right to physical and moral 
integrity.  These basic rights guaranteed constitute under both human rights 
law and humanitarian law instruments the minimum standard of protection 
in such situations155.  
                                                 
155 In fact the debatable question with regard to the interrelation between both laws was raised after the 
Second World War when common Article 3 and Protocol II were adopted.  Humanitarian law emerged, 
codified and developed outside the umbrella of UN, however human rights law has promulgated on 
international level under umbrella of UN.  With regard to Mechanism of enforcement though different, 
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Mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement under both laws are different.  
The absence of international supervision and control of states performance 
under humanitarian law is considered lacunae.  However the last twenty 
years witnessed a new approach in this relation.  The UN bodies including 
Special Rapporteurs from Human Rights Commission refer to principles of 
both laws in relation to protection of civilian victims.  International ad hoc 
Tribunals in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the ICC have jurisdiction 
over violations of both laws156. 
These common characteristics resulted in the concurrent application of both 
laws in certain situations during internal armed conflicts157, a fact which may 
                                                                                                                                                 
however conventions of both laws confer the responsibility for ensuring respect for them in cases of 
violations on the state.  Besides, human rights conventions rely on reports which state parties consent to 
submit to international bodies for that purpose.  Non-governmental human rights organizations play major 
role in drawing the attention of governments to respect human rights and draw attention of public and 
international opinion.  While under humanitarian law, the ICRC a non-governmental organization is to 
monitor compliance with humanitarian haw conventions.  However because of its independence, neutrality 
and impartiality it adopts a confidential approach in cases of violations by parties to the conflict.  Finally, 
humanitarian law treaties are universal, there are no regional humanitarian law treaties or regional systems 
like human rights law which may affect its implementation besides human rights application is in most 
cases accompanied by political considerations e.g. political rights and mode of government while this is not 
the situation in humanitarian law.  For references on the issue Hans, op.cit., pp. 619-620 – Hersch 
Lauterpact, "International Law and Human Rights (London: Stevens and Sons, (1950) p. 125 – Asbjorn 
Eide, The Laws of war and human rights – Differences and convergences, in Christophe Swinarski, Studies 
and essays on International humanitarian law and Red Cross, op.cit., pp. 675-698 – Louise Doswald – Beck 
and Sylvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, International Review of the Red 
Cross, March-April 1993, No. 293 pp. 94-119.    
156  David Weissbrodt and Peggy L. Hicks: Implementation of human rights and humanitarian law 
situations of armed conflict, IRRC, ibid, pp. 120-138. 
157  The General Assembly in a number of its resolutions called for the application of human rights in time 
of armed conflict by stating that "fundamental human rights, as accepted as international law and laid down 
in international instruments continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict".  Example Resolutions 
2675 (1970), UN Doc. A/8052.  The list of such resolutions reproduced in Claude Pilloud etal., 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
(Geneva: Nijihoff, 1987, pp. 157-77. 
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give rise to some problems of applicability.  For example, both laws 
guarantee the right to life which includes prohibition of summary executions 
in all circumstances158.  The question is whether any claim with regard to 
arbitrary deprivation of the right to life which is attributable to state agents 
falls only within human rights instruments.  This issue was raised and 
discussed by ICJ in its Advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons case.  The 
court stated in this connection, that claims of violations of non-derogable 
right to life arising out of an armed conflict may not be possible in many 
cases by reference to Article 4 of Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
alone.  The reason is that the CCP contains no rules that either define or 
distinguish civilians from combatants and other military targets159.  In 
practice, human rights entities and courts faced with claims alleging 
violations for human rights conventions during armed conflicts – refer to and 
apply definitional standards and relevant rules of humanitarian law as a 
source and basis in determining the issue.  In cases when there are 
differences between legal standards governing the same or comparable rights 
in human rights and humanitarian law instruments in a certain situation of 
armed conflict, we have to achieve the common purpose of both laws to 
protect human dignity.  Thus, one may argue that the duty is to give effect to 
                                                 
158  Common Article 3 Geneva Conventions and Article 4 of Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966. 
159  The Advisory Opinion Concerning the Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996. 
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the provisions of that treaty with the higher standard applicable to the rights 
in that question be it the higher standard is that rule of human rights or 
humanitarian law. 
Regarding the relation between Protocol II and the CCP, it is to be noted that 
though a number of provisions, in Article 4 of CCP protecting human 
dignity in all circumstances are related in the Protocol, however, Protocol II 
provides for a higher, detailed and more specific standard of   protection to 
their status as a civilian victims being the “lex specials law”160. In cases in 
which human rights norms which have not been embodied in Protocol II, 
may provide for a higher standard of protection or may provide for a rules in 
absence of a humanitarian law norm or provide a rule by reference to 
interpretation of human rights law then it is understood that human rights 
norms are applicable to achieve the common humanitarian objective161.  This 
rule applies not only in regard to relation between Protocols and human 
                                                 
160  Protocol II embodies almost all inalienable rights of the CCP: Article 2(1) of Protocol II and Article 
2(1) of CCP provide for the principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment of individuals.  Article 6 of 
Protocol II provides for the judicial guarantee embodied in the CCP, the principle of non-retroactivity and 
presumption of innocence, the right to be present at one’s own trial, death sentences not to be carried on 
persons under age of eighteen at time of commission of offence and the principle according to which no 
one may be compelled to testify against himself provided in the Covenant.  An excellent comparative 
analysis of protected rights under both laws and the differences in the nature and structure of human rights 
and humanitarian law is made by Rene Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law", 
Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 16-54. 
161  Some scholars consider humanitarian law as reformulated human rights applicable in armed conflict.  
However humanitarian law scholars reject strongly this view and consider humanitarian law a distinct and 
independent legal system for protection of victims – R. Quantin – Baxter, "Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law – Confluence or Conflict? (1985) Australian Year Book of International Law, pp. 94-96. 
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rights law but also to other rules of humanitarian law like Common Article 
3162.  
This specifity of the relationship is also to be noted in relation to the 
restrictions imposed on obligations of contracting states.  Article 4 of the 
CCP permits a state party to the Convention temporarily derogate, i.e. 
suspend, certain Convention basic guarantees during states of emergency.  
However this Article lays down an important condition which requires that 
any suspension of guarantees should not be inconsistent with that states 
other obligations under international law163.  This clause means that the 
legality of derogation measures under CCP (Article 4) should not be 
determined by reference to CCP only.  This is measured as to whether such 
derogation results in violations of the states party obligations under both 
CCP and humanitarian law instruments applicable during armed conflicts.  
In other words the state party should also ensure whether the rights affected 
by these measures under CCP are also guaranteed under applicable 
humanitarian law instruments i.e. Common Article 3 and Protocol II.  If such 
rights are guaranteed and protected under humanitarian law then any 
                                                 
162  Lysaght, C., "The Scope of Protocol II and its Relation to Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and other Human Rights Instruments" in American Law Review, Vol. 33 (i), 1983 pp. 
9-27. 
163  Schnidler, Dietrich, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Interrelationship of the laws", (1982) 
31 Am.UL.Rev. p. 935 – Plattner, Denise, International Humanitarian Law and Inalienable or Non-
derogable Human Rights, in Daniel Premont ed., Non derogable Rights and states of Emergency (Brussels: 
Bruylaut, (1996) p. 349. 
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measures by the state to derogate from their applicability during state of 
emergency (i.e. armed conflict) is considered violations of its obligation 
under both CCP and humanitarian law.  The purpose of this condition is to 
prevent state parties from relying on CCP as a ground for suspending rights 
to which an individual is otherwise entitled under international law164. 
Therefore one may conclude from above that irrespective to diversity of 
legal opinions on the nature of relationship between human rights and 
humanitarian law, the fact that some basic rights protected by humanitarian 
law are also protected by human rights shows that there are a common areas 
of concern which created a special relationship establishing a more effective 
international system of protection to civilian victims.165                                                             
Conclusion 
The above overview of the main specifities of Geneva Conventions 
applicable in internal armed conflicts reflects two areas of weakness at this 
stage i.e. the vagueness of the concept of "non-international armed conflicts" 
giving rise to divergent opinions as to the interpretation of the concept.  And 
the problem of legal characterization of the nature of conflict, the entities 
                                                 
164  T. Meron, "The protection of the human person under human rights law and humanitarian law" Bulletin 
of Human Rights 91/1, United Nations, New York, 1992. 
165  These main schools of thought on the relationship between the two laws are" the "integrationist" which 
favors merger, “separatist”, which believes that the two branches are distinct but complementing each other 
when it comes to protection of civilians, on this issue an important report had been prepared in October 
1983 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Societies presented to the Council of 
Delegates of Red Cross on the relationship between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights available at 
website (http:www.icrc.org.) 
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competent to perform the act of characterization for purposes of application 
and enforcement of the law.  The two are interrelated as Provost pointed out 
"The operation of characterization is very close to interpretation, the latter 
seeking to clarify law in reference to a set of facts, and the former the 
classification of facts in reference to some legal norms"166. 
The concept of "non-international armed conflict" is vague since Article 3 
does not provide a definition but gives a wide scope of application to cover 
all "non-international armed conflicts".  Conflicting opinions of legal writers 
attempted to provide an interpretation in theory.  However in practice, the 
question is left to the discretion of territorial government which in most 
cases at the commencement of conflict denies that the conflict reached an 
intensity of "armed conflict", thereby avoiding the imposition of any 
international obligation under Common Article 3 by claiming that it is an 
internal strife or violence.  This has its adverse consequence in civilians who 
will be deprived from international protection under the law and 
humanitarian services offered by the Red Cross or otherwise. 
The adoption of Protocol II was expected to eradicate the ambiguities 
regarding the exact definition of the concept, however it laid certain 
objective criteria which complicated the issue, in that the "threshold of 
                                                 
166  Rene Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, op.cit, p. 277 
 209
violence" needed for Protocol II to come into operation is high.  Besides the 
absence of any of the criteria provided under it, will render the 
inapplicability of the Protocol.  In addition, it is difficult to find any 
government that would be willing to apply Protocol II automatically once 
the conflict begins, since they could always claim that the threshold had not 
been met.  By such criterion the Protocol is restricted to certain types of 
conflicts, limiting the ambit of its application to those conflicts in which the 
government army forces are involved as a party and excluding other types of 
conflicts. 
Under Common Article 3 and Protocol II the Government has considerable 
"influence" and discretion in determining whether an internal armed conflict 
reached the "intensity" which qualifies it as "non-international armed 
conflict" in reference to criteria mentioned, however one may argue that 
human rights could be a yardstick in determining such intensity.  In some 
cases the UN Security Council and General Assembly have referred to 
conflicts in which grave violations of human rights of civilians e.g. killing 
and great suffering as intensive thereby bringing such conflicts under the 
definition of a "non-international armed conflict” or civil wars.  It calls for 
the concurrent application of international rules in both human rights and 
humanitarian law instruments.  In our view, the UN Security Council in 
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referring to the severe sufferings and number of civilians killed in a given 
situation by describing it as threatening international peace and security and 
calling parties to the conflict to abide by human rights and humanitarian law, 
this may be considered as an implied act of characterization of the conflict as 
"non-international" armed conflict for purposes of application of rules 
protecting civilians167. 
The question is whether the characterization of nature of conflict as "non-
international armed conflict" for purposes of application, is a matter of 
unrestricted political discretion or a duty imposed by the facts of the 
situation provided the criteria are met?  It is clear that state sovereignty is the 
basis which vests the right of characterization of a situation of conflict, 
taking place in territory of the state on it.  In most cases the act of 
characterization is a political act instead of being an act based on satisfaction 
of legal criteria which states are expected to perform in good faith.  
However, international law puts limits when this discretion is abused or not 
exercised in good faith.  In fact international practice has shown that various 
entities in international law may be competent to perform the act of 
characterization e.g. armed insurgents, third states, political organs like the 
UN and independent non-governmental bodies like human rights 
                                                 
167 Example the Security Council Resolution in Relation to Conflict in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia –Resolution 764 (1992) Para. 10. 
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organizations and international tribunals.  In fact, the problem arises in cases 
where divergent views on the nature of the situations are made by such 
entities.  That being the case, state sovereignty determines whether to apply 
humanitarian law by the territorial state.  On the other hand, third states and 
political organs of international organizations may adopt measures within 
their authority to give effect to its characterization.  As characterization by 
these entities would not be binding, the judicial act of characterization and 
interpretation constitutes the reasonable solution to a binding 
characterization.  This act by international tribunals is usually performed for 
purposes of determining the responsibility for violations of the law and not 
for purposes of application of rules of protection while hostilities are 
conducted. 
The question of interpretation and legal characterization of the nature of a 
situation as a non-international armed conflict" under Common Article 3 and 
Protocol II is of considerable importance.  Any diversity or reluctance can 
result in the inapplicability of the law, the legal consequence of which will 
adversely affect civilian victims168.  One may therefore argue that in the light 
of the objectives and humanitarian purposes of the law that interpretation of 
                                                 
168  One of the basic problems is that in absence of characterization of the situation by concerned 
government, it is difficult for members of armed forces when capturing an adverse party to determine his 
status as to whether to be treated as a rebel, i.e. a member of a dissident group entitled to treatment in 
accordance with Protocol II or a group of criminal, involved in violence. 
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any provisions and act of characterization is to be made.  Besides the 
ascertainment of the intensity and legal characterization should not depend 
solely on the subjective judgment of the territorial government in cases it 
exercises its discretion in bad faith or abuse it.  Other competent entities 
characterization may be taken into consideration169. 
To achieve the main objective of the law, a distinction should be made 
between the issue of protection of victims and qualification or 
characterization of the conflict.  The question of legal characterization of an 
armed conflict under Protocol II should be interpreted as broad as possible.  
The purpose of adopting Protocol II is to supplement and develop common 
Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV of 1949 in relation to protection of 
civilian victims by containing detailed rules without suspending or 
modifying its conditions of application.  As such, it is designed to expand 
the protection under common Article 3 and not to restrict or limit such 
protection to specific situation.  In our view, if Protocol II is to supplement 
common Article 3, it should be applicable whenever a relatively small 
threshold of violence occurs so that a wide range of civilians are protected.  
Protocol II criteria is not understood to refer to one type of conflict within 
                                                 
169  The ICTY in the Tadic Interlocutory Appeal supported its characterization of the armed conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by referring to the position of the parties to the conflict, the Security Council 
proceeding on the issue and the ICRC – The Prosecutor v. Tadic Decision on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October, 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-AR 72 (Appeals Chamber, ICTY) 
p. 40. 
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the broader ambit of application of common Article 3.  In other words, in 
case a state ratifying Protocol II, Article 3 applies concurrently even if a 
conflict does not satisfy the criteria of Protocol II.  In such a case both 
Article 3 and Protocol II applies simultaneously to supplement the rules of 
protection.  As a result, Protocol II is to apply in all cases of internal armed 
conflicts without it being necessary to determine whether the conflict in 
question reaches the level required under the Protocol as long as there are 
victims of armed conflicts170.  The legal relationship between Article 3 and 
Protocol II should be interpreted as supplementary and not separated i.e. the 
requirement of Article (1) of Protocol II are to be considered maximums 
which can be waived by the state for humanitarian considerations171.  
In conclusion, one may argue in case of rise of a de-facto situation of armed 
conflict, common Article 3 and Protocol II should apply automatically.  In 
case of diversity or reluctance when one party to the conflict claims the 
inapplicability of common Article 3 or the rebellion does not satisfy criteria 
of Protocol II, the parties to the conflict are bound to apply basic 
humanitarian principles.  These basic principles which, under the law, reflect 
customary values and jus cogens norms embodied in both human rights and 
                                                 
170  In interstate wars, no such criteria exists , Geneva Conventions and Protocol Iapplies once there are 
victims of armed conflicts, the same rational should be applied here.  
171  Marco, op.cit., p. 1365.  Besides, Article 1 (1) expressly states that the Protocol does not purport to 
modify "existing conditions of application" of Article 3 Common be the Geneva Conventions.  Then one 
may argue that it may be applicable with respect to those situations of internal conflicts which may not 
satisfy the criteria of Article 1(1) of the said Protocol. 
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humanitarian law instruments.  Example is guarantee of the value of human 
life, respect to dignity of human persons, the wounded and sick must be 
taken care of and detainees must receive humane treatment.  Under these 
common basic principles the civilian populations as victims are to be 
respected and protected.  In addition, the fact that some basic rights 
protected by humanitarian law are also protected by human rights law shows 
that there are common areas of concern which resulted in creating a relation 
between the two bodies of law of a special nature.  One may add here that 
good faith in the application of these principles remains a basic element, also 
in some cases political pressure upon governments may be useful.  
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CHAPTER 4 
The Content of International Regime of 
Protection of Civilians 
Introduction 
The main objective of the Law of Geneva is to ensure protection for all 
persons who suffer as a consequence of an armed conflict. To achieve such 
objective in non-international armed conflicts, common article 3 of Geneva 
Convention IV of 1949 and Additional Protocol II of 1977, laid down an 
international regime of protection to civilian victims of such conflicts. This 
regime of protection is based on the fundamental notion of ‘protected 
person’ i.e. the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians 
upon which the whole international humanitarian law regime of protection 
stands. It is based also on the fundamental principles which underlie all 
Geneva Conventions, i.e. the principles of humanity and non-discrimination. 
However, this international regime of protection has its own weakness and 
drawbacks revealed in some of its aspects.  This chapter examines the 
content of the regime and various aspects of its rules to identify places of 
weakness and propose some ideas to remedy the weakness. It is divided into 
three parts. The regime of protection of both common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II is examined in Part 1 and Part 2 respectively.  Part 3 
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examines the shortcomings by attempting to uncover the gaps, deficiencies 
and drawbacks of regime under common Article 3 and AP II. 
1. The Regime of Protection of Civilians under Common Article 3 
Common Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 aims at ensuring that even in the 
midst of internal armed conflicts, the dignity of the human person, 
universally acknowledged in principle shall be respected. Paragraph (1) of 
the Article defines its personal scope of application to “persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities: including members of armed forces who have 
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wound, 
detention or any other cause….”. Common article 3 as such has a general 
field of application, the persons protected are classified in a general way to 
include two main classes of persons who are entitled to protection under it, 
against arbitrary action by one party to the conflict i.e., person who do not 
take active part in the hostilities; civilians and members of the armed forces 
who laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds and detention. However, the class of persons protected is defined 
negatively as it intended to cover all persons who do not take active part in 
hostilities, without defining the notion of “protected persons” in a specific 
matter.  This fact gives rise to certain problems in regard to determination of 
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the category of civilian persons to benefit from such protection. Examination 
of the notion of “protected persons” will be made here and its applicability 
under common Article 3. 
i. The Notion of “Protected Persons” Under Common Article 3 
And The  Principle Of Distinction 
Apart from the factor that individual protection under humanitarian law is 
conditional on the existence of an armed conflict, as discussed earlier, 
Article 3 provided for a further condition that persons protected are those 
taking no active part in the hostilities. Article 3 as such is providing a very 
general definition of those protected, however it adheres to a recognized 
principle of international humanitarian law i.e. the principle of distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants. This principle underlies the 
regime of protection to civilians under international humanitarian law 
applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts. According 
to this principle, the parties to the conflict must differentiate between 
combatants and non-combatants. In other words, a distinction should be 
made between persons who participate in armed conflicts i.e. combatants 
and civilian persons who do not participate in hostilities.1 This distinction 
                                                 
1 - The notion of ‘combatants’ is used in humanitarian law applicable in international armed conflict. 
Combatants are members of armed forces, they have a right to fight and if captured by the enemy they 
become prisoners of war who may be punished for having directly participated in hostilities. Humanitarian 
law imposes on them certain obligations mainly to distinguish themselves from the civilians’ population. In 
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has fundamental consequences regarding protection of civilians from the 
dangers arising from military operations and acts of hostilities.  The 
principle acquired importance after the outbreak of the two World Wars and 
occurrence of three severe civil wars at the first half of the twentieth 
century.2 These wars brought with it changes regarding new means and 
methods in conducting warfare which made it difficult to make such 
distinction as a result of bombing of civilians population which included the 
killings of thousands of civilians .In particular ,these civil wars brought 
severe hardship for the civilian population including food shortage, 
repression threats and reprisals. Aerial warfare i.e. air bombings missiles and 
                                                                                                                                                 
case of violation of rules of international humanitarian law they are subjected to punishment however they 
do not loose the combatant status and retain the prisoner of wars status if captured by the enemy. However 
they loose the status of prisoner of war if they violate their obligation to distinguish themselves. At such a 
combatant is defined as a member of organized armed forces, which are under a command responsible to 
party to the international armed conflict. Such armed forces are subject to an international disciplinary 
system which shall enforce compliance with the laws and customs of war. The 1949 Geneva Convention 
extends the status of combatants to irregular armed forces i.e. to militias, volunteered resistance groups 
provided they comply with four basic conditions that they have a command structure, wear distinctive 
marking, carry arms openly and abide by the laws and customs of war. The third Geneva Convention 
extended the status of prisoner of war to resistance fighters. However, members of armed resistance groups 
captured in combat while not wearing the distinctive sign or not openly carrying arms are not considered 
combatants and are not entitled to prisoner of war status. Additional Protocol I requires the satisfaction of 
above criteria in order to recognize belligerent status of the armed forces of a national liberation movement 
(Articles 43-44).Protection is also granted to the spontaneous levee en  mass of inhabitants of a non-
occupied territory upon the approach of an enemy force.(Article 13(6),4 (A) and (6) of four Geneva 
Conventions respectively).Thus the criteria necessary to identify group is basic condition for application of 
humanitarian law in favor of above irregular combatants. Isolate persons are not given any protection as 
privileged belligerents under the law and are liable to be tried as war criminals. They are only entitled to 
fair trail and to be treated with humanity (Article.15 of Geneva Convection).It is to be mentioned here that 
customary law also extends the status of combatants to militias, volunteer and resistance groups provided 
they comply with four above mentioned conditions. Thus when captured they are to enjoy status of 
prisoners of war. Article 27 to 34 of Geneva Convention provides for above four criteria to distinguish 
civilians from combatants-Ingrid  Detter, The law of War,op.cit,pp.135-148 
2 - These civil wars are the Russian civil wars (1917-1921),the conflict in Upper Selesia(1921) and the 
Spanish civil war (1936-39).For more details on these civil wars and nature of sufferings of civilians on 
Bugnion François, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection of War 
Victims,ICRC,Mac Millam,2003 (pp.250-270) 
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attacks spreading terror among civilian population and the technological 
progress regarding use of nuclear and chemical weapons, resulted also in 
catastrophes to civilians. In addition civilians took an increasing active part 
in hostilities like militias, other volunteer corps, civilian uprisings or 
approach of the enemy, the emergence of irregular troops and resistance 
movements.  All these made the applicability of the principle of distinction a 
difficult task i.e. a clear line dividing between members of armed forces and 
civilians population. This fact, no doubt, affected the protection of civilians 
during armed conflicts.  
The principle of distinction was recognized impliedly in the first 
international  humanitarian instrument applicable in non-international armed 
conflict protecting civilians in Geneva Convention IV, by the mid of the 
twentieth century in 1949.  Common article 3, referred indirectly to the 
above principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatants in 
stating in paragraph 1 that the protected persons are those “Persons taking no 
active part in hostilities……”3 However, it does not provide a definition for 
civilian population or civilian persons which is necessary to apply the 
                                                 
3 - The drafters of Common Article 3 do not refer explicitly to the concept of combatants, mainly because 
states do not want to confer on rebels the right to fight against governmental forces. The rules governing 
non-international armed conflicts recognized no privileged status for those participating in the hostilities 
i.e. they are not prisoners of war if captured but are criminals subject to national laws. However for purpose 
of protection, the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants is used in that sense-
E.Rosenbald, International Humanitarian law of armed conflict, Some Aspect of Principle of Distinction 
and Related Problems, Geneva, 1979. 
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principle of distinction upon which the whole regime of protection is based 
under the law.4 The only criterion which brings persons under the umbrella 
of protection in Article 3 is “…..taking no active part in the hostilities, i.e. 
the criteria of non-participation in hostilities”. Though this criterion is not 
defined, it is obvious that Article 3 applies first and foremost to civilians, 
meaning persons who don’t take up arms against the other party. The 
absence of a definition of civilian raises an issue in case a civilian who in 
spite of the fact that he is not a member of any group of armed forces, takes 
a part in hostilities. This gave rise to legal controversy and views held by 
legal scholars in adopting two notions i.e.  the notion of direct participation 
and the notion of making a contribution to the war effort. According to 
advocates of the first notion, persons who participate physically and directly 
in hostilities are not entitled to protection given to civilian persons;5 this 
means that persons who participate indirectly are protected. To advocates of 
the second notion, the person is said to take active part in hostilities when 
the role he plays in hostilities results in occurrence of military loss to the 
enemy. As such the criteria may be interpreted to exclude from protection 
civilians participating indirectly in hostile activities e.g. spying or providing 
                                                 
4 - A.Solf, The status of combatants in non-international armed conflicts under domestic law and 
transnational practice, American University Law Review 33(1983), p.53. 
5 -Fritz interpret the notion “ to take a direct part in hostilities” to mean that the person in question performs 
war like acts which by their nature or purpose are designed to strike enemy combatant or material acts, such 
as firing enemy soldiers, throwing a Molotov-cocktail at an enemy tank…”---- Fritz Kalshoven, constraints 
on the Waging of Wars, op. cit, P.91 
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support to rebels as long as their participation may cause loss “indirectly or 
in long run” to enemies i.e. causing a definite military advantage.6 
The United Nations showed great concern about the development and 
respect for humanitarian rules protecting civilians during armed conflicts.  It 
has recognized the principle of distinction in a number of recommendations 
passed by the General Assembly calling for respect of human rights and 
respect of basic principles of humanitarian law protecting civilians when 
conducting hostilities by distinguishing between persons taking no part in 
hostilities and civilian population. For example the Resolution 2444 (XXIII) 
of December 1968 passed by the General Assembly pointed to that by 
stating: “……That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian 
population as such. That distinction must be made at all times between 
persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population 
to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.” This resolution 
shows that civilians are to be protected as long as they take no part in the 
hostilities.7  The importance of the principle of distinction in relation to 
civilians has been confirmed by the ICJ in Nuclear case when the court 
pointed out that this principle “is aimed at the protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects and establish the distinction between 
                                                 
6 - Ibid, P.91 
 
7 -Schindler / Toman, op.cit No.31 
 222
combatants and non-combatants”.8 The importance of the distinction is 
related also with the issue of determining which individual qualify as a 
civilian i.e. protected person for determination of criminal responsibility for 
acts committed in violation of rules contained in paragraph 1 of Article 3. 
This question is not easy especially when acts committed against an 
individual who can not be considered a traditional “non-combatant” because 
he is actively involved in the conduct of hostilities by for example 
membership in some form of resistance or rebel group.  The Trial Chamber 
in Tadic case adopted the test of “directly taking part in hostilities” to 
determine whether victims of such acts are protected person within the 
meaning of common Article 3 by asking whether alleged victim of the 
prescribed acts was directly taking part in hostilities. If answer is negative, 
the victim will enjoy the protection contained in common Article 3 as 
civilians or protected person.9 
It is clear that this distinction determines the international legal status of 
persons for purposes of protection during armed conflicts. However it is to 
be mentioned that in absence of a specific definition, and with the increased 
new methods and means in armed conflicts, the issue of distinction between 
civilians and combatant becomes more problematic. Especially taking into 
                                                 
8 -International Court of Justice ,Legality of The Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of  
8 July 1996,Paragranph  78 
9 - Tadic case, Trail Chamber ,op.cit..Para. ,. 615-635 
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consideration the nature of internal conflicts where it is not easy always to 
separate the civilians in habitants from members of rebel armed forces who 
in most cases are of the same tribe or area, except on the basis of their direct 
participation in hostilities. Beside, it is known that civilian persons in 
internal conflicts where tribal fights are involved support rebel groups to 
whom they are loyal in villages and rural areas indirectly. In light of these 
facts, if we are to achieve the objectives of Geneva Convention in our view, 
the civilian shall be protected based on one  criteria for distinction i.e. 
distinction between those who directly or physically participate in hostilities 
and those who does not participate.10 To allow attacks on persons other than 
combatants because they are indirectly participating will exclude civilians as 
unprotected victims thereby abrogating the very objective of the law. 
Therefore we have to widen the ambit of protection to cover all civilian 
persons who do not directly participate in hostilities, to achieve the purpose 
of Article 3 i.e. all persons to receive the minimum standard of humane 
treatment which protect their dignity as persons. In relation to determination 
of the criminal responsibility for acts committed against protected persons, 
since it is not an easy matter to define exactly the line dividing between 
                                                 
10 - Macro supporting this view by stating that “If the civilian population shall be protected only one 
distinction is practicable. The distinction between those who (may) directly participate in hostilities on one 
hand and all others, on the other hand, who do not….”-------- Macro, How Does Law Protect in War, op. 
cit. p.163 
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those taking an active part in hostilities and those who are not so involved, it 
is sufficient to examine the relevant facts in each case and to ascertain 
whether in each case that person was actively involved in hostilities on that 
special situation. 
ii. The Content of the Legal Regime of Protection of Civilians under  
 Common Article 3 
The states which have signed Geneva Convention IV have consented to the 
regime of protection to civilian victims formulated by common Article 3 
which is the main task of its adoption. The general features of the regime are 
that it provides for minimum standard of humanitarian principles for which 
parties are bound to apply. In addition it provides for certain mandatory rules 
in the form of prohibited acts. The Article further stipulates that an impartial 
humanitarian body such as the ICRC may offer its humanitarian services 
upon consent by the parties to the conflict. The parties to the conflict have 
the discretion to extend rules of protection applicable in international armed 
conflicts in Geneva Convection IV by concluding a special agreement to that 
effect. The whole regime of protection is based on the basic principles of 
humane treatment and non-discrimination. 
One specific feature of the regime is that it imposes international obligations 
on members of rebel group’s party to the conflict. This raises a question as 
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to the basis of such obligations under Article 3, which is necessary to 
examine before discussing critically the content of the regime of protection 
under Article 3. 
a. The Theoretical Basis of Binding Force of Common Article 3 on 
Members of Rebel Groups 
The obligations under Article 3 are binding equally on parties of conflict. 
The governments of contracting parties are bound by its ratification or 
accession or succession to Geneva Conventions.11 In such a case Article 3 
applies immediately on contracting parties to the conflict regardless whether 
the government of contracting party recognized the rebels or not. In addition 
it imposes direct obligations on rebels to respect principles of protection 
embodied in it. This raises a question as to the basis of such binding force on 
rebels as they are not considered subjects of international law nor are they 
contracting parties to Geneva Convention IV of 1949.  However, they are 
said to be bound to apply Article 3 because that provision has been 
incorporated into their states’ internal law. What if a state does not 
incorporate Geneva Convention IV rules into its own law by a formal Act of 
                                                 
11 - In states practice, a state not party to Conventions and within whose territory an armed conflict is 
occurring may declare that it is bound by rules contained in Article 3.Example declarations made by Congo 
and Yemen before they acceded in1967 and 1970 to Geneva Convention—A.Falk, Richard, The 
International Law of Civil War,(The John Hopkins Press),1971,p.327,245. 
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legislation?12 This issue has been subject to various opinions of legal writers 
as Geneva Conventions does not provide an answer to that question. 
Some legal writers argue that the basis of binding effect of Article 3 on 
members of rebel groups is based on a number of reasons.  The fact that the 
humanitarian principles of protection of Article 3 reflect customary rules of 
law of war and that as such their rules is binding on both parties to the 
conflict.13 Besides the jus cogens character of principles in Article 3 which 
has been affirmed by judicial pronouncements by the ICJ in Nicaragua case, 
form a basis for this binding effect.14  Article 3 has acquired a universal 
consensus among all states, parties to Geneva Conventions without making 
any reservation based on the universality character of its rules of humanity. 
Francois pointed to that by stating: “The binding force of Article 3 therefore 
derives from the fundamental nature of the rules it contains and from their 
recognition by the entire international community as being the absolute 
minimum needed to safeguard vital humanitarian interests. It also derives 
                                                 
12 - Under general principles of international law, the non-incorporation of the rules of Geneva Conventions 
into internal law is not an excuse for non-observance of their provisions by the state concerned. The 
Conventions may be effective when they have not being transformed into internal law by virtue of a general 
provisions in the constitution or by an Act of Parliament—Pictet, Jean, Commentary on IV Geneva 
Convention, op.cit p.16. 
13 - Bugnion,Francois ,The Protection of War Victims, op.cit, p.336 
14 -Nicaragua.v.The United States of America, Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986,ICJ. Reports 1986,p.114-
The ICJ also in its advisory opinion of 1996 on the Legality or Use of Nuclear Weapons, pointed to that 
fundamental principles of humanitarian law constitute intransgressible principles of international customary 
law  The Court stated that in the case under examination there was no need for the Court to pronounce on 
the question whether these principles are part of jus congens--- ICJ. Reports, 1996, Para 79- -On the notion 
of jus cogens in international law, L.Hanni Kainen, Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) in International Law. 
Historical development, Criteria, Present Status,Helsinki,1988, 
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from international custom, the law of humanity and dictates of public 
conscience.” 15 
The customary nature, jus cogens character and universality of humanitarian 
principles protecting civilians constitutes an undisputable basis of binding 
effect of Article 3.However, any answer to the issue should be supported by 
taking into consideration also the intention of contracting parties in Geneva 
Conventions within the context of law of treaties. The general rule of the law 
of treaties does not create direct obligations on individuals unless being 
transformed or incorporated into national legislation of contracting state then 
after its rules are said to bind individuals. However, it has been shown 
earlier that treaties can create legal rules directly affecting individuals if the 
contracting parties intended so i.e. whether granting rights or imposing 
obligations on such individuals to respect international rules. Then the 
question is to find whether the intention of states parties to Geneva 
Convention IV of 1949 is to impose equal obligations on members of rebel 
groups. Any argument providing an answer should be made in light of the 
objects of Geneva Conventions and Article 3. 
In this connection, it has been argued that the contracting states when 
consented to adopt a regime to protect civilians, their intention was directed 
                                                 
15 - Francois Bunguion ,op.cit, p.336 
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to one fact that protection to civilians can hardly be achieved by imposing 
obligation to respect its rules on one party to the conflict i.e. the government 
armed forces or in cases where armed groups fight each other. War is always 
between two parties and the killing and suffering caused to civilians is 
always a result of acts committed by either party to the conflict if not both. 
This reality of war or armed conflicts makes it a fact that protection to 
civilians cannot be achieved unless both parties fighting are put under equal 
obligation to respect rules of protection. Imposing obligation to respect rules 
of protection only on states’ parties to Geneva Conventions or stating that 
such rules are binding on rebels when transformed into national legislations 
only, does not reflect the intention of states contracting parties, from 
adopting such a regime which will be meaningless and deprived of its 
effect.16This argument is supported by the statement of Oppenheim: “….the 
entire law of war is based on the assumption that states but also upon their 
national, whether members of their armed forces or not…”17 
It is to be mentioned in this connection that by granting rights and imposing 
obligations on rebel groups under Article 3, international humanitarian law 
does not confer on them an international personality equal to that of states. 
                                                 
16 - For the preparatory work and discussion made in relation to the issue, Final-Record 1949, vol .11.B 
pp.334-340. 
17 - L.Oppenheim, International law: A Treatise, edited by Sir Hersch Lanterpacht, Vol.1,Peace,eight 
edition,Longman,London,1955,p.341-Quoted by Francois Bugnion, ibid, footnote 14. 
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However, rules of protection created by agreement under Article 3 or 
become customary rule upon consent of states impliedly confer on non-state 
actors an international legal personality of limited legal capacity to have 
limited rights and obligations. As such members of rebel groups enjoy the 
status of subjects of humanitarian law.18 
Irrespective of any legal argument or the legal value of Article 3, in our 
opinion the sources of rules of humanity contained constitute the basis of all 
religions or beliefs and are planted in cultures of societies of all persons. 
This is a sufficient base to bind morally and legally persons, parties to armed 
conflicts, to respect such values of humanity. In all cases respect of such 
obligations by rebels is likely to whiten their image among civilian 
population and before international community. States should also be 
assured, of their fears of the political recognition of rebel groups when 
conferring on them obligations, by the fact as stated by the International 
Court of Justice that “the subjects of law in the legal system are not 
necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights….”19 
b. Principles of Protection under Common Article 3 
The core of regime of protection under Article 3 is that protected persons 
must receive in all circumstance Geneva treatment without any adverse 
                                                 
18 - MARCO SASSOLI And ANTOINE A.BOUVIER, How Does Law Protect in WAR? Op.cit,p.215 
19 -Preparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,1949-International Court of Justice 
Reports, Advisory opinion of April,p.11 
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distinction founded on sex, nationality, religion, political opinions or any 
other similar criteria starting from these basic principles. The Article 
provides for a set of rules for the protection of the various categories of 
protected persons by stating: 
“………the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever:- 
a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
b) Taking of hostages, 
c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, 
d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which 
are recognized as in dispensable by civilized peoples. 
2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the international committee of the 
Red Cross, may after its services to the parties to the conflict. 
The parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
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Convention. The application of the preceding provision shall not affect the 
legal status of the parties to the conflict.20 
Civilians and persons who no longer take active part in hostilities under the 
control of the adversary are protected by the above mentioned set of rules 
which relate to the protection of human beings against the misuse of power 
of the party to the conflict .However persons taking part in hostilities which 
are captured in field of hostilities are not covered by such rules of protection 
but are considered criminals subject to the national laws and human rights 
law applicable for their treatment. It is to be noted that Article 3 though it 
does not define the principle of humane treatment; however it defines the 
content of this minimum humane treatment in the form of prohibition of 
certain acts. It is therefore prohibited to commit “violence to life” and to 
person’s health or physical or mental well-being of persons in particular 
murder. An absolute prohibition of torture is contained and all forms of 
torture and resort to inhumane conduct is not permitted under any 
circumstance or for any consideration, e.g. for nation’s survival or nation’s 
security could not justify torture. The article forbids “outrages on personal 
                                                 
20 -The various categories of protection include all \persons who do not take active part in the hostilities’ 
This includes civilians persons and members of armed forces who have laid their arms i.e. surrender and 
those  who are unable or no longer take part in hostilities because of sickness ,wounds, detention or 
otherwise. As to aliens residing in territory of conflict, the Article does not expressly  enumerate, however 
it is impliedly included by such principles of protection as long as they do not take part in hostilities and 
based on principles on non-discrimination -Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons on Time of Wars,op.cit,P.40. 
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dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”, “taking up 
hostages” and “collective punishments”. It is to be noted that the prohibited 
acts does not contain threats to commit such acts. Article 3 further contains 
requirements to ensure proper and fair judicial procedures before a court i.e. 
any person accused of an offence in relation to armed conflict shall receive a 
fair trial and shall be judged and sentenced by court acting in accordance to 
law. 
In relation to the above, it is to be mentioned that the obligations under 
Article 3 which imposes on the adversary party in whose hands the protected 
persons fall, the duty to refrain from the commission of certain acts, include 
the duty to take action also i.e. to take all necessary measures to ensure that 
protected persons in the control of that party suffers no injury or subject to 
inhumane treatment. Besides, the above obligations in Article 3 are not 
conditional upon respect by the other party to the conflict of his 
obligations.21  The adoption of the word “prohibited acts” is strong in effect 
in that it imposes absolute obligations not to do certain acts. Neither 
reciprocity nor any justification for committing such acts is allowed. As such 
the obligations apply to both sides equally without making any declaration to 
                                                 
21 - Article 60 of Vienna Convention Law of Treaties in 1968 affirms the non-reciprocity and unconditional 
nature of obligations under International Humanitarian Law. 
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apply such rules. The violations of such obligations may constitute 
international criminal responsibility in some situations.22 
Article 3 does not provide for provisions limiting the freedom of parties to 
the conflict in conducting hostilities. However, parties to the conflict may 
agree to increase the protection by accepting more obligations by concluding 
special agreements to that effect. There is no doubt that impliedly it is 
understood that such freedom is limited to achieve the objective of Article 3. 
For example acts of terror against civilians are a violation of right to life 
guaranteed by Article 3, and indiscriminate attacks conducted against 
civilians are in violation of humane treatment. In addition, the prohibition of 
such acts evolved as customary rules of international humanitarian law 
which bind parties to the conflict. 
c.   Special Agreements Extending Rules of Protection 
Common Article 3 distinguishes between the fundamental principles 
embodied in it i.e. rules of humanity and other provisions of the Convention. 
These fundamental principles constitute a minimum standard of protection to 
persons not taking   part in hostilities. Under Article 3 the parties have the 
discretion to increase such protection by concluding special agreement 
extending the applicability of rules of protection applicable in Geneva 
                                                 
22 - The issue of international responsibility of persons committing acts in violation of common Convention 
Article 3 during non-international armed conflict is discussed in chapter eight. 
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Conventions of 1949 in international armed conflicts i.e. all or part of its 
provisions to non-international armed conflicts.  However, in most cases 
parties to the conflict conclude such agreements to serve their common 
interests e.g. to exchange prisoners of each party captured by them. In 
practice, the ICRC plays an important role in supporting parties to conclude 
agreements to that effect as an intermediary. As far as civilians are 
concerned, under such agreements the parties bring into force rules 
protecting civilians in international armed conflicts and rules in relation to 
limiting conduct of hostilities.23 These include setting up of safety zones 
during the conflict (or in time of peace demilitarized zones) to protect 
civilians and vulnerable people (the wound and sick, elderly and children).24 
                                                 
23 - In some cases of non-international armed conflicts, the parties to the conflict in pursuance of their 
desire to provide more protection to civilians conclude special agreement to extend application of rules of 
protection in Geneva Convections to the conflict to fill gaps in regime of protection under Article 3.The 
ICRC plays a major role in inviting parties to conclude such agreements for example the agreement 
concluded between the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement No. 1 was 
concluded in May 22 1992 .The parties undertook to respect rules in Article 3 of four Geneva Conventions 
in the first part. The second part of special agreement, the parties agreed to bring into force some of the 
provisions in four Geneva Conventions 1949. These include rules protecting wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked, rules protecting hospitals and other medical units. As to rules protecting civilian’s population, 
it provided that Article 13 to 34 of Geneva Convention IV is applicable. The civilians at such shall enjoy 
protection against dangers arising from military operations, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats 
of violence spreading terror among civilians were prohibited. Civilians deprived  of their liberty where 
reasons in relations to armed conflict are to benefit from rules in relation to the treatment of internees in 
Geneva Convention IV of 1949.Displacement of the civilians population shall not be ordered unless the 
security of the civilians or imperative military reasons so demand. In such case shelter, hygiene, health, 
safety and nutrition is to be ensured. In relation to conduct of hostilities, Articles 35 to 42,48 to 58 of API 
are to be applicable  and the 1980 Weapon Convention and  its annexes are applicable .Combatants are 
obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. In case of violations of humanitarian law the 
agreement provides that each party undertakes to open an enquiry promptly and take necessary steps to put 
an end to alleged violations or prevent their recurrence and to punish those responsible in accordance to 
Law. The text of this special agreement reproduced in Mercier, M., Crimes without Punishment, 
Humanitarian Actions in Former Yugoslavia, London East Haven,1995 pp 203-207 
24 -  Article 13, 14 of Geneva Convention IV of 1949. 
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Such zones may not be subject to military attack to protect the populating 
sheltering within them. It also provides for rules to ensure for humanitarian 
organization supplying food, medicine and shelter to victims secured roads 
i.e. free passage to ensure that the aid reaches the civilians,25 prohibiting 
reprisal attacks against protected persons, their property, any other measures 
of “intimidation” of terrorism,26  and prohibition of the use of civilians as a 
shield to protect certain areas or installations.27 
 Parties to the conflicts may conclude special agreements to give combatants 
or rebels captured the status of prisoners of war. In such a case detainees will 
enjoy the rights of prisoners of war contained in Geneva Convention III of 
1949 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 1949.28 Such recognition 
                                                 
25 - Article 23 of Geneva Convention IV of 1949 
26 -Article 33 and 34 of said convention. 
27 -Article 28, Geneva Convection IV. 
28 -Members of rebel groups parties to a conflict under Article 3 who are detained, does not enjoy the status 
of prisoners of war unless by special agreement or recognition under paragraph 3 of Article 3, when 
detained they are treated as criminals and may be punished for participating in hostilities (i.e. taking up 
arms against the government or other groups) unless they are granted impunity. When captured they are 
entitled to the humane treatment provided for under Article 3 and if accused of committing crimes under 
domestic laws then they are entitled to a fair trial. All these general rules fall short of the detailed 
provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949,in relation to rights of prisoners of war in international 
armed conflicts .However, detainees in non-international armed conflicts if granted the status of prisoners 
of war then they may enjoy the following rights under Geneva Third Convention: Prisoners of war must at 
all times be humanely treated and must be protected particularly against acts of violence or intimidation 
and against insults and public curiosity, reprisal directed against them are prohibited. They are not to be 
subject to any form of torture or coercision to obtain information. Other matters include the living 
conditions, food, religious freedom and medical care and not to be compelled to work. The detention of 
prisoners of war lasts in principle to the cessation of active hostilities, “after which they shall be released 
and repatriated without delay”. Detention of prisoners of war may be terminated in cases of their exchange 
as a result of an express agreement between the interested parties of the conflict. “……..ALLAN ROSAS, 
“The legal status of prisoners of war, A study in international humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conflicts”- ANNALES ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM FENNICAE- HELSINKI 1976,P.239 
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excludes punishment of rebels for merely participating in hostilities however 
they will be punished for acts constituting crimes under national laws. 
iii. State Sovereignty And The Drawbacks of the Regime of 
Protection Under Common Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV 
1949 
The regime for the international protection of civilians in non-international 
armed conflicts under Article 3 of Geneva Convention of 1949 undoubtedly 
represents an advance over the situation which had existed previously. Not 
only as regards the content with respect to the treatment of civilians victims 
but also and most important because of the subjection of their protection to 
international law.  
The general review of contents of common Article 3 above shows that the 
rules adopted tend to preserve the national sovereignty by not restricting the 
powers of the government of the state during the conflict.29 As such, the 
Article does not limit the right of the state to use force or otherwise to 
repress rebels, restore security and to subject them to its criminal or military 
laws. As far as civilians are concerned, a minimum rules of protection under 
the Article are applicable, any further rules of protection to be applicable 
depends on the consent and discretionary power of the state by concluding 
                                                 
29 -NIYUNGEKO,G. “The implementation of internationalh law and the principle of state sovereignty” in 
IRRC,No.281,1991,pp.105-133 
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special agreement with other party to the conflict. Here again it is clear that 
sovereignty prevails over humanitarian considerations of civilians. Under 
paragraph 2 of Article 3 any organization can “offer its services” to the 
parties to the conflict.30 The International Committee of the Red Cross, for 
its part in a number of internal conflicts offered its humanitarian services 
throughout the territory of such conflicts.31 However such offer to be 
accepted it must be made by an organization which is both humanitarian and 
impartial and the nature of aid or services must be humanitarian. It is to be 
noted that the contracting sovereign state is not under a legal obligation to 
accept humanitarian organizations for reasons it may deem reasonable as a 
sovereign power. In practice in a number of non-international armed 
conflicts the offer made by the ICRC of relief work on behalf of the civilian 
population has been rejected by Governments of states in whose territory the 
conflict occurs.32 
 
                                                 
30 - Example of text of such special agreements is former Yugoslavia, special agreements between the 
parties to the conflict – reproduced in Macro, op.cit,p.1109 
31 - In situations of internal conflicts not characterized as non-international as defined in –Article 3,the 
ICRC can base its offer of services on its rights of initiative and on Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Movement  
Statute- 
32 - In case its offer is accepted by one side rejected by the other, the ICRC is entitled to assist the victims 
under the control of the side that accepted the offer. However, the issue is complicated when the 
government rejects the offer. In practice of ICRC, in such situation and in a number of such cases the 
Committee sends missions to areas under control of rebels without the government prior permission when it 
failed to convince such government through negotiations to send its mission to area of conflict. This raises 
a question as to whether the Committee is entitled to perform its humanitarian activities in areas outside 
that party’s control without necessarily having to obtain its consent. In fact this issue is sensitive, for more 
discussion on the issue and the role of the ICRC and effects of offers of services in non-international armed 
conflicts- Bugnion Francois, op.cit, ,pp.447-450 
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A critical evaluation of the minimum rules adopted, after Article 3 came into 
force, reflects a number of drawbacks in the regime of protection.  Article 3 
contains a set of rules and principles which are general, not defined and is 
not comprehensive. It does not protect certain categories of persons. For 
example, it does not provide for protection of vulnerable groups like 
children, women who are the most to suffer during international conflicts. 
Categories which need special rules based on the nature of their work during 
such conflicts e.g. journalists, civil defense, members of medical units to 
carry their obligation to collect and take care of wounded and sick found on 
field of hostilities need protection while carrying on their duties. In addition, 
the Article is silent in relation to protection of displaced persons. All these 
categories need special protection beside the general rules of protection 
under Article 3.33 
One of the main draw backs of Article 3 is that it specified and enumerated a 
number of prohibited acts, thereby limiting the obligations of parties to these 
acts only. As such, and in absence of special agreement, the regime of 
protection is weak in that it does not provide for prohibition of other acts 
which are necessary to ensure protection to civilians. For example, it does 
                                                 
33 -The regime under Article 3 has been criticized as it does not provide for any protection to rebels who 
participate or take active part in hostilities and who if fall in the hands of adversary (unless by special 
agreement is granted the status of prisoners of war).When captured they are subject to national laws and for 
penalties which may amount to sentence to death for mere participation in hostilities. 
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not provide expressly for the prohibition of compulsory evacuation of 
civilians either as individuals or groups. The evacuation of civilians in 
internal armed conflicts is a usual practice because rebels in most cases stay 
in villages and areas inhabited by civilians. In such cases the government 
may evacuate civilian population to reach areas from which rebels are 
directing their hostilities. However, evacuation of civilians for their security 
is permissible while evacuation with object to make demographic changes in 
certain areas of ethnic conflicts is unlawful. The Article does not prohibit the 
volunteer recruitment of children which in most cases of internal armed 
conflicts, are found to participate directly being used as human shields by 
rebel groups. In addition, starvation of civilians, as a means to compel them 
to move from their areas to reach adversaries should be prohibited. The 
absence of express prohibition of terrorist reprisal acts is considered one of 
the weaknesses of the regime. During the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 
adopting Article 3, The United Kingdom delegate proposed the express 
prohibition of reprisal acts in non-international armed conflict in Article 3 
but was rejected on the view that this will deprive armed forces from 
defending itself. Such reprisal attacks in most cases results in killing of 
civilians. Other lacunae exist in that the regime does not provide for rules 
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protecting civilian’s objects and the protection of the natural environment 
which is necessary for civilians to survive.  
The absence of express rules protecting civilians from effects of conduct of 
hostilities is a serious drawback of the regime. It does not contain any clause 
limiting or restricting the freedom of parties in choosing the means and 
methods of fighting. This may open the door to parties to use all kinds of 
lawful and unlawful methods in conducting hostilities. However, in our 
view, such interpretation is inconsistent with the spirit of Article 3 since the 
freedom of parties is not absolute. The use of any weapons which may affect 
the right to life or physical integrity of civilians like landmine, which is 
unlawful, is understood to be impliedly prohibited under Article 3.34 Also 
indiscriminate attacks which does not differentiate between civilians and 
military objects is to prohibited as they result in killing of great number of 
civilians and destruction of civilians’ property.35 
The regime of protection provides for the necessity of humanitarian aid to 
civilians in such conflicts by the ICRC. However, one weakness of this is 
that the provision of humanitarian aid by the ICRC depends on the consent 
of the government to the offer, based on sovereignty considerations. The 
                                                 
34 -OTTAWA Convention of 18 September. 
35 - However, the United Nation ‘s General Assembly in its Recommendation 2444 of 1968 provided for 
certain principle to be recognized by parties to the conflict i.e. the right of parties to choose means and 
methods of attacking adversary is limited, it prohibits direct attacks against civilians and parties must 
distinguish between civilian and persons who take active part in hostilities . 
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humanitarian service of the ICRC is considered a basic complementary part 
of the regime of protection, to provide that the offer of such services or aid 
depends on consent of parties’ renders weakness in the regime of protection. 
The practice in fact has shown that the consent is given depending on the 
assessment of the government, party to the conflict, to the situation which 
may not give such consent for political considerations.36 However, in our 
view, once the international community accepted the ICRC services and its 
important role in providing protection to victims, and then it should be 
entitled to assess also the situation based on its impartiality and neutrality.37  
The concept of protection includes all measures which seek to ensure that 
the victims are protected including relief operations which are to preserve 
life, health and dignity.38 The ICRC should be entitled to make an 
independent assessment of the existence of a conflict for its own purpose to 
be able to offer its services. This certainly will not affect the sovereignty of 
contracting state as long as ICRC is fulfilling its humanitarian mandate. 
 
                                                 
36 - Gasser, H.P, “Universal Acceptance of International Humanitarian Law – Promotional Activities of the 
ICRC “in IRRC, No. 302,1994  pp.450-457 
37 - Article 5 of the Movement’s Statute requires the ICRC to co-ordinate when necessary with National 
Red Cross and Red Crescent societies for the assistance of victims of international or internal armed 
conflicts or disturbances.--- CICR, Ligne, Relations between the National Society and the ICRC;---- 
Outside advisers to the ICRC- IRRC,No.208 (January -February 1979) pp. 15-28. 
38 - Example of ICRC activities in some cases of non-international are conflicts carried  in Nigeria armed 
conflict (1967-1970, Lebanon (1978) and Congo (1960-69) is analyzed by Hans, The Law of Humanity,  
op. cit., pp. 112-147 
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In our opinion, the consent of the government of the contacting party or 
other party of the conflict is not discretionary or absolute and is to be taken 
in light of objectives and spirit of common Article 3 and Geneva Convection 
IV. This is supported by the fact that application of international 
humanitarian rules of protection is not determined by formal declaration by 
parties such as declaration of armed conflict, but by the fact that there exists 
an armed conflict which meets criteria of intensity. As long as this is 
satisfied and there are victims then the whole regime of protection of Article 
3 should apply and the ICRC is entitled to commence its humanitarian 
services to protect civilian’s victims which should not be considered 
interference in the internal affairs of the said state.  Rejection of such 
services based on political considerations or otherwise does not reflect a 
good image and respect of such government before international community. 
And as the representative of Mexico, stated at the Diplomatic Conference 
adopting Article 3, “……the rights of the state should not be placed above 
all humanitarian considerations.”39 
Another weakness of the regime is the absence of guarantees to ensure 
enforcement and implementation of the rules of protection to civilians under 
the regime. Article 3 does not contain any clause providing for penalties in 
                                                 
39 - Final Record of Diplomatic Conference of  Geneva of 1949, - vol. 11-B, p.11 
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case of violations of its rules. Also the absence of international supervisory 
body having powers to supervise and guarantee the implementation of rules 
of protection to ensure that parties to the conflict are fulfilling their 
obligations i.e. to undertake investigations in cases of violations of Common 
Article 3 and to receive complaints from victims of such violations is a 
serious drawback of the regime of protection of civilians under the Article. 
2.  The Regime of Protection of Civilians under Additional Protocol II 
i. Basis of the Regime of Protection 
Additional Protocol II is considered the first international legal instrument 
for the protection of victims in non-international armed conflicts it contains 
a preamble which lays down the basis of such regime. The first paragraph 
provides that common Article 3 of four Geneva Conventions, constitutes the 
foundation of respect for the human person. By thus, it is referring to the 
principles and humanitarian standards embodied in Article 3 to be part of the 
regime of protection to civilians developed by the Protocol. Additional 
Protocol II (APII) was adopted to develop the regime of protection under 
Article 3 and to supplement it by containing rules of protection which 
increased the umbrella of protection. Article 2, Para. 1 of the said Protocol 
by stating this, affirms one fact that by APII, it was intended to set up an 
independent regime of protection to civilians in non-international armed 
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conflicts on one hand.40  On the other hand, their regimes of protection 
shares common basic aspects in that the rules of protection under both 
regimes are to apply immediately and automatically once an armed conflict 
not of an international character is said to out break. The application of rules 
of protection of both regimes do not affect the status of the rebel party nor is 
considered a kind of recognition to them .In cases a member of the armed 
forces falling in the power of the adverse party or a civilian detained for a 
reason in relation to the conflict enjoys the same legal protection i.e. 
fundamental guarantees of a fair trial but remains subject to the domestic 
law of contracting state .As such, a member of a rebel army may be 
prosecuted for the act of taking up arms. Neither Article 3 nor APII when 
applied confer on him a combatant or a prisoner of war status. Equality of 
the parties to the conflict in relation to obligations and humanitarian rights 
are provided for under both regimes.41 Accordingly, all conflicts to which 
APII is applicable are governed also by common Article 3.42 
The second paragraph of the Protocol affirms the great importance of 
international human rights instruments constituting the basis of protection to 
the human person. APII is the first humanitarian convention which expressly 
mentions the importance of human rights in offering basis of protection to 
                                                 
40 -The Preamble of APII in Pictet, Commentary on Additional Protocols,op.cit. p .1337 
41 - Ibid ,pp.1343 - 1345 
42 - The Prosecutor, v. Musema (Judjment), 27 January 2000,ICTR-96-13-T (Trial Chamber).  
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civilian victims in international armed conflicts. It does not name certain 
instruments which mean that all human rights instruments which may offer a 
basis of protection to civilians is to be applicable43. The fourth paragraph 
provides that “in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person 
remains under the protection of the principle of humanity and the dictates of 
the public conscience. ”This paragraph reiterates the content of the so called 
Martens Clause.44The drafters of the Protocol intended by such paragraph to 
ensure protection to civilians because of a gap in the law or because the 
parties do not consider themselves to be bound by common Article 3 or in 
case they are not bound by Protocol II.45 In all above cases and under the 
said paragraph, the civilians remain under the protection of the principles of 
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience. 
The importance of referring to the above three basis, i.e. common Article 3, 
human rights instruments and Martens Clause, as sources for rules of 
protection lies on the fact that humanitarian law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts is a recently developing part of the law which 
practice may reveal gaps in the regime. Drafters of the Protocol recognizing 
                                                 
43 - APII contains basically the ‘non-derogable rights’ of the Covenant on Civil and Political rights 1966. 
Those rights which are universally accepted and are binding even in absence of a treaty being customary 
rules and form part of jus cogens and applicable in all circumstances –Meron, Theodor, Human Rights and 
Humanitarians Norms as customary Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). 
44 -The Martens Clause is contained in a number of humanitarian conventions e.g. the 1899 and 1907 
Conventions respecting the laws and customs of war on land. 
45 - Pictet, Commentary in the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949(ICRC, Geneva 1987), Martinus N: Jhoff Publisiers,p.1339 
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this fact and to ensure protection to victims provided for those basics as 
complementary to rules of protection by filling gaps or providing a source of 
interpretation as will been seen in the course of this part of the study. 
ii. The Notion of “Protected Persons” Under APII 
From above it is clear that the Article specifies two categories of “protected 
person” i.e. “all persons affected by an armed conflict” and “persons 
deprived of their liberty”. Those affected by an armed conflict are those 
persons who do not or no longer take part in hostilities.46 By this APII like 
Article 3 adopted the general criterion of “participation” in hostilities to 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. It is noted that under 
Article 2 above, the very notion of protected persons is abandoned in favor 
of “……all persons affected by an armed conflict” inclusive of the notion of 
civilian under the said Article. The definition of civilian addressed by such 
protection as distinguished from combatants was subject to controversy 
before the final adoption of APII which contained a general definition in 
Part IV, Article 13, by stating:  “….. Civilians shall enjoy the protection 
afforded by this Part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
                                                 
46 - APII puts a restriction on the scope of its application in pointing out that “a person who takes a direct 
part in hostilities”.   Unlike AP I, APII does not adopt the notion of ‘combatant’ or prisoners of war, and 
does not provide for rules of their protection. The only provision which provides protection to those who 
take part in hostilities is in Article 4 paragraph 1 “……it is prohibited to order that those who belong to 
armed forces or armed groups may be attacked”. This provision of APII intends to protect persons who do 
not take a part in hostilities or who have ceased to take part in hostilities. The same rules provided for in 
paragraph 3 of Article 13. 
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hostilities”.47  As such Article 13, like Article 3, adopted the general 
criterion of ‘direct participation in hostilities to distinguish between 
combatants and non-combatants without providing for a precise definition of 
civilians.48 However an element of considerable importance is that in case of 
doubt to their status, persons would be presumed to belong to the civilian 
population. 49 
iii. Content of the Regime Protecting Civilians under APII 
The regime of protection under APII contains a set of fundamental rules, 
prohibitions and guarantees aiming at the protection of persons who do not 
participate in hostilities. These rules of protection as mentioned earlier, 
apply to all persons affected by the armed conflict who are in the power of 
the adversary. The regime is based on the general principles of humane 
treatment without any distinction. A general description of content of the 
                                                 
47 - The principle of protection of persons who do not participate directly in hostilities has been recognized 
earlier in 1863 Lieber Code in stating that unarmed citizen is to spared in person, property, and honor, as 
much as the exigencies of war will permit”.----F.Lieber,op.cit, Article 22. 
48 - The principle of protection of persons who do not participate be directly in hostilities has been 
recognized earlier in 1863 Lieber Code in stating that “unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, 
and honor, as much as the exigencies of war will permit”. ----F.Lieber,op.cit, be Article 22. 
49 - Article 50 (1) of API applicable in international armed conflicts defines ‘civilians’ more general by 
stating that “civilians are all those persons who are not members of the armed forces within the meaning of 
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention 1949 and Article 43of the Protocol”.  One of the major problems 
in defining the civilian population in discussions during the Conference of Governments Experts was the 
scope to be given to such a definition, should it cover those who although not taking part in the actual 
fighting, contribute to the war effort in other important manner? Any answer necessitates first a 
clarification by referring to activities which constitute such participation e.g. spying, recruitment, 
propaganda and the transport of arms and of military personnel, as opposed to activities as providing of aid, 
medical care or food supplies for protected persons such as wounded rebels. However the ICRC position 
which was supported by a great number of experts was that such persons cannot be made object of direct 
attack. Pointing by thus to a fact that persons whose activities could contribute directly to the military effort 
do not thereby loose their civilian status’- Fritz Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian law Applicable in armed conflicts. The Conference of Government Experts 
(Second session) 3 May – 2 June 1972- 3 NYIL(1972) pp.34-35 
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regime provides for specific rules for treatment of civilians by guaranteeing 
that all persons not taking a direct part in the hostilities are entitled to respect 
of their person, honor, and religious practices. Protected persons have to be 
treated humanely while certain acts are prohibited e.g. outrage upon personal 
dignity, collective punishments and acts of terrorism, pillage, slavery and 
slave trade on all their forms and prohibition includes even threats to commit 
such acts. Persons whose liberty has been restricted, as well as, the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked have to be treated humanely and be given 
the necessary social and medical support.50 Special protection is accorded to 
children and women being of vulnerable groups. With regard to protection 
against effects of hostilities, and adoption of rules limiting conduct of 
hostilities, there was a controversy. At the Diplomatic Conference, second 
session 1975, two opposing views emerged as to which rules to be 
applicable. Some delegation holds the view that Protocol II should restate 
the rules which by and large correspond in form and substance to those 
founding API. They based their view on the grounds that the intensity of 
non-international armed conflict and that the suffering caused to civilian 
                                                 
50 - These rules of protection and guarantees of human treatment are contained in Article 4 (Fundamental 
guarantees), Article 5 (minimum standards during detention for persons whose liberty has been restricted 
for reasons related to the armed conflict. Under Protocol II rebels captured are called detainees (not 
prisoners) of wars as in international conflicts e.g. those in uniform and members of organized forces. They 
do not enjoy any favorable treatments. Detained persons have rights to food, medical relief, rights to 
religious practice. If wounded and sick or shipwrecked have same rights as civilians in this situation 
(Article 5, 7). And Article 6 provides for judicial guarantees in cases of penal prosecutions- Pictet, 
Commentary on Additional Protocols of 1977, op.cit. , p.1305. 
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population is the same in all types of conflicts. An opposed view, was held 
by a number of delegations, refusing the adoption of detailed rules of 
protection to non-international armed conflicts. They considered that 
account should be taken of the necessity of restoring law and order and 
maintaining the internal authority of the state. So they called for application 
of simple rules, so as not to discourage ratifications or make it impossible 
for provisions to be applied. As a result the main provisions that were 
reflected by the Conference though considered by the ICRC as essential e.g. 
the status of combatant, the treatment of prisoners of war and the regulation 
of means and methods of warfare in the context of civilian population were 
not adopted. However, some rules of restraints are embodied in the context 
of general protection to civilians. According to this view sovereignty of the 
state prevail over humanitarian considerations. Part IV in Article 13, lays 
some rules protecting civilian’s populations against damages resulting from 
hostilities i.e. they cannot be an object of military attack and objects which 
are necessary for civilian survival are protected from military attacks. 51 
 
The above regime providing of general protection to civilians under APII 
may be critically examined under the following headings: First the general 
                                                 
51 Diplomatic Conference on, The Reaffirmation  and Development of International Humanitarian Laws 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts- Summary of second session’s work, Extract from the International Review 
of the Red Cross, Geneva ,July 1975,p.30 
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protection against effects of hostilities. Secondly, provision of special 
protection to certain categories of civilians and thirdly general protection of 
civilian objects. 
iv. The General Protection of Civilians Against Effects of Hostilities 
The general rule that the civilians population should be immune from the 
effects of hostilities evolved in customary law based on the principle of the 
distinction that must be made between civilians and combatants .This 
principle is the basis underlying the regime of protection under international 
humanitarian instruments. The most important valuable development of 
APII brought to the international regime of protection to civilians in internal 
armed conflicts is the codification of the rule in Article 13 (Part IV) based 
on the distinction between civilians and combatants during conduct of 
hostilities. The reason being that common Article 3 of Geneva Convention 
IV does not expressly provide for rules regulating the conduct of hostilities. 
At such Article 13 is considered one of the basic articles in APII 
supplementing the rules of protection of civilians by offering them a 
protection that is consistent with military necessity.52 A historical 
                                                 
52 - The rules regulating conduct of hostilities applicable in international armed conflicts is based on the 
three principles: The principle of distinction, the principle of proportionality and principle of military 
necessity. According to the second and the third principle, those who plan military operations shall take 
into consideration the extent of destruction and probable casualties which will result and to the extent 
consistent with the necessities of the military situation seek to avoid unnecessary suffering to civilians or 
destruction to civilian property, in other words to avoid this proportionate damage.  For more details on the 
content of those principles, Leisle C. Green, The contemporary law of armed conflict,op.cit,pp.350-352 
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background of the development of the principle and its application to 
internal armed conflicts is necessary before examining the nature of rules of 
protection based on above principle. 
v. The Historical Development of the Principle of Distinction 
Between Civilians and Combatants 
The principle of distinction is an ancient principle which evolved centuries 
ago being recognized by all civilizations and developed as a customary 
principle of international law of war. It has been formulated earlier by Jean 
Rosseau that non-combatants should be immune from attacks of parties to 
the war. He wrote that “war is not a relation, between men, but between 
states, in a war individuals are enemies only by chance, not as men, not even 
as citizens, but only as soldiers, not as members of their country, but only as 
its defenders.53  This principle had gradually been recognized by legal 
scholars and state practice in the nineteenth century when it was firmly 
rooted under customary international law. The first international instrument 
to give effect to the principle has been the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907.The preamble to the Declaration of St. Petersburg 1868 provided that 
                                                 
53 Jean Jacques Rosseau, The Social Contract translated by Maurcie Cranston, Penguin Classis, Penguin 
Books,1968, Book 1,Chapter IV,page.56 
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“The only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”.54 
The principle evolved as a customary rule in states practice in international 
wars during the nineteenth and twentieth century. The method of fighting at 
that period was armies fighting against each other on a battlefield where 
civilians were in most cases uninvolved in direct hostilities. However they 
were not immune i.e. cities were besieged in which civilians were subject to 
starvation and the right of general devastation was recognized in situations 
of military necessity. In most cases the army was entitled to do any acts 
which it considered necessary to bring about the subjection of the enemy. 
The promulgation of the Lieber Code in 1863, which contained instructions 
for the government armies of the United States in the field at the time of the 
American civil war, brought with it major changes in the law applicable in 
civil war in relation to  the issue of protection of civilians. It prohibited acts 
of violence and cruelty to civilians unless military needs require so.55 
However, as a result of development in means and methods of conducting 
hostilities which caused direct effect on civilians e.g. bombardment of cities 
and villages it become difficult to distinguish between civilians and 
                                                 
54- The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and other Documents, edited 
by Dietrich Schindler and Jir Toman, third edition, Henry Dumant Institute, Geneva and Martinus Nijhoff 
publishers, Dordrecht 1988 (herein after The laws of armed conflicts),p.p.101-2. 
55 - Article 23 of Lieber code states “private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved or carried after 
distant parts and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relation as the commander of 
the hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demand of a vigorous war.” 
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combatants and between defended and undefended areas. The Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 gave effect to the customary law principle 
codified the preamble of the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 i.e. 
“…..the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.” 56 Two articles 
only of the Hague Regulation’s showed concern for the civilian populations 
i.e. the duty of the attacking army to warn of their forthcoming 
bombardment when this is possible and the prohibition of pillage once the 
city has fallen. Other restrictions on the army were included which are of 
customary nature.57 
The two World Wars witnessed use of aircraft and aerial bombardment 
which resulted in catastrophes to civilian population. This led the ICRC in 
1930 to propose laying down specific rules of international law protecting 
the civilian population against bombardments but its efforts did not 
succeed.58 When states of Diplomatic Conference of 1949 met, a general 
                                                 
56 - Declaration to the effect of prohibiting the use of certain project ties in wartime adopted at St. 
Petersburg, December 1868- is the first multilateral instruction to provide for the principle of distinction. 
The text reproduced in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts. A Collection of Conventions, 
Resolutions and Documents,  third edition, .Institute, Geneva and Martiins Nijhoff publishing Dordrecht, 
1988. 
57 - For example those private citizens are not to be murdered, enslaved or carried to distant areas. When 
bombardment of population centre was necessary the army was to take all necessary steps to spare as far as 
possible buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or charitable purpose, historical monuments, hospitals 
and places where such and wounded are collected. These places are protected provided they are not used at 
the time for military purpose.(Article 27) 
58- The atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is an example of the horrified effect of such bombs on 
civilian population. In 1938 the League of Nations Assembly adopted three principles to be recognized as 
an integral part of positive international law: 1- The international bombing of civilian populations is 
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limitation of aerial bombardment was not on the agenda. However some 
rules providing special protection to civilians in international armed conflicts 
was adopted e.g. protection of medical personnel and installations, and of 
hospital zones and safety zones. Such rules were not included in Common 
Article 3 and the general principle that civilian population shall be spared 
from the effects of hostilities was not expressly stated in Geneva 
Conventions. However, this does not exclude the fact that all rules adopted 
in Geneva Conventions rests on that principle to attain its main objective. 
Nevertheless, the ICRC continued its efforts to convince states to agree on 
rules protecting the civilian populations in international and internal 
conflicts and other victims against air warfare and of weapons of mass 
destructions. In 1957 it submitted to the Nineteenth International Conference 
of the Red Cross which was held in October and November in New Delhi, 
the Drafts Rules for the limitations of Dangers incurred by the civilian 
population in time of war. Western states saw prohibition of such weapons is 
unrealistic unless accompanied by general disarmament and an international 
system of inspection which led to failure of the proposal. However in59 1965 
                                                                                                                                                 
illegal.2- Objectives aimed from the air must be legitimate military objective and must be identifiable.3- 
Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such a way that civilian populations in 
the neighborhood are not bombed through negligence-Francois,Bungoins.op.ict,p-722 
59 - The Draft contained rules providing that military operations were to be confined to the destruction of 
military sources and that incident civilians injury was not to be disproportionate at prohibited aerial 
bombardment and weapons which are of uncontrollable affects-Final Record Concerning the DraftR for the 
Limitation of the Dangers Suffered by the Civilians Population, Time of war, ICRC, Geneva, April 1958. 
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International Conference of the Red Cross adopted a Resolution containing 
basic principles, which is to be accounted to success of its efforts. It declared 
that the parties to a conflict should conform to the principles that the right of 
the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited, it prohibited parties of conflict to launch attacks against the 
civilians population, distinction must be made at all times between persons 
taking part in the hostilities and civilians population must be spared as much 
as possible and finally the general principle of the law of war apply to 
nuclear and similar weapons.60The important and effectiveness of such 
principles is undermined by the fact that such principles were not embodied 
in a treaty to bind parties to a conflict.61 
The whole issue drew the attention and concern of the international 
community when the United Nations General Assembly incorporated the 
above principles in its Resolutions 2444(XXIII) adopted unanimously in 19 
December 1968.It called the need for “additional humanitarian international 
conventions…to ensure the better protection of civilians.” Another 
Resolution adopted in 9 December 1970 reaffirmed basic principles limiting 
                                                 
60 - Thomas and  Schindler, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, op. cit., pp.259-260 
61 -Meanwhile during this period military manuals issued by some states provided for the general principle 
that non-combatants must not be made the object of direct attack. Example, the British Manual of Military 
Law on Land of 1958 and the U.S Military Manual of 1958. 
 256
the freedom of parties to the conflict in conducting hostilities.62The 
importance of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444 of 
1968 lies on the fact that it is declaratory of existing customary international 
law. This encouraged efforts by the ICRC to submit the issue of protection 
of the civilian protection against the effects of hostilities in the priority of the 
agenda of experts meetings in Geneva from 1971 until its adoption by the 
Diplomatic Conference of 1977 in the two Protocols. 
The concern of international community to spare civilians against the effects 
of hostilities after Second World War was not limited to international armed 
conflicts only.63 Bombing practice in internal armed conflicts resulting in 
destruction of entire cities and villages and death of civilians changed the 
traditional nature of such conflicts. Interventions by third states in varying 
degrees in internal conflicts, use of sophisticated fire arms in a blind way 
and the guerrillas fusing among civilians, in a number of internal conflicts 
occurring since that period, made it difficult to identify the adversary.64 The 
guerrilla warfare which is a usual practice in modern internal armed conflicts 
                                                 
62 -The text of the two resolutions reproduced in Thoman And Schindler, Laws of Armed Conflicts,op.cit, 
pp.259-60. 
63 - This issue also attracted the concern of legal writers during that period by expressing their opinions on 
the importance of the principle and its recognition during armed conflicts. Example G.Schwarzengberger, 
The legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1958, p.21.-Kalshoven, F., The laws of warfare, Leiden, 1973, pp.41-42. 
Nurick L., “Aerial bombardment, theory and practice;” AJIL, 1945, p.690. 
- O.Brien,J.C, Biological and chemical warfare, and the international law of war”, Georgetown Law 
Journal,1962,p.5 
64 - Spanish civil war, the Vietnam and Yemen civil wars are example of such practices, Falk, Richard, The 
International law of civil war, op.cit, pp.111, 348, 303. 
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makes it difficult to distinguish the civilian population from combatants, as 
members of guerilla groups are in most cases fighting or depend on the 
civilian population for their supplies including food, shelter etc.65 
In fact, The Resolutions of 1968 and 1970 passed by the United Nation 
General Assembly offering respect of human rights during all types of armed 
conflicts, stressing the recognition of the principle of distinction between 
civilian population and combatant in international and non-international 
armed conflicts. And the general international trend to spare civilians of 
effects of military attacks made it easier for states to accept the adoption of 
some rules based in the principle of immunity of civilians from effects of 
hostilities in APII. This fundamental principle relating to the conduct of 
hostilities, found judicial recognition by international tribunals. It was 
affirmed by the ICJ court in its Advisory Opinion of 1996 when it pointed 
that this principle is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants; states must never make civilians the object of attack and must 
consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing 
between civilians and military targets.66 
                                                 
65 - Paret,P. and Shy,J.W., Guerrillas in 1960’s ,New York,1962. 
66 - Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case,op.cit,p.257,paragrah 78 
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This principle derives from the basic notion governing IHL that only the 
weakening of the military potential of the enemy is acceptable in time of 
armed conflict. As a result prohibition of the use of weapons that causes 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is necessary to spare civilians in 
all types of armed conflicts.67 
vi.  Rules of Protection Contained in Additional Protocol II 
AP II provides for a number of rules for the protection of the civilian 
population, some of which are concerned with protection against the direct 
effects of hostilities. The most important of these which gives substance to 
the general principle of immunity of civilians is Article 13,68 states in 
paragraph 1 that “The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy 
general protection against dangers arising from military operations.” To give 
effect to this protection, Article 13 provided for rules prohibiting certain 
methods of combat.  It prohibits direct attacks against the civilian population 
and intimidation by stating in paragraph 2 that “The civilian population as 
                                                 
67 - A. Cassese, “Means of warfare: The traditional and the new law”, in A. Cassese (ed.), The New 
Humanitarian law of Armed Conflict, Edit orate scientifica,Naples,1979,p.165—Rogers. Clarke, “Methods 
of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering or are inherently indiscriminate”; A Memorial Tribute to 
Howard Berman’, 28 California Western International Law Journal (1998), p.380. 
68 - Article 13 restates the essential parts only of Article 46 of Protocol 1.The reason being several 
delegations basing their argument on their plea for a more realistic attitude, they called for a shortened 
Article. The draft Article contained defaulted rules of protection e.g. paragraph 2, the employment of 
means of combat and any methods which strike or affect indiscriminately the civilian population and 
combatant or civilian objects and military objectives are prohibited. An attack by bombardment by many 
methods or means which beats as a single military objective ,a number of clearly separate and distant 
military objectives located in a city, town, village , or other area containing a concentrating of civilians or 
civilians  objects is to be considered as in discriminate. Paragraph 5 states the parties to the conflict shall 
not use the civilian population or civilians in attempts to shield military objectives from attack. Extracts 
from ICRC, July 1975,supra.,p.31 . 
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such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among 
the civilian population are prohibited.”69  The immunity offered to civilians 
under this Article, is subject to a condition in paragraph 3 that “they do not 
participate directly in hostilities”, what constitutes a “direct participation” is 
of crucial importance to the issue of protection to civilians in non-
international armed conflicts. Direct participation has been interpreted to 
include acts of war which by their very nature or purpose are likely to cause 
actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces. It is 
only during such participation that a civilian looses his immunity70.  
However, the drafters of APII adoption to the concept of “direct 
participation” seem to be based on the fact that indirect participation of 
civilians in internal conflicts is a usual practice, referring to the war effort as 
distinguished from above interpretation of direct participation mentioned 
above. 
 
In practice it seems it is difficult to draw a clear line of distinction, 
especially in internal conflicts, in which civilians participation is required to 
                                                 
69 - Article 13 is similar in content to the first three paragraphs of Article 5 of Protocol 1, Relating to the 
Protection of Civilian Population. However Article 51 contains more detailed rules and prohibitions which 
one may refer to and to its commentary for more elaboration of Article 13, since both Article aims of 
protection of civilians. For commenting on Article 51 of Protocol 1,Pilloud ,Commentary to Additional 
Protocols, op. cit. p.613 
70 - ibid, p.619. 
 260
various degrees and many activities of civilian persons during such conflicts 
could contribute in a way or another to the conduct of hostilities. In all cases, 
the provision in paragraph 3 is essential to the protection of civilians in that 
for example working in munitions factories, or otherwise supplying or 
supporting the war effort does not justify the targeting of civilians, being an 
indirect participation in hostilities. This provision is meant to avoid the 
characterization of large part of the civilian population as ‘quasi-
combatants’. Despite Article 13, paragraph 3, the recent practice in civil 
wars shows that civilians who indirectly participate on side of one party to 
the conflict have been subject to military attacks for the mere fact that they 
are related to a tribe or certain ethnic groups as in Rwanda.71 
Article 13, paragraph 1, mentioned, protects civilians against dangers arising 
from military operations. This paragraph contains the general rule which 
prohibits direct military attacks against civilians as individuals or groups. 
The phrase “military operation” is wide to cover all hostile acts undertaken 
by armed forces .It applies to all military operations that aim at inflicting 
damage to the adversary e.g. attacks on population and bombardments in 
populated areas as well as laying of a minefield. As such, parties to the 
                                                 
71 - Civilians who participate directly in hostilities will not enjoy any protection against attacks. However in 
case of doubt regarding the status of an individual, he is presumed to be a civilian until contrary is proved. 
A person suspected of having taken part in hostilities and deprived of his liberty for this reason will have 
the benefit of the provisions laid down in Article 4 providing for fundamental guarantees and Article 5 
containing rules in relation to persons whose liberty has been restricted and Article 6 providing for penal 
prosecutions-Pilloud ,ibid, p. 1453 
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conflict are not only prohibited from the act of attack but their obligation 
extends to do its best to avoid and limit damage by taking the necessary 
precautions before launching an attack based on the facts.72 The fulfillment 
of such obligation depends on the good faith of the party launching the 
attack. In a number of internal conflicts this good faith proved to be non-
existing and as a result civilians are the victims to suffer. 
The above prohibition is linked with the fundamental principle which 
requires distinction between civilians and combatants.73 To render the rule 
more effective to protect civilians against dangers of hostilities, paragraph 2 
of the same Article prohibits certain acts. It prohibits launching direct 
attacks against the civilian population; the term “attack” includes all acts of 
violence against the adversary committed during the carrying of military 
operations.74 It basically aims at the protection of civilian population from 
                                                 
72 - This includes safety measures e.g. military equipments not to be placed in areas of civilians populations 
.Protocol 1 (Arts.48-58) provides for conditions of attacks and precautionary measures necessary to ensure 
protection to civilians in Pilloud, Commentary on Additional Protocols,op.cit,pp.597-695. 
73 - It is to be mentioned here that the conduct of hostilities in international humanitarian law are based on 
three basic principles recognized to ensure the immunity of civilian population that the parties engaged in a 
conflict do not have an unlimited right as regards the means of injuring the enemy, a distinction should be 
made at all time between persons participating in hostilities and the civilian population, so that the latter 
may be spared as far as possible. And that the relation between the direct advantage anticipated from an 
attack and the harmful effects which could result on the persons and objects protected should be considered 
in advance. This is referring to the principle of proportionality which is defined in Article 51 of Protocol 1 
“ an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent” that the attack may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of  civilian objects or a combination therefore, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”. Such a principle is essential to protection of civilians 
since the purpose of attacks so as to destroy all life in a certain village without resulting in most cases in 
any substantial military advantage. This practice occurred during Second World War. Detter, The Law of 
War, op.cit, p.276. 
74 - The paragraph prohibits the attacks on civilians and that they should not be the subject of military 
objectives. Military objectives are defined in Article.52 (2) of APII as “those objects which by their nature, 
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acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population. Although the mere fact of launching military 
attacks always gives rise to terror among civilians, however the prohibition 
here refers to those acts which are intended to spread terror as a method of 
hostilities, without offering any substantial military advantage.75 Such acts 
may be considered an indiscriminate attack as it inflicts damage on civilian 
population without distinction, which is difficult to make in practice. 
Directly targeting the civilian population has become a common feature of 
military conducts in non-international armed conflicts. For example, rebel 
groups to the conflict in Southern Sudan have resorted to this method of 
warfare and targeting civilians as direct object of attacks with the purpose of 
‘ethnic cleaning’ was practiced in Bosnia – Herzegovina and Kosovo.76 
Directly targeting the civilian population as a practice is condemned by 
international community. The United Nations Security Council strongly 
condemned the deliberate targeting of civilians in armed conflicts in a 
number of situations.77 
                                                                                                                                                 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstance ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage”. 
75 - Hans- Peter Gasser, Prohibition of terrorists acts in international humanitarian law, IRRC (off print) 
July-August 1989,pp.3-15 
76 - S/Res/1265 (1999) paragraph 2 
77 - For example in the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Air force carried out indiscriminate bombing attacks on 
Iraqi an areas, causing destruction to civilian property and ,death and injuries to great number of civilians. 
The United Nation Secretary General in June 1984 criticized such attacks-ICRC, 2nd Memorandum to 
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Article 14 of Protocol 11 prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of 
warfare. At such it prohibited certain acts by stating that “….. It is therefore 
prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, 
objects indispensable to the survival to the civilian population such as 
foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, 
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.” 
The importance of this Article to the protection of civilians lies on the fact 
that the starvation of civilians in some cases of armed conflicts was an 
accepted method of fighting in customary law. This practice included siege 
of areas of population for days preventing any aid or supplies from entering 
the area seized or sea blockade of ships carrying supplies. General 
devastation i.e. the destruction of property on a wide scale including crops 
was also lawful so as to compel the enemy to surrender, justified as an 
extreme measure of military necessarily.78 It is to be mentioned that this 
method has been used in a number of modern international armed conflicts 
where certain areas of rebels were seized and acts of pillage and attacks on 
vehicles carrying supplies to victims, burning of agricultural areas, all these 
resulted in malnutrition of civilians and children and in death of thousands 
                                                                                                                                                 
Governments participating in the Geneva Convection of 1949 on the conflict between Iran and Iraq, 10 
February 1984. 
78 - Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulation- For more information on nature and policy of blockade during 
armed conflicts, Leisle, The Contemporary Law of War,op.cit,pp.178-79 
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of them as in Somalia conflict. Illegal sieges have been also made by the 
Yugoslav Army in 1990’s conflicts.79  
As such, the Article introduced a new rule of protection to civilians in non-
international armed conflicts by providing for specific protection to objects 
necessary to the survival of civilians. This develops and supplements Article 
3 which poses obligations on parties to the conflict to guarantee humane 
treatment for all persons not participating in hostilities.  Installations 
containing dangerous forces have always been a target for military attacks 
e.g. dams thereby threatening the life of thousands of civilians. At the 
Diplomatic Conference of 1974/1977 the absolute prohibition of such 
installations was subject to controversy. Some delegates saw that exceptions 
to the prohibition should be allowed since adversaries may use it for military 
purposes. They saw that the protection of such installations should depend 
on the purpose of its use. The other view saw that the prohibition should be 
absolute since any release of dangerous forces will result in catastrophe to 
civilians.80 This second view is adopted in Article 15 by providing absolute 
prohibition to such installations even if it is used for military objects. It 
states “works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, 
dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object 
                                                 
79 - Article 54 of Protocol 1 provides for a similar prohibition of such acts. 
80 - Pilloud, Commentary on Additional Protocols, supra,p.665 and pp.1461-1463 
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of attack even where these objects are military objective, such attack may 
cause release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the 
civilian population”.81 The above Article enumerated the installation which 
is subject to protection however; this raises a question in case of other 
objects which may contain dangerous forces. The Article subjects the 
protection to a condition that if such attack may cause the release of 
dangerous forces and consequent losses on any civilians. Accordingly one 
may say that any object meeting above criteria is protected under the 
Article.82 
The forced movement of civilians in ethnic or religious conflicts by 
governments within the territory of a contracting party is a practice followed 
in some conflicts with the aim to change the demography of a certain area of 
conflict or to achieve a military advantage; as a result persons of one ethnic 
or religious tribe are spread in different areas. Article 17 laid down a general 
rule that prohibits displacement of the civilian population for reasons related 
to the conflict. However, there are two cases which constitute an exception 
to the general rule of prohibition. Displacement is lawful in cases where the 
security of the civilians involved requires so i.e. to avoid anticipated attacks 
                                                 
81 - Unlike Article 56 paragraph 2 of API which does not provide protection if such installation were used 
to contribute to military operations. However, Article 15 was finally adopted – Extracts from the 
International Review of the Red Cross, July 1975,supra,p.32 
82 - The protection of these installations from attack was discussed by the Disarmament Conference in 1980 
because of the considerable danger posed by such attacks to civilians for example nuclear installation when 
aciderably radiation could be released affecting whole region. 
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to civilian population in certain areas as a result of possible bombings. In 
such situations it is lawful to transfer or evacuate to another areas. Example 
is the evacuation arranged by the ICRC of besieged civilians during the civil 
war in Lebanon (1975-1990) where different villages had been turned heavy 
weapon targets.83The second case when imperative military reasons so 
demand i.e. the compulsory evacuation for military necessity is lawful where 
existence of civilian population in certain areas may act as a barrier to 
carrying of military operations. In practice, the government party to a 
conflict usually evacuates civilians from areas where rebels stay to launch 
military attacks against these rebels.  Article 17 imposes obligations on the 
party carrying such evacuation in the above two cases.84 All possible 
measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be 
rehabilitated in other areas by ensuring for them satisfactory conditions of 
shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. In a number of internal armed 
conflicts such practice was followed, for example, the conflicts in Angola, 
Burundi, Indonesia and the former Yugoslavia witnessed substantial 
                                                 
83 -Bugnion Francois, The Protection of War Victims, op.cit,p.747 
84 -At the Experts Conference 1971 discussing the draft of APII, some experts pointed out that those rebels 
did not consider themselves bound by treaties; the question was the legal basis of binding APII on them. 
The ICRC has always considered that Article 3 which lays down fundamental principles for the protection 
of human beings, was binding not only on the government of the contracting state but on the population as 
a whole and that rebels were therefore under an obligation to respect its provisions. If Article 3 was to be 
developed by means of an Additional Protocol, the ICRC saw that the situation in law would not be 
radically changed and rebels, like authorities in power could justifiably be considered bound to observe the 
new provisions in APII—Conference of the Red Cross Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian law applicable in Armed conflicts, (The Hague-1-6 March 1971)-Report on the 
work of the Conference, Geneva 1971. 
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displacement of the civilian population, either as refugees or internally 
displaced persons. This policy of compulsory displacement is always linked 
with policy of either ethnic cleansing by launching direct attacks on   civilian 
population with the aim of eliminating or expelling a group among civilian 
population from specific territory or with terrorizing the civilians whereby 
compelling them to leave their homes. The Serbs followed this policy of 
ethnic cleansing with Muslim Bosnians and Croats as a declared policy to 
make demographic changes in the area. 85 
Permitting and facilitating humanitarian activities for the purpose of 
providing victims in international conflicts with necessary supplies for their 
survival in one of the essentials of their protection. Article 18 contains a 
number of paragraphs relating to the issue of relief to the civilian population, 
if it is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for 
its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies. In such case relief 
actions of “an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature” to be 
conducted without any adverse distinction, shall be undertaken.86  However  
such action require” the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned”, 
i.e. the consent of the recognized government of the state whether the relief 
has to be brought to the civilian population in territory under its control or 
                                                 
85 - C.M. Carey, International Displacement: Is prevention through accountability possible? A kosovo Case 
Study,49 American University law review(1994),p.243 
86 - The ICJ in Nicaragua case affirmed the principle –ICJ. Reports 1986,p.125 
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under control of rebels.  Unlike Article 3, which required the consent of 
parties to the conflict, the consent of the recognized government of the state 
is required whether the relief has to be brought to the civilian population in 
territory under its control or under the effective control of adversary. Thus, 
the Government in all cases is to give its consent. Relief societies located in 
the territory of the High contracting party, such as Red Cross and Red 
Crescent may offer their services to assist victims. The civilian may even on 
its own initiative offer to collect and care for the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked. This right to humanitarian aid is to be read with Article 14 of 
Protocol II which prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, 
mentioned earlier. The party who rejects the offer of humanitarian societies 
to assist in providing food to civilians arbitrary or who hinders the work of 
such societies is violating its obligations under Article 14.87Although the 
scope of Article 18 (2) addresses only states actors, however it should be 
mentioned that the prohibition of starvation according to treaty and 
customary law is binding on all parties to the conflict. 
 
 
                                                 
87 -The XXI International Conference of the Red Cross in 1969 adopted a resolution entitled “Declaration 
of principles for International Humanitarian Relief to civilian population in disaster situation”.   States were 
requested to exercise their sovereign and other legal rights so as to facilitate the transit admission and 
distribution of relief supplies provided by impartial international humanitarian organization for the benefit 
of civilian populations in disaster areas where disaster situations imperil the life and welfare of such 
population.-----Resolution text reproduced in International Red Cross Hand Book,op.cit,12th ed,p.661. 
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vii. Special Protection to Certain Categories of Civilians 
The above rules discussed provide general protection to civilians as 
individuals and civilian population. One of the developments brought by 
regime of protection under APII is that it contains special protection to 
specific vulnerable categories of civilians. These groups which enjoy the 
general protection under Protocol II being persons who do not take direct 
part in hostilities. However they enjoy special protection in addition based 
on their personal status because of age, sex or health conditions e.g. 
children, women, wounded and sick. This special protection also extends to 
certain categories based on the nature of their duties carried during armed 
conflicts e.g. persons of medical services, persons of civil defense and 
journalists. Such protection is extended to enable them carry their 
humanitarian duties.88 The nature and extent of protection of some of these 
categories in particular the special protection offered to children and women 
will be examined. 
a.  Special Protection to Children 
The category of children is the most vulnerable groups suffering during non-
international armed conflicts from the effects of hostilities physically and 
                                                 
88 - Articles 9-12 of APII. 
 270
psychologically.89 Common Article 3 does not provide for any special 
protection to children, they enjoy the general protection as persons who do 
not take active part in hostilities. The reality of armed conflicts shows that 
children are the most categories of victims who suffer from military 
operations in that they are separated from families, they loose their 
education, killed in wars, left homeless or orphans or refugees and displaced. 
Besides in most internal conflicts they are recruited to participate in hostile 
activities either compulsory or voluntarily.90 APII is the first international 
humanitarian instrument to provide special protection to children in non-
international armed conflicts, when the international community started to 
be concerned about the issue of protection of children in civil wars which 
occurred at the beginnings of the 1960’s.91Article 4 paragraph 3 lays down 
                                                 
89 - The idea of special protection to children was proposed by the ICRC by submitting a draft which was 
supported in principle by government experts. The draft contained a set of rules about the safeguards of 
children i.e. the duty to take care that children do not take part in hostilities, the pronunciation or execution 
of the death penalty on children under eighteen years at the time of the offence on mothers of infants or 
women responsible of their care, and on pregnant women, and the repatriation of children. For the duty to 
safe guard children, discussion was made whether to restrict it to only direct participation or to exclude the 
employment of children as auxiliaries. The first found support. The recruitment of children by armed 
groups is due to various factors e.g. economic, political causes of the conflict, fear, take revenge and tribal 
or family pressure on them. The experts of Egypt and Lebanon suggested to lay down that such children 
when captured would not be responsible for their participation and instead of being punished they would be 
the object of protective measures such as being placed in a re-education institutes -Fritz,Kalshoven 
Constraints on The Law of War op.cit,pp.42-43 
90 -The participation of child soldiers has been reported in most recent internal armed conflicts e.g. Liberia, 
Angola, Algeria, Rwanda, Sudan South conflict and Sierra Leone .The promotion of the Rights of Children 
Report of the Expert of the Secretary General, Submitted to the General Assembly Resolution 
48/157/306/26 August 1996, at paragraph 2 Available online at 
gopher://gopher.un.org.70/00/ga/docs/51/plenary/A51-306-EN. 
91 - The United Nation General Assembly adopted a recommendation No.33138 (29),in 14 of Dec.1974 
including a Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict –
United Nations GA/Res/33/8 (XXIX). The Declaration prohibits attacks against civilian population and 
children and acts such as torture, imprisonment and all violence against women and children-International 
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the fundamental basis of such regime of protection during internal conflicts. 
It provides for a number of needs of a child by imposing obligations on 
parties to the conflict in whose territory or power a child is found.92 These 
obligations include the duty to protect children from the consequence of 
military operations i.e. to provide the care and aid they require. The 
paragraph asserts the importance of education in that they shall receive an 
education including religious and moral education in keeping with the 
wishes of their parents or those responsible for their care. It provides for the 
importance of family reunion in children’s life, the ICRC is entrusted 
according to its mandate to play the major role in unifying families.  In fact 
Paragraph 3 (c) is handling one of the main problems threatening the life of 
thousands of children during internal armed conflict i.e. the issue of 
recruitment and participation of children in hostile activities. It provides that 
“children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be 
recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in 
hostilities.” It determines the lower age of recruitment into the armed forces 
i.e. children who have not attained the age of fifteen .It prohibits the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Instruments protecting children are: The Genocide Convention of 1948 which prohibits transfer of children 
from group to group and The Refugee’s Convention of 1951- 
92 - It is to be noted that Protocol II does not define the term “child”. There was a controversy on this point 
at the Diplomatic Conference as to at which age a child becomes an adult. Some delegates were of view 
that this issue differs from county to another. The age may vary between fifteen and eighteen years, 
depending on the culture, the physical characteristics of the child and the domestic legislations of each 
country Pilloud, Commentary on Additional Protocols,op.cit,p.1377 
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recruitment of any child who did not reach the age of fifteen years in regular 
forces or armed groups. This prohibition includes the compulsory and 
voluntarily recruitment as well as direct and indirect participation in hostile 
activities.93 Thus recruiting children less than 15 years or involving them in 
hostilities is unlawful under APII.  
The recruitment of children or involving them in hostilities is prohibited also 
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).94The said 
Convention defines a child as any person under the age of eighteen. 
However Article 38 of the CRC prohibits the direct participation of children 
under the age of fifteen in hostilities. This means that participation of 
children indirectly is not prohibited and at such are not protected. As to what 
constitutes direct participation, the CRC does not illustrate.95 Efforts has 
been made since 1992,for the adoption of an optional protocol which would 
raise the minimum age at which children can be recruited into armies from 
fifteen to eighteen years old and which would prohibit the participation of 
                                                 
93 - Example of compulsory recruitment when children have been abducted to serve in a rebel army in 
Uganda-For report on this ‘The scars of Death; Children Abducted by the  lord’s resistance army in 
Uganda, Human Rights watch/Africa /September .1997. 
Article 77 of API applicable in international armed conflicts prohibits the direct participation of children 
only while paragraph 3 of Protocol II extends the protection to children who participate indirectly also. 
94 - The Convention was adopted by UN General Assembly in November 1989 
95 - Stephane Jeannet and Joel Mermet.” The involvement of children in armed conflict,” IRRC, No.322 
(March 1998), p.106. 
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children under the age of eighteen years in hostilities.96 These efforts 
succeeded when the UN General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts in 2002.Under the 
Protocol, the UN developed new international standards to protect children 
from effects of armed conflicts.97 The states parties agreed to basic rules i.e. 
to take all feasible measures to ensure that persons under the age of 18 do 
not take a direct part in hostilities- Establish 18 as the minimum age for 
compulsory recruitment into their armed forces-declare that the minimum 
age for voluntary enlistment at time of deposit with parental consent-prohibit 
and criminalize recruitment of persons under the age of 18 by armed groups 
that are distinct from the armed forces of a state.  It is to be mentioned here 
that the International Criminal Court Statute of Rome 1998 considers the 
participation and recruitment of children under age of 15 in hostilities in all 
types of armed conflicts constitutes a war crime and entails the international 
criminal responsibility of persons using them for such acts. 98  Paragraph 3 
(d) extends the protection to children even in cases they participate indirectly 
                                                 
96 - “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child Concerning Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, Position of the International Committee of the Red Cross. “Geneva 27 Oct.1997,IRRC 
No.322 (March 1998) p.107 
97 - The Optional Protocol adopted on May 25, 2000 and came into force February 12, 2002.One hundred 
ten countries have signed while 42(including the United States) have ratified it. For text of the Protocol and 
for additional information online:http://www.unicef.org/crc/oppro.htm. 
98 - Article 8 (2) (b) (XXVI) prescribes as a war crime when committed in an international armed conflict, 
“Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years international armed forces or using them 
to participate in hostilities” Article 8(2)(e)(vii) prohibits when committed during and international armed 
conflict ‘within the established framework of international law”, “conscripting or enlisting children under 
the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.” 
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in hostilities and are captured i.e. such children still enjoy protection 
provided for under the Protocol. No death penalty may be imposed upon a 
person under eighteen, regardless of the offence committed.99 Paragraph 3(e) 
provides for necessary measures to be taken to transfer or remove children, 
if their safety requires removal from the area in which they are. This should 
be done in a safer area within their country and whenever possible with the 
consent of their parents or guardians and they should be accompanied by 
persons responsible for their safety. The process of their removal in most 
cases has often have been made by the ICRC or under its protection. Such 
children are not to be removed outside their country and to make sure that in 
case of threat they are unified with their families. 
b.  Special Protection to Women 
Under the regime of protection of both common Article 3 and APII, all 
victims of non-international armed conflicts are to enjoy the same general 
protection without distinction based on sex, as persons not taking active part 
in hostilities.100 However, the prohibition of discrimination is not a 
                                                 
99 - Articles 4, 6 (4) of APII prohibits pronunciation and execution of death penalty on persons who are 
under age of 18 years old. While API, Article 77 does not prohibits pronunciation by states. “The death 
penalty for an offence related to the armed conflict shall not be executed on persons who had not attained 
the age of eighteen years at the time of the offence was committed.” 
100 - The need for special protection for women during armed conflicts was felt before adoption of Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War 1929,taking into account of the fact that a large number of women had participated in the 
First World War 1914-1918,contained two Articles protecting women as prisoners of war affording to them 
special treatment based on their physical status. In the Second World War, women participating in 
hostilities were greater in numbers in addition number of women killed as victims were great. The 
 275
prohibition of differentiation if they are favorable, taking into account the 
state of health, the age and the sex of protected persons. The reason of such 
protection is that they are exposed to specific acts which are committed 
against them during armed conflicts which degrade their humanity. Under 
common Article 3 women are protected by the fundamental guarantees 
governing the treatment of persons not taking part in hostilities. However, 
APII is the first international instrument affording special protection to 
women in non-international armed conflicts in addition to the general 
protection they enjoy like civilians both against abusive treatment by the 
parties in whose hands they fall and against effects of hostilities. Under this 
general protection they are to be treated humanely, this includes respect of 
their life and physical and moral integrity, particularly forbidding coercion, 
corporal punishment, torture, collective penalty, pillage, taking of hostage 
and acts of terrorism. In case of capture for commission of acts in relation to 
the conflict, women have the right to a fair trial.101 Article 4 (e) provides 
                                                                                                                                                 
Diplomatic Conference in 1949 took consideration of this fact adopted thirty articles of special concern of 
women under the Third Convention Relative to their treatment during war. In armed conflicts which took 
place after the adoption of Geneva Convention 1949, and as a result of use of new means and methods of 
warfare with indiscriminate effects, making it difficult to distinguish between combatants and women as 
vulnerable persons, resulted in the death of great number of women. This Diplomatic Conference adopting 
Additional Protocols in 1977, and on the initiative taken by the ICRC, provided special protection to 
women in armed conflicts.----Bugnion ,Francois,op.cit,pp.126,134,160. 
101 -Participation by women in hostilities is not a new phenomenon, it includes giving food and aid supplies 
to soldiers, taking care of wounds .Women contributed to the war effort in World War 1 and II e.g. working 
in arms factories, supplying services and munitions depots. They participated directly in World War II in 
the armed forces when captured as prisoners of war they were subjected to forced labour. Francoise Kril. 
“The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law”, The IRRC, No –December,1985,pp.15-16-
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women with rules guaranteeing special protection to  women who do not 
take a direct part in hostilities and fall in hands of adversary by prohibiting 
the commission of certain acts i.e. “outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment ,rape, enforced prostitution 
and any form of indecent assault.” The obligation imposed by the paragraph 
is absolute in that the acts mentioned are prohibited at any time and in any 
place whatsoever.102 
Women may be interned or charged for committing acts violating national 
criminal laws, special rules of protection are contained in Article 5 
paragraph 2(a) protecting women who are arrested, detained or interned, 
they shall be held in quarters separated from those of men and shall be under 
the immediate supervision of women except when members of a family are 
accommodated together. When it is not possible to provide separate quarters 
it is essential in all cases to provide them with separating sleeping places. 
The reason of separating them in such places is to protect them against any 
of the acts listed in Article 3 paragraph 2(e) mentioned above. However, it is 
to be noted that such protection is undermined by the fact that Article 2 
requires persons who are responsible for their internment or detention to 
                                                                                                                                                 
ICRC records and Report of the ICRC on its Activities during the Second World War ( 1 Sept.1939-30 
June 1947),ICRC,Geneva,1948, 3 vol.-on volume 1,p.295. 
102 - Article 27 of the Fourth Convention provided for similar protection to women in international armed 
conflicts. 
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fulfill their obligation towards women in such situation “within the limits of 
their capability”. Such a clause is vague which may be used to avoid 
obligation to separate women, a fact which allows for such violations. 
It is to be mentioned here that the above rules of protection are applicable to 
civilian women, deprived of their freedom. In case it is decided to release 
women deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure their safety 
should be taken103. Under APII, combatant women captured benefit from the 
fundamental guarantees of Article 4 of APII. Article 6, paragraph 4 inspired 
by the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 1976, provides 
that a death penalty shall not be pronounced and shall not be carried out on 
pregnant women or mothers of young children.” Such a clause prohibits the 
execution of death penalty on women who committed an act in relation to 
the armed conflict.104 The Protocol prohibits also the pronouncement of 
death penalty on pregnant women and the mothers of young children. By 
this, the Protocol is a development to the ICCP which specify that the death 
                                                 
103 - In addition to this special protection, detained women are entitled to the general protection to persons 
whose liberty has been restricted in Article 5 paragraph 2(a) they shall be allowed to send and receive 
letters, places of internment and detention shall not be located close to the combat zone and to be evacuated 
when exposed to dangers arising out of armed conflict, to have medical care and treated humanely –Pilloud 
,Commentary on Additional Protocols,op.cit,p.145 
104 - In international armed conflicts women who take part in hostilities are like men, protected by 
international humanitarian law when they fall into hands of the adversary. It is essential for them to be 
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict if they are to be considered as combatants entitled to 
the status of prisoners of war, once captured. In addition they enjoy protection resulting from principles 
previously mentioned with respect to protection of women a members of the civilian population (Articles 
76, paragraph 2 of Protocol I ) and Geneva Convention III-For more details on this issue Krill, supra, 
pp.17-21 
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penalty shall not be carried out on mother of young children. The CCP 
prohibits only the execution of death penalty and not its pronouncement. In 
our view, such a prohibition of both pronouncement and execution of death 
penalty on young women and mothers of children should be recognized in 
the domestic laws of states.  It is to be noted that Article 6 paragraph 4 does 
not specify the age at which a child will not be in need of his mother for 
purposes of execution of death penalty on her. This vagueness opens the 
door for different interpretation in applying the paragraph from state to state. 
In non-international armed conflicts, women as members of the civilian 
population are entitled to enjoy protection under certain rules, which impose 
limits in the conduct of hostilities, some of which became part of customary 
law and reaffirmed and developed in Protocol II, basically, that the parties to 
a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants. This is affirmed in Article.13 of Protocol II by stating that “the 
civilian population as such as well as individual civilian shall not be the 
object of attack.” 
viii. General Protection of Specified Civilian Objects 
Common Article 3 of Geneva Convection IV of 1949 does not contain any 
provision in relation to protection of civilian objects. Instead APII provides 
for a special protection to certain categories of civilian objects the scope and 
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extent of such protection depends on the nature and function of the object, 
the attack of which will affect the physical and moral protection of civilians, 
The Protocol provides protection to two categories of civilian objects: 
Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,105 the 
historic monuments ,works of art or places or worship which constitute the 
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples.106 
However, APII does not define the “civilian objects” as distinguished 
from military objectives, which makes it necessary to make such a 
distinction by defining military objectives. Military objectives are those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage. These civilian objects are all objects which 
are not military objectives as defined above. According to this definition, 
two elements must exist to describe an objective i.e. the object must 
make, an effective contribution to military action”, and its elimination 
must after a definite military advantage.107 The value of such definition is 
that military objectives contribute to military action and may therefore be 
attacked, whereas civilian objects do not make such a contribution and 
                                                 
105 - Article 14 of APII 
106 - Article 16 of APII 
107 -This definition in Article 52(2) of API is used here by analogy. 
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hence may not be attacked. In case of doubt whether an object is used for 
civilian or military purpose such a place of worship , a house or a school 
as being used to makes an effective contribution to military action then it 
shall be presumed not to be so used.108 
a.   Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian 
Population 
Article 14 of Protocol II provides protection to objects necessary to the 
survival of civilians based on the general principle of protection of civilian 
population i.e. prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of combat. 
As a result it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless for 
that purpose such objects. The Article enumerates objects which are 
necessary to the survival of civilians such as “foodstuffs, agricultural areas 
for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations 
and supplies and irrigation works.” The above mentioned objects are not 
exclusive but the term may include other objects or property which may be 
considered indispensable to the survival and existence of the civilian 
population in a certain circumstances. These are new rules of protection 
supplementing and developing those rules of Common Article 3.It follows 
from this rule that used blockade or siege as methods of warfare directed 
                                                 
108 - Objects which ‘by their very nature’ are used for civilian purposes e.g. a house or a school and yet 
used for example as military quarters or so contributing effectively to military objective-Kalshoven, Frits, 
Constraints on the Waging of War,op.cit,pp.89-90 
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exclusively against civilians to let them die of starvation is unlawful109. This 
obligation prohibiting on starving civilians, includes authorizing relief 
societies and relief actions to carry their humanitarian activities and ensure 
that such relief reaches them. The obligation also includes not only 
attacking, destroying, removing and rendering useless but the obligation to 
take measures to supply the population with objects which are of basic 
importance for the survival and existence of civilian population to protect 
such objects. Food and crops are the basics of life survival to civilians; as a 
result protection to agricultural areas and livestock is necessary as well as 
water. Thus attacks of water dams or poisoning of water sources resulting in 
death of thousands of civilians or pollution by chemical or other elements as 
a means of warfare are prohibited.110 However, in some cases of non-
international armed conflicts water becomes a target or is even as a means of 
warfare as in Yemen where a pumping station was attacked during the civil 
war in 1994.111 In fact the customary rule prohibiting the use of poison as a 
                                                 
109 - Blockade as a concept is applicable in international armed conflict. It is used to prevent military 
supplies from reaching the adversary and is not to be directed against civilians. However it is used within 
the context of Protocol II by analogy in certain cases provided it will not affect civilians and if so they may 
be evacuated for humanitarian reasons –Pilloud, Commentary of Additional Protocols,op.cit.p.1457-
Mudge,Starvation as a Means of Warfare, The International lawyer (Chicago) volume 4.1970,p.228 
110 - The Declaration adopted by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law of San Remo (1990) on 
the Rules of International Humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed 
conflicts prohibits the use of poison as a means or method of warfare in such conflicts .The text of the 
Declaration reproduced in IRRC No.278,Sept-October 1990,p.404. 
111 - Islamic Sharia provides for similar rules for protection of civilians especially children, women and 
elderly during armed conflicts. For details on this issue and the Islamic concept  of humanitarian law-
Sultan,Hamid , “The Islamic concept of International Humanitarian law, Egyptian Review of International 
Law,vol.34,1978 (in Arabic) p-6-Said El-Dukkak, International Humanitarian law between the Islamic 
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means of warfare in non-international armed conflicts constitutes an 
application of the general rule prohibiting superfluous injury and 
unnecessary suffering. Such rule sets out more explicitly the provisions of 
common Article 3, which prohibits violence to life and person. It results also 
from this rule that it is prohibited the use of starvation of civilians as a policy 
to enforce movement of civilians for whatever purpose. 
It is to be mentioned here that the prohibitions contained in Article 14 of 
APII are absolute and does not allow for any exceptions.112 As such Article 
14, no doubt, developed the regime of protection to civilians by ensuring the 
satisfaction of basic human needs of food and water necessary to ensure to 
them humane treatment.113 
b. Protection of Cultural Objects and Places of Worship 
The international regime of protection of cultural objects safeguarding the 
heritage of mankind in non-international armed conflicts is restricted to two 
instruments –the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural property 
                                                                                                                                                 
concept and positive international law,IRRC,March-April,1990,No.275,p.101-Ammeur Zenmali; Imam Al-
Awazai and his humanitarian ideas, IRRC, March-April ,1990,No.275-115 
112 -Unlike article 54 (5) of API which may allow destruction of such objects in the case of imperative 
military necessity provided situated within territory under its control. However the adverse, party when 
using force against objects used in direct support of military action should ensure that the population is not 
reduced to starvation or compelled to move. Pilloud, Commentary on Additional Protocols, op.cit, pp-656-
659. 
113 -For an excellent discussion on this issue, Ameur Zemmali: The Protection of Water in Times of Armed 
Conflict, IRRC, September-October, 1995, No.308, pp.550-564. 
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in the event of Armed Conflicts 1954 and its Additional Protocols; 114 and 
AP II (Article 16).  It is worth to examine the general aspects of such regime 
here. 
c.  Rules of the Hague Convention 
The Hague Convention is the first international instrument to provide 
protection to the cultural property expressly in non-international armed 
conflicts as well as in international armed conflict in Article 19. The reason 
of such protection is that any loss of cultural property is considered a loss to 
the heritage of all mankind.115 The regime of protection under the Hague 
Convention divides cultural property into three categories in defining the 
term to include: 
 
(a) Moveable or unmovable property of great importance to the 
cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments, works of 
art, manuscripts, books and scientific collections. 
(b) Buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or 
exhibit the moveable, cultural property such as libraries and 
                                                 
114 Regulations for the Execution of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954 and the Hague Protocol (One for the Protection of Cultural property in the 
event of Armed conflict of 14 may 1954. And the second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, March 26, 1999 UNESCO Doc.HC/1999/7 
115  Lieber Code provided for protection of cultural property in non-international armed conflicts for the 
first time in Article 34, 35 and 36. 
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museums, and refugee intended to shelter the objects in question 
in the event of armed conflict. 
(c) Centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined 
under (a) and (b). 
The Convention contains rules providing for general and special protection. 
The general protection imposes obligations on states parties to safeguard and 
respect cultural property within their territory against the effects of an armed 
conflict. Article 4 imposes obligations on states to ensure respect by taking 
necessary measures. They are to refrain from any use of the property and its 
immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for 
purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event 
of armed conflict. To prohibit, prevent and if necessary put a stop to any 
form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of and any acts of hostilities or 
reprisal directed against cultural property. Article 19 provides that even in 
the event of a non-international armed conflict ‘each party in the conflict 
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of the present 
convention which relate to respect for cultural property. 
The regime provides special protection to buildings and centres where such 
property is kept. It provides that such objects must be situated at an adequate 
distance from any important military objective or in the case of a refugee, be 
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so constructed that in all probability it will not be damaged by bombs and 
the object must not under any conditions be used for military purposes.116 In 
the event of armed conflict such objects must be marked with the distinctive 
emblem. The Parties are under obligation to prosecute and try under its 
criminal laws, any person who commits any act in violation of the regime of 
protection.117 
Though the above regime of special protection, guarantees the safeguard of 
all major cultural centers, however, one weakness of this regime of 
protection under The Hague Convention is that it allows for the possibility 
of derogation from above obligations in the case of imperative military 
necessities.118 This concept of military necessity is a vague concept which 
may be used by a party to a conflict to justify his acts in attacking protected 
cultural objects. 
d.  Protection of Cultural Objects under APII 
Common Article 3 is silent on the protection of cultural objects. However 
APII by providing for such protection in Article 16 supplements the 
                                                 
116 Under the Convention an object which is brought under special protection e.g. the Centre or building is 
to be registered in the International Register of Cultural Property under special protection and under the 
supervision of the UNESCO – Articles 8-4 of the Convention. 
117 The importance of AP of 1999 lies on the fact that it provides for a number of acts which are considered 
“grave breaches” giving rise to international criminal responsibility. Example, the action taken by the 
Yugoslav Army against a number of Catholic Churches in 1991-95 constitutes a war crime, as their 
destruction was not in a way caused by military necessity but deliberately targeted – Detter, the Law of 
War, op.cit p. 256 
118 TANJA, G. J., Recent Development Concerning the Law for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict, in Leiden Journal of International law, 1994, pp. 115-125 
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international regime of protection to include cultural property. The reason 
the Article was adopted in APII, because not all states are parties to The 
Hague Convention of 1954, so it was found that it is necessary to provide 
special protection under humanitarian instruments.119 Article 16 provides 
for rules protecting the historic monuments, works of art or places of 
worship, which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, as it 
is related to its history and culture. The nature and extent of protection to 
cultural property and worship places under the Article is defined by 
imposing specific obligations on parties to the conflict. It prohibits the 
commission of acts of hostilities directed against historic monuments; 
works of art or places of worship and it prohibits using them in support of 
any military effort.120 This obligation is necessary to protect such objects 
because if the above objects are used in any military activities they would 
become military objectives exposed to attacks. As a result measures should 
be taken to evade using such objects or exposing them for such purposes 
and to protect them from being destroyed or damaged.121 
The protection under Article 16 is absolute in that it does not allow for any 
derogations or exceptions. In addition the Article 16 provides that it is 
                                                 
119 Pilloud, Commentary of Additional Protocols, op.cit, p. 1466  
120 Nahlik, Stanslaw, Protection Of Cultural property, in UNESCO, international Dimensions of 
Humanitarian Law(Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988), p. 203 
121 In 1991 the Yugoslav Federal Army bombed the city of Dubrovnik of Croatia which had long been 
included in UNESCO’s list of the World’s Cultural heritage and which was an ‘undefended open town’  
Detter , op. cit. p. 106.  Similar acts were committed in Iraq war.   
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applicable without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention of 
1954. As such the application of Article 16 should not be inconsistent with 
the special rules of protection under the Convention applicable also in non-
international armed conflict. Article 19 which state that “1- In the event of 
an armed conflict not of an international character occurring within the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party in the conflict 
should be bound to apply as a minimum, the provisions of the present 
Convention which relate to respect for cultural property.” 
3.  The Shortcomings of the Regime of Protection of Civilians under 
APII 
The regime of protection set up under AP11 undoubtedly supplemented and 
developed common Article 3. It reflects a measure of continuity with respect 
to the regime under Article 3, which is based on a very limited set of 
principles and commitments. However, a critical evaluation of the regime 
reveals a number of weaknesses and lacunae which undermines the 
protection afforded to civilians. The examination of such weaknesses may 
help to understand why the protection regime set up do not have the 
expected results, as observed by Speaker by stating “Additional Protocol II 
has been simultaneously both enthusiastically praised for its progressive and 
more detailed regulations by humanitarian law of non-international armed 
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conflicts and harshly criticized for its shortcomings, deficiencies and non-
regulation compared to Protocol 1 and given the practical needs.”122  
However, one should point out first that the weakness of the regime as a 
legal order is due to certain factors, in relation to its scope and significance 
as far as civilians’ protection is concerned. APII does not apply to all 
internal conflicts, to recall here its scope of application is limited to those 
conflicts which are prolonged and of a greater intensity. As such, their rule 
of protection applies to those conflicts characterized as civil wars, example 
in Nigeria, armed conflict. As a result, civilians suffering from hostilities 
less intense are protected only under common Article 3 regime.  On the 
other hand, APII and similarly common Article 3, does not recognize the 
existence of “combatants” nor of military objectives.123 The principle of the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants is the cornerstone of the 
regime of the protection of civilians against the effects of hostilities. It is 
impossible to define the civilian population and civilian objects without 
reference to those concepts of “combatants” and military objectives.124 The 
effect of absence of a definition in the regime is as Khalshoven described 
                                                 
122 Heike, Spieker, Twenty-five Years after the Adoption of Additional Protocol II: Breakthrough or failure 
of Humanitarian Legal Protection? Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, volume 4, 2001, p. 130  
123 This principle of distinction is recognized in Article 44 of Protocol 1 applicable in international armed 
conflicts.  
124 E. Rosenbald, International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts: Some Aspects of the Principle of 
Distinction and Related Problems, Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1979.  
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“the provisions on the protection of the civilian population which constitute 
Part IV of Protocol II, hang some what in the air…” 125 
Article 13 (3) of the Protocol refers only indirectly to distinction in so far as 
it distinguishes between civilians and those taking “a direct part in 
hostilities” which is a vague term. The absence of a definition of combatants 
as distinguished from civilian population indirectly affects the civilian 
population who will be threatened from the violence of rebel fighters and 
from the reaction of government forces in situations where rebels move into 
the camps of internally displaced persons and areas where civilian 
populations are found. As a result civilians suffer from the negative effects 
of its lack of separation from armed fighters.  On the other hand, the 
objective criteria of Article (1) of the Protocol 126 do not give irregular 
armed forces an incentive to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population as for example by recognition or status of combatants and in 
improving the protection afforded to the civilian population. 
Therefore, in our view, to strengthen this weakness in the regime, it is 
necessary to consider a specific legal status for “combatants” in non-
international armed conflicts as distinguished from recognition of 
belligerency. A recognized status on basis of specific criteria to contribute to 
                                                 
125 KHALSHOVEN, FRITS, Constraints on the Waging of War, opicit, p.143 
126 Article 1 requires only the criteria of responsible command, exercise control and concreted military 
operations, and to implement the Protocol. 
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distinguish between civilians and rebel fighters should be required. These 
criteria could be that rebel groups and irregular armed forces must have at all 
times ‘a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance’ and they must as a 
group conducts their operations in accordance to humanitarian law.127  
However in situations of armed conflicts where owing to the nature of the 
hostilities, an armed rebel cannot distinguish himself he should be required 
to carry his arms openly during military operations so as to be visible to the 
adversary party before launching an attack. What is required by such criteria 
is that rebels or irregular fighters distinguish themselves at all times from 
civilians, as a result the risk to the civilians to be the object of military 
attacks will be reduced thereby improving their protection. Another issue to 
be mentioned in this connection is that a provision to the effect that failure 
by combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
throughout their military operations is a punishable offense in the Protocol is 
important. Such a provision will discourage rebels to disguise themselves as 
civilians or among civilians. 
                                                 
127 The Brussels Declaration concerning the laws and customs of war adopted in 1874 was the first 
international document to define ‘combatants’ and ‘non-combatants’ by providing in Article 9 that the 
laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling 
certain conditions of responsible command, have a fixed, distinctive emblem recognized at a distance so 
that they be distinguished from the civilian population, carry arms openly and conduct their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war – Text of Declaration Schindler and Toman, op-cit, p.25. It is 
to be mentioned that the requirement that combatants shall wear a fined distinctive emblem identifiable 
from a distance is not provided for in Article 44 of Protocol 1.  
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Another factor, which may add to the weakness of the regime under Protocol 
II, is the question of the legal basis of the binding force of Protocol II (as 
well as Article 3) on non-state parties to a non-international armed conflict. 
This question is one of the most debatable issues as long as rebels are not 
recognized as subjects under international law. Though it is today generally 
accepted that both common Article 3 and APII fundamental rules of 
protection and customary rules are binding on both governmental and non-
state parties to the conflict, however one sees that still the matter remains 
open.128 This fact makes it difficult to convince rebels to abide by such 
obligations. Rules providing protection to civilians may only be effective 
when the obligation to respect such rules is accepted by them as legally 
binding. Considerations of reciprocity may act as a factor convincing parties 
to have a binding bilateral relation. This is to be based on the fact that the 
parties to the conflict are subjects of international law in the limited context 
of humanitarian rights and obligations in both common Article 3 and 
Protocol II.129 Moreover, once rebels show willingness and intention to abide 
                                                 
128 The ICTY Appeals Chamber holds that many of the provisions of Additional Protocol II can now be 
regarded as declaratory of existing rules or having crystallized into emerging rules of customary law. The 
Prosecution, v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Para 17 
129 A close reading of Protocol II shows that for the Protocol to apply by the government party to the 
conflict, a condition of application are required in Article (1) i.e. the rebel group must possess also the 
capacity to implement its rules. This shows that an element of reciprocity is necessary to determine from 
the beginning the application of the Protocol as a whole. This fact may encourage rebels to respect the 
Protocol rules. This is different from reciprocity in fulfilling their obligations under the Protocol as 
obligation s under it are absolute and each party to the conflict must carry out its obligations irrespective of 
whether the other party violated it or not, the reason being humanitarian.  
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by its provisions, the rebels as a consequence are entitled to invoke the 
Protocol. In addition the incentive to rebels to abide by rules of APII are 
likely to win internal support and respect and by putting pressure on the 
governments to sit for negotiations and peace. 
In the following pages observations on some of the weaknesses of the 
regime and shortcomings in relation to absence of sufficient rules of 
protection to civilians, or inclusion of some provisions containing terms with 
ambiguities requiring clarification, will be made. 
i. Absence of Sufficient Rules Protecting Civilians Against Effects of 
Hostilities 
Article 13 of Protocol II does not provide a comprehensive set of rules 
against effects of hostilities. As a result, parties are prohibited to launch 
attack only directed deliberately to civilian objects, attacks with the 
purpose of spreading terror among the population and prohibitions to 
launch attacks against civilian objects necessary for their survival or 
against installations or works containing dangerous forces. However, the 
Article is silent on the prohibition to launch indiscriminate attacks, 
reprisal acts, which may directly or indirectly affect the civilian 
population. The obligation to spare civilians includes the duty to take 
precautionary measures, which the Article does not embody, a rule to that 
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effect. The fact that the Article is silent in relation to these prohibitions 
constitutes a major weakness in the regime of protection against effects 
of hostilities as far as civilians are concerned to be examined here. 
a. Prohibition of Indiscriminate Attacks 
Indiscriminate attacks are those attacks which have no specific military 
objective and the effects of which cannot be limited, example, are mass 
destruction weapons, bombs which are likely to affect civilians and 
combatants alike and minefields sown in areas where civilians are likely 
to be found.130 Indiscriminate attacks are a normal practice in non-
international armed conflicts causing incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct damage anticipated.131 
Such attacks are prohibited by customary international law and are 
unlawful.132 Under the heading of general protection of the civilian 
population, the ICRC had in particular proposed express prohibition of 
indiscriminate attacks at the Conference of Government Experts of 1972. 
The discussion showed the difference in appreciation resulting from a 
                                                 
130 H. Blix, “Area Bombardment: Rules and Reasons”, British Yearbook of International Law, Volume 49, 
1978, pp 31-69.  Protocol I prohibits indiscriminate attacks in a number of provisions: Article 51 (6), 52 
(1), 54 (4), 55 (2) and 56 (4) 
131 A. Cassese, “The prohibition of indiscriminate means of warfare”, in R.J. Akkermanm, (ed), 
Declarations on Principle: A Quest for Universal Peace, Lieber Amicorium Discipulorundue Prof. Dr. Bert 
V. A. Roling, Lieden. 1977, pp 171-194. 
132 M.H.Hoffman, The customary law of non-international armed conflict. Evidence from the United States 
Civil War; IRRC; No. 277 (July – August 1990), pp. 322-344 
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military or humanitarian approach. For military approach the proposal 
would appear too restrictive, some experts feared that the ICRC proposal 
would have indirectly forbidden certain weapons.133 However, at the 
Diplomatic Conference adopting Protocol II the proposal did not find 
consensus.134 The absence of an express prohibition of indiscriminate 
attacks in Article 13 is considered lacunae in the regime. In fact there is a 
trend to expand the scope of rules of conventional international law 
originally designed for international armed conflicts in relation to 
conduct hostilities in order to ensure their application also in non-
international armed conflicts.135 However one may argue that the rule 
requiring the distinction between combatants and civilians in the conduct 
of military operations being a fundamental principle of IHL, reaffirmed 
in resolutions 2444 (XXIIII) of 19 December 1968 and 2675 (XXV) of 9 
December 1970 should be the basis for prohibition of indiscriminate 
                                                 
133 Khalshoven Frits, Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts, The Conference of Government Experts (second session), 3 May – 2 July 1972, 3NYIL 
(1972), pp 36-38 
134 Protocol I prohibits indiscriminate attacks in a number of provisions: Article 51 (6), 52 (1), 54 (4), 55 
(2) and 56 (4)  
135 - For example, Ottawa Convention of 1997 on The Prohibitions of Landmines, state parties are under 
obligation to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in all types of armed conflict. 
Also the 1980 Convention on certain conventional weapons i.e. Convention on Prohibition or Restriction 
on the Use of certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
Indiscriminate Effects of 10 October 1980, as amended on 13 October 1995 and 3 May 1996. Also the 
Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons, 1995 Annexed to the 1980 Convention mentioned – Y. Sandoz, 
“A New Step Forward in International Law – Prohibition and Restriction on the use of certain 
Conventional Weapons”, IRRC, January – February 1981, p.3 
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attacks as such attacks affecting civilians without distinction are violating 
the very rules of protection.136 
b. Reprisal Acts 
Reprisals as a means of warfare against the civilian population and 
civilian objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population are 
not prohibited at such under APII. 137 During the discussions of Protocol 
II of 1977, the prohibition of reprisal acts was withdrawn from the draft. 
The inclusion of such proposal was protested by some states’ delegations 
on the justification that reprisal acts are practiced in international armed 
conflicts and at such it had no place as an instrument on internal 
conflicts. Other delegations protested on the reason that such inclusion 
will restrict the power of governments of states in whose territory the 
conflict occurs.138 Nigeria strongly protested against its inclusion by 
saying that: “It is not inconceivable that in the course of an internal 
conflict, rebels deliberately commit acts which the normal reaction would 
be in the nature of reprisal, but because of a prohibition such as this, 
governments would feel bound to fold their arms while dissident groups 
                                                 
136 - David Turns, “At the Vanishing Point of International Humanitarian Law: Methods and Means of 
Warfare in Non-international Armed Conflicts”, German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 45 – 2002, 
pp.115-147. 
137 - Reprisal acts are prohibited by four Geneva Conventions and Protocol I applicable in International 
armed conflicts.  
138 - Khalshoven, The Diplomatic Conference, 20 February – 29 march 1974, op.cit, N.Y.I.L. (1974), p.26 
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go on a rampage killing and maiming innocent civilians and burning 
dwellings and food crops.” 139 
Nigeria and other delegations supporting her views, is arguing by thus, 
that reprisals is a sanction to stop further violations of the law and it is 
not an act of revenge. It is clear that the proposed Article prohibiting 
reprisal was deleted on the basic reason to the understanding of such 
states, that it violates their national sovereignty and that by such 
prohibition; the sovereign rights of governments will be restricted. 
However, the question as to whether the Protocol makes allowance for 
using the concept of reprisals in non-international armed conflict has 
given rise to a controversial debate among legal writers despite the 
absence of such a rule in the Protocol. Some legal writers are of view that 
reprisal acts are not prohibited by arguing that not all obligations under 
the Protocol are absolute. The Protocol includes a category of 
obligations, which may be ignored for a time by one of the parties to the 
conflict, in relation to serious violations by the opposing party.140 
However, in our view, such argument will inevitably result in the failure 
                                                 
139 - CDDG/SR 51, Vol. 7, 122. In fact the view held by Nigeria reflects the general attitude of some states 
during the discussion held to adopt APII in relation to other rules. The idealists, led by the Norwegians had 
wanted Protocol II to be as close as possible to Protocol I in substance with maximum protections 
applicable even in non-international armed conflict. While on the other hand, the developing countries felt 
that they were more likely to experience non-international armed conflicts than the Norwegians and did not 
want their hands tied when it came to suppressing rebellions.  
140 Antonio Cassese, The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-international Armed 
Conflicts, International Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 30, April 1981, p.436 
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of the regime of rules of protection of civilians set up under APII. The 
reason is that rebels may take a similar attitude by launching military 
attacks by way of reprisals as a counter measure to that of the 
government.  To say that certain obligations of the Protocol can be 
suspended in retaliation to serious violations by the adversary, in our 
view, allows a party to the conflict to act in contrary to basic 
requirements of humanity.141 
The second view held by Cassese supports the above opinion but restricts 
its application. He sees that parties to the conflict are allowed to resort to 
reprisals subject to certain strict conditions, taking account of the 
humanitarian purpose of the Protocol. Firstly, a party in a conflict can 
resort to reprisals only in case the violations to which a party reacts by 
way reprisals to be gross and systematic; secondly the gross and repeated 
violations have been established by an independent body such as the 
ICRC or humanitarian institution; thirdly a part intends to launch reprisal 
attacks should give a warning to other party of his intention so as to stop 
its action.142  
                                                 
141 These are provisions providing for obligations in Article 4, paragraph 3 (protection of children), Article 
5 (persons whose liberty has been restricted), Article 6 (penal prosecutions), Article 8 (search for the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked), Article 9 (protection of medical and religious personnel) 
142 Cassese, op.cit., pp 437-439 
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One tends to disagree with the above views; the absence of prohibitions 
of reprisal acts in APII does not make the act lawful in non-international 
armed conflicts. The ICRC considered that in the absence of an express 
reference to reprisals in common Article 3, acts of reprisals against 
protected civilians was implicitly prohibited.143 The same is to be 
applicable to Protocol II which supplements the regime of protection of 
Article 3. The two regimes are indivisible. In addition, our argument is 
based on the spirit and objects of the Protocol i.e. reprisal acts are 
incompatible with the ‘humane treatment’ guaranteed in Article 4. 
Government measures of retaliation may lead rebels to increase violence 
instead of compelling them to stop violations of the Protocol. The result 
in all cases will negatively affect civilian victims. Besides the fear of 
States that such a prohibition might deprive it from its rights as a 
sovereign to repress rebels does not reflect the reality since both Article 3 
and Protocol II do not have a legal effect on the status of both rebels and 
states, nor in any way imply recognition of belligerency. 
Another reason is that these prohibitions in Protocol II impose absolute 
obligations. In other words, no provision of the Protocol may in any 
circumstances or for any reason be violated, even in response to a 
                                                 
143 A declaration was made by the ICRC in relation to the Arab-Israeli Conflict - The ICRC in Action 
Information Note; 5 December, 1973, No. 2056, p.9 
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violation by the other party.144 As such The Protocol does not provide for 
reciprocity of obligations. In conclusion, one may say that such a 
prohibition is intended to protect civilians and not to restrict the acts of 
governments to repress rebels. 
c. Precautionary Measures Against Indirect Effects of Attacks 
Launching attacks against military objects situated near areas where civilians 
are found may result in serious effects on civilians. In such cases, to reduce 
the suffering and damage indirectly caused to civilians and their property, 
precautions should be taken by parties to the conflict in the conduct of 
hostilities to spare civilians and their property. They must take all possible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with view to avoid 
and in any event to minimize incidental loss of civilians life, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects 145 and civilian property146 These 
precautions require that the parties to choose exactly the military object and 
the other party to take all precautions possible in favor of civilians under his 
control by removing them from areas near to military objects , to set up 
protective areas (safety zones) and to establish camps for displaced persons. 
                                                 
144 Pilloud, Commentary on the Protocols of 1977, op.cit, pp.1372 
145 Article 57 of Protocol 1I deals with such precautions – For more details on this Klashoven,op.cit, pp. 98-
100 
146 APII provides protection of certain civilian objects, example cultural objects and places of worship. An 
Article was proposed to extend the protection to civilian property but was deleted. It was claimed that 
national legislation is often sufficient to protect such interest – CDDH/SR.51. Vol.7 p.123 
 300
Neither common Article 3 nor Protocol II provides for such precautionary 
measures to be taken for the protection of the civilian population either 
directly or indirectly.147 APII contains rules requiring parties to the conflict 
to abide by certain rules or forms of prohibitions. However one may argue 
that even in the absence of such a provision, the obligation to take such 
measures is presumed by analogy in applying other provisions and spirit of 
the Protocol.148 It may suffice to note that the requirement to separate 
civilians and evacuate them for security purposes is one kind of such 
measures but not exhaustive. 
The UN General Assembly in passing Resolution 2444 (23) on 19 December 
1968, Relative to the Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts 
affirmed that the right of a party to the conflict to use methods to inflict 
injury on adversary is not absolute. By this it laid down general principles to 
be observed in conducting hostilities during all types of armed conflicts, 
basically it prohibits launching attacks against civilian population. In its 
                                                 
147 Article 58 of Protocol 1 provides for precautions against the effects of attacks which states that the 
Parties to the conflict shall to the maximum extent feasible, avoid location military objectives within or 
near densely populated areas. 
148 The ICRC has published a Statement on the Basic Rules of Armed Conflict Applicable in Non-
international armed conflicts in 1989 which provides for general rules protecting civilians against effects of 
hostilities and prohibitions, and restrictions on the use of certain weapons. Section III A (8) that the general 
rule to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and prohibition of attacks against the civilian 
population as such or against individual civilians implies, in order to be effective, that all feasible 
precautions have to be taken to avoid inquiry, loss or damage to the civilian population. It is to be 
mentioned here that their rules are published in a Declaration adopted at the 14th Round Table on 
Humanitarian Law organized by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, in 1989. The 
ICRC rules text published in Int’l. Rev. Red Cross, 278, (September – October 1989), p.404 
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Resolution No. 2675 (25) titled “The Basic Principle for the Protection of 
Civilian Population in Armed Conflicts”, it provides that civilian population 
or individuals should not be an object to reprisal attacks and that in 
conducting military operations, parties in the conflict should take all 
measures to evade civilian population from effects of war, and to take 
necessary measures to protect them against injury. 
Despite the importance of the above resolutions mentioned earlier, its 
significance is undervalued by the fact that the UN General Assembly 
resolutions have no legal binding effect. However their content reflects 
customary rules which are binding on both parties to the conflict. 
ii. Prohibition of Specific Practices 
APII is criticized in that it does not provide for the prohibition of certain 
practices which adversely affect civilians as perfidy and use of civilians as 
human shields as a method of hostilities.  Perfidy is defined as consisting in 
acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him, with intent to betray 
him, to believe that the perpetrator of the perfidious act is entitled to receive 
protection under the rules of international humanitarian law. It is a normal 
practice that members of rebel armed forces in non-international conflict 
fuse among civilian population with intent to deceive or mislead the 
adversary and make him believe that he is a civilian protected person. This 
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brings the obligation of combatants to distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population. In international armed conflict, the combatant that acts 
as a civilian or appears as surrendering, or wears the military uniform of 
adversary, with intention to kill, injure or capture an adversary, he is 
committing the act of perfidy as long as by such acts he intends to invite the 
confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under the law.149 
Similarly to lead the adversary to believe that he is obliged to grant such 
protection to the perpetrator of the perfidious act.150 It is a normal practice 
that acts of perfidy are outlawed in customary law of war.151 In addition 
there is ample evidence that the rule prohibiting perfidy form part of the law 
of war whether or not embodied in a treaty as this rule reflects what is 
binding on the basis of general international law applicable to all types of 
armed conflict.152   
                                                 
149 For more details on the issue, Klashoven, Constraints on the Waging of War, infra, pp. 82-84 
150  Article 37 of Protocol 1 defines perfidy. The prohibition of perfidy is important as regard respect of the 
emblem as it includes the prohibiting of its perfidious use, example to use flag, emblem, or uniform of the 
United Nations or other body – Commentary on the Declaration on the Rules of the International 
Humanitarian Law governing the conduct of hostilities in Non-international Armed Conflicts, adopted by 
the Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, meeting in Taormina on 7 April 1990, 
pp.426-427  
151 The Lieber Code contained provision prohibiting perfidy. 
152 Article 23 of Hague Regulation prohibits perfidy, Article 37 (2) of API defines the opposite concept of 
perfidy i.e. ruses of war: these are said to consist in those acts which, without inviting the confidence of the 
adversary are intended to mislead him or to induce him to act recklessly. Example of the ruse of war is 
camouflage, traps, mock operations and misinformation. Ruses of war are not prohibited under Article 37 
(2) above because they are not perfidious. They do not invite the confidence of the adversary with respect 
to protection under the law. Example of perfidious act is the feigning of a situation of distress, disguise of 
combatants in civilian clothing, misuse of recognized signs – Detter, The Law of War. op.cit, pp.303 - 307  
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Article 13 does not contain a provision prohibiting use of civilians for 
military purpose as human shields. In non-international armed conflicts, this 
method is one of the patterns used by rebels in conducting military 
operations. One of the basic rules to protect civilians in law of armed 
conflict is that prohibiting parties to the conflict from directing the 
movement of the civilian population or individual civilians to shield military 
objectives from attacks or to shield military operations. In the Chechen 
armed conflict, the Russian army was accused of using civilians as human 
shields when conducting military operations.153 The absence of a provision 
prohibiting such acts is a serious drawback of the regime, as such acts no 
doubt exposes civilian population to direct military attacks and violates the 
basic rules of humanity. 
iii. Absence of Provisions for the Protection of the Natural Environment 
in Non- international Armed Conflicts 
Any methods or means of warfare which are planned to cause or expected to 
cause serious damage to the natural environment even if this is incidental, 
will inevitably affect the physical or mental health of civilian population.154 
The protection of natural environment in internal armed conflict was one of 
the topics which the ICRC made efforts by proposing rules imposing 
                                                 
153 Article 51 (7) of API prohibits the use of civilians or their objects as a shield in conducting military 
operations.  
154 Article 35 (3) and Article 55 of Protocol I  
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obligations on parties of the conflict to take measures to prevent harmful 
effects on the civilians as a result of using weapons causing damage to the 
environment, but the idea was rejected.155 APII contains provisions which 
may indirectly relate to the issue of protection of the environment with view 
to protect the civilians. Article 14 which prohibit attacks against ‘foodstuffs, 
agricultural areas for the production of food stuffs, drinking water 
installations etc.’ Also Article 15 which prohibits any attack against 
‘installations containing dangerous forces’ if such attack may cause the 
release of such forces. However, the Protocol does not contain rules 
protecting the environment in non-international armed conflicts expressly. 
Reality of conflict has shown that chemical weapons have a serious effect in 
not only affecting human beings, but destroys crops, poisons water and 
animals, its effects continue after armed conflict is over. The damage caused 
to such items, which are considered objects necessary to the survival of 
civilian population as a result of military attack, is obviously prohibited even 
in absence of an express provision to the effect. 156 
                                                 
155 “The Red Cross and the Human Environment”, IRRC, June 1976, p.295. In fact the United Nations 
played an important role in providing protection to the natural environment starting from the UN 
Environment Programme in 1972 held in Stockholm – Pilloud etal, Commentary on Additional Protocols of 
1977, op.cit, pp 410-411 – Detter, The UN Special Conference on the Environment, in P. Taylor and J. 
Groom (eds) UN Special Conference, London, 1987. 
156 Antoine Bouvier, “Protection of the Natural Environment in time of Armed Conflict”, IRRC (off print), 
November-December 1991, No.285, pp.567-578.  
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Closely related to the issue is the protection of natural human environment 
from the effects of methods and means affecting the climate, example 
destruction of oil wells, causing serious pollution, such as the damage 
caused during Iraq-Kuwait conflict in 1991 as a result of attacking oil wells 
and pipelines in Kuwait and Iraq causing dangerous materials to enter the 
Gulf, damaging lower water purification installations, destroying aspects of 
life and polluting air.157 Iraq government was held responsible for the 
damage caused to the environment and was obliged to pay compensation. 158 
This means that under general international law, parties to a conflict are 
under obligation not to use environment as a means of warfare and to take 
measures to protect it.159 This has been affirmed by the ICJ in its advisory 
opinion by stating that ‘States must take environmental considerations into 
                                                 
157 Green, “The Environment and the Law of Conventional Warfare”, 29 Canadian Yearbook of 
International law (1991), p.222 
158 Security Council Resolution No. 687 (1991). As a result of the Gulf crisis to the environment in the area, 
the UN increased its efforts to develop the law applicable to the protection of environment during armed 
conflict. The United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development was held in June 1992 in 
which the ICRC was invited to present the main legal provisions relating to the protection of the 
environment in time of conflict – On the agenda discussed on the issue before the Conference and other 
Meeting – Antoine Bouvier, Recent Studies on the Protection of the environment in time of armed conflict 
– IRRC (off print) November – December 1992, pp.554-566 – After the Gulf war, the ICRC prepared a 
report for the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and red Crescent held in Budapest, November-
December 1991. The protection of the environment during non-international armed conflict was one of the 
areas in which clarification was imperative – Y. Sandoz, “ A propose of the postponement of the 26th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and red Crescent”, IRRC, No.286, January-February 1992, pp.5-
12 
159 Detter, the Law of War, op.cit, p.272 – Grunawalt, Protection of the Environment During Armed 
Conflict, 1997, Newport, Naval War College – Adam Roberts, “Destruction of the Environment during the 
1991 Gulf War”, IRRC, No.291, November-December 1992, pp.538-553  
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account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of 
legitimate military objectives. 160 
 
iv. Compulsory Evacuation and Insufficiency Measures to Displaced 
Civilians 
Article 17 of APII prohibits compulsory evacuation of civilians (unlike 
common Article 3 which is silent on this issue), however one of the 
weaknesses of the Article is that it does not subject it to an important 
condition, that the evacuation should be temporary i.e. civilians are to be 
rehabilitated once the danger ceases. The effect of this is to avoid the 
adoption of evacuation by a party as a method of causing demographic 
changes for a certain group of population. The reason being that in most 
conflicts which last for years, civilians who are settled in areas for long time, 
makes it difficult to return to their home areas. 161 The conflicts in Angola, 
Brundi and Yugoslavia were widely characterized by displacement of great 
number of civilians either as refugees or internally displaced persons.162  The 
Article contains other weaknesses in that it allows displacement for reasons 
of military planning i.e. for security of the civilian population or imperative 
                                                 
160 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports, op.cit, p.30 
161 However in some cases the ICRC and Red Crescent play an important role in assisting such civilians to 
retrieve back to their areas by convincing them that the dangers of war ceased to exist – Francois, intro, 
p.747 – the UN Secretary General, http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.htm  
162 C.M.Carey, “International Displacement: Is Prevention through Accountability Possible? A Kosovo case 
Study”, 49 Am. Univ. LK (1999), p.243 
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military reasons. The cover of ‘imperative military reasons’, is vague and 
gives wide discretion to any party in the conflict to expose civilians to forced 
displacement. Unfortunately, Article 8 of the ICC Statute of 1998 does not 
provide for a provision on unlawful deportation or transfer in Article 8 (2) 
(c) in relation to violation of common Article 3 of Geneva Convention  
applicable in non-international armed conflict. 163 
v. Denial of Access of Humanitarian Aid Operations to Civilian Victims       
The problem of sufficient rules which guarantees access to civilian victims 
in non-international armed conflicts is another shortcoming of the regime of 
protection under APII. One of the weaknesses of Article 18 relating to rules 
applicable to “societies of aid and aid operations” is that these operations are 
subject to the consent of contracting party.164 This consent is discretionary 
whether from the ruling government or rebel parties to the conflict, and even 
in cases it is given there is no guarantee to ensure the safe access of such aid 
till it reaches the victims. Besides, Article 18 (2) subjected this consent to 
the satisfaction of harsh conditions i.e. the civilian population has to suffer 
under hardship due to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as 
foodstuffs and medical supplies. This condition, of “undue hardship” gives 
                                                 
163 However Article 8 (2) (vii) of the ICC statute of 1998 provides that unlawful deportation or transfer of 
civilians in international armed conflicts is a violation in the law giving rise to criminal responsibility. 
164 APII does not refer to ICRC offer of services however since the clause is contained in Common Article 
3 then it retains its full validity with regard to Protocol II as it supplements the regime under Article 3. 
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rise to several questions since it is vague and difficult to ascertain such a 
condition linking the issue of humanitarian aid to the judgment of the 
government presumed to give its consent which may be arbitrary.165  In 
some cases refusal to give consent may be used to inflict starvation on 
civilians as a method of combat in violation to Article 14 of the Protocol.166 
Lack of safety and security of humanitarian staff by targeting relief 
personnel are main obstacles in providing effective access to civilians 
especially when hindered by rebels exercising control of certain areas. On 
the other hand, national societies like Red Crescent are not allowed to work 
in areas under control of rebel party who look to such societies with 
suspicious as working in part of the government. The experiences in Congo, 
Chechnya and internal conflicts in Sudan are examples reflecting the 
deficiencies of the regulations on relief operations in non-international 
conflicts. The law does not provide rules guaranteeing privileges or 
immunities, nor the safety, security and protection of the personnel.167 
However, this regime is strengthened by Article 8 (2) (e) (iii) of the ICC 
Statute of 1998 which prohibits “intentionally directing attacks against 
                                                 
165 Bothe M.,”Relief Actions: The Position of the Recipient State” in Kalshoven, F., (ed), Assisting the 
Victims of Armed Conflict and other Disasters. Derdrecht, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982. pp.91-98 
166 Macalister  Smith, P., “Protection of the Civilians and the Prohibition of Starvation as a Method of 
Warfare – Draft text on International Humanitarian Assistance” in IRRC, No. 283, 1991, pp.440-459 
167 The UN Council Assembly has shown concern in a number of cases of armed conflict on the issue of 
ensuring the security and protection of humanitarian personnel and United Nations and associated 
personnel.- 
 309
personnel, installations, materials, units or vehicles involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations as long as they are entitled to the protection 
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict”.  To overcome such deficiencies the same argument allowing ICRC 
to work in case of arbitral refusal with regard to Common Article 3 applies 
here as long as such societies are working within its humanitarian mandate 
and does not operate partially and on the basis of unjustifiable 
distinctions.168 A protection to humanitarian personnel working in the field 
should be secured by the party to the conflict within whose area of control 
they work. 
vi. Weakness of the Regime of Special Protection 
The special protection regime under APII though supplemented general rules 
of protection in Common Article 3, however it has its own weakness in 
relation to protection of children and women, victims of such conflict. The 
worst type of exploitation of children is to use them as human shields during 
military operations.  The Protocol does not prohibit using children as such, 
despite the fact that in a number of non-international armed conflicts they 
are used as human shields. One of the basic weaknesses of the Protocol is 
                                                 
168 Plattner, D., “ICRC and Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance”, IRRC, No. 311, 1995, pp.161-185 
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that it specifies the age at which children are not to participate in hostile 
activities as fifteen years and less. This means that children who reach 
fifteen years may participate in hostilities.169 This is critical because even 
children who reach fifteen years still are not matured to appreciate the 
consequences of their acts. As a result the age of participation should be 
increased to eighteen years to be consistent with the age of recruitment, 
especially it is observed that in most internal conflicts children who 
participate in hostilities are between 15 and 18 years,170 In our opinion, 
participation of children in hostilities which threatens the life of thousands of 
them should be prohibited in all cases by providing for this in national 
legislations, besides the age of eighteen years is the age of criminal 
responsibility in most domestic legislations.171 The Protocol does not 
provide for any provision in relation to children less than fifteen years who 
lost their parents or dispersed as a result of armed conflicts. These children 
need to be collected in special centers, taken care of their health, their 
education and their right to play. The mental and physical disorders caused 
                                                 
169 Kuper, J., International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 1997.  
170 Gill sees that the best way of raising the age of participation of hostilities would be to adopt declaration 
as a humanitarian instrument, containing humanitarian standards prohibiting any participation under 18 
years – Guy Goodwin – Gill and Ilene Cohn – Child Soldiers, The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts, A 
Study on Behalf of the Henry Dunant Institute, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p.228 
171 The ICRC sees that increasing the age to 18 years is required by international law and practice. Because 
referring to Article 1 of Child’s Convention, a child is defined as ‘every person who did not reach the age 
of eighteen years.’ This age of eighteen years marks the transition between childhood and adulthood.  
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to children by their participation in hostilities or periods spent in detention is 
a crucial issue which the law should cover by embodying rules imposing 
obligations on states to take measures for their reintegration into society with 
the help of non-governmental organizations. Children who have been 
deprived of their liberty need to be detained in places separate from grown 
up detained persons.172  It is to be noted that the protection of children under 
APII depends on states and their domestic laws, besides the application of 
such rules is subject to the willingness of states parties to sincerely 
implementing them and the consent or ability of rebels to implement them. 
As a result protection of children needs from states to take concrete 
measures by enacting legislations ensuring such protection.173 
As far as women are concerned, APII undoubtedly adopted certain rules 
providing them with special protection against rape, enforced prostitution or 
any form of indecent assault. Despite this, crimes against honor on women 
and girls continue to be committed on a large scale during non-international 
armed conflicts. The absence of a provision in APII regime providing for 
                                                 
172 Additional Protocol 1 provides more detailed rules for protection of Children in Article 76 and 78 (3). 
For example, they are to be put in safety areas, protect them from dangers of methods of warfare which 
may affect them indirectly – Marie – Francois, The Non-Derogable Rights of the Child in the Light of the 
United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child – in Non-Derogable Rights and States of Emergency, 
Editors Daniel Premont Christian Stenerson, I. Sabelle oseredczuk (Bruylent) 1966, pp.389-410 
173 The Convention on the Rights of Child of 1989 confirming in Article 38, paragraph. 2, the age limit to 
be of fifteen years. However APII does not define the term ‘Child’ deliberately. In this way the varying 
views in different cultures are taken into consideration. In some African and Muslim countries have 
different views of the age of maturity which varies from person to another. However one may assume that 
under international humanitarian law any person who has not attained the age of fifteen is a child. 
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specific sanctions to repress such crimes against women is a major gap 
rendering the special regime of protection ineffective. In fact, such crimes 
are committed on wide scale in today conflicts. Practices in former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, armed conflicts have been documented showing 
that sexual violence including rape against women had been used 
systematically as a part of the process of destruction of certain groups. It was 
practiced as part of the process of destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole 
in Rwanda. Measures to prevent births within the group had been also 
practiced. The Trial Chamber in ICTR in 1998 found that rape and sexual 
violence “constitute genocides as long as they were committed with intent to 
destroy a particular group targeted as such”.174 In former Yugoslavia, rape 
had been used as a method to commit genocide, not only this but it was 
practiced as a method to enforce civilians to evacuate their villages. 
To have an effective regime of protection it is necessary to prohibit such 
acts. Special protection to women should also include specific prohibitions 
to take measures to prevent births within the group, the practice of 
sterilization and forced birth control which are practiced on wide scale in 
ethnic armed conflicts.175 In conclusion, these practices even if not expressly 
provided for in APII, still they are implicitly prohibited being acts of torture, 
                                                 
174 The Prosecution, v. Jean Paul Akayseu, Case No. ICTR – 96-4-T, paragraph. 731 
175 Avril McDonald, The Year In Review, Year of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 1, 1998, p.128 
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degrading women’s dignity and acts of inhumane treatment.176 The 
responsibility to apply the provisions giving special protection to women is 
the duty of international community who should ensure respect and 
guarantee their application when the legal framework for prosecuting rape 
and sexual violence against women in non-international armed conflict is 
made. 
vii. Absence of Protective Rules to Civilian Victims in Armed Conflicts 
between Dissident Groups where the Government is not a Party 
The scope of application of APII is restricted to those non-international 
armed conflicts in which the government armed force is a party to the 
conflict. This restriction in application is no doubt a major drawback of the 
Protocol, as it creates a serious legal gap in the system of protection of 
civilians in conflicts among rebel groups.  In a number of internal conflicts, 
the government armed forces were not considered a direct party involved in 
the conflict as in Somalia, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Liberia. In such cases, 
the government is not a party, because either it is weak or cannot control the 
                                                 
176 Article 2 of the Rome Statute of ICC considers such acts serious violations of both common Article 3 
and APII, which entails international responsibility as war crimes.  
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conflict or the state political institutions failed.177 In such cases the civilians 
are to be protected under the limited regime of Common Article 3.178 
 
viii. Absence of an International Supervision Mechanism 
Additional Protocol II is silent on the issue of breaches of rules of 
protection. It contains no provisions concerning penal repressions of 
breaches whether grave breaches as in Protocol I, or otherwise to ensure its 
effective implementation.179  No doubt this gap in the regime renders respect 
of rules of protection by parties to the conflict weak. 
An important issue relating to the implementation of the Protocol is the 
absence of a provision providing for supervision of an international body to 
ensure the implementation in compliance with and respect of these rules by 
parties to the Conflict.  Under Protocol I regime, the task of supervision to 
ensure respect by parties to the conflict of the law is vested in the Fact 
Finding Commission.180 The absence of similar tools or institutions at 
                                                 
177 The ICRC proposal of APII submitted to the Diplomatic Conference included such type of conflicts in 
which government is not a party to the conflict provided that the conflict occurs in the territory of a 
contracting party. However the proposal was rejected. 
178 It will be shown that in such conflicts in addition to rules of Common Article 3, human rights Law and 
customary Law may fill gaps of protection.  
179 Protocol II, Article 85 provides for the concept of ‘grave breaches’ – Leisle, The Contemporary Law of 
Armed Conflict, op. cit, p.326 
180 Additional Protocol I provides for the establishment of a permanent International Fact – Finding 
Commission in relation to supervision of its execution in Article 90. It came into existence in 1992, it is 
competent to enquire into any allegation that a grave breach or other serious violations of the Geneva 
Convention or Protocol has occurred during international armed conflict and to use its good offices to assist 
in helping to restore respect for the law – Kussbach, “The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding 
Commission” 43, 1994, p.185 
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internal level for ensuring compliance by the parties to a conflict in non-
international agents is justified on basis of the sovereignty of the state and 
fear of interference by such bodies in time of conflict. 
 
As a result of the above weakness in the regime of protection to civilian 
victims, resort to other sources of applicable rules is necessary in 
establishing and strengthening the international regime of protection of 
civilians in non-international armed conflict. APII, in its preamble, after 
recalling the validity of humanitarian principles contained in common 
Article 3 of Geneva Conventions, it recalls in paragraph 2 that the 
international instrument relating to human rights offers a basic protection to 
the human person, and that in cases not covered by the law in force, the 
human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity 
and the dictates of the public conscience”, referring to the so called Marten’s 
clause. This opens the door for seeking use of mechanisms under 
international law for the purpose of ensuring respect and implementation of 
the law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Comparative Law Quarterly (I.C.L.Q.) – Francoise Krill, The International Fact-Finding 
Commission, The ICRC’s Role, IRRC (off print) March-April 1991, No.281, pp.190-207, pp.190-205 
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Conclusion 
The regime protecting civilian victims under humanitarian law applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts is based on common Article 3 of Geneva 
Convention IV of 1949 and it’s Additional Protocol II of 1977.  The regime 
provides for a set of principles and rules of humanitarian nature which are 
considered advancement to the situation of civilians prior to its adoption.  
However, analysis of the regime and the application of such rules, after both 
common Article 3 and AP II came into force, in a number of non-
international armed conflicts, revealed a number of weaknesses in the 
content of such regime.   The weakness is resulting from the limited set of 
rules applicable which constitutes minimum standards compared to the 
regime protecting civilians in international armed conflicts.  States 
apparently accepted the idea of subjecting civilian victims to protection 
under international regime.  However, their fear that their sovereignty may 
be eroded or restricted and their insistence to preserve to themselves wide 
powers over their citizens, be civilian victims or members of rebel groups, 
have resulted in adopting a regime containing a number of shortcomings.  
Analysis of common Article 3 uncovered some of the gaps in theory and 
practice in relation to protection of civilians under the Article.  The 
problematic issue of distinction between civilians and combatants as a result 
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of absence of definition of “civilian” and the vagueness of concept of “ 
taking part in hostilities” are considered one of the aspects rendering the 
application of rules provided for in the Article ineffective.  Its rules are 
limited to prohibition of certain acts while it is silent in addressing problems 
and providing rules to protect civilians against other serious atrocities which 
are practiced against them in such conflicts like compulsory displacement, 
reprisal acts and their subjection to starvation.  Rules do not that provide 
special protection to vulnerable victims like children and women.  More 
serious is the absence of a provision providing for any form of international 
guarantees to ensure application and implementation of its rules of 
protection, a fact which no doubt added to the weakness of the regime. 
In addition, Common Article 3 does not contain rules governing the conduct 
of hostilities during such conflicts which guarantee protection to civilians 
against effects of hostilities.  The absence of an express provision restricting 
the freedom of adversaries in relation to use of means and methods of 
fighting, no doubt opens the door for parties of the conflict to use lawful and 
unlawful weapons.  Besides, the absence of sufficient international 
disarmament policies and rules restricting use of certain weapons  during 
non-international armed conflicts no doubt have its negative effect on 
civilians as far as their protection is concerned.  However, absence of such 
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provisions should not be interpreted to mean that parties to the conflict are 
free to use weapons which are of mass destruction, have indiscriminate 
effects or plant mine fields.  Common Article 3 prohibitions should be 
interpreted widely in light of the spirit and content of the Article.  As a 
result, use of such weapons violates the right to life and physical integrity 
which is guaranteed under the Article.  This is supported by the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444 (23) adopted in 1968 which 
provided for basic principles to be respected by parties to the conflict 
limiting their freedom to use means and methods when conducting 
hostilities.  The legal significance of this Resolution lies on the fact that it 
was adopted by consensus, thus reflecting the belief of international 
community in relation to the matter.  The same reasoning should be applied 
in relation to prohibition of other acts which may result to sufferings to 
civilians or damage to their property in cases where the Article is silent.  
Despite the shortcomings of the regime of protection under the Article which 
may be supplemented by customary rules, one cannot deny the value of the 
regime setup under Common Article 3, in particular its wide scope of 
application compared to that set up under Additional Protocol II of 1977. 
APII regime of protection contains rules which no doubt strengthened the 
protection of civilians and civilian objects.  It introduced new rules for the 
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protection of special categories of victims and certain civilian objects 
necessary for their survival and general rules relating to conduct of 
hostilities.  However, the regime has its own drawbacks in relation to 
absence of sufficient rules protecting civilians against the effects of 
hostilities e.g. prohibition of indiscriminate attacks.  Absence of a rule 
imposing obligation on parties to the conflict to take precautionary measures 
against indirect effects of attack.  There is no provision prohibiting specific 
practices as perfidy, using civilians as human shield, protection of natural 
environment and insufficient measures protecting displaced persons.  
To remedy shortcomings and weakness of the regime resulting from 
insufficiency of rules of protection, new rules should be adopted.  The ICRC 
is expected to play an important role in enhancing efforts to develop the 
regime setup under common Article 3 and AP II. This could be done by 
widening the scope of its application to cover any situation of armed conflict 
of such intensity which causes suffering and death of civilians.  Introducing 
new rules to fill lacunae in the law and most important to contain a provision 
providing for setup of an international supervision body to ensure respect 
and application of rules contained in the regime.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Human Rights Instruments Strengthening the Content  
Of the Regime Protecting Civilians in Non-international  
Armed Conflicts 
Introduction 
The regime of protection of civilians in non-international armed conflicts is set 
up under common Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV of 1944 and Additional 
Protocol II of 1977 contains a number of rules of protection.  These rules are 
considered advancement to the situation of civilians as victims of such conflicts 
prior to the adoption of the regime.  However, the regime does not address all 
problems and does not provide sufficient and comprehensive protection to such 
victims as it has its own weaknesses and shortcomings which are revealed in 
some of its aspects.  Human rights instruments forming the source and basis of 
protection to human person, sharing with humanitarian law common objectives 
and common principles of humanity, may contribute to the content of the regime 
with a view to strengthen it and ensure greater protection to civilians in such 
conflicts.   
This chapter explores and examines the nature and extent of such contribution 
taking into consideration that human rights and humanitarian law are two 
independent legal orders. It is divided into five parts.  Part 1 sheds a light on 
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some issues which are related to both human rights and humanitarian law.  Part 2 
examines the applicability of human rights in armed conflicts and basis of such 
application.  Part 3 discusses the theoretical basis of binding force of human 
rights instruments on non-state armed entities in armed conflict situations.  Part 4 
discusses the nature and extent of contribution of human rights instruments to the 
content of regime protecting civilians.  Part 5 examines how the so-called 
Martens Clause may provide a source for rules protecting civilians and effect of 
human rights law in formulating the clause.  
1. Human Rights and Humanitarian Law:  Some Related Issues 
“Respect of human rights during armed conflicts”, which has been stressed by the 
UN General Assembly in a number of its resolutions, affirms one fact that the 
international regime of protection of civilians is not restricted to humanitarian 
law.1  Human rights law is also a basis of such protection, both laws have a 
common goal i.e. protection of humanity and dignity of persons during armed 
conflicts. This link between both laws is expressly affirmed in the Preamble of 
APII in providing that human rights instruments form a basis of protection to 
victims of such conflicts. Besides the inspirations of some provisions of Geneva 
instruments in common Article 3 and AP II can be traced directly to human rights 
law as will be noted. However, before examining in what way norms of human 
                                                 
1 Texts of such resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly is reproduced in Claude Pilloud et 
al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
(Geneva: Nijhoff, 1987) pp. 1571 - 1577 
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rights law may contribute to strengthen regime of protection of civilians, one has 
to shed light on certain issues which are closely related to the matter. 
Though human rights and humanitarian law are two different legal orders, 
however, as noted earlier, both seek to protect more or less similar human 
interests. This allows for the concurrent application of certain rules to the same 
situation in some cases, provide basis for interpretation of some of its provisions 
or fill lacunae in the regime of protection. However, the two legal orders adopt 
different norms in providing protection to persons. Human rights law ensures 
protection to all persons irrespective of their status, while applicability of 
humanitarian law rules of protection depends on the status of persons as defined 
under humanitarian law instruments e.g. civilian or prisoners of war. It follows 
that individual protection under humanitarian law is subject to the satisfaction of 
two conditions i.e. the existence of an armed conflict and on his status as defined 
by humanitarian law. 
Human rights instruments guarantees the protection of certain international basic 
rights conferred on individuals to be respected in all circumstances. This is to be 
compared to the regime of protection to civilian individuals under humanitarian 
law applicable in non-international armed conflicts by asking whether the 
treatment which civilian persons are to receive under Article 3 and APII 
constitute a body of rights to which they automatically entitled or those more of 
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an ‘indirect benefit’ resulting from the attitude of states? Neither Article 3 nor 
APII seem to contain a direct answer to the above question. However, two views 
are held by some legal writers to be examined in relation to this issue. Advocates 
of the first view, argue that Article 3 does not use the term ‘rights’ but contains a 
regime of principles representing a minimum standards and absolute prohibitions. 
At such, humanitarian law norms are to be interpreted as standards of treatment 
or conduct rather than as rights of protected persons. APII adopts the same norms 
of Article.3 i.e. rules of protection as standards rather than rights by imposing 
obligations on parties to the conflict to abide and respect such standards. 
According to this view, to have a right means you have a capacity either to 
exercise it or renounce or waive it. Under the regime of protection set up by 
Geneva law and APII, the protection granted to individuals cannot be waived 
either by the protected persons or by their states. Provost pointed out in relation 
to this issue, by stating that “the protection given is not in the nature of rights 
held by individual civilians but of standards existing independently of any actions 
of the benefited persons”. Provost by this is supporting the view that such rules of 
protection are resulting benefits to civilians but does not confer on them rights. 
He concludes on this point by stating that “humanitarian law standards although 
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grounded in the principle of humanity, are not directly attached to the human 
person but instead stem from international public order”2. 
The second view holds that Article 3 does not use the concept of ‘rights’, instead 
of this the rules of protection are put in form of “each party to the conflict shall 
be bound to apply”. The question is in what sense should the above clause to be 
understood. According to this view, the issue is to be examined in relation to 
other provisions of Geneva Convention IV protecting civilians in interstate armed 
conflicts3. For protection of civilians in international armed conflicts, Geneva 
Convention IV imposes obligations on all states parties to the Conventions to 
seek those who are guilty and to punish breaches of the Convention i.e. breaches 
of rights of persons protected. Similarly each rule of protection in Article 3 
represents an obligation on parties to the conflict. The sense of the expression 
“shall be bound to apply” then is to be understood in light of the above i.e. an 
obligation is to be paralleled with rights to protected persons, otherwise rules of 
protection are meaningless4. In law to assess that a person has a right is to say 
that he is able to enforce such rights in case of violation which entails a penalty. 
In that respect, though Article 3 does not provide for such penalties, however to 
                                                 
2 Provost, op.cit, p.34 
3 Common Articles 6/6/6/7 and 7/7/7/8 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 respectively, have been 
interpreted as indicators that Conventions grant rights to the benefited individuals by stating that “no special 
agreement shall adversely affect the situation of protected persons nor restrict the rights it confers upon them” – 
Theodor Meron, “The Humanization of Humanitarian law” 94 (1999) American. Journal of International Law, 
p.239, available at www.asil.org/abtajo.htm 
4 Jean Pictet ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1948 – Commentary on the IV Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (Geneva: ICRC, 1954) pp. 77 -79 
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safeguard the dignity of the human person Article 3 should be intended by 
drafters to confer on protected persons inviolable rights. This concept of rights 
can be used to describe a set of legal relationships i.e. an entitlement to 
something from the bearer of a corresponding obligation and immunity against 
violations of certain fundamental interests. This meaning of rights under 
humanitarian law legal order is designed to protect fundamental human interest 
being framed as obligations imposed on states. In this sense they act as an 
immunity against violations of certain fundamental interests i.e. humanity and 
dignity of persons5. 
One tends to support the second view in that protected persons have rights to 
receive humane treatment and rights not to be subjected to torture or inhuman 
treatment, to which they are automatically entitled upon outbreak of armed 
conflict irrespective of attitude of state concerned.6  Thus, a protected person may 
claim the protection of Article 3 as a right and in case of breaches he may appeal 
to procedures available. However such rights, because of the nature of 
international legal order are not directly enforceable before international law as 
protected persons are not considered subjects of international law.  In addition, 
the above interpretation is consistent with the trend which was prevailing when 
                                                 
5 Dinestein, Yoram, Human Rights in Armed Conflicts: International Humanitarian Law, in Theodor Meron ed., 
Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1948) 11, pp. 334 – 345 ---
Draper, G.1.AD., The Relationship Between the Human Rights Regime and the Law of Armed Conflict; in 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Humanitarian Law (Grassi: Istituto Editoriate Ticunese, 1970) p. 
142 
6 Article 3 of Rome Statute of International Criminal Court of 1998. 
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Geneva Convention IV was adopted i.e. the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 and the concept of conferring international rights of protection on 
individuals. For example, Article 3 of the above Declaration states that “everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of person”. The Preamble of APII by 
stating that human rights instruments provides a basis for rules of protection is 
presumed by this to adopt the same notion of ‘rights’ under human rights law to 
protect civilians.  Thus, one may say that the two legal orders seek to achieve 
identical objects and achieve the protection of such human interests by conferring 
rights on protected persons under each law. As a result, these protective rules of 
international humanitarian law may be translated into rights which are protected 
under both laws7. An overview of norms of human rights that may contribute to 
strengthen content of the regime of protection in practice will be examined. 
2. The Applicability of Human Rights in Armed Conflicts 
It has been shown earlier that the rules of protection applicable to civilians in 
non-international armed conflicts, under Article 3 and AP11 derived their 
aspirations directly from human rights instruments. Moreover, paragraph 2 of 
Preamble of APII recalling that human rights instruments form the basis of 
protection to the human person8. The legal significance of inclusion of paragraph 
                                                 
7 Pictet, Jean, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, op. cit, p. 1358 
8 Human rights instruments include all those treaties which may be relevant to provide protection. A list of some 
of these relevant human rights instruments include: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with its 
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2 to be deduced is that the protection of civilian victims is also ensured under 
human rights instruments. A civilian is a human person who acquires the status 
of civilian under HL as a result of occurrence of armed conflict, provided he does 
not take active part in hostilities. He looses the protection if he participates in 
hostilities as he will loose the status of civilian. While under human rights he is 
entitled as a human person to rights which are attached to him in all 
circumstances. Therefore he needs both protections being a human person and 
being a civilian victim of such conflicts. It is here that the importance of both 
laws are said to be complementary9. On the other hand they apply concurrently in 
some cases in situations of armed conflicts which are declared situations of 
emergency. To recall here the UN General Assembly in its resolution 2444 
(XXIII) adopted unanimously in 1968 which laid down basic principle in 
providing that “Fundamental human rights as accepted in international law and 
laid down as international instruments continue to apply fully in situations of 
armed conflict”.10 
                                                                                                                                                          
Optional Protocol (16 December 1966); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(9December 1948); Protocol amending the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926 (23 
October 1953) and Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices similar to Slavery (7 September 1956); Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading treatment or Punishment (10 December 1984); Convention on the Right of the Child (20 November 
1989), Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (/8 Dec. 1979); Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (12 Dec 1965) – Reprinted in Ian Brownlie ed. Basic 
Documents on Human Rights, 3rd ed (Oxford: Clarendon 1992) 363. also available at : 
http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/h2catoc.htm  
9 T. Meron, The Protection of the human person under Human Rights law and Humanitarian law, Bulletin of 
Human Rights 91/1. United Nations, New York 1992. 
10 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly during its Twenty-third session, 24 Sept – 21 December 1968, 
General Assembly , Official Records: Twenty third session, supplement no. 18, Document A/752/8, p. 50 
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Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of  1966 
(ICCPR) allows a state party to unilaterally derogate temporarily from part of its 
obligations under the Covenant in times of public emergency subject to 
substantive and procedural conditions11.In armed conflict situation declared as an 
emergency, measures derogating from the Covenant are allowed only and to the 
extent the situations constitutes a threat to the life of the nation12 and only 
“provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligation under 
international law.” This condition is important as far as civilian protection is 
concerned which ensures guarantee to applicability of humanitarian law rules. 
This means that during armed conflict, humanitarian rules protecting civilians 
under common Article 3 and AP II are to be guaranteed by the state in addition to 
the applicability of the core rights in Article 4 of the ICCP to civilians. In other 
words derogations shall not affect or apply to the rights and special guarantees 
concerning the prohibitions undertaken by the state in Article 3 and APII.13 It is 
to be mentioned here that humanitarian instruments are not subject to derogations 
                                                 
11 The procedural requirements includes that a state of emergency must have officially been proclaimed and a 
state party availing itself of the right of derogation must immediately inform the other states parties, through the 
United Nations Secretary General, giving full information about the measures taken and reason for that – Jamie 
Oraa, Human Rights in states of Emergency in International Law, Oxford: Clarendon, 1992, p. 54. S. Joseph, 
Jschutz and M. Caston, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Cases, Materials and 
Commentary, 2000. 
12 War or armed conflicts are not explicitly mentioned in Article. 4 (1) of the ICCP, this omission results from the 
consideration that the Covenant should not envisage the possibility of war even by implication. Nevertheless it 
was never recognized that armed conflicts are one of the most dramatic public emergencies and might be invoked 
as a reason for derogation under Article. 4 – Dense Plattner, International Humanitarian Law and Inalienable or 
Non-Derogable Human Rights, at Non-Derogatiable Rights and States of Emergency, editors Daniel Premont, 
Christanio Steverson, Buryland, 1996 pp. 350 
13 Montealegre, Hernam, ‘The Compatibility of a state ‘Party’ Derogation under Human Rights Instruments with 
its obligations under Protocol 11 and Common Article 3, American, University Law Review, 33 (1983) p. 41 
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having been enacted to govern situation of armed conflicts.14 Article 4 paragraph 
2 of the ICCP lists such non derogable rights to include the right to life (Article 
6), the prohibition of imprisonment on the ground of inability to fulfill a 
contractual obligation (Article. 11), the prohibition of torture (Article 7), the 
prohibition of slavery and servitude (Article 8 paragraph. 1and 2), the right to 
recognition as a person before law (Article. 6) and the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Article.18)15. However, the Covenant leaves out several 
other essential rights such as freedom from arbitrary detention and freedom of 
movement. This is to be read, that even beyond those provisions expressly listed 
in Article.4 (2) there are elements of rights under the Covenant which cannot be 
subject to lawful derogation and which are guaranteed during armed conflicts. 
These refer to humane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, to the 
prohibition of taking hostages, abducting or unacknowledged detention, the 
prohibition of deportation or forcible transfer of population and fundamental 
requirements of fair trial. Legal protection against disappearances, destruction of 
                                                 
14 Except in the rather narrow context of Article 5 of Geneva Convention IV, which parallels the limitation clauses 
of human rights instruments. Imperative military reasons, military necessity or reasons of security may provide 
states with certain options as expressed in Article. 49,25, 64 (1) or 78 (1) of Fourth Geneva Conventions 
applicable in international armed conflicts. Common  Article. 3 and APII contain no similar rules i.e. under them 
all rules of protection to civilians are non derogable – Pictet, Jean, Commentary of IV Geneva Convention IV, op. 
cit, pp. 280, 335, 368 
15 Regional Human Rights Instruments provide for similar derogations: Article. 27 of the American Convention 
on  H.Rs at http://www.cidh.org. Artilce.4 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (1994 at 
http://www.islamkatalog.uni – Leipzig – de/islamindex.html. The African Charter on H.Rs and Peoples Rights has 
no derogation or provisions at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instru/zlafchar.htm. - example of Human Rights 
instruments which do not include a provision dealing with emergency derogation are the International Convention 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and The Childs’ Convention. 1984 
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homes and all economic and social rights relevant to their protection are to be 
guaranteed16. It is to be mentioned here that the characterization of a given 
situation as a state of emergency or an armed conflict which may render one or 
the other legal system partially or totally inapplicable, does not affect the core 
rights which apply at all times independently of any act of characterization17. 
3. The Theoretical Basis of  Binding Force of Human Rights Instruments 
on Non-State Armed Entities in Armed Conflict Situations 
A state party to a conflict is bound to respect its obligations under human rights 
instruments applicable during armed conflicts being contracting parties. 
However, any claim that human rights instruments are applicable during military 
operations faces a question as to whether and how non-state actors’ rebels are 
also bound by human rights to respect obligations under such instruments? The 
reason being that such instruments bind states only while rebels are not parties to 
such instruments nor addressed directly by obligations under it. Little literature is 
found in relation to this issue. 
As a general rule, an international instrument does not have a direct legal effect 
on individuals; however after a treaty becomes part of the domestic law then it 
                                                 
16 In its General Comment No. 29, adopted on 24 July 2001, the UN Human Rights Committee in referring to 
measures to be taken in cases of declaring emergency during armed conflict under Article 4 of the ICCP, 
expressly referred to these elements which cannot be subject to lawful derogations – International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights General Comment No. 29 states of Emergency (Article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev/Add: 11 – 
31 August 2001 – available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.  
17 Christina M. Cerna,  “Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Implementation of International Humanitarian Norms 
by Regional Intergovernmental Human Rights Bodies, in Kalshoven and Sandoz op. cit., p. 56  
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creates a direct source of obligations to individuals18. Other than this, human 
rights instrument imposes obligations on states and its institutions only unless the 
intention of the contracting states desire or intended to impose obligations on 
individuals under such instruments. This was recognized by the Permanent Court 
of International justice, in its Advisory Opinion in Danzig Cases.  The Court 
stated “it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international agreement 
according to the intention of the contracting parties may be adoption by the 
parties of some definite rules creating individual rights and obligations 
enforceable by national courts”19.  This establishes a principle that states may 
grant to individuals direct rights or impose upon them direct duties by treaties. 
This is in contrast with the traditional theory that norms of international do not 
create rights or duties of individuals. In fact the granting of direct rights to 
individuals and imposition of obligations on them through international 
instruments has become accepted and widespread. This is true of both 
humanitarian and human rights instruments20. 
To say that the contracting parties intended to subject rebels to obligations or that 
the provisions of human rights instruments are designed to impose obligations on 
rebels as an exception to the general rule, such a possibility needs to be examined 
                                                 
18 Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961, pp. 322 - 339 
19 ICJ, Case of the Jurisdiction of the Case of Danzig, Advisory Opinion of March 3rd, 1928, series B, No. 15, pp. 
16 - 21 
20 Hampson, Francoise J., Human rights and Humanitarian law: Two coins or two sides of the same coin?, (1991), 
Bulletin of Human Right (Bull. Hum. Rts) p. 49 – Provost, Rene, International Human Rights And Humanitarian 
Law, op. cit, p. 33 
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in light of the objective and content of rules of human rights instruments. The 
apparent intention of contracting parties to human rights instruments seems to 
impose obligations on states and their agents. A close reading of such instruments 
reveals that there are core or basic rights which are required to be respected in all 
times i.e. during peace and during conduct of military operations or hostilities 
declared as cases of emergency. This suggests that the states’ parties intended to 
say that such rights which adhere to all human persons should be respected in all 
circumstances and all persons are bound to respect them in relation to other 
individuals21.The preamble of the ICCPR points to this by stating that “Realizing 
that the individual having duties to other individuals and to the community to 
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and 
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”. This implies that 
the state parties intention is to say that the individual has obligations vis-à-vis 
other individuals to respect certain basic rights in all circumstances. Article 29 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 points to the same in 
providing that “everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality is possible”. This asserts the fact that 
                                                 
21 Provost, Rene, Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humanitarian law, BYIL, vol. 65, 1995, pp. 383 454- 
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individuals under human rights instruments owe duties to others within their 
community to respect human rights22. 
States’ parties to human rights instruments have obligations to respect human 
rights of persons; this obligation to respect includes an obligation not to commit 
an act which violates such rights whether in peace or armed conflict. To recall 
paragraph 2 of the Preamble of AP11 that human rights instruments forms a basis 
of protection to civilians victims, suggests that states as well as rebel parties to 
such conflicts are also bound to respect rules under such instruments applicable 
during non-international armed conflicts. These human rights instruments which 
are binding on governments of states’ parties, guarantee the protection of rights 
conferred on individual citizens including rebels as human persons. Since rebels 
enjoying human rights, a corollary to these rights are obligations to respect the 
others individual civilian rights23. However, to say that the provisions are 
intended and designed to impose obligations on rebels, one has to take into 
consideration the nature and content of such provisions. Such provisions contain 
a set of basic rights responding to the requirements of humanity and human 
dignity, its fundamental nature is evidenced both by the obligation it imposes on 
                                                 
22 Paust, Jordan, The Other Side of Rights: Private Duties under Human Rights law, (1992) 5 Harvard, Human 
Rights Journal, p. 51 
23 Robertson, Arthur Henri, Human Rights as the Basis for International Humanitarian Law, in Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Humanitarian law (Grassi: Institute Editoriale Ticinese, 1970. p. 55 
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parties and the condition that it shall be guaranteed in all circumstances24. The 
binding force of such provisions derives from their universality and recognition 
by the whole international community and from their nature as jus cogens norms. 
In addition, the same arguments held for the binding force of both common 
Article 3 and AP11 on rebels, mentioned earlier, may be applicable here by 
analogy to render basic human rights under such instruments binding on rebels 
on the basis of the effects of such instruments on individual civilian rights. As a 
result, respect to such provisions is binding not only on the governmental 
institutions but also on the individuals constituting the population of the state 
concerned25. Supporting our above argument, is the recent trend in international 
criminal law to subject individual persons to international criminal responsibility 
for committing acts against civilian victims constituting serious violations of 
human rights law26. The imposition of obligations on rebel individuals take the 
form of a criminal prohibition which seems to be exceptional and is limited only 
to crimes committed in violation of human rights instruments described as 
international crimes. Besides, there are certain international human rights 
instruments which provide sufficient precedent of treaties imposing obligations 
on individuals and groups. For example Articles I and IV of the Genocide 
                                                 
24 Schwebel Egon, The law of Treaties and Human Rights, in Micheal Reisman an Burns Weston eds. Toward 
World Order and Human Dignity – Essays in Honor of Myres S. McDougal, (New York: Macmillian 1976) p. 262 
25 R. McCorquodale, Overlegalizing Silences: Human Rights and Non-state Actors, ASIL Proceedings, 96 (2002) 
pp. 384 - 388  
26 The issue of international criminal responsibility of rebels for acts committed in violations of both human rights 
and humanitarian law during non-international armed conflicts is examined in chapter eight of this study. 
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Convention of 1948,confirms that genocide is a crime under international law 
and that any person taking part in the crime of “genocide to be criminally 
responsible whether they be state agents or private individuals27”. The attribution 
of such a responsibility implies that an individual obligation imposed under such 
instruments in relation to prohibition of slavery, genocide and crimes against 
humanity are included with view to protect civilian victims28. Thus one may 
argue that these violations are referring also to the prohibitions under Common 
Article 3 and AP11, the content of which are identical to human rights standards 
and which constitutes a translation of the right to life and physical integrity of 
civilians into detailed rules of behavior for those conducting hostilities affecting 
civilian victims29. 
In all cases, the issue that human rights instruments consider the possibility  of 
individual rebels having obligations corresponding to rights is still  controversial  
rejected by some on the basis that there is a danger in moving that direction. 
Governments have been known to rely upon the actions of private individuals 
and non-state groups as an excuse for refusal to comply with human right 
                                                 
27 Similar prohibitions of acts constituting international crimes relates to human rights are contained in the 
Supplementary Conventions on the Abolition of Slavery of 1956 and the Apartheid Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, (Article. III). Also the 1984 Convention against Torture. 
These instruments are reproduced in Brownlie, Basic Documents op.cit. p. 336 – It is to be mentioned in this 
connection that criminal responsibility is imposed on individuals by the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions committed in international armed conflicts, Articles: 50/51/130/147. 
28 Article 25 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court provides for punishment for crimes against 
humanity committed by groups. Under Article 75 of Rome Statue of the ICC, victims can be heard and they may 
receive compensation for violations of human rights by a non-state actor – Steven Ratner and Janson Abrams, 
Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International law, Oxford: Oxford up., 1997, pp. 64 - 67 
29 JUNOD, S, Human Rights and Protocol 11, IRRC, No. 236, 1983, pp. 246 - 254 
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standards. More generally, the creation of individual obligation may invite abuse 
by states, focusing exclusively on individual obligations while neglecting human 
rights30. However, one tends to disagree with the view limiting the obligations to 
respect human rights during conduct of hostilities to states only. Experiences of 
non-international armed conflicts show that rebels are committing acts against 
civilians, women and children violating human rights law on a large scale on the 
excuse that they are not under obligations to comply with human rights 
instruments which are relevant in providing protection to civilian victims in some 
cases. Instead one supports the view of Heike who stated in relation to this issue 
“If non-state actors have human rights, it appears logical that they must also have 
responsibilities, no different from the obligations insurgents have under 
international humanitarian law31.” Moreover, the practice of human rights 
monitoring bodies shows that violations of human rights by non-state actors 
during non-international armed conflicts are condemned as well as those of 
states32. 
In conclusion to this issue, it would be reasonable to argue that basic human 
rights contained in human rights instruments are to be respected by states, its 
                                                 
30 This was the justification given by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to decline the invitation 
to comment on violations of human rights by non-state groups – Provost, Rene, International Human rights and 
Humanitarian law, op. cit, p. 75. 
31 Fleck, Dieter, Humanitarian Protection Against Non-state Actors, pp. 68 -91, available at, 
http://edoc.mpil.de/fs/2003/eitel.cfm  
32 Reports released y human rights bodies like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International of violations by 
rebels in internal conflicts, such reports available at http://www.amnesty.org  
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agencies and individuals during conduct of hostilities and those rebels are bound 
by the provisions which ensure protection to individuals as human persons since 
they also derive benefit from such provisions. To say that rebels are not under 
obligation to respect rights of individuals protecting their humanity and dignity 
during armed conflicts, we are then depriving civilians from the protection of 
their humanity as human persons. 
4. The Nature and Extent of Contribution of Human Rights 
Instruments to the Content of the Regime of Protection of Civilians 
The contribution of human rights instruments with view to strengthen the regime 
of protection to civilians takes various forms i.e. by filling gaps in the law, 
clarifying ambiguities and providing more details in certain cases. An overview 
of these cases is examined here by identifying such rules and show how they 
contribute to the regime of protection under Article 3 and AP II based on 
common fundamental principles of humanity and non-discrimination. Hans 
described the nature and content of this regime in Article 3 and AP II as 
“…codification of fundamental human rights law for civil war situations,”33 to 
show that the two bodies derived from same source and seek to achieve the same 
end, complement each other34. 
                                                 
33 Haug, Hans, Humanity For All, op. cit, p. 566 
34 One has to recall at this point the specific characteristics of each law in brief. Humanitarian law (HL) which is 
an emerging law is applicable in armed conflicts, its provisions are mandatory and rules of protection are all non 
derogable. Human Rights Law (H.Rs) is applicable in time of peace and armed conflicts, however in time of 
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i. Human Rights and the Regime of Protection under Article 3 
It has been shown earlier that states have relative discretion in assessing whether 
a situation is characterized as a non-international armed conflict to which 
common Article 3 is applicable. However practice shows that in most cases of 
armed conflicts, governments are reluctant or deny that the conflict is a non-
international armed conflict thereby evading any obligations under common 
Article 3 or AP11, example are the cases of Nicaragua, El Salvador and 
Afghanistan35. As a result a legal gap of the applicability of rules to protect 
civilian victims is created while atrocities causing widespread sufferings among 
the population. However, in such situations the relevant rules contained in human 
rights instruments, to which the said state is a party, is applicable to protect the 
humanity and dignity of victims of such conflicts. In situations, where the state 
                                                                                                                                                          
armed conflicts its applicability is restricted by derogation clauses except for hard core of human rights i.e. right 
to life, the prohibition of torture and in human degrading punishment and treatment, the prohibition of slavery and 
servitude and the principles of legality and non-retroactivity. HL rules are more detailed and adapted to situations 
of armed conflict, they respond to the needs of persons acquiring the status of civilian victims and various persons 
affected by an armed conflict. HRs rules are more general. The advantage of HL is that it imposes obligations on 
both governments and rebel groups and are held both for violations and the law whereas HRs in principle imposes 
responsibility on governments. The major difference is that HL is not formulated as a series of rights, but rather as 
a series of duties that combatants has to obey. The mechanism for implementation and monitoring are different. In 
case of HR law, they are entrusted to UN and regional and international human rights bodies while HL the 
mandate is to ICRC. – Alike Yet District – Humanitarian law and Human Rights law, IRRC, March – April 1993, 
No. 293, p. 91 
35 In most cases states characterize such situations as internal tensions and acts of violence. Though such acts may 
be committed by more or less organized groups against the Government or among themselves, the state still may 
say that such violence is less intense to be characterized as a non-international. The reason being that the states by 
thus will be able to restore order by using great number of police force or even armed forces, use arbitrary arrest 
and extrajudicial detentions and suspension of judicial guarantees are characteristics of such situations. It is to be 
mentioned in this connection that the situation is similar in human rights law. As a result of absence of an organ 
competent to make a binding determination of the character of situation, it is left to the Government of the state to 
determine whether the situation threatens the life of the nation to avoid obligations under the ICCP by derogations 
under Article. 4 – Djamchid Momtaz, The Minimum humanitarian rules applicable in periods of internal tension 
and strife – IRRC Sept. 1998, No. 324, p. 455. 
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restricts its obligations by declaring emergency under Article 4 of the ICCP, still 
victims are protected against the most serious human rights violations by 
guaranteeing basic rights which involve the right to life, the prohibition of 
slavery, of inhuman cruel or degrading treatment especially torture36. These are 
described as “elementary considerations of humanity”, forms an integral part of 
general international law.37 It is to be mentioned here that several of the 
prohibitions provided for under Article 3 are identical to the non derogable rights 
protected by the ICCP.38 
It has been noted earlier that Article 3 regime of protection is based on the 
principle that victims of such conflicts are to be ‘treated humanely39’. However, 
the Article does not specify the acts that would constitute ‘humane treatment’ but 
listed specific acts which are incompatible with the principle of humane 
treatment in the form of prohibitions. This gives a range of interpretation to 
include other acts which are incompatible with humane treatment relevant in 
other sources of the law as those in human rights. For example, the prohibition of 
                                                 
36 Stephen P. Marks, The principles and norms of human rights applicable in emergency situations, in Rarel Vasak 
(ed.), The international dimensions of human rights, UNESCO, Paris, 1978, p. 218 
37 The Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom V. Albania) I.C.J Reports 1944, p.22. It is to be mentioned here that 
a legal gap is created in situations of tensions and violence leaving victims unprotected under HL and as a 
suspension of most human rights in situations of emergency. To fill this gap an approach was adopted combining 
elements of both human rights and humanitarian principle passing the declaration of Minimum Standards in 1990 
called Turku Declaration to treat victims humanely. The Declaration is the work of a group of experts who met 
privately for the purpose. The text of Declaration reproduced in UN Doc.E/CN.4/1996/80.  
38 Example, non-discrimination, the right to life, prohibition of torture.  
39 It is to be mentioned in this connection that rebels do not become protected persons or privileged combatants by 
virtue of the application of Article. 3. The criminal law of state applies to rebels, except as provided by the rules 
stated in Article. 3 and subject to the applicable human rights obligations of the state. 
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medical and scientific experiments on individuals provided for in Article 7 of 
ICCP of which Article 3 is silent, and which is practiced in a number of internal 
armed conflicts in the form of biological experiments may be protected under 
human rights law. Article 3 is also silent in regard to the prohibition of slavery 
which is a common practice in ethnic conflicts however Article 8 of the CCP 
prohibits slavery.40 
One of the drawbacks, shown earlier, with regards to common Article 3 regime 
of protection is the absence of rules limiting the conduct of hostilities.  However, 
some rules of human rights instruments may be applicable to ensure more 
protection in such cases to some rights.  Article 3 guarantees the right to life to 
some extent during hostilities by prohibiting murder and arbitrary execution of 
persons in the power of the adversary. However during hostilities, the prohibition 
of direct attacks against civilian population, as a measure to guarantee the right to 
life is not provided for in Article 3 expressly.  As a result, the Article does not 
ensure absolute guarantee of the right to life and does not prohibit carrying out 
the death penalty. Article 6 of the ICCP protects this right and regulate the 
conditions under which capital punishment may be imposed basically it states 
that “every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” As such, 
                                                 
40 Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situations of Systematic Rape, Sexual Offences and 
Slavery and like Practices during Periods of Armed Conflict – UN Doc. EICN. 4/sub. 2/1996/26. 16 July 1996. 
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launching direct attacks against civilians is considered an act which arbitrarily 
depriving one of his life under the law. 
The contribution of human rights instruments is also clearly seen in filling 
lacunae in common Article 3 by prohibiting certain practices not provided for 
under the Article. For example, the Article does not include prohibition of 
slavery, slave trade and servitude which under Article 8 of the ICCP is 
guaranteed as a non-derogable right. Civilians accused for committing acts in 
relation to armed conflicts or detained are not protected under Article 3. The 
Article is silent with respect to other principles and rights e.g. it does not provide 
for the principle of non-retroactivity, which is guaranteed in Article 15 of the 
ICCP and the right to recognition every where as a person before the law stated 
in Article 16 of the ICCP is not mentioned in Article 3.  The importance of 
human rights appears also in other cases by supplementing the rules of 
protection. For example the prohibition of imprisonment merely on the ground of 
inability to fulfill contractual obligations in Article II of ICCP has no counter part 
in Article. 3. The provision of Article 18 of ICCP provides for freedom of 
thought, conscience and religions are not found in Article 3.  Such a provision 
acquires importance to protection of civilians in religious conflicts where it is 
usual to practice coercions impairing a person’s freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief not of his choice as happened in Kosovo and Chechen. 
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Vulnerable civilian victims like women and children need special protection that 
enjoys general protection only under common Article 3.  Human rights 
instruments providing special protection may be in such cases.41  
ii. Human Rights Law and Additional Protocol II Regime of Protection 
Additional Protocol II regime of protection is clearly inspired by a human rights 
approach. The content of provisions of ICCP of 1966 has been adapted by AP II 
to the specific situation of the armed conflicts. For example those provisions 
providing for humane treatment, judicial guarantees, non derogable principle of 
non-discrimination, prohibitions of torture, prohibition of retroactive penal 
measures and prohibitions of slavery and servitude. While other provisions 
responds to issues specifically related to the facts of armed conflicts. In fact AP II 
protects various basic civil rights but adapts them to the situation and 
requirements of protection in an armed conflict e.g., the right to liberty is 
guaranteed with some restrictions on the right to detain only for acts in relation to 
armed conflicts. Human rights instruments provides for economic and social 
rights and cultural rights in a general way, AP II instead contains detailed 
provisions providing for example medical care, food and other supplies necessary 
for survival, care of children as victims, protection of victim women, family 
reunification and protection of cultural object and worship places.   
                                                 
41 For example the Convention on Children’s Rights 1989 and the Convention on the Elimination against All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979. 
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However, the regime of protection of AP II contains a number of shortcomings 
which human rights instruments may provide contribution to ensure greater 
protection to civilians. Specific aspects of applicability of human rights, stated in 
basic instruments, to be respected in armed conflicts will be examined for 
purposes of illustration. 
a. Guaranteeing Protection to Life 
The value of human life is protected under both ICCP and AP II. However, the 
nature and extent of such protection varies, neither regime establishes an absolute 
guarantee of the right to life in general. Article 6 of the ICCP prohibits arbitrary 
deprivation of life. AP II invokes the right to life as far as possible during 
hostilities by prohibiting murder, attacking civilians, destruction of civilian 
objects necessary for their survival or installations containing dangerous 
materials which affects their lives. However, under Article 6, death resulting 
from ‘lawful acts of armed conflicts’ as distinguished from deprivation of life as 
an act of retribution, might not be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life. 
However, to invoke the right to life under Article 6, in certain cases where 
governments or rebels had made direct attacks on civilian populations, cases of 
hostages taking and deliberately armed killing, without examining its relevance 
with regard to armed conflict, provides greater protection. While to invoke the 
right to life, under AP II, will lead to issues of applicability of criterion under 
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humanitarian law. For example to clarify the exact status of civilian whether a 
combatant or non-combatant which is not easy to determine because of the nature 
of non-international armed conflicts where combatants may be civilians and the 
vagueness of the term “taking active part in hostilities”. Besides other 
problematic issues are involved as to whether the attack resulting from unlawful 
targets, indiscriminate attacks and reprisal acts. All these would make it difficult 
to ascertain and condemn such kind of killing. This may be illustrated in 
considering the request for an advisory opinion on The Legality the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons case. The ICJ considered the effects of the use of such 
weapons in the light of human rights and humanitarian law with regard to 
problems posed by nuclear weapons related to the protection of human life i.e. 
the right to life. It referred to Article 6 of ICCP, which provides that ‘every 
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’ To determine whether in this case 
life is deprived arbitrarily during armed conflict, the Court referred to standards 
under humanitarian law i.e. to the extent the effect of nuclear weapons cannot 
discriminate between civilians and combatants, human life will be considered to 
be taken arbitrarily.42 In this case, the ICJ cannot avoid checking the 
permissibility of weapon systems according to human rights and IHL when it 
                                                 
42 The Legality of The Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, July 8, 1996, ICJ Reports, p.226  
 345
comes to the examination of the legality of nuclear weapons. The Court observed 
that the protection of the ICCPR does not cease in times of war i.e. the right not 
arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies in hostilities. The Court stated 
“…whether the particular loss of life through the use of certain weapon in 
warfare is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of 
the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed 
conflict and not decided from the terms of the Covenant itself…”. Thus this case 
shows how the complementary of human rights and humanitarian law may ensure 
guarantee to the right to life during armed conflict. 
Physical health is an important aspect of the value and quality of life. 
Environmental damage and pollution and water crisis resulting from conduct of 
hostilities are major life threatening factors to civilians. APII does not provide for 
prohibition of environmental pollution. The consequences of such a situation 
affects guaranteed human rights mainly the right to life.  However, respect and 
the duty to protect the right to life under human rights law by states includes 
obligations such as prevention and punishment of those who cause such damage 
to the natural environment thereby infringing the right to life for others.43  In 
absence of a provision of protection under APII to protect natural environment, 
                                                 
43 Laurance Boisson De Chazournes, Non-Derogable Rights and The Need to Protect the Environment, in Non-
Derogable Rights and States of Emergency, Editors, Daniel Premont, Christian Stevenson, (Bruylant) 1996, 
pp.462-475 
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this can be invoked under human rights instruments as a guarantee to right to life 
of civilians during non-international armed conflicts.44 
The importance of referring to human rights law in such situations is clear since 
neither Geneva Conventions nor APII are capable of safeguarding the right to life 
to the same extent as the human rights instruments since the former are all laws 
of armed conflicts where the right to life is diminished. However, APII protects 
life to an extent going beyond human rights law which protects life only as a civil 
right.  It prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and the 
destruction of objects necessary for their survival, declaration of special zones to 
protect them from military operations, acceptance of relief and to sustain life and 
ensuring to them medical care. Under human rights instruments these are 
categorized in general terms as economic and social rights. With regard to death 
penalty, AP II imposes restrictions by requiring a delay of at least six month 
between the sentence and its execution, by prohibiting the death sentence from 
being pronounced on persons under eighteen years or being carried out on 
pregnant women or mother of young children. 
 
 
                                                 
44 It is to be mentioned that Additional Protocol I of 1977 applicable in international armed conflicts, prohibits in 
Article 35, paragraph 5, the employment of ‘methods of warfare which are intended, or may be expected to cause 
wide-spread, long term and severe damage to the natural environment”, Of interest the  General Assembly 
Resolution 47137of 25 November 1992, on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed conflict, affirms 
that environmental considerations constitute one of the elements to be taken into account in the implementation of 
the principles of the law applicable in armed conflict. 
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b.  Acts of Torture Practiced Against Civilians 
Torture is prohibited under general rules of international law.45 Article 7 of the 
ICCP provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’ and that ‘no one shall be subjected without 
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation’. Similarly Article 4 of APII 
forbids cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation, any forms of capital 
punishment, outrages upon personal dignity in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment of persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased 
to take part in hostilities.”46 Thus, torture is prohibited absolutely during time of 
emergency or armed conflict. The reason is that torture is considered one of the 
worst cruel treatments that violate the dignity of human persons in time of peace 
and war. It has far-reaching psychological effects and damage, which continues 
for long besides the physical wound inflicted. 
However, APII does not provide for sufficient guarantees and measures to 
prevent torture, it rather addresses the issue in a general and broad way which no 
doubt weakens the regime of protection. While human rights instruments provide 
for detailed and sufficient guarantees to tackle the issue. The United Nations 
                                                 
45 The first international legal instruments prohibiting torture is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
in Article 5. 
46 The text of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 
1984, reproduced in Ian Brownlie, A Compilation of International Instruments, op.cit p.212 – It is to be 
mentioned here that detainees could be civilians who are detained for an act in relation to the armed conflict and 
could be rebels detained. Detained persons have the right under APII to food and medical care and right to take 
part in religious practices. If wounded, sick or shipwrecked they have the right to care.  
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Convention Against Torture, 1984, is the first international Human rights 
instrument which deals wholly with the issue of torture in all its aspects i.e. 
prevention, enforcement, repression and reparations. Article 2 (1) of the 
Convention imposes a duty on states to prevent acts of torture, physical or mental 
practiced against persons deprived of their liberty i.e. prisoners and other 
detained persons. This duty to prevent torture is not expressed in AP II or Article 
3; instead torture is prohibited as such. The duty under the Convention includes 
visits to places of detention which are effective in preventing torture. Though, in 
situations of non-international armed conflicts the ICRC may offer its service to 
the parties to the conflict, to visit persons deprived of their liberty as a result of 
conflicts to ensure that they have not been subjected to torture, however this 
depends on the discretionary consent of either the government party to the 
conflict or rebel group to give permission to the ICRC to make such a visit.47 
A number of human rights instruments developed a system for enforcing the 
prohibition on torture. 48 The Convention of 1984 imposes obligations on states 
parties to submit on regular basis reports on measures they have taken to ensure 
the prevention of torture, to be submitted to the Committee against Torture which 
may investigate situations of systematic violations with consent of state party 
                                                 
47 Kalin, Walter, The Struggle Against Torture, IRRC, Septembe,1998, No.324, pp.433-454 
48 This reporting system is also part of the mechanism of enforcement of International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights of 1966 provided for in Article 7 and 40 
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concerned. Special Rapporteurs on Torture appointed by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights are to report on allegations of torture.49 It is to be mentioned here 
that the Convention provides for interstate and individual complaints. Compared 
to the regime of protection under APII which does not provide for any 
enforcement procedures in non-international armed conflicts,50 the above 
mechanisms under the Convention may be useful in non-international armed 
conflicts where torture is one of the serious and repeated practices against 
civilians detained during such conflicts. 
In addition the Convention recognizes torture as an act which entails individual 
criminal responsibility of the perpetrator, at such it imposes an obligation on 
states to provide effective criminal sanctions against those persons who commit 
such acts. Neither APII nor Article 3 expressly imposes a duty on states to 
provide for the punishments of persons committing acts of torture during armed 
conflicts in their domestic legislations.51 However it is to be mentioned that 
torture was among the acts punishable by the ad hoc tribunals established to try 
and punish those who had committed crimes during the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda armed conflicts. 
                                                 
49 There are also Special Rapporteurs on Extra-Judicial Summary and Arbitrary Detention and on Disappearances.  
50 Under Article 90 of Additional Protocol I applicable in international armed conflicts, the International Fact-
Finding Commission may investigate serious cases of torture – Pilloud, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, 
op.cit, p.1037 
51 In all Geneva Conventions, torture is considered an act of grave breach of basic obligation which necessitates 
criminal repression in Article 50, 51, 130, 147 of four Geneva Conventions respectively applicable in 
international armed conflicts. 
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The Convention of 1984 went further by recognizing reparations and 
compensation for victims of torture.52  Neither APII nor Article 3 addresses the 
question of reparation, nor provides for compensation to be paid to victims of 
torture.53 Thus, human rights law may be useful in supplementing the regime of 
protection under APII or Article 3 with regard to mechanisms for the 
enforcement of the prohibitions on torture, individual complaints proceedings 
and investigation methods beside the idea of reparations for victims of torture. 
Such rules may contribute in ensuring greater protection to victims of torture in 
relation to armed conflicts. Though the incorporation of individual criminal 
responsibility in the framework of human rights law to rebel groups committing 
the act of torture remains unusual,54 nevertheless, one may argue that the 
criminality of torture, in practice was not limited to the Convention but it is found 
in international customary law.55 
 
 
                                                 
52 Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture, And Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment of 1984. 
53 International Humanitarian law applicable in international armed conflicts provides for this in four Geneva 
Conventions and in Article 91 of Additional Protocol I which provides that parties to a conflict shall be liable to 
pay compensations for violating provisions of the Convention or of Protocol – Pilloud, Commentary on 
Additional Protocols, op.cit, p.1053 
54 One may mention in this connection that despite the large number of Iraqi prisoners and detainees in the hands 
of the coalition forces, little was done regarding the possibility of bringing to trial those responsible for the serious 
violations of humanitarian law by subjecting such detainees to cruel and degrading treatment. On this subject 
matter, Adam Roberts, “the Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflict” in law on 
Humanitarian Crisis – How can International Humanitarian Law be made effective in Armed Conflict? 
(Luxembourg: European Committees, 1995), p.1  
55 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the rule of law in armed conflict, IRRC, Vol.87 No.867 march 2995, p.208  
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c.  Due Process and Right to Reparation 
AP II establishes a minimum international standard of due process of law for 
securing life, liberty and property of civilians in non-international armed 
conflicts. Civilians may be deprived of their lives, liberty and property, in such 
cases due process is an important condition to such unlawful deprivations. Article 
8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 states an important 
principle that ‘everyone has the right to an effective remedy by competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
constitution or law’. The ICCP contains a number of provisions giving more 
details on the principle. Article 9 of the ICCP provides for remedies to persons 
arrested or detained by stating in paragraph 5 that “Anyone who has been victim 
of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation”. 
Article 14 of the same Convention provides for detailed guarantees to persons 
before the court and tribunals.56  
Though Article 6 of APII provides for judicial guarantees, however the weakness 
of this Article is that it does not provide for compensation as a remedy for 
injuries inflicted on civilians, destruction of their property, unlawful arrest or 
detention of civilians caused by acts in relation to the armed conflict as provided 
                                                 
56 Also Article 2 (3) of the ICCP, Article 14 of Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides for similar guarantees. 
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for in Article 9 (5) of the ICCP.57 Instead Article 6 (3) of APII provides for “the 
right to be informed of judicial remedies and of the time-limits in which they 
must be exercised”. It provided for the principle that everyone has a right of 
appeal against sentence pronounced upon him.58  Article 6 which applies equally 
to combatants and civilians who have fallen in the power of the adverse party and 
who may be subject to penal prosecutions, adopts the word “judicial remedies” in 
paragraph 3 which is not sufficient to include compensation or other reparation. 
A substantive right to reparation is a necessary element of the legal regime of 
protection to civilians. Without such rights to injuries caused to civilian e.g. 
property destroyed and unlawful detention, the civilians are lacking material 
protection in reality. However the absence of a right to a remedy under APII and 
Article 3 does not prevent all claims for injuries by individuals in time of non-
international armed conflicts. Human rights also apply during such conflicts; 
most violations of APII and Article 3 will be co-extensive with violations of non 
derogable human rights for which there are a right to remedy. International 
                                                 
57 Neither Geneva Conventions nor the Protocols contain an equivalent to the human rights provisions of a 
substantive right to remedy i.e. payment of compensation for violations of humanitarian law. A number of 
decisions passed by Courts of different states have denied claims by prisoners of war, by slaves, laborers by 
women subjected to sexual assaults on the ground that there was no right to compensation accruing to the 
individual under the laws of war i.e. Geneva Conventions and API applicable in international armed conflicts. 
However under international law, compensation rights for violations of humanitarian law rules for acts committed 
during interstate war would not go to the individual but the victim’s state has the right to claim such compensation 
on behalf of its citizen victims in such war before international tribunals. Example of such decisions in Provost, 
Rene, op.cit, pp.46-47 – Article 9 of API was adopted to guarantee a right to compensation in favor of parties to 
the conflict i.e. states and not to individual victims – Frits Kalshoven, ‘State Responsibility For War-Like Acts of 
the Armed Forces’, (1991) 40 International laid Quarterly, p.287 
58 Pillouds etal, Commentary on Additional Protocols, op.cit, pp.1400-1401 
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human rights which are incorporated into municipal laws as guaranteed into 
constitutions or legislations of states, creates an efficient source of such right to 
remedy. This may include compensation, restitution or otherwise to civilians in 
cases of violations of human rights law.  This is based on the states’ duty to 
protect and guarantee human rights which are corollary to those basic rights 
under Article 3 and APII.59  This means that claims for compensation by 
individuals harmed by activities related to armed conflicts maybe made under 
human rights law since no international right to a remedy is thus envisaged for 
individual victims of violations of Article 3 and APII.60 These complementarities 
of human rights and humanitarian law ensure that victims will not be left without 
a right to reparation for their injuries. It should be noted that under human rights 
conventions, states parties undertake to ensure that individuals shall have an 
effective remedy for violations of guaranteed rights in all circumstances; 
however enforcement of such remedy remains subject to national laws and 
procedures. 
d.  Guarantees of Right of Access for Relief Operations 
It has been shown that one of the weaknesses of regime of protection under APII 
is that it does not always guarantee perfect rights of access for relief to civilian 
                                                 
59 Provost, Rene, International Human rights and humanitarian law, op.cit, p.48 
60 Theo Van Boven, “Final Report of a Studies Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and 
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations Of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom”, UN Doc. EICN, 41 
Sub 2 / 1993 / 8  
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population. The reason is that the right of access under this regime is subject to 
the consent of the government party to the conflict which may be arbitrarily 
refused since the whole issue falls within the ambit of internal sovereignty 
decisions of the state. However, human rights law may still have to overcome this 
situation. Denial of relief and access to civilian population in need of food and 
other supplies by governments is a violation of its commitment under human 
rights instruments. On the other hand, human rights organizations could play a 
valuable role in finding access to victims to provide them with relief aid. They 
make their own assessments of the situation and impose political pressure on 
governments by releasing reports of grave breaches of the law to the international 
community. 
AP II does not contain specific provisions requiring respect for and protection of 
humanitarian relief personnel and objects. In addition to absence of provisions 
obliging parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded 
passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need and to ensure the freedom of 
movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel. This gap in the law 
hinders the work of relief activities, however human rights instruments contain 
provisions ensuring for relief personnel protection for their person and right to 
movement which may fill this gap. 
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e.   Human Rights and Vulnerable Categories 
AP II is considered a development to the regime of protection of Article 3 in that 
it provides for special protection to certain vulnerable categories like women and 
displaced persons. Progress in human rights of such categories has contributed to 
strengthen the regime of protection under both Article 3 and AP II to be 
examined here. 
i. Human rights of Women During Armed Conflicts 
Women are major victims of armed conflicts, who are always exposed to acts 
violating their honor. The weakness of the general regime of protection under 
Article 3 and APII lays on the fact that it provides for humanitarian standards to 
be recognized in non-international armed conflicts but does not contemplate the 
prosecution of persons who violates these standards. Progress in women’s rights 
has substantially strengthened the international regime of protection to women as 
a result of efforts made by human rights groups and United Nations activities. 
The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the United 
Nations World Conference on Human Rights confirmed that ‘violations of 
human rights of women in situations of armed conflicts are violations of the 
fundamental principles on human rights and humanitarian law’. Similar 
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Declarations were also adopted.61 The Fourth UN World Conference on Women, 
held in Beijing in 1995 adopted a strategy to ‘increase the participation of women 
in conflict resolution of decision-making level and protect women living in 
situations of armed conflicts. In addition to these efforts, the ICRC has shown 
great concern to the situation of women in armed conflicts. The 1995 Conference 
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent adopted a resolution condemning such acts 
and reaffirmed that rape in the conduct of hostilities is a war crime.62 In fact 
human rights organizations played an important role in drawing the attention of 
international community to the seriousness of situations of women and girls 
during armed conflicts. Specially as a consequence of the widespread in former 
Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda Conflict 1997 of rape and many other forms of 
sexual violence against women, calling for the prosecution of crimes of sexual 
violence committed in armed conflicts.63  These efforts have resulted in 
prosecution of such acts by tribunals set up by the UN Security Council to try 
individuals who committed such acts during armed conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.64 The important development has been the inclusion of 
such acts within the definition of war crimes and as serving violations of 
                                                 
61 For example, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, UNGA / Res / 481104, December 
1993 
62 The Text of the Resolution in IRRC, No. 310, January-February 1996, p.63 
63 For more details on such activities by human rights organizations, Judith Garham, Women, Human rights and 
International Humanitarian Law, IRRC, September 1998, No.324, pp.421-432  
64 For example Human Rights Watch Report in War Crimes in Bosnia – Herzegovina, 1993, J. Garclam, “Women 
and the Law of Armed Conflict”, International and Comparative law Quarterly, Vol.46, 1997, p.74 
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common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions in Rome Statute of International 
Criminal Court of 1998. 
No doubt, this progress in the area of women’s human rights have its impact on 
strengthening the protection of women in armed conflicts by internationally 
criminalizing such acts. 
ii. Human Rights Norms Complementing Regime of Protection of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) 
The issue of internally displaced persons is one of the major humanitarian 
problems facing international community and governments of states where armed 
conflict occurs within its territory. Humanitarian law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts provides for some general and broad rules, leaving 
the issue of measures to be taken to face the situation to national government 
policies and legislations which provides in most cases for very limited set of rules 
of protection. This resulted in having a weak regime of protection containing 
several gaps. It is useful then to highlight the gaps in common Article 3 and APII 
regime of protection first and then an attempt will be made to see how far human 
rights norms may contribute to further protection to displaced persons. 
In non-international armed conflicts, civilian population, because of intensity of 
hostilities, has no choice but to flee within or beyond their own country borders. 
They suffer effects of hostilities i.e. bombing, landmines, starvation used as a 
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means of pressure, destruction of their homes and to their houses, separation of 
families and absence of medical care. They are in most cases subjected to 
arbitrary treatment on hands of rebels taking them as hostages, exposed to the 
risk of being arrested, summary executions or disappearances. In some cases they 
flee because the object of conducting hostilities being the ethnic cleansing of the 
area as the case in Bosnia and Chechnya.65 As a consequence of such sufferings it 
was sought to provide some protection to them under Article 3 and APII regime 
as civilians and also enjoy special protection as IDP under APII. 
In substance rules of protection applicable to them under common Article 3 
include rules protecting life, humane treatment, legal guarantees to detained 
persons, protection to wounded and sick, and prohibition of torture, taking 
hostages, slavery and protection to medical and religious personnel. APII 
supplements the content of regime under Article 3 by offering protection to 
civilians against the effects of hostilities. According to these rules of protection, 
IDP must never be the object of military attacks, acts or threats of violence 
designed to spread terror among them are prohibited. APII prohibits starvation as 
a means of warfare, it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless 
objects necessary to survival of IDP. It provides for establishment of protected 
                                                 
65 – Tarcisio Gazzini, Considerations of the conflict in Chechnya, 17(1996) Human Rights Law Journal,p.93 
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zones to protect civilians from hostilities.66 All civilians are entitled to such 
protection without discrimination.67 On and above Article 17 of AP II provides 
for specific rules for protection of IDP. It expressly prohibits forced displacement 
except in cases where the safety of civilians or imperative military reasons so 
requires .In such cases all possible measures must be taken to ensure that the 
civilian population is afforded satisfactory conditions of housing, healthy, 
hygiene and safety places. 
However, the above regime of protection faces problems regarding its 
applicability, besides it does not adequately provide sufficient rules to address 
specific problems facing the issue of protection of IDP.  As to its applicability, it 
has been shown that Article 3 does not define “non-international conflicts” and as 
a result governments deny characterization of situation of armed conflict at such 
to avoid application of Article 3 thereby depriving displaced persons from such 
protection as civilians. Under AP II the condition of territorial control by rebels 
as a required criteria for its application, is in most cases denied by governments 
or its direct involvement in the conflict, thus resulting in inapplicability of its 
rules to them. Even in “failing state” situation of conflicts where no 
government’s structures exist anymore as in Somalia, a lacunae of applicable 
                                                 
66 - For importance of such zones to IDP, Yves Sandoz, The Establishment of safety zones for persons displaced 
within their country of origin, Multi-Choice Conference on International Legal Issues arising under the UN 
Decade of International Law, Doha, Qatar, March 1994, pp.119-136. 
67 -Article 13-16 and 18 of APII 
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rules of protection to civilian in general and to displaced persons in particular, is 
created.68 On the other hand, inadequacy of sufficient rules to provide for and 
guarantees specific rights to them, weakens the above regime of protection. For 
example, no rule exists as to the right of displaced persons to return neither to 
their places of residence nor to their right to fair compensation for the loss of 
private property, recovery of housing and property lost as a consequence of 
displacement.  In addition, no rules prohibiting forced return in situation offering 
no security guarantees exists .Important also that displaced persons be able to 
apply for or have right to asylum as refugees outside their country.69 No rule 
provides for their right to obtain official documents.  
In presence of such lacunae in the above regime of protection, a question arises 
as to whether human rights law is relevant at such for protection of IDP. In fact, 
experience of internal conflicts has shown that IDP are always victims of human 
rights violation’s as a result of cruelty inflicting on them, families separated, no 
work, no access to food, miserable places of shelter where no health services. 
Besides, they are mostly exposed to acts of violence and attacks on camps, 
disappearances, rapes on women, girls and children.  Human rights instruments 
contain rules providing for certain basic rights which contribute to some extent to 
                                                 
68 -Denise Plattner, The protection of displaced persons in non-international armed conflicts,No.291 ,November- 
December 1992,pp.567-580 
69 -Refugees are protected under Refugee Convention of 1951.For more details on the status of refugees and 
problems facing refugees who flee and abandon their homes because of internal conflicts to third states- Walter 
Kalin, Flight in times of war, IRRC September 2001,vol.83,No.843 pp.629-649 
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further their protection. However, the responsibility to guarantee such basic 
rights to such IDP lies on their governments. These rules of protection includes in 
particular their need to choose their own residence, to move freely within their 
own region which means they need protection against forced evacuation and 
transfer. They should be protected against forced return to places under 
conditions dangerous to their safety. They should be ensured the return to retire 
voluntarily and in safety to their places of residence or other safe place. 
Disappearances in most situations violate non-derogable guarantees of the right 
to life, the prohibition of torture, also rights to food, health and relief aid70 are all 
to be guaranteed. Therefore it is useful to shed a light on some human rights 
norms which are relevant to ensure guarantee to above rights to IDP in such 
situation.  
One of the basic rights guaranteed under human rights instruments is the freedom 
of residence and movement in Article 12(1) of CCPR which states that 
“Everyone lawfully within the territory, have the right to liberty of movement 
and freedom to choose his residence.”   The importance of this basic right to IDP 
is that it allows free movement to them and guarantee free choice to residence, it 
is thus to be interpreted to include a right to remain and a right not be displaced. 
The right of IDP persons to return to their original place of residence or to move 
                                                 
70 Report by Mr. Francis Deng dated 2 February 1995, to the UN Commission on Human Rights 
Ref.ELCN.4/1995/50,pargraph 116. 
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to another safe place of their choice is a consequence of freedom of movement 
and the right to choose one’s own residence. This is provided for by UN Security 
Council in a number of such situations by affirming the right of refugees and 
displaced persons to return to their homes.71 
Human rights norms are also relevant to fill gaps in absence of rules under the 
humanitarian law regime in some situations. For example, no provisions against 
disappearances are found in Article 3 and APII, while under human rights law 
disappearances violate the non derogable guarantees of right to life and 
prohibition of torture. Also it guarantees right to work, education, aspects of 
religions rights, prohibition of slavery, protection of private property not covered 
by APII and Article 3.As to children who may grow in camps as long as the 
conflict is continuing, human rights norms are important in providing them with 
greater protection and satisfy their specific needs both under CCP of 1966 and 
The Child Convention of 1989. 
Though human rights contributed to some extent in providing protection to IDP, 
however a close analysis of international regime of protection under both human 
rights and humanitarian law reveals several areas of gaps in relation to its rules. 
None of above laws contains an express right not to be arbitrarily displaced, 
                                                 
71 -It is to be mentioned here that these human rights guarantees are relevant and applicable as long as the state in 
whose territory the conflict occurs, has not derogated from its commitment under human rights instruments to 
which it is a contracting party especially in cases where the state has not ratified APII which contains some 
provisions relating to IDP. 
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absence of a right to restitution of lost property and compensation for that72, 
absence of a right to personal identity documentation and absence of a 
prohibition of deploying or using landmines against them. It is also silent  in 
relation to special needs of displaced women in areas of reproductive and 
physiological health care as well as needs of children in camps of displaced and 
to specify certain measures against gender violence.73  Further gaps occur in 
cases where no law is applicable i.e. because human rights  is generally binding 
only on state agents, while in such conflicts most of violations of human rights 
against displaced persons are committed by non-state actors. Insufficient 
protection occurs in situations following the application of humanitarian law or in 
which restriction or derogations of human rights guarantees might be 
permissible.74 Also, no express guarantee is provided against the forcible return 
of internally displaced persons to dangerous areas within their own country. 
Under both laws protected persons are to receive protection without 
discrimination based on race, religion etc.  However, practice has shown that IDP 
face the risk of discrimination as a displaced persons which proven to be an 
obstacles to the enjoyment of other rights especially in ethnic and religious 
                                                 
72 - For restitution and protection of private property in inter-state war, Detter, The Laws  of War,op.cit,pp.358-
360 
73 -Khushalani Yougindra; Dignity and Honour of Women as Basic and Fundamental Human Rights, The 
Hague/Boston/ Lounder 1982.,p.1 
74 - Walter Kalin, Protection in International Human Rights law, Internally Displaced Persons ,Report of the 
Symposium Geneva,23-25 October 1995,editor Jean-Phillpe Lavoyer,International Committee of the Red Cross 
1996-p.15 – http://www.icrc.org. 
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conflicts. For example, guarantee to freedom of movement, this right is subject to 
restriction to protect national security and public order. In some cases, IDP is 
arbitrary prevented by armed forces from arriving in areas they consider safe. 
Even within the camp, their right to leave the camp and come back is restricted in 
certain cases because they belong to certain ethnic or religious tribes involved in 
the conflict. 
The above shortcomings created weakness in the international regime of 
protection to IDP under both human rights and humanitarian Law. This fact led 
the international community to increase efforts to overcome such shortcomings. 
As a result, the United Nations adopted the so-called the UN Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement in 1998.75  The Guiding Principles are based on the 
principle of non-discrimination, places special protection on children i.e. dealing 
with the recruitment of children in armed forces and their participation in 
hostilities, the right of displaced children to education and it provides for special 
attention to be paid to women and their health needs. It deals with the issue of 
missing persons and the reunification of dispersed family members. It also 
reaffirms that offers of services made by humanitarian organizations shall not be 
regarded as interference in a state’s internal affairs nor arbitrarily refused. It 
                                                 
75 -The Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng, 
presented to the UN Commission a Human Rights, at its 54th Session, a report entitled “Guiding principles in 
Internal Displacement” which was adopted by consensus. It was a result of study of legal team, titled Compilation 
and Analysis of Legal Norms-UN Doc.EICN.4/1998/53/Add 2 of 17 April 1998.The text reproduced in 
IRRC,No.310 ,January –February 1996,p.119. 
 365
stipulates that all persons have the right to leave their country and seek asylum in 
another country which can save their lives in some cases. It also reaffirms the 
principles that internally displaced persons have the right to return in safety and 
dignity and that it is the duty of the competent authorities to assist them. 
Furthermore, the authorities must help them to recover the property and 
possessions left behind or when such recovery is not possible, to obtain 
appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation. Finally the 
principles specifically protect internally displaced persons against forcible return 
to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and health are at 
risk. 
These principles do not modify or replace existing international law or rights 
granted to them under domestic law. They reflect and are consistent with human 
rights law and humanitarian law designed to fill gaps and provide guidance on 
how the law should be interpreted and applied during different stages of 
displacement.76 Though these principles are guiding however they are to be 
binding, being essentially declaratory of customary law. Most of the principles 
are basic humanitarian rules and principles of human rights which are guarantees 
intended to protect the humanity and dignity of IDP. These principles are a 
codification of international rules on internally displaced persons, an area where 
                                                 
76 -Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, Guiding Principles, on Internal Displacement. A few comments on the contribution of 
International humanitarian law, IRRC, September 1998,No.324,p.467 
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both human rights and humanitarian law consideration are to be taken into 
account.77 The principles intended for states that have the primary duty to provide 
protection and assistance to IDP.78 It also intended for armed opposition groups 
responsible for respect of humanitarian rules and for government and non-
governmental organization, like the ICRC required providing humanitarian aids 
during armed conflicts and natural disaster to IDP.79 At such, the guiding 
principles may be invoked by the ICRC where humanitarian law does not make 
specific provisions for certain needs e.g. the return of displaced persons in safe 
and dignified conditions. 
5.  The Martens Clause and Effect of Human Rights Law 
As a comprehensive regime of protection to civilians victims in internal conflicts 
is not possible to attain, paragraph 3 of APII preamble provided that “in cases not 
covered by the law in force, the  human person remains under the protection of 
the principles of humanity and of the dictates of public conscience”. This is a 
                                                 
77 -Robert K.Goldman,Codification of International Rules in Internally Displaced Persons, An Area Where Both 
Human Rights and Humanitarian considerations are being taken into account, IRRC ,September 
1998,No.324,p.463. 
78 - For purpose of the UN Guiding Principles, IDP are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or 
obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to 
avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made 
disaster and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (Guiding Principles, Introduction, 
para.2). 
79 -This offer includes human rights organizations and ICRC. The ICRC humanitarian activity to protect victims 
of armed conflicts includes all civilians without any distinction. IDP are covered by the ICRC mandate to offer 
protection and assistance. In fact it plays an active role to help IDP in tracing missing persons, conveying 
messages between separated family members, arrange for family reunification, in addition to its ordinary relief 
activities –For more details Francois Bugnion, The International Committee of the Red Cross And The Protection 
of War Victims,op,cit,pp.777-785—Frederic Maurice and Jeande Courter, ICRC activities for refugees and 
displaced civilians”, IRRC ,No.280,January-Feburay 1991,pp.9-21. 
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simplified version of the so-called Martens Clause which was incorporated in the 
preamble of The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 Relative to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and its Additional Protocols. It provided in paragraph 8 
of the Convention of 1907 that “until a more complete code of the laws of war 
has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that in 
cases not included in the Regulation, adopted by them, the inhabitants and the 
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of principles of the law of 
nations as the result from the usage established among civilized peoples, from the 
laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” 
The above clause relates to situations where victims of armed conflicts no longer 
enjoy the protection of treaty law or to cases not covered by the law by stating 
that such victims are in any event protected by established custom, the principle 
of humanity and the ‘dictates of public conscience”. The importance of Martens 
Clause in non-international armed conflicts lies on the fact that, it is where one 
may seek the grounds on other sourses protect civilians and rebels as it provides 
that “the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the 
rules of the principles of the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience.  These principles are jus cogens norms in any society, so that persons 
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as well as states are to respect its rules.80 The clause in APII preamble by 
recognizing the Martens Clause, it broadened the sources of rules of protection to 
civilians in that humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts 
is constituted not only of treaty law but of customary rules and laws of humanity 
also. The term “humanity” is understood to refer to the principle of humanity as a 
core rule of humanitarian law which is to be considered as part of customary 
law.81  Thus, in the absence of treaty rules or in cases of uncertainty of such rules 
and in absence of a customary rule covering the issue, the behavior of parties to 
the conflict should be examined in the light of the principle of humanity. 
Therefore, a behavior which is not prohibited should be weighed up according to 
the various interests involved and the principle of humanity should be granted the 
priority in balancing matters for purposes of finding the applicable rule.82  In fact 
the principles of humanity are to be considered part of jus cogens in the light of 
the provisions of the Vienna Conventions on the law of Treaties of 1969 .These 
principles of humanity forms also the bases of human rights, a fact confirming 
the relationship of the two laws and explains the grounds for contribution of 
human rights law in the field of protection of civilians in non-international armed 
conflicts. Judge Karoma in his dissent in the Advisory Opinion in the case 
                                                 
80 - MIYAZAKI, SHIGEKI, The Martens Clause and International Humanitarian law ,in Humanitarian law and 
the Protection of War Victims, editor J.Pictet,Geneva,1984 (NIJHOFF) p.38. 
81 - Denise Plattner, International Humanitarian Law And Inalienable or Non-Derogable Human Rights ,in Non-
Derogable Rights  and States of Emergency, editors Daniel Premont And others,(Bruylant),1966,p.262 
82 - Plattner,ibid,P.262 
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concerning The Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons pointed to this 
relationship by stating that “It is commonly remarked that while human rights 
law is infused with considerations of humanity, humanitarian law is shaped by 
the tension between concerns for humanity and military necessity.”83 
Not only have this, but the development in the field of human rights since the 
promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, influenced the 
context of such concepts as “considerations of humanity” and dictates of public 
conscience.84  Thus human rights law has contributed indirectly in extending the 
ambit of content of humanity to include human rights norms to be applicable and 
binding as part of customary international law. The concern of both laws is 
human dignity and respect for human rights. One important conclusion from this 
is that both laws originate from identical source i.e. the laws of humanity.85 This 
explains one fact that if one refers to the basic core of elementary human rights, 
e.g. rights of detainees, the right pertaining to penal prosecutions and to due 
process of law that are stated in AP II and to those that have already been 
recognized as a customary law in the context of the Martens Clause, then these 
should also be recognized by parties as being binding as customary law in the 
context of armed conflict. This is so, even if the parties to the conflict are not 
                                                 
83 - ICJ Reports, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996,p.15. 
84 -On this development, The United Nations and Human Rights 1945-1995,The United Nations Blue Books 
Series, Volume VII, Department of Public Information United Nations, New York, NY 10017,1995,pp.5 – 122. 
85 -Meron, Theodor, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law,81 AJIL,1987,p.355 
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parties to human rights instruments or AP II. As a result, human rights norms are 
reformulated into customary international humanitarian law under the principle 
of humanity. 
The Marten Clause has a major significance in non-international armed conflicts 
with regard to customary rules of conduct of hostilities. It has often been 
involved in connection with prohibitions on the use of means and methods of 
warfare affecting civilians.86  In the case of Prosecutor, v. Martic, the Court was 
invited to confirm an indictment for the 1995 Shelling Zagreb by rebel Serbs 
forces in Croatia using rockets fitted with cluster bombs, affirmed this in stating 
that: “There exists, at present, a corpus of customary international law applicable 
to all armed conflicts irrespective of their characterization as international or non-
international armed conflicts. This corpus includes general rules or principles 
designed to protect the civilian population as well as rules governing means and 
methods of warfare. The general principles that the right of the parties to the 
conflict to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited are 
undoubtedly part of this corpus of customary law.”87  It is to be mentioned here 
that state practice has prohibited use and certain types of use of a number of 
specific weapons in non-international armed conflicts under customary 
                                                 
86 - MIYAZAKI, SHIGEKI, The Martens Clause and International Humanitarian law ,in Humanitarian law and 
the Protection of War Victims, editor J.Pictet,Geneva,1984 (NIJHOFF) p.33. 
87 - ICTY, The Prosecutor.v.Matric, 8 March 1996, Case no. IT-95-11-R61, ILR, vol.108, 39-Avaible at: 
http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm. 
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international law.  This is based on the general principle, prohibiting the use of 
weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and weapons that 
are by nature indiscriminate which were found to be customary in any armed 
conflict. This rule incorporates a reference to other rules of customary 
international law, namely the prohibition of attacks that would cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage of civilian objects and the 
prohibition on causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to natural 
environment.88 Such acts violate the minimum considerations of humanity. 
In conclusion, the incorporation of the version of Martens Clause in AP II, at 
such, is of significance and has an important role to play in this very sensitive 
area of the law applicable in non-international armed conflicts in relation to 
protection of civilians. There are two reasons for that, the first being that the 
clause provides a source for applicability of rules to cover areas which because of 
sovereignty were not included expressly in the content of APII. Detter 
commented in this connection by stating: “It is important to underline the 
implications of the Martens Clause that it is really the conscience of individuals 
or of a group of individuals, perhaps a large body of individuals, which in the last 
resort, will be relevant since states themselves have no such conscience”89.  
                                                 
88 - This includes for example poisoned weapons, biological and chemical weapons---Henckuerts,Jean-Marie, 
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for the rule 
of law in armed conflict,IRRC,vol.87,No 857,March 2005,p.193 
89  Detter, Ingrid, The Law of War, op.cit., p.375 
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Secondly, the clause acts as a dynamic factor to applicability of new rules and 
principles relevant in relation to the issue of protection of civilians during non-
international armed conflicts. 
Conclusion  
The regime of protection to civilian victims in non-international armed conflicts 
set up under common Article 3 and APII is considered advancement to 
international humanitarian law. However analysis of the content of the regime 
revealed a number of places of weakness. Since both human rights and 
humanitarian law have common objectives and share common principles, then it 
is natural that human rights norms in some situations during armed conflict, may 
contribute to strengthen some of these weakness of the regime. This contribution 
takes various forms, for example by filling legal gaps in absence of a relevant 
rule covering the situation or applicability of norms complementing these rules or 
may provide interpretation to clarify vagueness in provisions and in some cases 
by parallel application. 
Human Rights instruments provide protection in cases a legal gap is created due 
to inapplicability of Article 3 or APII when the government denies the 
characterization of an armed conflict as a non- international armed conflict, thus 
leaving civilian victims without any protection under the law. In other situations 
human rights norms are applicable to complement rules of protection for example 
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in relation to aid relief, addressing more specific needs to women, children as 
human persons and displaced persons. In some cases, it enhances protection to 
basic rights e.g. the right to life by overcoming the problematic issue of 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants as a result of absence of 
definition of civilian and vagueness of concept of “taking part in hostilities”. 
Damage caused to natural environment is a violation of right to life under human 
rights instruments constituting an obligation during armed conflict also. 
Though human rights can be said to be of general relevance, however, all human 
rights rules are not equally relevant. The foregoing analysis leads us to say that 
the rules relative to the conduct of hostilities are very specific and limited to 
criminal responsibility. On the other hand, emphasizes is placed on those human 
rights norms providing protection for persons against atrocities committed by 
government forces. The norms of human rights which appear to be most relevant 
are those of the hard core of human rights which are designed to ensure human 
treatment for persons protected.  Article 4 of the CCP includes no derogation 
from right to life except in respect of death resulting from lawful acts of war, 
torture or in humane punishment, no slavery or servitude no crime without a law, 
international or municipal existing at time of commission. This means if killing 
cannot be legitimated by the law of armed conflict, and then criminally remains 
under municipal law.  It has also been shown that there are certain rights which 
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are basic to protection of civilians but derogable under human rights law, are 
guaranteed under common Article 3 and AP II, applicable in internal conflict e.g. 
judicial guarantees. A hard core group of human rights have been recognized as 
applicable during armed conflicts because they are prescribed by Article 3 and 
APII thus resulting in concurrent application. This implies that the same rights 
have a dual enforcement mechanism which has the chance of being implemented 
.Any overlap of norms of humanitarian and human rights law adds an advantage 
to the international regime of protection of civilians as long as they assured 
compliance.   It has been seen from the above analysis that there are several rights 
that correspond directly with human rights recognized as basic rights .For 
example both Article 3 and APII recognizes right to life, freedom from torture 
and cruel treatment, principles of legality, due process and non-retroactivity and 
non-discrimination. Also Article 4 of CCP contains these fundamental rights. 
However judicial guarantees or due process are derogable rights under Article 4 
of CCP. Other rights guaranteed only by humanitarian law in the time of armed 
conflict includes special protection of children and women, prohibition of taking 
of hostages, prohibition of medical experiments, acts of terrorism and prohibition 
of collective punishment.  This also implies that states have accepted their same 
obligation under both instruments of human rights and Geneva Law i.e. Article 3 
and AP II, to increase protection to their own nationals during armed conflicts. 
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The repeated criticism against the regime under human rights instruments is that 
it allows derogation of judicial guarantees and other rights e.g. freedom of 
movement, of assembly, of expression and of opinion in situations of armed 
conflict declared as state of emergency. This is said to undermine the possible 
contribution of human rights in strengthening the content of regime of protection 
of civilians. And those human rights norms remain applicable in all above 
situations, in so far as the state within whose territory the conflict occurs has not 
legitimately derogated from certain rights under relevant human rights 
conventions or that specific guarantees are non-derogable.90 The arguments 
against these criticisms are that any derogation permissible in time of armed 
conflict as a state of emergency is limited by two general conditions. First, the 
extent of any such derogation is strictly limited by the exigencies of any 
particular situation.91 The fact that some of the provisions of the Covenant have 
                                                 
90 - Humanitarian rules by definition are non derogable this is evidenced by the acceptance of principle of non-
reciprocity as the basis of the legal system of observance of humanitarian law including the non-applicability of 
reprisal during conduct of hostilities. 
91 -A distinction should be made between derogation from obligation in emergency situations as distinct from 
restricts or limitations allowed under several provisions of the Covenant for example Article 12 in relation to the 
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence which are subject to restrictions only when are 
provided by law and are necessary to protect national security, Another example ,is Article 19 and the right to 
hold opinions without interference which may be subject to restrictions only if provided by law and for respect of 
rights or reputations of others and for protection of natural security. It is to mention here that Article 4 lays out the 
conditions that must be met before derogation can be entered as well as principles that must be observed during 
derogation. The conditions which must be fulfilled: temporary derogations only are allowed, an exceptional threat 
to the life of the nation must exist, an official proclamation of a state of emergency must be made and derogations 
must be reported to the Secretary General of the United Nations, a notification to other states and/or relevant 
treaty monitoring body of the measures taken. When derogations takes place, there are limits to the action that a 
state can take that based on legal principles, these includes :the principle of proportionality i.e. a reasonable 
proportionality between the means employed and the end to be realized must exist; the principle of legality i.e. the 
limitation is determined by law and must meet the “Just” requirement outlined; the principle of non-discrimination 
i.e. measures taken to derogate must not be discriminatory; the principle of consistency i.e. the state’s use of 
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been listed in Article 4 (paragraph 2) as not been subject to derogation does not 
mean that other articles in the Covenant may be subjected to derogations at will 
even where a threat to the life of the nation exists as in case of armed conflicts. A 
state is under duty to conduct a careful analysis based on an objective assessment 
of the actual situation. For example freedom of movement of displaced persons 
may be generally sufficient during such situations and no derogations from the 
provisions in question could be justified by the exigencies of the situation. 
Secondly the most important as far as humanitarian law instruments are in issue, 
no measures may be taken which are inconsistent with the state party’s other 
obligations under international law, particularly rules of international 
humanitarian law. Thus, Article 4 of the Covenant cannot be read as justification 
for derogation from the Covenant if such derogation would entail a breach of the 
state’s other obligations whether based on treaty or general international law. 
Article 5 (2) of the Covenant provides for the same according to which there 
shall be no restrictions upon or derogation from any fundamental rights 
recognized in other instruments on the pretext that the Covenant does not 
recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to be a lesser extent. Even in 
those provisions of the Covenant that are not listed as non derogable in Article 4 
(2), there are elements which makes the derogation from such rights in armed 
                                                                                                                                                          
derogations must not be inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and that these obligations 
remain applicable; the principle of non derogability of fundamental rights.-On more details on the issue in 
general, Provost, International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law,o.p.cit,pp.152-175 
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conflict unlawful. For example, the right guaranteed in Article 10 of the 
Covenant, which is not mentioned as non derogable under Article 4, stating that 
all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. The provision expresses a 
norm of general international law not subject to derogation by reference to the 
inherent dignity of the human person. The prohibitions against taking of 
hostages, abduction or unacknowledged detention are not subject to derogation. 
This is justified by their status as norms of general international law. Deportation 
or forcible transfer of population without grounds permitted under international 
law in the form of forced displacement by expulsion or other conceive means 
from the area is not justified on basis of a state of emergency so as to derogate 
from article 12 of the Covenant. This is confirmed by the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court to constitute a crime against humanity. 
Article 2 (3) of the Covenant requires a state party to the Covenant to provide 
remedies for any violation of the provisions of the Covenant, this clause is not 
mentioned in Article 4 (2) as non derogable but it constitutes a treaty obligation 
inherent in the Covenant which the state party must comply with it even in case 
of emergency like armed conflict by providing remedy that is effective. It is 
inherent in the protection of rights explicitly recognized as non derogable in 
Article 4 (2), that they must be secured by procedural guarantees including 
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judicial guarantees. For example the right to life in Article 6 is non derogable; the 
imposition of death penalty sentence during state of emergency like armed 
conflict must conform to Articles 14 and 15 of the Covenant relating to judicial 
guarantees. No derogation is to be made to Articles 20 relating to propaganda for 
war or in advocacy of national, racial or religions hatred that would constitute 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. Even in cases of derogation, 
the Covenant provides for certain safeguards which are based on the principles of 
legality and the rule of law inherent in the Covenant as a whole as certain 
elements of the right to a fair trial are expressly guaranteed under international 
humanitarian law during armed conflict.92 
Therefore, in our opinion, the nature and extent of such obligations must be 
interpreted broadly in light of the spirit of both human rights and humanitarian 
law to achieve one goal i.e. strengthening the international regime of protection 
of civilians in non-international armed conflicts. For example the judicial 
guarantees are essential to ensure protection of civilian rights under both human 
rights law and humanitarian law.   One may also suggest that it is within the 
power of the state to stretch the set of non-derogable rights under human rights 
                                                 
92 - These provisions of the Covenant that are not listed in Article 4 (2) there are elements which in the opinion of 
the United Nations Committee of Human Rights’ cannot be made subject to lawful derogation-General Command 
no.29 (50) of 24 July 2001 on Article 4 ICCPR (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 of 31 August 2001)- 
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instruments which may be basic to civilian victims during armed conflicts,93 
since with few exceptions, most of these rights are considered customary 
international law. Other criticism regarding the applicability of human rights 
norms is that they are not binding on rebel groups. However it has been shown 
that under Martens Clause, there are certain human rights which are considered 
part of customary international law and are jus cogens, thus binding on both 
states and individuals. 
Admittedly, human rights law like humanitarian law does not constitute a 
comprehensive regime of guarantee for human persons. Both regimes contain 
weakness founded on state sovereignty considerations .The weakness in regime 
of protection under humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts is not much between humanity and military necessity as between 
humanity and sovereignty. This is explained by the very elementary character 
and limited rules that states have accepted to restrict their sovereign power as 
binding in internal conflicts. In human rights law, the philosophy underlying the 
right of states to derogate from or temporarily suspended human rights is founded 
on the very essence of the principle of state sovereignty. The territorial integrity 
or political integrity of a state and its internal public order prevail over human 
rights during emergency situations. 
                                                 
93 - It should be noted that not all human rights treaties contain derogation clause. For example, the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the elimination of Racial Discrimination, the 
Convention Against Torture and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, do not contain derogation clauses. 
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Nevertheless, this does not affect the significance of both regimes to victim who 
are entitled to invoke all relevant guarantees, being from a legal pointed of view 
civilians and human persons. The importance of this is clear in absence of 
definition of “civilians” under Article 3 and AP II and vagueness of concept of 
“participation”, since civilians in such cases may loose protection under Article 3 
and APII. In such cases they remain entitled to enjoy the full range of human 
rights and the application of human rights instruments during armed conflicts as a 
source forming basis of protection to civilian victims as expressly stated in the 
preamble of AP II.  This has recently been confirmed by the International Court 
of justice in its Advisory Opinion in The Legal Consequence of The Construction 
Of a Wall in The Occupied Palestinians territory, by stating that” the protection 
offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict” 
and that “while there may be rights that are exclusively matters of international 
humanitarian law or of human rights law, there are others that “may be matters of 
both these branches of international law”.94 
Final words to be mentioned in this connection, is that contribution does not 
mean fusion of human rights and humanitarian law own standards and principles 
into a single set of rules. Common Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV and AP II 
and relevant human rights instruments, all these different instruments constitutes 
                                                 
94 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinians 
Territory, Advisory opinion,  9 July 2004,p.106 
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a set of legal provisions which complement and reinforce each other when it 
comes to the protection of civilian victims. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Implementation of Humanitarian Law Applicable 
In Non-International Armed Conflicts: Role of Human  
Rights Mechanisms  
Introduction 
Ratification or accession to humanitarian law instruments applicable in 
situations of non-international armed conflicts is a first step but not 
sufficient to provide civilians with protection. Implementation of rules of 
such instruments is an important step, governments and armed opposition 
groups each bear responsibilities for their recognition and respect to those 
rules. However, governments are responsible primarily for the 
implementation of humanitarian law as contracting parties to Geneva 
Convention IV of 1949 and APII. Neither common Article 3 nor AP II 
provides expressly for duty to implement on contracting states however, this 
does not alter the principle that the law imposes obligations to implement 
such rules on governments.  
Common Article 3 and APII regime of protection is considered a major 
development of humanitarian law protecting civilians in non-international 
armed conflicts, however laying rules is one face of the coin of the regime, 
the other face of the coin is implementation. This requires from contracting 
states to take certain necessary and preventive measures before outbreak of 
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armed conflict at the national level. The necessity of such measures to be 
taken during peace is due to the nature of humanitarian law in that it is a law 
which tends to protect human beings from injuries and killing which may 
occur at any time. As such, the law is like an operation room which requires 
measures to be taken to prepare it in order to meet emergencies with a view 
to save lives of civilian persons and reduce their sufferings. In fact the 
reality of increasing number of civilian victims of non-international armed 
conflicts during the last twenty years leads to one conclusion, that 
implementation and respect of such rules is the major challenge facing such 
law. The matter is connected with a number of factors and a number of 
shortcomings affecting the issue of implementation. This includes mainly 
the ignorance of the rules under the law by those who are required to respect 
and apply such rules of protection, absence of provisions imposing 
obligations on contracting states to take necessary measures to implement 
such rules, absence of provisions imposing obligations to repress and 
prevent acts in violation of common article 3 and AP II and absence of a 
provision penalizing such acts i.e. a duty to punish such acts. In addition to 
the necessity that implementation of the law requires national measures to be 
taken by the contracting states. Another weakness which is closely 
connected with the issue is the absence of international supervision to ensure 
implementation.  The principle of state sovereignty has always been a factor 
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which creates obstacles in adopting effective rules for implementation of 
humanitarian law during non-international armed conflicts. As a result, 
neither Article 3 nor AP II provides for an international body to secure 
compliance. Though ICRC acts as a guardian for implementation of the law 
and reminds parties to the conflict of their obligations under humanitarian 
law instruments, because of its impartiality and confidentiality it is not in a 
position to release reports disclosing serious violations to such obligations 
during armed conflicts nor to exert political pressure on governments of 
contracting states with regard to implementation of the law. However, 
human rights mechanisms enforcement if used in certain situations could 
strengthen and ensure compliance. This chapter proposes to discuss the 
question of implementation of humanitarian law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts and how human rights mechanisms could be 
useful. It is divided into three parts. Part 1 proposes to examine the national 
measures which are to be taken by governments of Contracting States during 
time of peace. Part 2 examines how the principle of state sovereignty places 
several obstacles in the way of implementing the law.  Part 3 examines what 
human rights mechanisms at international level may be useful to secure 
compliance and act as an international supervisory body. Attempts to 
specifically highlight features and potentialities of human rights mechanisms  
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of implementation relevant to the issue, will be made as well as difficulties 
arising and suggested solutions.  
1.  National Measures of Implementation  
It is a general principle of international law that treaties in force are binding 
upon the states parties and must be performed by them in good faith. This 
principle is based on the rule pacta sunt servanda embodied in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Under such rules states parties to 
treaties are under obligations to take all necessary measures to ensure 
implementation of its obligations therein at the national level  especially 
when its provisions provides for rights and protection to persons within its 
territory. This principle applies to treaties applicable to internal armed 
conflicts, and to Article 3 and AP II which do not provide expressly for 
measures to be taken to implement the law except the obligation of 
dissemination under Article 19 of AP II. The obligation to implement Article 
3 and provisions of AP II cannot be fulfilled without necessary measures to 
be taken by the contracting states within its domestic level. In this 
connection, the Final Declaration of the International Conference for the 
Protection of War Victims held in Geneva 1993, urged all states to make 
every effort to “adopt and implement at the national level all appropriate 
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regulations, laws and measures to ensure respect for international law 
applicable in the event of armed conflict and to punish violations thereof.1  
The obligation to implement the law includes and requires contracting states 
to take certain measures: to reconcile its domestic legislations with its 
international obligations under such instruments; to ensure that all persons 
civilian’s and military are aware of the rules of international humanitarian 
law by dissemination of its rules; they are under duty to repress violations of 
such rules by adopting national legislations providing for the criminalization 
and punishment of acts committed in violation of such rules and measures to 
be taken for the establishment of national committees and societies which 
may provide assistance in implementing the law. It is to be mentioned here, 
that the means and methods of taking these measures varies from state to 
state, some of these measures require the adoption of legislations as for 
example the duty to repress. Other measures depend on the existence of 
some form of structures, administrative arrangements and trained personnel 
for the implementation and dissemination of the law.2  
                                                 
1 The text of the Declaration drawn by the International Committee of the Red Cross and published in the 
International Review of the Red Cross, September-October 1993 (No. 296) P. 379.  
2 Other measures may be taken to ensure that fundamental and procedural guarantees are respected in time 
of armed conflict e.g. to recognize international humanitarian rules in selecting  locations of military sites 
to avoid exposing civilians to be objects of military attacks and to provide for the establishment of hospital 
zones and security zones.  
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i. The obligation of States to Implement Humanitarian in 
National Legal System  
Neither common Article 3 nor AP II, contains a provision imposing 
obligations on states to incorporate rules embodied in above instruments in 
its domestic legislations. However, the absence of such a provision does not 
exempt states parties to such instruments of such obligation. There is a 
general duty under international law on states to bring internal laws into 
conformity with its international obligations, be treaty obligation or under 
customary international law.3  In addition, some of the principles and rules 
of international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts are to a great extent peremptory norm i.e. jus cogens, which are 
accepted and recognized by the international community. Example are 
principles embodied in common Article 3 from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.4  States are under obligation to 
implement such rules and cannot derogate from them by claiming that they 
are not part of its domestic laws or modify them by its national legislations. 
However, there are obligations which can be implemented without taking 
legislative measures e.g. the obligation of dissemination of the rules and 
                                                 
3 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, op.cit. p 39. 
4  Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties 1969.  
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principles under Article 3 and AP II and the obligations of training persons 
to be qualified in international humanitarian law. On the other hand there are 
some obligations which require the adoption of legislative measures for its 
implementations. For example, legislative measures are required to 
implement the obligations to prevent misuse of Red Cross, Red Crescent and 
other protective emblems and legislations to be enacted to suppress and 
provide appropriate sanctions for breaches of the law. In cases where the 
death penalty is mandatory for certain offences, a provision in the relevant 
legislation is needed to implement this obligation and to embody provisions 
not to pronounce death penalty on pregnant women or mothers having 
dependent infants; provisions criminalizing the acts of recruitment and 
participation of children in armed conflicts who are under the age specified 
by law and provisions criminalizing acts committed against the honor of 
women. In such cases, the contracting states are under obligations to      
reconcile its legislations military or criminal by enacting new legislations or              
amending existing legislations as the case requires.  
This process of reconciling national laws with its international obligations 
under Geneva Conventions varies from country to another. Implementation 
of international rules within the municipal legal orders of states is 
determined by such legal systems, the status of international law within the 
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legal order and whether the rule to be implemented is conventional or 
customary, to be examined here.  
a. The Reception of Conventional Humanitarian Rules in Municipal 
Legal Systems  
The implementation of conventional rules in municipal legal system is 
determined in most cases by the constitution of each contracting state. The 
status of such conventions within national legal orders depends on whether 
the state is adopting the ‘monism’ or dualism’ theory. According to both 
theories, there is a common field in which international and municipal legal 
orders can operate simultaneously in regard to the same subject matter. 
However the problem arises when there is contradiction or inconsistency 
between the two as to which is to prevail.  
According to the dualism theory of law, international and municipal law is 
two independent and parallel legal systems based on the fact that the two 
systems regulate different legal subject matter. One main result of this 
theory is that the international legal rules do not apply or be implemented 
within the municipal legal order unless it is received and transformed to 
internal legal rules according to national measures adopted. In such a case 
the rule is applied not as an international rule but as part of municipal 
legislation. As such national courts are not obliged to interpret or implement 
international rules but bound only to apply municipal legislations. However, 
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in cases of inconsistency between international rules and internal obligations 
of a state, municipal law prevails and should be implemented.5 As a result of 
this, states adopting the dualism theory of law are under obligation to enact 
necessary legislations or amend its legislations to implement humanitarian 
rules within its municipal law by transforming such international rules into 
national legislations. According to Monism theory of law, both international 
and municipal law form part of one and the same legal order. One prevailing 
version of this theory is that, rules of international law prevail over 
municipal law and that in cases of inconsistency the first is binding or 
applicable. Thus, under this version of the theory, international conventional 
rules are directly applicable in the domestic legal order of the state and that 
all rules of international law are supreme over municipal law.6 One basic 
result of this is that contracting states adopting monism theory in relation to 
the status of Geneva Conventions within their legal system, the rules of such 
conventions are incorporated automatically and become part of the national 
laws upon ratification or accession. In relation to the above, neither 
humanitarian law nor any specific article imposes on states obligations to 
give direct effect in their national legal systems to the provisions of 
                                                 
5 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed. 1999, Oxford University Press, P.33.  
6 K.J.Partsch, International law and Municipal Law, EPIL (1995), pp 1185-202. 
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humanitarian law instruments in that these norms could be invoked by 
individuals before national courts in the same way as national norms.  
Few modern legal writers pointed to the question of the direct application of 
humanitarian law rules in the municipal legal orders of contracting states 
despite the importance of the issue in relation to rights under it. Of these 
few, most writers support the traditional theory of international law by 
arguing that individual’s are not subjects of international law and as such 
they are not directly entitled to rights under international conventions or 
bound by any rules unless such rules are transformed into national 
legislation. Others argue that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 
Additional Protocols of 1977 are “self executing” and need only be ratified. 
Detter supports this approach by pointing that “it is evident that the rules are 
primarily aimed precisely at individuals and thus provide guidance on how 
to, for example, deal with prisoners of war or on which methods and 
weapons to use in a campaign. Few commentators appear to have 
commented on the aspect of the direct application of the law of war in the 
municipal sphere, although these issues are essential …”7 
However, referring to practice, constitutional texts especially those of states 
which are keen to affirm their sovereignty,8 one finds that, the majority do 
                                                 
7 For further discussion on these views  in Detter, Ingrid, The Concept of International Law, 2nd  
edition , Stockholm, 1994, pp. 1-5 and same author, The Law of War, op. cit., pp. 193-196. 
8 Example of  constitutions of some states in relation to the issue is made by Akheurst, Modern 
Introduction to International Law, 7th revised edition, op. cit., pp.65-70 
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not give primacy to international law over municipal law.  The prevailing 
approach in practice seems to be dualist, i.e. regarding international law and 
internal law as different systems requiring the incorporation of international 
rules at the national level. The effectiveness of international humanitarian 
law thus, depends generally on the criteria adopted by municipal legal 
orders. According to this practice Geneva Conventions to be implemented 
requires changes in national laws of a contracting state i.e. it is necessary to 
pass legislation to that effect in order to bring national laws into conformity 
with the obligations under the said Conventions. This is supported by states 
practice; few states adopt the direct application approach. In the United 
States there are certain treaties concluded which are “self-executing” and as 
such, directly applicable in the national legal order. In France, every ratified 
and duly published treaty forms part of French law. In light of the above 
uncertainty among legal writers and states practice, it is necessary to adopt 
an approach which leads to results consistent with the objections of such 
instruments. In our view, the traditional attitude of legal writers that 
international law does not operate within states municipal legal systems, 
unless the constitutional machinery allows for such direct application, 
depending on theory adopted i.e. monism or dualism, is not practical and 
might lead to result which may abrogate the very objectives of the law i.e. to 
ensure the human protection of such victims. 
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 It is true that international law and municipal law are two distinct legal 
orders and that their norms are derived from different sources, however there 
are rules of international law i.e. human rights and humanitarian law, that 
have direct effect and application international legal systems i.e. they are 
self-executing. Otherwise, it would be impossible to explain why individuals 
enjoy rights in these two fields and why they are bound by obligations under 
both laws. This is supported by the fact that actors who commit acts of 
serious violations are prosecuted in international law irrespective of whether 
national laws criminalize such acts as a result such rules have direct effect 
within national legal orders. In addition in case legislation is not passed to 
that effect, the Convention is still binding on the contracting state and that 
such state will be responsible for not complying with the Conventions and 
its Protocols. This has been affirmed by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Free Zones Case by stating that “It is certain that 
France cannot rely on her own legislation to limit the scope of her 
international obligations”.9  Article 27 of the Vienna Convention provides 
for the same rule by stating “A party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”.10  Therefore, 
                                                 
9 PCIJ, series A/B, No. 46, p. 167 
10 Text of the Convention in, International Legal Materials, 8 (1969) p. 679.  
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the argument that effectiveness of international humanitarian law rules 
depends generally on the criteria adopted by legal systems and constitutions 
of the contracting states should not be applicable to all branches of 
international law.  
The attitude of national legal systems to international humanitarian law, 
should also be examined in relation to international humanitarian customary 
rules which is considered one of the basic sources of rules of protection 
under the regime.   
b.  The Reception of International Humanitarian Customary Rules in 
Municipal Legal Orders  
The sources of rules protecting civilians during non-international armed 
conflicts under humanitarian law, being a branch of international law, is not 
restricted to rules contained in Article 3 of Geneva Conventions IV of 1949 
or its Additional Protocol II, but extends to include customary rules of 
humanitarian law. Unlike treaties the recognition of customary international 
law in the international legal order of a state is governed by the general 
principle that customary rules are to be considered part of the law of the  
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land11. They are to be enforced as such or by incorporating them within their 
municipal laws. These customary rules are implemented directly without a 
need of internal procedures in most of municipal legal orders of states 
provided that it is not inconsistent with public order or with Acts of 
parliament or prior judicial decision of final authorities in the state 12.  
In some countries a procedure by a legislature would have to transform 
customary international rules into municipal law. This process is not a 
simple matter because custom is less clear than treaty rules, it requires 
identifying the rules, regular review of all changes of norms and principles 
should be made to ensure its existence and that it has not been overruled by 
subsequent customary rule. The ICJ in Nicaragua case confirmed that 
custom is constituted by two elements; the objective one of ‘a general 
practice’ and the subjective one “accepted by law” the so-called opinion 
Juris13.  In fact the ICRC recognized the important role of custom as a main 
source of rules to protection of civilians applicable in non-international 
armed conflicts in relation to rules regulating conduct of hostilities. 
 
____________________________________________________  
11.  Akheurst, Custom as a source of International Law, BYIL, 47 (1974-5) p.1 
12. J.J. Paust, Customary international law: its nature, sources and status as law of the United States, 
Michigan’s Law Journal of International Law, 12 (1990) PP. 59-91 
13. Nicaragua v USA (Merits), ICJ Reports, 1986, at p. 97.  
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It exerted great efforts in identifying those customary humanitarian rules by 
requesting experts of international humanitarian law from different 
geographical and legal systems, government experts and international 
organizations to prepare a report on the customary rules applicable 14. The 
identification of customary rules and its incorporation within national 
legislations be criminal or military laws or military manuals, is an important 
step to be taken by contracting states in the process of implementation of 
humanitarian law. This is essential to ensure protection of civilians in non-
international armed conflicts against effects of hostilities as a result of using 
means and methods of warfare which directly or indirectly affects them. As 
such, rules for the recognition of customary international humanitarian law 
in the internal sphere are to be either laid down in advance in the 
constitution of the state, providing that customary humanitarian law  
automatically forms part of the municipal law or applying the incorporation 
doctrine of law. 
 
__________________________  
14. Henckaerts, Jean Marie, Study on customary international humanitarian law. A contribution to the 
understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict, IRRC, vol. 87 No. 857, March 
2005, P. 175.  
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 Some states adopt this approach like the Unites States in which customary 
rules are to be considered part of the law of the land and to be enforced at 
such. In Great Britain similarly, the law of nations in its fullest extent is and 
forms part of the law of England 15.  It may also be gradually formulated by 
national courts in absence of such provisions in the constitution of a state.  
ii.  Dissemination of International Humanitarian Law  
 
One of the important requirements for the actual implementation and 
application of the law for the protection of civilians is the dissemination of 
rules of international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts. The reason for such measures is that in most cases the non-
observance of such rules is due to the ignorance of its content by those  
whose duty is to respect and apply it. Respect for humanitarian law and 
application of the law requires dissemination of its rules and training of 
personnel to carry the task by spreading knowledge of the content of Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II as widely as possible 16.  In doing so 
it is necessary to prepare translation of such instruments in national  
 
__________________________ 
15. “Akheurst, Modern Introduction to International Law, infra, p. 69. 
        16. Article 144 of Geneva Convention IV and Article 87 of AP1.
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languages17. This obligation of dissemination and training are 
complementing each other however, the process of dissemination and 
training depends on administrative structure of each contracting state.  
The fundamental objective of dissemination of the law among those 
addressed by the implementation of rules is to limit the sufferings of victims 
and prevent violations of the law, at such it is considered an important 
preventive measure in the regime protecting civilians. Dissemination has 
been described by the Diplomatic Conference of 1977-74 as an effective 
measure to implement international humanitarian law protecting civilians. 18 
The legal basis of obligation of contracting states to disseminate 
humanitarian law is based on four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its 
Additional Protocols. Though common Article 3 does not provide for such 
obligations, however it cannot be applied in isolation of the general rules 
applicable to Geneva Conventions since states undertook to take necessary 
measures to disseminate Geneva Convention IV in general.  
Article 19 of Additional Protocol II expressly provides for the obligation of 
dissemination of rules in the Protocol by contracting states as widely as 
possible, as a measure of implementation. Article 19 acquires importance,  
in absence of express provisions of obligation under common Article 3. The 
                                                 
17. Article 84 of 1977 Additional Protocol-1, Article 145 of Geneva Conventions IV.  
18. Pilloud et.al, Commentary on Additional Protocols, op.cit, p. 1484.   
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obligation imposed on states to disseminate rules and principles contained in 
the said Article, is to be considered an important step in supplementing the 
regime of protection under such Article. This obligation of dissemination, 
being a preventive measure to ensure respect of the law, is to be made before 
outbreak of armed conflict. Disseminations and during conflict acts as an 
action to limit the spread of violence, and after the armed conflict ends acts 
as an action to prevent any halting factor of the peace process 19.  
Article 19 mentioned above, in laying down the obligation in general, gave 
states discretion to determine the scope of its obligation to disseminate such 
rules according to the nature of its administrative structure by providing that 
“This Protocol shall be disseminated as widely as possible”. The obligation 
of dissemination in time of peace falls on the contracting state, however, 
during armed conflict, it is the obligation of both the government agencies 
and those responsible of rebel groups to take necessary measures for 
disseminating the rules among military and fighting personnel’s and among 
civilians. In practice, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies play an 
important role in the process of dissemination among members of armed 
forces involved in the conflict.20 
                                                 
19 Pilloud, ibid, p. 1438. 
 
20 Bugnion, Francois, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection of War Victims, 
op.cit, p. 370.  
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Dissemination of rules of protection among members of armed forces is 
necessary since they are primary responsible for applying humanitarian rules 
during armed conflicts, as such they are the main category to be addressed in 
the process of dissemination during peace time Common Article 3 and AP II 
contains a number of principles and rules to be observed by combatants 
during conduct of hostilities.21 This includes, prohibition of direct hostilities 
against civilians, medical staff, and religious and against those who are no 
longer taking active part in hostilities and prohibitions not to attack civilian 
objects. 
The dissemination among civilians is important for several reasons. Raising 
their awareness acquires more importance in non-international armed 
conflicts where the conflict in most cases between irregular armed forces 
and where the combatants are not only military men but civilians who are 
either involved in hostile activities or may participate at any stage of 
conflict. Civilians also may participate in the process of providing 
humanitarian assistance e.g. medical care to wounded, sick victims, shelter 
and food in some cases since civilians are above all citizens of one nation 
irrespective of causes of conflict. In addition dissemination among civilians 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 Hampson, F.J “Fighting by the Rules: Instructing the Armed Forces in Humanitarian Principles” in 
IRRC, No. 269, 1989, pp-111-124-Roberts, D.L “Training the Armed Forces to Respect International 
Humanitarian Law-The perspective of the ICRC Delegate to the Armed and Security Forces of South Asia” 
in IRRC, No. 319, 1997, pp. 433-446.  
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raises their awareness in relation to landmines planted in an indiscriminately 
way in outside skirts of cities and how to avoid them. In fact, dissemination 
as such provides a direct protection to civilians against effects of such mine 
lands22.  
Dissemination among civilians requires the adoption of certain means and 
methods using local resources especially in states in which civilians belong 
to different ethnic, religious or cultural categories. Dissemination of 
humanitarian rules to such categories should take into consideration such 
differences to find acceptance from such civilians. This can be achieved by 
setting up programmes appropriate to the customs, language and cultures of 
the addressed category of civilians. In other words, dissemination is to be 
linked with the ethical, religious and cultural values of the civilians 
addressed. Intercultural approach is also essential in dissemination by 
identifying common values of humanity in such societies underlying 
humanitarian law. Dissemination among civilians includes a number of 
persons to be addressed i.e. officials of the state, diplomats, academic 
                                                 
22 Bothe, Michael, Peter Machalister-Smith and Thomas Kurziden eds, National Implementation 
of International Humanitarian Law, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1990, p. 304.  
David, E.,” Dissemination of International Humanitarian Law at University level” in IRRC, No. 
257-1987, pp. 155-167. 
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circuits, medical personnel entrusted to the care of wounded and sick during 
such conflicts. 23 
 
Though the primary responsibility of dissemination of international 
humanitarian law lies on state parties to Geneva Conventions and its 
Additional Protocols, however the ICRC plays an active role in 
disseminating such rules and ensuring its respect in situations of armed 
conflict.24 In doing so the ICRC provides governments of contracting states 
with advices, holding training courses, translation of humanitarian 
instruments and all other possible forms which enhance the process of 
implementation. Training of qualified persons entrusted to disseminate such 
rules is important including legal advisers within the armed forces who are 
to render advices to the government authorities concerned in matters relating 
to implementation of the law.  
The importance of dissemination of humanitarian rules acquires more 
importance in relation to protection of civilians in non-international armed 
conflicts in absence of an international mechanism ensuring the application 
of the law internally. However, this process of dissemination may face a 
number of difficulties. For example the availability of sufficient means and 
                                                 
23 David, E., Dissemination of International Humanitarian Law at University level” in IRRC, No. 257-
1987, pp. 155-167.  
24 Article 5-2 (2) of the Statute of International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement. 
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methods to carry this process among armed forces and civilians on a large 
geographical scope especially where the contracting state is of a large area 
and constitutes different ethnic, religious or cultural categories of civilians. 
In all cases dissemination still remains an important part of the whole 
structure of regime of protection to civilians.  
ii. Obligation to Repress Breaches of Common Article 3 and 
           Additional Protocol II 
Preventive measures may not be effective in ensuring complete respect to 
rules embodied in international humanitarian instruments. As such 
international humanitarian law imposes the obligation to repress acts 
constituting breaches of the law. State parties to international humanitarian 
law instruments applicable to international armed conflicts are under an 
obligation to take the legislative measures necessary to impose penalties in 
cases of commission of grave breaches of rules contained in such 
instruments. This could be done either by amending its laws or enact special 
criminal legislations for the repression of breaches of Geneva Conventions25.  
To repress grave breaches states are to ascertain that their criminal law 
provides for criminal prosecution and punishment for any grave breaches, 
this applies to substantive law as well as to procedural law. The measures of 
repression shall also meet the criteria of universal jurisdiction i.e. to be 
                                                 
25 Articles 49/40/129/146 of four Geneva Conventions of 1949 respectively 
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applicable to nationals as well as foreigners, irrespective of where the crime 
was committed. Grave breaches includes some of the most serious violations 
of international humanitarian listed in Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
Additional Protocol I applicable in international armed conflicts which are 
regarded as war crimes.26  In doing so, national criminal legislations adopted 
to repress violations of humanitarian law should provide for punishment of 
each grave breach, recognize the individual criminal responsibility not only 
of persons having committed such breaches but also of those having ordered 
the commission thereof. As such, orders issued by superiors do not justify 
the commission of grave breaches and are not grounds for exemption from 
punishment. Also permitting application of the law to any person 
committing grave breaches, irrespective of his or her nationality or place 
where the act was committed.  
The duty to repression of violations of humanitarian law rules committed 
during non-international armed conflicts is neither expressly prescribed in 
common Article3 nor in AP II. They do not provide expressly for an 
obligation on contracting states to take measures to implement the law by 
providing in its national legislations for prosecution and punishment of 
persons committing acts in violations of their rules.  However, the absence 
                                                 
26 Articles 85 of Additional Protocol 1, war crimes include willful killing, torture or inhumane or serious 
injury to body or health, attacks on the civilian population and indiscriminate attacks. 
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of express provision for such obligation is not to be interpreted to mean that 
persons committing acts in violations of Article 3 and AP II are not to be 
prosecuted and punished. In our view, the obligation to repress violations of 
the law stems from the principle pacta sunt servanda, which is reaffirmed in 
Article 1 of Geneva Convention IV recalls the obligation of states to respect 
and to ensure respect for the present Convention on all circumstances. This 
is to be interpreted to include a duty to repress violations of common Article 
3 if the state is to implement its obligations under the Convention in good 
faith. As result, states should enact legislation or regulations to prescribe for 
the prosecution and punishment for such acts. The reason is that such 
violations when committed during internal armed conflicts they are similar 
to violations of similar humanitarian rules applicable in international armed 
conflicts. In fact, repression under a regime similar to that applicable in 
grave breaches of the law of international armed conflicts was claimed by a 
number of legal writers.  
Though Geneva Conventions of 1949 and AP 1 do not include violations of 
common Article3 in the regime of grave breaches under it, however states 
practice and jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals was firm in 
introducing this concept of “grave breaches” and repression for acts 
committed in violations of common Article3 and AP II during non- 
international armed conflicts. The increasing violations of humanitarian law 
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committed in such  conflicts on large-scale and the need for punishment of 
those committing such breaches in particular the atrocities committed during 
Yugoslavia and Rwandan armed conflicts against civilians, all these led to 
increasing of efforts to develop the law in this area. The Statues establishing 
the ad hoc international tribunals to try atrocities committed against civilians 
in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court of 1998, considered that customary international law 
criminalize serious violations of international humanitarian law applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts27. In addition, grave breaches of 
humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts are 
considered acts which are criminalized by other international conventions 
such as crimes against humanity, genocide and torture28. The ICJ affirmed 
this in Genocide case in relation to application of Genocide Convention by 
stating that the obligation to prevent and repress is imposed on states under 
the provisions of the Convention whether the conflict is international armed 
conflict or non-international armed conflict29. As to crimes against 
                                                 
27 “This was confirmed by the ICTY in Prosecutor. v. Drugol Juba Kunarac, to cover war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide Judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber of 12 June 2002, paras 51, 54. 
28 Article 75 Para 2 of the ICC Statute provides that the court may “make an order directly against a convicted person specifying 
appropriate reparation to, or in respect of victims including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.  
29 T. Meron, International Criminalization of internal Atrocities, 89, AJIL (1995)-p. 554.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 407
humanity, the U.N. Secretary General commenting on the Statute of the ad 
hoc International Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia stated that these 
crimes occur in international and non-internal armed conflicts.30 The ICTY 
in Tadic case also affirmed the same principle by stating that “it does not 
matter whether the serious violation has occurred within the context of an 
international or an internal armed conflict, as long as the requirements are 
met”31.  
Thus, to effectively implement humanitarian law applicable in non- 
international armed conflicts with a view to stop violations, contracting 
states have to adopt legislation and provide for universal jurisdiction to 
ensure repression for such acts. In practice, a number of states have 
undertaken steps to reconcile its national legislations with its international 
obligations under Geneva Conventions by incorporating principles embodied 
in common Article 3 in such legislations. This is made by providing for 
repression for acts constituting war crimes in military and criminal laws; 
providing for penalties for acts committed against persons and protected 
objects, that no statutory limitation will apply to such crimes; by providing 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 UN Doc. S / 257 04 (May 3, 1993).   
31 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR 72, Oct. 4 1995, ICTY, Para 94.  
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for provisions regulating and protecting use of emblem of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent and criminalize the misuse of such protected emblems32.  
In addition, national legislations should contain provisions according civilian 
victims compensation for injuries and damage caused to them as a result of 
acts committed in violation of the law.   
iv. National Committees and Implementation of Humanitarian Law 
The measures that must be taken, other than above mentioned, for the 
implementation of international humanitarian law are numerous and requires 
co-ordination of state institutions and ministries which sometimes require 
establishing certain mechanisms and bodies which may be useful in taking 
action to ensure implementation of the law at the national level. This could 
be done by establishing national committees and advisory committees’ 
networks. Humanitarian law instruments do not provide for any provision 
imposing an obligation on states to set up such committees in relation to 
implementation of humanitarian law, whether in international or non-
international armed conflicts. However, Intergovernmental Group of Experts 
for the Protection of War Victims met in 1995, held in Geneva, adopted 
Recommendations encouraging states to create national committees “to 
                                                 
32 On example of states which took measures to reconcile its military and criminal laws with its obligations 
under Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols, Maria Teresa Dutli: Implementation of 
international humanitarian law-National measures-Information received by the ICRC on implementation 
measures taken by the states at the national level IRRC, September-October 1994, No. 302 P. 464.   
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advise and assist governments in implementing and disseminating 
international humanitarian law. 33  
These committees are convened of representatives from government 
ministries concerned, representatives of Red Cross and National Red 
Crescent and experts in international humanitarian law. Its main function is 
to facilitate the process of national implementation of humanitarian law at all 
national levels. This includes rendering advices to the government and 
supporting it by suggesting policies, measures in relation to issues like 
reconciliation of national legislation with states, obligations under 
humanitarian law instruments to which it is a party and dissemination of 
rules confirmed in such instruments.  In practice since 1995, a number of 
states have set up national committees which have proved to play a 
significant role in supporting the governments of contracting states in the 
process of implementation of the law. 
2. State Sovereignty and Obstacles facing the Process of 
Implementation of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Non-
international Armed Conflicts 
The regime of protection under common Article and AP II provide for a 
number of rules to protect civilian victims. However, when it comes to the 
                                                 
33 Maria Teresa Dutli, National Implementation Measures of International Humanitarian Law, Some 
Practical Aspects, Yearbook of Internal Humanitarian Law, Volume-1-1998 p. 251. 
 
 410
implementation of such rules, the principle of state sovereignty places 
several obstacles on the way of its implementation. The general structure of 
the regime tends to preserve state sovereignty. This fact creates obstacles in 
various forms by providing for rules which require the consent of the state 
for its implementation in some cases and those which retain wide 
discretionary powers to the state in other cases. In addition, absence for 
provision of certain rules justified on the basis of reservations of state 
sovereignty created serious lacunae in the regime of implementation.  
Few illustrations is made here to show how the process of implementation of 
humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts can be 
hindered by such obstacles placed on its way which are based on 
justifications of reservation of state sovereignty.   One of the obstacles which 
state sovereignty places in the way of direct implementation of humanitarian 
law in such conflicts is created by the general problem of effectiveness of 
rules of international law within the internal legal order, as a result of the 
traditional theory that international law and internal law are different legal 
orders based on the subject matter they address. Under this traditional theory 
the whole implementation of humanitarian law rules remains within the 
internal discretion of the contracting state, unless the constitutional 
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machinery allows for such direct application.34  In practice, most states who 
are witnessing internal armed conflict, nowadays, are reluctant to provide for 
the direct implementation of international law rules within its municipal 
legal systems.  
One of the specifities of humanitarian law regime is that some of its 
provisions are to be of direct implementation; otherwise it is difficult to 
explain why individuals are bound by obligations in humanitarian law and 
also why they enjoy rights under such law.35 At such, this distinction 
between international humanitarian law and national legal systems based on 
the theories of “monism” and “dualism”, which tends to serve requirements 
of state sovereignty, should be ignored, in our view, when the issue relates to 
implementation of internal rules protecting the dignity and lives of 
thousands of civilian victims of such conflicts. Direct incorporation of such 
rules within the national legal orders of contracting states, no doubt, serves 
the purpose of humanitarian law by ensuring direct implementation thereby 
evading the complex technical and practical problems of reconciling national 
                                                 
34 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, op.cit, pp. 31-34.  
35 Detter Ingrid, The Law of War, op, cit, p.195. 
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legislations with international obligations and binds the judiciary organs of 
the state.36 
International humanitarian law provides for fundamental rights of civilians 
but does not contain rules for guaranteeing observance of these rights in 
cases of violations. Neither Article 3 nor AP 11 imposes the obligations 
necessary to repress acts infringing such rights. The absence of obligations 
concerning penal repressions of grave breaches, similar to that under Geneva 
Conventions applicable in international armed conflicts, has been justified 
by states adopting Article 3 and AP II for considerations of sovereignty. The 
reason is that the obligation to repress grave breaches is independent of the 
nationality of the person committing them and of the place where they are 
committed. This is pursuant to the principle of universal criminal jurisdiction 
provided for by Geneva Convention IV.37  
This principle places all states parties to humanitarian treaties under 
obligation to repress such acts effectively. Under this duty of criminal 
repression, states can prosecute any person committing acts of grave 
breaches to ensure implementation of humanitarian law rules. However, 
states reluctance to provide for such obligations is based on their sovereignty 
                                                 
36 M. Duffy, Practical Problems of Giving Effect to Treaty Obligations-The Cost of Consent-American 
Year Book of International Law, 12 (1988/89) pp.16-21 
37 Article 51, 52, 131 and 148 common to Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
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to have jurisdiction over its nationals in prosecuting them for acts committed 
within its territory.  
The absence of an international supervisory body to observe and ensure the 
implementation of humanitarian law is another obstacle. Neither common 
Article 3 nor AP II contain a provision relating to international supervisory 
mechanism similar to that provided for under Geneva Conventions and AP1 
applicable in international armed conflicts. This regime of protection 
provides for the acceptance by the contracting states of two types of outside 
supervisory mechanisms. First, they have committed themselves to accept 
the supervision by a third state to ensure respect for the Conventions. Article 
1 common to the four Geneva Conventions and Article1, Para 1, of Protocol 
1, provides that “The High contracting parties undertake to respect and to 
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances”. With regard 
to the obligations to ensure respect for humanitarian law, third states may 
take diplomatic measures or publicly denounce violations. Some legal 
writers see the possibility to impose non- military sanctions or to impose 
military sanctions or any form of intervention in fact, states practice tends to 
resort to these measures.38 Secondly, states accepting the system of 
                                                 
38 Benevenuit Paaolo, Ensuring observance of International Humanitarian Law: Function, Extent and Limits of the 
obligations of Third States To Ensure Respect of IHL, Report presented at the 15th Round Table on Current Problems 
of IHLI (San Romeo, 4-8 September (1990), p. 39 Available at http.//www.gva.icrc.org/web/siteengo.ns… 
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supervision by a Protecting Power.39 The Protecting Power is a state 
instructed by another state (known as the power of origin) to safeguard its 
interests and those of its nationals in relation to a third state known as state 
of residence. This Power is responsible for ensuring whether the state of 
residence is complying with and implementing the rules of humanitarian law 
in relation to the Power of original of its nationals. The ICRC in some cases 
plays this part as substitute for a Protecting Power in practice.   
As to whether this system of international supervision is effective or not is 
another question, the fact is that states consented to be subject to an outside 
supervision to ensure implementation of the law at national level. However, 
this concept of international supervision was not accepted to be applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts by contracting states. The reason is 
obvious when read with article 3 of AP II stating. “Nothing in this Protocol 
shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of the state or 
the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or 
re-establish law and order in the state……….”   The term “legislative 
means” apparently restricts state sovereignty but in practice it is left to the 
state to determine such legislative means.  Sates were not accepting the fact 
to enter into international legal commitment to accept outside supervision of 
the way in which it is applicable in international armed conflicts based on 
                                                 
39 Article 8, 88 and 9, common to the Conventions and Article 5 of AP-1. 
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the justification of reservation of state sovereignty from outside interference 
in a matter falling within its sovereign jurisdiction.40  
However, one finds some references to the possibilities of parties to the 
conflict accepting of a body such as the ICRC to play this role being 
guardian of humanitarian law instruments.41  But the scope and extent of role 
to be played by ICRC as an international supervisory body in relation to 
implementation of Article 3 and APII is not that clear due to the 
confidentiality and impartiality characterizing the ICRC activities. The 
reason is that ICRC is not in a position to reveal violations of such 
obligations to international community or exert political pressure. Besides, 
the ICRC may offer its services but the state is not under legal obligation to 
accept such services.  
Taking into account the whole regime of protection under Article 3 and AP 
11, applicable with view to protect civilian persons dignity and humanity 
and the close relationship between humanitarian law and human  rights, 
specific guarantee mechanisms has proved useful in providing necessary 
contribution in the field of implementation of the law in some cases. The 
                                                 
40 Article 3 common to Geneva Conventions, Para 3 suggests that special arrangements to confirm 
compliance and to supplement the regime of protection, may be made but have never been concluded. The 
possible use of the international Fact Finding Commission under Article 90 of AP1 for assisting in the 
Investigations of breaches of IHL in non-international armed conflicts is theoretical since it needs consent 
of parties to the conflict.  
41 “National Measures to Implement International Humanitarian Law, Steps taken by ICRC”, IRRC, 1991, 
March-April, volume 281, P. 134.  
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following pages examine the potential for reliance on human rights 
mechanisms in armed conflict situations in ensuring implementation of the 
law.  
3. The Role of Human Rights Mechanisms in the Process of 
Implementation of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Non-
international Armed Conflicts  
The competence of human rights bodies for monitoring implementation of 
humanitarian law has been denied by some legal writers on theoretical basis. 
They base their arguments on several reasons. The first is that there is no 
express mandate for human rights bodies to apply, determine or interpret 
norms of international humanitarian law other than within the context of 
human rights law. In addition, a number of human rights instruments provide 
for adjudication of individual complaints which address situations in which 
the state agents has violated the provisions of said Conventions and not non-
state actors. Besides, such complaints are not decided against breaches of 
international humanitarian law instruments.42  
                                                 
42 Example ICCPR, the Convention against Torture, The Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
These instruments provide for individual complaints. Available texts of these Conventions at:http://www. 
umr.edu / humanarts / instree / h2catoc.htm.  
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Moreover in cases where individual mechanism have been accepted, human 
rights commissions passes recommendations only since there is no 
enforcement mechanisms under most human rights treaties.43 
However, the above theoretical arguments against the possibility of using 
relevant human rights mechanisms in monitoring implementation of 
humanitarian law rules during non-international armed conflicts is defeated 
in some situations. Human rights could be used or play a role in the process 
of implementation and compliance with humanitarian law our view is 
grounded on a number of arguments. First, based on the fact that both laws 
share common principles and objectives and that some of the obligations 
imposed on states parties to instruments of both laws, aim at the protection 
of persons in time of armed conflicts. In other words, human rights 
instruments, common Article 3 and AP II, share a common non-derograble 
rights and a common purpose objective i.e. protecting human life and 
dignity, in time of peace and during situation of armed conflict. This fact 
makes the issue of implementation a common concern under both laws. 
Secondly, AP II Preamble by recalling in Para 2 the importance of human 
rights instruments as a source forming a basis of protection to human 
persons in non-international armed conflict, it is to be understood that 
                                                 
43 Fleck, Dieter, Humanitarian Protection against Non-State Actors. The article available at. 
http://edoc.mpil,de/fs/2003/eitel.cfm. p84.  
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monitoring mechanisms operating under such instruments may provide a 
source of such protection since implementation of the law is a cornerstone of 
cornerstone of any regime of protection. Human rights instruments provide 
mechanisms for their implementation under a system of international control 
over the observance by governments of their obligations under such treaties. 
They set up monitoring bodies to consider national reports, individual 
petitions and interstate complaints. For example, under UN Human Rights 
Covenants, the system of reporting and examination of the reports is 
entrusted to the Human Rights Commission, while interstate complaints and 
individual communications are contained in optional provisions. These 
bodies have varying powers of implementation and enforcement ranging 
from legally binding decisions of European Court of Human Rights to 
passing of recommendations of the UN Human Rights Commission. 
Example of such mechanisms includes: UN Commission of Human Rights 
and its Sub Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
working groups and a net work of individual experts, representatives and 
special rapporteurs which have developed a practice in relation to reference 
to humanitarian law in armed conflicts situations.44  
                                                 
44 The reporting procedures under Article 40 ICCPR, inter-state complaints under Article 41-43 ICCPR, individual 
communications under the Frst Optional Protocol and the Commission on the Prevention of Racial Discrimination and 
the Protection of Minorities. Regional human rights instruments provide for the same e.g. the Inter American system 
and African system. The Arab Charter on Human Rights provides only for mandatory reports submitted by state 
parties-The United Nations and Human Rights 1945-1995, op cit, p. 92.  
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Thirdly, the competence of human rights bodies is generally limited to the 
enforcement of human rights as embodied in its relevant conventions, so that 
these bodies cannot automatically expand their jurisdiction to cover the issue 
of application and implementation of humanitarian law. However, the 
common characteristics, mentioned earlier, between the two legal orders 
suggests that in some respects, human rights law mechanisms could prove 
useful in issues relating to implementation of humanitarian law in particular 
in situations combining a state of emergency of an armed conflict.  
Fourthly, some human rights instruments require states when considering 
derogations of human rights which are also guaranteed in humanitarian law 
instruments that the rules of the latter have to be considered and guaranteed 
with view not to create inconsistency in relation to obligations under such 
instruments as under Article 4 (1) of ICCPR. This point to the fact that 
human rights bodies determining the lawfulness of derogations of certain 
rights, are competent to refer to rights guaranteed under humanitarian law 
instruments.45  
                                                                                                                                                 
45 For example Article 38 of the Conventions on the Rights of the Child of 1989 makes a general reference 
to the humanitarian law provisions applicable to children in paragraph 1 and lays down rules that are 
applicable in the event of armed conflict. 
. 
 
 420
The above arguments are supported by recent trend of existing practice and 
case law.46 The experience and possibilities of monitoring implementations 
of Article 3 and AP II by human rights mechanisms can take various forms 
in armed conflict situations. By co-operation, in the process of dissemination 
of humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflict with the 
ICRC, by reliance on humanitarian law by UN human rights mechanisms 
and by non-governmental human rights organizations (NGO’s) and regional 
human rights commissions. This part seeks to identify and illustrate some 
cases of recent trends to show how such mechanisms can contribute in 
monitoring implementation of the law.  
i. Human Rights Bodies and Dissemination of Humanitarian Law 
The dissemination of knowledge of humanitarian law by human rights 
bodies is not strange since both laws are complementary. Knowledge of the 
law is part of process of protection of individuals when armed conflict 
breaks out as an emergency situation. Dissemination of one branch of law at 
the expense of the other provides for an incomplete picture of the protection 
of human persons in international law. As a result, bodies undertaking to 
disseminate human rights law may also contribute in the process of 
implementation of humanitarian law by disseminating knowledge of 
                                                 
46 Example of such practice in Weissbrodt, David, “The Role of International Organizations in the 
Implementations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Stuations of Armed Conflict, (1988) 21 
Vanderbilt Journal of International Law, p. 313. 
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humanitarian rules to draw a complete picture of protection of persons under 
international law. These dissemination activities could be developed at 
various levels for the members of armed forces and the civilian population. 
It also extends to qualifying personnel to be trained to facilitate the 
implementation of both human rights instruments and humanitarian law 
instruments.  However, the lack of know how, of legal expertise can be 
overcome and remedied in terms of financial and intellectual resources by 
human rights sources available. The co-ordination of efforts to spread 
knowledge of international humanitarian law with human rights, aiming at 
preventing excesses of sufferings in armed conflicts, mentioned above, has 
been discussed in the context of dissemination of humanitarian law in the 
Report on the Protection of War Victims, organized by the ICRC in Geneva, 
June 1993.47  
ii.  United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms Reinforcing 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Non-international Armed 
Conflicts  
The United Nations system of the promotion and protection of human rights 
consists of two main types of bodies created under the Charter including the 
Commission on Human Rights and bodies created under international human 
                                                 
47 Report on the Protection of War Victims, organized by the ICRC, Geneva, June 1993. Document No. 
24-SASSOLI, Macro, How Does Law Protect in War?, op.cit.p.444.  
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rights treaties. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights was 
established in 1966 to protect fundamental rights and freedoms. Composed 
of 53 states members, its brief expanded over time to allow it to respond to 
the whole range of human rights problems during time of peace and armed 
conflict and it set standards to govern the conduct of states. It also acted as a 
forum where countries, non-governmental groups and human rights 
defenders from around the world discuss matters of relevance to individuals 
in all regions and circumstances. It was assisted in this work by the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, a number of 
working groups and a network of individual experts, representatives and 
rapporteurs mandated to report to it on specific issues. During its regular 
annual session in Geneva, for which over 3,000 delegates from member and 
observer states and from non-governmental organizations participated, the 
Commission adopted resolutions and decisions on matters before it. 
However, this body has been heavily criticized for having countries in recent 
years, including countries with poor human rights records, as members 
accused of gross violations. As a result on 15th March 2006, the General 
Assembly adopted a Resolution to establish the Human Rights Council to 
replace the Commission.48  
                                                 
48 There will be periodic reviews of membership and any state accused of systematic human rights 
violations could be suspended-A/RES/60/251.   
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As to treaty bodies, there are seven human rights treaty bodies that monitor 
implementation of the core international human rights treaties.49 There are 
other several important United Nations bodies and agencies which are 
concerned with the promotion and protection of human rights and interact 
with the main human rights bodies. Of these there are bodies involved in 
protection of human rights of individuals in time of armed conflict also.50 
The United Nations human rights mechanisms have provided in some cases 
the framework for promoting recognition and implementation of 
humanitarian law in situations of internal armed conflicts where human 
rights, common Article 3 and AP 11 are applicable. This is carried out by the 
practice of the rapporteurs, appointed by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights and working groups entrusted to investigate the human rights 
situations in a number of countries witnessing civil wars and also entrusted 
to monitor situations of human rights violations. Reports prepared by special 
rapporteurs in relation to situations of human rights in a number of non-
international armed conflicts have analyzed and applied humanitarian law 
                                                 
49Human Rights Committee (HRC) on Economic; Social and Cultural Rights; (CESCR); Committee 
against Torture; Committee on the Rights of the Child; (CRC) and Committee on Migrant Workers. Four of 
the Committees (HRC, CERD, CAT and CEDAW) can, under certain conditions, receive petitions from 
individuals who claim that their rights under the treaties have been violated. 
50 This includes, Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Inter-Agency Internal 
Displacement Division, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations, 
Mine Action. Other United Nations bodies concerned with promotion of human rights include United 
Nations General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and International Court of Justice. For more 
information on the topic, available at. http://w.w.w.ohchur.org/english/boche.index.htm.  
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rules to situations of armed conflicts covered in their reports.51 In fact, the 
implementation of substantial humanitarian law standards by rapporteurs has 
been obvious in recent years. However in the practice of rapporteurs52, 
humanitarian standards are applied when the analyses focuses on the 
obligations of states and not on rights of victims under human rights law e.g. 
when the issue is relating to use of prohibited methods of warfare. In this 
case reference is made to humanitarian law standards which cover it 
indirectly. Also in cases of forced displacement of the civilian population, 
rapporteurs applying Article 17 of standards, view such displacement as a 
violation of AP II if applicable. In this connection the issue of freedom of 
movement and residence covers the case also. 
In other cases, humanitarian law standards have been implemented to 
evaluate the loyalty of a specific practice as the most appropriate in the 
situation and to emphasize the gravity of the offence in that not only does a 
particular act violate human rights law but it also violates humanitarian law. 
Example, the Special Rapporteur on the former Yugoslavia condemned the 
                                                 
51 Example is the Special Rapporteurs on Extra Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. 
52 Example is the report prepared by the Special Rapporteur on Iraq who concluded that the use of chemical 
weapons is a serious breach of Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting use of interalia, poisonous, or other 
gases as a method of warfare. Under Human Rights Law the use of chemical weapons is incompatible with 
the right to life indirectly O, Donnell, Daniel, Trends in the applications of international humanitarian law 
by United Nations human rights mechanisms, IRRC, Sept. 1998, No. 324, pp 442-443 
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siege of Sarajevo and Bichac in his report referring to attacking civilian 
objects like hospitals resulting in terror to civilians.53  
Economic blockade of a region is an act which is incompatible with the 
obligations of a state doing so under human rights law in terms of economic 
rights and threatening survival and the right to life. It is as well, a violation 
of humanitarian law as the blockade amounts to siege.54 Also, the practice of 
ethnic cleansing is described as a combination of practices incompatible 
with human rights, Article 3 common and Article 16 and 17 of AP II, as it 
violates fundamental principles embodied in both laws.55  
It is to be mentioned here that acts committed by non-state groups are 
considered beyond the scope of international human rights law, according to 
classic human rights doctrine under which human rights is binding only on 
states. However, the recent practice of UN rapporteurs in non-international 
armed conflicts referred to violations committed by them. They consider that  
a thorough, impartial and objective analysis of the situation of human rights 
                                                 
53 O, Donnel, ibid, p. 487.  
54 O, Donnell, infra, p. 486 referring to the report of Special Rapporteur on Iraq and the economic 
blockade against Kurdish region. 
55 The Special Rapporteur on the former Yugoslavia, in his third report of 1993, stated that ethnic cleansing 
is defined as a combination of practices including killings, torture, inhumane and degrading treatment, the 
forced movement of civilians and the destruction of Historic monuments and places of worship. At such 
killings, torture and in human treatment violate both human rights and common Article 3 while forced 
movement of civilians and destruction of monuments and places of worship violates articles 16 and 17 of 
AP 11-E/C-4/ 193150, Para 256, 257 and 260. 
 
 
 
 426
in a specific country must take into account grave breaches committed by 
armed groups.  
However, if a criticism is to be made, the reports prepared by rapporteurs are 
not in all cases clear as to violations of humanitarian law. It does not identify 
the applicable human rights law rules in some cases and may mention the 
facts of violence in a general way. In all cases, special rapporteurs as a UN 
Human rights mechanism, observing implementation of common Article 3 
and AP II proved to be effective. UN political organs have relied on such 
reports to pass resolutions condemning such violations, urging parties to the 
conflict to respect both human rights and humanitarian law applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts. And in serious cases of violations based 
on investigations by rapporteurs in their reports, the United Nations Security 
Council exercised its powers under the Charter to impose sanctions to 
preserve international peace and security.56  
The activities of the Human Rights Division, of the UN Observers Mission 
and Truth Commission sent in situations of non-international armed conflicts 
are good examples of the application of humanitarian law by a UN human 
rights mechanism. In some situations these missions are entrusted with a 
human rights express mandate to monitor violations of international 
                                                 
56 The United Nations Security Council Resolutions, concerning the situations in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
1992 provides an example of UN practical reliance on such reports. Also the report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Afghanistan in 1992-E/CN. 4 / 1992/ 33 Para 49. 
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humanitarian law as well as violations of human rights law. The mission in 
doing so investigate violations of humanitarian law for example attacks on 
the civilian populations, acts of threats of violence, acts involving attacks on 
material goods essential to the survival of the civilian population or the 
obstruction of relief operations and arbitrary relocation of the civilian 
population. It also expands to include acts such as the execution of non- 
combatants by the rebels without respect to due process and the 
indiscriminate use of land.57  
iii. Non-Governmental Human Rights Organizations and 
Implementation of Humanitarian Law  
Non-governmental human rights organizations (NGO’s) has long played an 
active role in working for the implementation of common Article 3 and AP 
II rules in non-international armed conflicts.58 Since human rights violations 
within their respective areas of concern may occur during armed conflicts it 
is normal that such organizations rely upon human rights and humanitarian 
law when analyzing human rights abuses in internal armed conflict 
situations. Serious human rights violations including arbitrary killing, 
                                                 
57 Third report of the Human Rights Division A /146/ 23580-S/23580 F. J. Hampson, “Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict” in M. Meyer ed. Armed Conflict and the New Law, London ( 1989, 
p. 58).  
58 Among the numerous NGO’s working in this field, Human rights Watch and Amnesty International are 
recognized in this field for its actives roles in releasing reports and publications of serious violations of 
both human rights and humanitarian law in a number of non international armed conflicts such reports 
available at http://web.amensty org. and http://www.hrw.org. 
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detention and degrading treatments are also considered violations of 
common Article 3 which are likely committed in wide scale in such 
conflicts. A study on practice of non-governmental organizations in applying 
humanitarian law standards relevant in such conflicts is not practical in this 
part as their practice is extensive and widespread in a number of areas of 
armed conflicts. However, highlighting some of the issues arising in relation 
to their work and practice in such conflicts to point out its impact on the 
implementation of common Article 3 and AP II would be more useful.  
A question which might arise in relation to citation of international 
humanitarian law by NGOs in support of their human rights concerns, is 
why NGOs rely on humanitarian rules in their work investigating human 
rights violations? The convincing reasons may be that reliance on 
humanitarian instruments like Geneva Conventions and its Additional 
Protocols serves their purpose in attracting media attention and public 
opinion due to the fact that such Conventions acquired universal acceptance 
by all states, unlike human rights instruments. This is based on the fact that 
humanitarian principles and rules met universal consensus and respect from  
all cultures and societies in specific from the category of persons required to  
observe the rules as members of military forces. Besides, decisions on 
human rights issues are politically sensitive. This is in addition to the fact 
that acts committed against civilians dignity and humanity constitutes a 
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serious violation of both laws. In such cases humanitarian law provides 
valuable tools for NGO’s in their work to safeguard human rights of such 
civilians.  
In achieving their objectives human rights organizations adopt various 
approaches in certain situations of armed conflict, which are useful in 
serving implementation of common Article 3 and AP II. They face 
governments committing violations with evidences and request the 
authorities concerned to take necessary measures to stop such violations.59  
In most cases, these organizations release reports to draw attention of media 
about human rights and humanitarian law violations committed against 
civilians. The release and publication of such abuses tends to serve two 
purposes; first to generate international condemnations against such 
governments and to urge international community to exercise pressure on 
governments to react to stop such violations by taking all possible actions.  
An important question also arises in relation to their work as far as 
opposition armed groups are concerned, as to whether the mandate of such 
organizations should be extended to questions concerning abuses by such 
groups or rebels fighting in non-international armed conflicts? It is to be 
mentioned here that, the nature of the work of such organizations is based on 
                                                 
59 Weissbradt, David, The Contribution of international non-governmental organizations to the protection 
of human rights, in 2 Human rights in international law (Meron, Ted ed.1984) p. 403. 
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human rights law which is basically concerned with the individuals’ rights in 
relation to government authorities. They monitor situations of human rights 
in relation to acts which are considered violations of human rights law if the 
actors are the agents of a state or if the state fails in its duty to protect the 
individual or to prosecute the persons accused of such violations. Though on 
theoretical basis, their mandate does not extend to abuses by non-state 
actors, however, the practice of such organizations addresses abuses by 
armed opposition groups e.g. in taking of hostages, deliberate killing of 
civilians, rape etc. The justification given for this practice is that the decision 
to include certain abuses by non-state actors within the scope of such 
organizations is based upon recognition that the principles of international 
humanitarian law embodied in area of applicability of Article 3 and AP II 
can support their work in non-international armed conflicts.60 However it 
seems to us that in such situations the NGOs are invoking the principles of 
common Article 3 in assessing violations of non-state actors rather than 
provisions itself. Besides, most of the rules under Article 3 and AP II are of 
customary nature.  
NGOs when implementing humanitarian law during armed conflicts are 
faced with some difficulties in relation to interpretation of the law and the 
                                                 
60 This justification was given by the International Council of Amnesty International in its meeting in 
1991- David Weissbrad and Peggy L. Hicks, Implementation of human rights and humanitarian law in 
situations of armed conflicts, IRRC, March-April 1993, No. 293 P. 125.  
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applicable standards of humanitarian law to the situation of violation before 
them. However, their practice showed them that there are some standards, 
which are to be specifically applied to certain situations, which human rights 
standards may not cover sufficiently. Example is the rules governing 
displacement of the civilian population under Articles 17 and 18 of AP II 
which specifies that “all possible measures” must be taken to ensure 
“satisfactory conditions of shelters, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition for 
those displaced”. This provision has been used by NGO’s in a number of 
non-internal armed conflicts in its reports as the yard stick for whether 
camps set up by the government satisfy such conditions.61  
One of the strong criticisms against the work of such organizations is that 
their decisions are influenced by political factors and not based solely on 
legal criteria for assessing such violations. And that in their reports and 
publications they tend to select the human rights violations committed by 
government agents closing an eye on serious violations and abuses 
committed by opposition armed forces in a number of cases. No doubt, 
doing this would affect the credibility and reliance on such reports especially 
in relation to violations of common Article 3 and AP II applicable, the 
implementation of which requires, respect and observance by both parties to 
                                                 
61 Example the Report of Human Rights Watch of 1998 in Burandi, “Broxy targets civilians in the war in 
Burundi” Human rights Watch, New York 1998. Rachel Brett, Non-governmental human rights 
organization and international humanitarian law, IRRC, Sept. 1998, No. 324 PP-531-53.  
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the conflict. In our view, such organizations if they are to be genuine in their 
work ensuring respect of humanitarian law during non-international armed 
conflicts and to achieve their supervisory and monitoring role, it is necessary 
to distinguish the legal argument from the political argument when handling 
violations of common Article 3 and AP II, since implementation of such 
rules is of purely humanitarian nature. They should be objective and 
unbiased in disclosing violations committed by both sides of the conflict to 
gain credibility and reliability.  
iv. The Approach of Regional Human Rights Commissions to the 
Implementation of Humanitarian Law 
Commissions of regional inter-governmental human rights treaty bodies, has 
been regarded as competent to invoke international humanitarian law and 
that it can apply its rules. Example, of such Commissions is the inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the European Commission on 
Human Rights and the African Commission on Human Rights. The reason 
being that application of humanitarian law enhances its ability to respond to 
situations of armed conflicts especially in cases the applicable regional 
human rights Convention or instrument under which it is set up are not 
designed to regulate situations of armed conflicts62 and do not contain rules 
                                                 
62 Liesbeth Zegveld, The inter-American Commission on Human Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law: A comment on Tabalada Case-IRRC / September 1998, No. 324, P. 506. 
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governing the means and methods of warfare.63 As to whether such 
Commissions competence is limited to allegations of violations and not to 
assess compliance with humanitarian law by the state concerned, depends on 
its mandate under the Convention which sets it up. At such, the legal basis to 
apply international humanitarian law by such Commissions is to be specified 
in the Convention under which it is set up.64  
Conclusion 
In absence of an express provision providing for implementation of 
international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts based on common Article 3 and AP II an absence of an 
international supervision, the issue of implementation has to be considered 
as a whole. This should take into account matters such as the existence of 
political will, action by authorities, training of law enforcement forces, 
cultural perceptions and dissemination of the law by experts in the field. On 
international level effective protection of civilians victims is the challenge 
facing international community, be states or international bodies. This needs 
the combined efforts of all, ignoring legal constraints pertaining to state 
                                                 
63 For example whether a particular loss of life through use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be 
considered an arbitrating deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of CCP, can only be decided by reference 
to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from terms of the ICCP Covenant. Advisory 
Opinion of the Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ, Reports 1996 P. 240. 
64 Ch. M. Gerva, Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Implementation of International Humanitarian Law 
norms by Regional International Governmental Human Rights, Bodies” in F. Kalshoven, Y, Sandoz (Eds), 
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, pp 31-
67.  
 
 434
sovereignty aspects and legal formalities as to the nature and scope of 
activities of bodies ready to co-operate. Human rights regime can and 
contributes in these efforts. 
The role of international human rights bodies introduced a development to 
the traditional understanding that humanitarian law was the province of 
ICRC. This development is to be welcomed in so far as it contributes to 
strengthen the implementation of law providing for the protection of 
civilians rights in such conflicts. The possibility of co-operation between 
human rights organizations and ICRC in situations of international conflicts 
could be informal on an ad hoc basis as long as no fixed framework of 
working together has been set up. It is also useful to establish a link between 
humanitarian organizations working in the filed e.g. the Red Cross, the Red 
Crescent and human rights bodies to develop complementarities. NGOs have 
a role to play which proved to be useful. Human rights mechanisms are free 
from any restrictions in their work. Release of reports and publications to the 
public at large of violations produces its effects. However to co-operate with 
the ICRC, such human rights organizations face some difficulties. The 
NGOs staff members do not know the activities methods and way in which 
the ICRC worked. The ICRC activities during armed conflicts in relation to 
implementation of provisions of Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols as defined by Article 5 of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
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Movements Statute, include visiting detainees and civilian internees, 
interviews with them without witness to assure they are not ill-treated, 
search for missing persons, unite families, help to establish hospitals and 
safety zones, and provide victims with humanitarian aid. In addition, the 
ICRC work for the faithful application of international humanitarian law, by 
assessing whether all the provisions of the four Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols are implemented by parties, making official and an unofficial 
approaches to the authority and make use of its right to take humanitarian 
initiatives regarding matters in which it believes that a violation have 
occurred or may be prevented. This is made in principle without publications 
and in confidence to the authority. However the ICRC reserved “the right to 
public statement concerning violations of international humanitarian law in 
very restricted way i.e. if the violations are major and repeated; the steps 
taken confidentially has not succeeded, publicity will help the persons 
affected and the breaches are established by reliable and verifiable sources. 
It takes this step only in cases no remedial action is taken. At such the 
approaches of ICRC to governments in cases of violations of humanitarian 
law are different and in principle made in confidence65 the need for more 
training in international humanitarian law in order to become better 
acquainted with each other activities is required. In all cases, the fact that the 
                                                 
65 “Action by the ICRC in the Event of breaches of IHL”, 221, IRRC 76, C March-April 1981. 
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substantive norms of human rights and international humanitarian law are 
complementary, in character in some situations, does not mean that 
supervisory bodies set up under human rights law are automatically 
competent to apply or to supervise compliance with international 
humanitarian law, unless its mandate empowers it to act so. Otherwise, it is 
sufficient in our view, for such bodies to apply provisions of human rights 
conventions to be interpreted in light of international humanitarian law in 
situations of non- international armed conflicts.  
Implementation by a body within the umbrella of the United Nations to be 
set up could be another mechanism which we may propose. Such 
international body or agency is to be of an independent character, entrusted 
to exercise international supervision with view to observe implementation of 
humanitarian law and human rights law during non-international armed 
conflicts. This could be done possibly within the frame work of the United 
Nations system.  In addition we propose adoption of a binding reporting 
system by contracting states, on measures they have undertaken to 
implement its obligations under humanitarian law instruments during peace 
time, during armed conflict and the peace process period thereafter under 
this body.  The main objective of such body is to ensure the existence of an 
effective regime of protection for civilians which is prevailing over 
sovereignty justifications, monitoring implementation and respect of the law.  
 437
Political pressure from third states like donors and politicians to achieve a 
common goal, proved to be influential in political realities of today 
situations of armed conflicts. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention for 
 Protection of Human Rights of Civilians in Non-International  
Armed Conflicts 
Introduction  
 
The protection of civilian victims in non-international armed conflicts is the 
responsibility of the government of the state within whose territory the armed 
conflict occurred, being a matter falling within the domain of domestic jurisdiction 
of states.1 This general rule does not reflect any more the reality and practice of 
today international legal order. The last years of the twentieth century, have 
witnessed an interventions which were, justified on humanitarian considerations 
owing to the widespread of atrocities committed against civilians in a number of 
internal armed conflicts. Since then humanitarian intervention became one of the 
most debatable issues in international jurisprudence, among states and in the 
jurisprudence of international courts. In particular, after the end of the cold war i.e. 
the 1990’s period which witnessed international intervention in a number of non-
international armed conflicts based on humanitarian grounds to protect civilians 
from gross violations of human rights as in Somalia and Kosovo.   This raises a 
number of enquiries as to the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention, the attitude 
                                                 
1 There are three categories of situations in which intervention could be envisaged in internal conflicts i.e. 
intervention by the consent of the established government, secondly intervention to assist a struggle for self-
determination and thirdly humanitarian intervention. The last category is the subject matter of discussion in this part.  
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of international jurisprudence, the rules governing such practice within the 
framework of the United Nations Charter and the practice of Security Council.  
In view of these enquiries, this Chapter is therefore to consider the extent to which 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention justified in stopping gross violations of 
human rights, can enhance the protection of civilians in non-international armed 
conflicts. The chapter is divided into six parts. Part 1 attempts to define the 
concept. Part 2 traces the history of practice of humanitarian intervention. Part 3 
presents the attitude of international jurisprudence from the legality of the concept 
by presenting main arguments for humanitarian intervention and those against such 
intervention. Part 4 examines the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention within 
the framework of the UN Charter and related principles. The practice of the 
Security Council after the cold war will be examined in this part in relation to the 
protection of basic human rights of civilians during internal conflicts which is 
always cited as a justification for intervention by the Security Council .Part 5 
examines the principle of non-intervention under Geneva law and Part 6 considers 
whether humanitarian intervention at such, “internationalize” the conflict.  
1.   Definition of the Concept of Humanitarian Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention is a broad term which has been used in a number of 
ways. Intervention may mean any form of interference in the affairs of another 
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state.2 As to what constitutes “humanitarian considerations is a loose clause,  
sometimes violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed during 
armed conflicts on a large scale may qualify the conflict for such intervention 
However, in most cases gross violations of human rights systematically, has been 
used to justify such action under international law. Humanitarian intervention 
refers also to the forceful intervention by one country into another for the purpose 
of preventing further gross and persistent violations of the basic rights of the 
citizens in that country.3  
A number of definitions have been made in an attempt to define the concept by 
legal writers and institutes. A classical definition given by Stowell as “…..the 
reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of 
another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to 
exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act 
with reason or justice”.4 
Modern writers define the term in relation to human right considerations. It is 
defined in the legal sense as the use of force in order to stop or oppose massive 
violations of the most fundamental human rights, especially mass murder and 
                                                 
2 The word “intervention” is wide which way include any form of interference in the affairs of another state through 
aggression, reprisals, self defense to economic and political pressure-R. Higggins, “Intervention and international 
law” in H. Bull ed. International World Politics, New York, 1984, P. 30.  
3 It is to be mentioned here that protection of nationals abroad is something more in the nature of self defense than purely 
humanitarian interventions, Example Israeli citizens saved by Israeli’s raid against Uganda at Entebbe-D. Angelo, “Resort to 
force to protect nationals, Virginia Law Journal (1980), 1, P. 485 
 
 
4 E.C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, (Washington DC 1921). P 53. 
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genocide, in a third state provided that the victims are not nationals of the 
intervening state and there is no legal authorization by a competent international 
organization, in case of United Nations by means of the Security Council.5 The 
idea underlying such definition is linked with the emergency of a new world order 
in which values like respect of human rights were supposed to be top priorities and 
refers to the criteria of absence of legal authorization. To some writers, the need to 
help people in such situations would mean that everyone had “a duty to assist a 
people in danger” which would override the traditional legal rules of state 
sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. 6 
International institutes have defined humanitarian intervention a “coercive action 
by states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of 
its government, with or without authorization from the United Nations  
Security Council, for the purposes of preventing or putting a halt to gross and 
massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.7  
In view of the above definition, humanitarian intervention could take the form of 
action by a single intervening state; in such a case it is unilateral intervention. 
However if a number of states used their military resources together to intervene in 
                                                 
5 Under Article 53 of the UN Charter regional organization or agency may authorize a state to carry humanitarian   intervention 
subject to the authorization of Security Council, Kold Robert, Note on humanitarian intervention, IRRC, March 2003, Volume 
85, No. 849, P. 119.  
6 Kioko, BEN, The Right of Intervention under The African Union, Constitute Act. From Non-interference to Non-
Intervention, IRRC, December 2003, Volume 85, No. 852, P. 808.  
7 This definition is given by the Danish Institute of Foreign Affairs, quoted by Kioko, ibid, P. 809. 
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a foreign territory then this constitutes a collective intervention. An action based on 
humanitarian grounds is said to be intervention if it takes place only in so far as no 
consent is given by the state in whose territory the action is to be taken. If such a 
state gives its consent then this is another form of intervention called intervention 
by invitation, example when Britain and United States were invited by the 
Government of Lebanon to intervene to put an end to the civil war in 1958. The 
above definition implies that the term “intervention” cannot be used for UN action 
in a territory when the action carried under the authorization of a competent organ 
of the organization, unless enforcement action is taken under Chapter VII in a state 
which opposes such action.8 It should be noted that the above concept of 
humanitarian intervention is based only on the intervention by the use of force. 
However, this is a restrictive definition9 in our view; every act constitutes 
intervention if done against the will of the concerned state. In this sense a wider 
definition has been proposed by some modern legal writers. Humanitarian 
intervention is defined as follows “It is coercive conduct carried out by the 
international community in a certain state without the state’s approval; it is carried 
out in two kinds of situations, one is that when a large scale and organized 
violations of human rights occurs in a country, whose government is incapable of 
curbing it, or when that violation is simply carried out, incited or tolerated by the 
                                                 
8 Detter, Engrid, The Law of War op,cit PP. 70-71 
9 J.N. Rosenan, International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York, IA 1969, P. 161. 
 
 
 443
government, and another is when the government of one country is incapable or 
reluctant to assure its other responsibilities concerning the protection of basic 
rights which are necessary for its forms of intervention as well as those 
interventions which do not include the use of force,  population to survive”.10 
According to this definition, humanitarian intervention includes not only military 
intervention in the classic sense, but also non-military forms of intervention as well 
as those interventions which do not include the use of force.  
2.  The History of the Practice of Humanitarian Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention had a long standing in states practice as a concept in 
international law it has an ethical, legal and political basis.11 During the nineteenth 
century and first half of the twentieth century there were instances of intervention 
noted which were rooted, shared and were justified on humanitarian values. 
However, there is little doubt that a permissive custom of intervention existed at 
that time as a result of practice by the great powers in Europe at the time. There 
that period when use of force was lawful in states relations. However, the United 
National Charter by prohibiting the threat or use of force in international relations 
                                                 
10 Martha Finnemore “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention”, in Peter Katzenstein (ed), The Culture of 
National Security; Norms and identify in Word Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, PP. 153-185).   
11 C.A.J. Coady, The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, United States Institute of Peace, P. 5-Hoffmann, 
Stanly, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, Notre Dame, England University of Norte Dame 
Press, 1996.  
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were contradicting views among jurists as to the validity of the practice 12 during 
under Article 2 (4), excepting case of self defense under Article 51, it introduced 
new changes to the concept in abrogating the customary practice of humanitarian 
intervention, if it could be considered a valid practice at that time.13As a result the 
practice of states after 1945 and during the cold war was very few.  
Three cases of humanitarian intervention during the period took place and were 
condemned by the United Nations as violating obligations under the Charter 
prohibiting use of force without authorization of UN. In the three cases the 
Intervention was justified as putting an end to gross violations of human rights of 
nationals of that states. One of these cases was the intervention by India into East 
Pakistan (New Bangladesh) in 1971-72, after the United Nations failed to take 
action against the large scale human rights abuses in East Pakistan, which 
succeeded to put an end to such atrocities. This intervention was condemned by a 
number of states on the fact that India invaded East Pakistan, irrespective of the 
motives of such action.14 However, supporters of such action arguing that the gross 
                                                 
12 Example of few incidents of humanitarian intervention is in 1827 Great Britain, France and Russia intervened to 
put a stop to the civil war in Greece. The intervention was authorized by the concert of Europe. Also the French 
intervention in 1860 to save the Christian Marionettes of Mount Lebanon from further brutalities at the hand of the 
Druse, the intervention of the United States in Cuba in 1898 is another incident when the Cubans rebelled against 
the Spanish Monarchy, defeated by the United States intervention and become a republic. For more examples 
the Spanish Monarchy, defeated by the United States intervention and become a republic. For more examples of 
such incidents given by L. Oppenheim    in F. Rox Burgh (ed), International Law, 3rd ed. Vo. 1, London, 1920, P. 
221.  
13 Michael Akheurst, Custom as a source of International Law, BYIL (1974-1975) P. 14.    
 
14 T. Frank and N. Rodley “After Bangladeshi, The law of humanitarian intervention by armed force”, American 
Journal of International Law, Volume 67, 1973, P. 275.  
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violations of human rights, with the failure of UN to take action, makes it 
necessary to re-evaluate the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in light of such 
situations. Lillich commenting on the incident reflected this view by stating that:  
“Following months of inactivity by the United Nations and the world community 
generally in the obvious gross human rights deprivations in the area, manifestly 
calls for a fundamental re-evaluation of the protection of human rights by general 
international law. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention, whether unilateral or 
collective, surely deserves the most searching reassessment given the failure of the 
United Nations to take effective steps to curb the genocidal conduct and alleviate 
the mass suffering which took place in Bangladesh”.15 The second incident during 
this period was the Tanzanian intervention into Uganda in 1979 when Tanzanian 
troops aiding Ugandan rebels invaded Uganda to end the rule of Amin. Tanzania 
justified its intervention on humanitarian considerations i.e. to end the rule of the 
bloody Amin.16 The third incident was in 1979 when French troops aided rebels in 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 The international protection of Human Rights by General International law”, Second Intervention Report of the 
Sub-Committee (Richard Lillich, Rapporteur), in Report of the International Committed, on Human Rights of the 
International Law Association, p. 54, 1972.  
 
 
 
16 S.K. Chatterjee, “Some aspects of support in international law: Tanzania and Uganda”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 30, 1981, P. 755.  
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 the overthrow of Bokassa, the French justified this on humanitarian basis.17 These 
incidents since then heated the debate on the lawfulness of humanitarian 
intervention which reached the highest during the 1990’s as a result of incidents of 
intervention on humanitarian considerations to stop gross violations of human 
rights of civilians in areas of non-international armed conflicts.  
By the end of the cold war, the 1990’s intervention for humanitarian reasons in 
some cases took place under the auspices of the UN. For example the United 
Nations authorized entry of troops into Somalia in 1992 and in East Timor and 
Haiti.18 However, the intervention which was made by NATO in Kosovo in 1999 
was without authorization from the United Nations when NATO decided to bomb 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to force the Belgrade regime to cease ethnic 
cleansing of Albanians Muslims in Kosovo. There was great damage and death of 
civilians caused by the NATO attacks and a mistake bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade. The action was justified on humanitarian considerations with 
objective to stop the gross violation and human rights atrocities committed by the 
                                                 
 
17 F. R. Teson “Humanitarian Intervention, an enquiry into law and Morality, 2nd ed. Irvington on Hudson, New 
York 1997, P. 159, other incidents include the U.S intervention in Gernada, the intervention by Belgium and Britain 
and U.S. in 1964 in the Congo to undertake the evacuation of trapped foreigners in an area controlled by rebels 
opposed to the central government of Congo. However some legal writers argue that since the intervention was 
sanctioned by the Congolese government it was not humanitarian intervention. However some justified the action as 
necessary for the protection of their nationals i.e. self defense rather than humanitarian intervention. Lillich, 
Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, (University Press of Virginia, 1973 P. 144). 
18 R.E, Gordon, Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations, Iraq, Somalia and Haiti, Texas International Law 
Journal, Volume 31, 1996, P. 43-M. Robert, United Nations intervention in East Timor, Columbia, Journal and 
Transnational Law, Volume 39, 2000, P. 25.  
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Belgrade regime against the civilians in Kosovo.19 The intervention in Kosovo by 
the NATO gave rise to great controversy as to the lawfulness of the action as the 
UN had not authorized the NATO to intervene.20  This raised the old question as to 
lawfulness of a unilateral use of force by a state or groups of states or international 
bodies outside the umbrella of UN in non-international armed conflicts based on 
justification of protection of human rights of civilian victims. This question will be 
examined here in relation to the attitude of international jurisprudence from the 
existence of humanitarian intervention as a concept. The legality of humanitarian 
intervention to stop gross violations of human rights committed against civilians in 
non-international armed conflicts, within the framework of the United Nations 
Charter, will then be examined as various doctrines were invoked to back 
humanitarian action while others stood against such intervention even if based on 
humanitarian considerations with view to stop human rights atrocities.  
 
3. The Attitude of International Jurisprudence from the Concept of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Conflicting Views 
Humanitarian intervention in non-international armed conflicts, as mentioned 
earlier, gave rise to great controversy as a concept among legal writers. Two 
attitudes appear to reflect such controversy, the first attitude which stands against 
                                                 
19 R. Wedgwood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia”, American Journal of International Law, Volume 93, 1999. P. 
82.  
20 B. Simma,” NATO, the UN and the use of force, legal aspects”, European Journal of international law, vol. 10, 
1999.   
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the acceptance of humanitarian intervention in theory and practice and the second 
attitude which recognizes the existence of the concept i.e. it accepts humanitarian 
intervention as a principle but subjects it to specific conditions.  
i.    The First Attitude  
The first attitude is represented by those scholars who deny legal justification to 
humanitarian intervention especially under customary international law. The basis 
of such denial was grounded on the various states practices which have been 
described as humanitarian. Brownlie, believes that there has been not enough 
evidence of state practice amounting to humanitarian intervention as to confer 
recognition and legality on the doctrine. As a result, he concludes that “unilateral 
action by a state in the territory of another state on the ground that human rights 
require protection or a threat of force against a state for this reason, is unlawful.21 
Other legal writers like Frank and Rodley would not want humanitarian 
intervention absolutely prohibited. To them the concept of humanitarian 
intervention is not yet precisely determined. Thus, any genuine humanitarian 
intervention should be viewed as a mitigation factor other than an exception to the 
general prohibition. Those who deny legal justification in international law to the 
concept give other reason i.e. because of the possibility of its abuse and its precise 
nature. Their fear is that humanitarian intervention may cause more injury and may 
                                                 
21 Brownlie, “Humanitarian intervention” Chapter 10, in Richard B. Lillick, International Human Rights, Problems 
of Law, Policy and Practice, (Brown & Co. 1979), p. 226.  
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expose the international order to be divided as to supporters and those who reject 
such intervention a fact which way threaten international peace.22  
However, the most challenging aspect of the concept of humanitarian intervention 
is to identify the legal principles on which it can be based. It has been argued by 
some writers that the concept does not exist in positive international law as 
humanitarian considerations do not in themselves amount to rules of law as 
confirmed by the ICJ in the South West Africa cases.23 Beside, intervention in the 
name of human rights is a breach of customary obligation not to intervene in the 
affairs of another state which was asserted by the ICJ in the case of Nicaragua.v. 
United States.24 To Lautherpact, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention had 
never become a fully acknowledged part of positive international law.25  
Thus, according to above, attitude humanitarian intervention as a concept has no 
legal basis under customary international law or under treaty law. Advocates of 
such attitude are then prepared to accept and recognize the validity of collective 
humanitarian intervention under the United Nations Charter only. Other supporters 
of this attitude commence from the premise that humanitarian intervention is 
subject to abuse and therefore must be prohibited and at such it is not lawful. They 
                                                 
22 Thomas M. Frarck & Nigel S. Rodley “After Bangladesh, The law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military 
Force”, 67 A.J.I.L. (1973) p. 274.  
23 ICJ, 1966 Report 6, p. 32. 
24 ICJ, 1996 Report 6, p. 32.  
25 Lautherpact “The Grotian Tradition in International Law” 23 BYIL (1946) p. 46.   
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also sought to deny the existence of state practice of humanitarian law by adducing 
motives other than purely humanitarian considerations to the incidents of intention. 
To them motives of such incidents are not the sole reason in all cases, various 
interests will operate at a particular time to influence the decision to intervene for 
humanitarian reasons.26  
However, some of legal writers criticized this attitude by asserting that 
humanitarian intervention is existing at least as a fact in international relations. It is 
true that personal interests are in most if not all cases, determine such action, 
however the protection of the interests of humanity must form the dominant and 
motivating factor. As to the claim that it may be abused, this does not negative its 
legal existence. Grotious said in this meaning “the intervention in another state for 
the protection of the oppressed nationals of that state as this, but that which is used 
by bad men, does not necessarily cease to be a right”. 27 
ii.   The Second Attitude  
Advocates of the second attitude like Lillich and Teson, assert the existence of the 
concept of humanitarian intervention in customary international law Lillich 
disagrees with Brownlie, in believing that there has been enough evidence of state 
practice to confer legality in the doctrine. He argues that the history of 
international relations recognized the existence of the concept and incidents of 
                                                 
26 G. Eze Jiofor and Dr. Quashieau, The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention in the Contemprary world 
situations, American Society of international and Comparative Law (ASICL) Proceedings (1993) 5, p. 45.  
27 Quoted by G. Eze Jiofor, ibid, p. 48.   
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humanitarian interventions before the establishment of United Nations and 
adoption of the Charter thereinafter.28 He goes further to assert that in cases where 
disrespect for the human person on a large scale occurred to shock the conscience 
of mankind, any outside intervention to prevent such atrocities, have always 
received the approval or at least tacit approval of the other countries.29  
Lillich, Teson and Reisman assert that humanitarian intervention is a legal fact in 
customary international law and in accordance to the Charter. To them what is 
needed to reduce the possibility of its abuse is to set out standards or conditions 
according to which any state contemplating unilateral humanitarian intervention 
should satisfy it to such conditions, before taking the action of intervention.30 By 
this they are holding the same classical view of Gentile, that intervention is a fact 
and may be taken by any state or a group of states by pointing that; “There remains 
                                                 
28 Example is the intervention of France, Great Britain and Russia against the Turkish massacres and suppression of 
the Creeks which resulted in independence of Greek in 1830, the Russian intervention against Turkey and the 
intervention of Austria, Russia, Great Britain, Italy and France in Turkey as a result of insurrection of minorities in 
Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1877 and Macedonia in 1903.  
29 Richard. B. Lillich, International human rights: Problems of law, Policy and Practice, op. it, p. 587. 
 
 
30 They referred to conditions and standards set out by the International Commission of Jurists in relation to events 
in East Pakistan which requires that the state against which measures are to be taken has shown, itself manifesting 
guilty in respect of its citizens of systematic cruelty, their fundamental human rights are denied, the conscience of 
mankind is shocked and persecution is intolerable, no practical peaceful means of resolving the problem is available 
such as negotiation’s inter-mediations or submission to competent international organizations, the international 
community must have had the opportunity within the limits imposed by the circumstances to ascertain whether the 
conditions justifying humanitarian interventions do in fact exist and it takes for itself to solve the problem and 
change the situation by applying such measures as it may deem appropriate. If the international community does not 
avail  itself of the opportunities and fails to act in order to prevent or put stop to widespread violations of human rights which 
have been called to its attention thereby leaving no choice but intervention then, a state or group of states will be justified in 
acting in the name of humanity provided that: (a)  Before resorting to force it will deliver a clear peremptory demand to the state 
concerned insisting that positive actions be taken in to ameliorate the situation and (b) it will resort to force only within the state 
limits of what is absolutely necessary in order to prevent further violations of fundamental human rights and (c) it submit reports 
on its actions to the competent international agency to enable the later to know what is being done and to intervene if it seen fit to 
do so, finally it will withdrawn the troops involved in the interventions as soon as possible. The text of the report reproduced in 
Lillich, International Human Rights, op. cit, pp. 574-575.  
 
 452
now the one question concerning an honorable cause for waging war which is 
undertaken for no private reason of our own but for the common interest and on 
behalf of others. Look you, if men clearly sin against the laws of nature and 
mankind, I believe that anyone whatsoever may check such men by force of arms” 
and “if subjects are treated cruelly and unjustly, the principle of defending them is 
approved”.31 
Hugo Grotious who acknowledged the existence of humanitarian intervention 
before Gentili, maintained the lawfulness of intervention by one state on behalf of 
gravely persecuted citizen of another.  However, he accepted important 
qualifications to the principle of non-intervention if “the wrong is obvious (and 
some tyrant) should inflict upon his subjects such treatment as no one is warranted 
in inflicting, the exercise of the right vested in human society is not precluded and 
other states may take up arms to help the persecuted”. He was aware of the ever-
present potential for abuse but insisted that occasional abuse did not render the 
right of intervention invalid.32 He went even further in recognizing that the right of 
humanitarian intervention is the right to punish the perpetrators of gross violations 
of human rights committed in another state. Grotious asserts that this right to 
punish is implicit in the right to wage war in humanitarian causes, as important to 
the recognition in modern international law of universal jurisdiction over such acts 
                                                 
31 A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (1954), p. 108. 
32 Edwards, The law of war in the thought of Hugo Grotions, 19 Journal of Public Law, 1970, pp 396-97.  
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as genocide, war crimes and a crimes against humanity by saying, “The fact must 
also be recognized that Kings, and those who posses rights equal to those kings, 
have the right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries 
committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries 
which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of 
nations in regard to any persons whatsoever……”.33 This attitude rejects 
Brownie’s conclusion that customary international law, Charter of the UN and 
subsequent practice absolutely forbids intervention for humanitarian purposes by a 
state or a group of states. 
However, some criticism to the second attitude taken may be made. In 
acknowledging existence of humanitarian intervention as a concept, it qualifies 
such lawfulness by the satisfaction of certain standards that the intervening state is 
to decide on its own laws whether the standards are met or not. This is not enough 
to avoid abuse since there is no international body to take this task in absence of 
permission of such action under the Charter. Thus, the possibility of abuse is still 
there. However we do agree with advocates of this attitude that humanitarian 
intervention exists as a fact in international state practice, but the main question 
which remains is whether such a practice is lawful under the framework of the 
United Nations Charter or not, this question is to be addressed herein under.   
 
                                                 
33 Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 British Year Book of International Law, 1946, p. 46.    
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4.  The Lawfulness of Humanitarian Intervention within the Framework of                     
the United Nations Charter 
Though, The Charter does not contain any provisions in relation to the question of 
humanitarian intervention in general, however since it is a situation of use of force, 
then any attempt to examine its lawfulness in practice after 1945 should refer to the 
UN Charter as a basis for the legality of particular situations of use of force. This 
does not ignore other sources constituting part of the international order as treaty 
and customary law. The UN Charter sets up a system to the use of force in 
international relations by providing for certain rules and principles imposing 
obligations on states which may be used as a yardstick to determine the legality of 
humanitarian intervention in law and practice. Two fundamental principles are to 
be examined in relation to this issue which constitutes cornerstones of the Charter 
system governing states relations. These are the principle of prohibition of use of 
force and the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal 
affairs.  
i. The Principle of Prohibition of Use of Force 
One of the great achievements of the United Nations Charter is the recognition of 
the principle of prohibition of use of force under Article 2 (4) which provides that 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political in dependence of any state or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. This 
 455
subsection is one of the basic grounds upon which supporters and those against 
humanitarian intervention rely. Though different views have been made in relation 
in the ambit of Article 2 (4), however it is certain that any form of armed force is 
prohibited under the Charter if it is directed against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state or if it is inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations.34 This fact did not close the door for other interpretation by 
scholars in relation to use of force for purpose of humanitarian intervention. The 
reference to ‘force’ rather than war in the Article led some scholars to argue that it 
may cover situations in which violence or armed force employed, which fall short 
of the technical requirements of the “state of war”. In fact, the Charter provides for 
certain exceptions to Article 2 (4) which undermine the general prohibition of use 
of force i.e. exceptions in relation to collective security measures taken by the 
United Nations and with regard to the right of self defense and use of force by 
liberation movements to self-determination. 35 
The debate as to whether the above Article should be interpreted restrictively so as 
to permit force that would not contravene the Article or as reinforcing the primary 
prohibitions serves little purpose since the Article is regarded now as a principle of 
customary international law and as such is binding upon all states. However, the 
majority of legal writers are of view that the Article prohibits the use of force 
                                                 
34 N. Shaw Malcon, International Law, op.cit, pp. 685-691.     
35 ibid, p.691 
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irrespective of any justifications which may be made in cases other than the 
exceptions made, which does not include humanitarian intervention or otherwise.36 
The ICJ in Corfu Channel case in 1949 between Great Britain and Albania refused 
to recognize the use of force as an aspect of international relations in view of a 
claim by Britain to be acting in accordance with a right of intervention in mine 
sweeping of Channel to secure evidence for judicial proceedings, in stating that 
“the alleged right of intervention was the manifestation of a policy of force such as 
has in the past given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot find a place in 
international law”.37 The Court concluded that “the essence of international 
relations, lay in the respect by independent states of each others territorial 
sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs”,38 a principle to be examined 
here in relation to the system under the Charter.  
ii. State Sovereignty and The Principle of Non-Intervention in The 
Internal Affairs of States  
The principle of non-intervention is considered part of customary international law 
based upon the concept of respect for the territorial sovereignty of states.39 The 
                                                 
36 SHAW, International Law, op.cit, pp.687-698. 
37 ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 34.  
38 ibid, p. 35 
 
 
39 In December 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted its first formulation of the principle of non-intervention,  “The 
Declaration” on the inadmissibility of intervention in the Domestic Affairs of states which provides” 1-No state has the right to 
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reasons whatever in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, 
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its 
political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned ”--UN doc. A160 14, 1965, PP. 11-12. Also in October 1970, the 
General Assembly adopted the “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”-UN Doc A 18028 / 1971, pp. 121-124.  
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United National Charter recognized the principle of non-intervention in Para 7 of 
Article (2) providing that, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. According to this paragraph there are 
certain matters which are considered as of internal affairs of the state which does 
not allow for intervention. In fact, this Article has given rise to more controversy 
than any other provision in the Charter as it does not specify what these matters are 
and does not identify the concerned authority or entity to determine whether a 
matter is falling within the internal affairs of the states. As states practice, its 
interpretation is still uncertain. Besides, in the practice of the United Nations, a 
number of different tests are applied in order to determine whether a matter falls 
within a states domestic jurisdiction. The paragraph at such created a problem in 
relation to distribution of jurisdiction among states and the United Nations. The 
solution becomes even more complicated since sovereignty today is not absolute.  
Recent practice of UN has shown that a matter is unlikely to be regarded as within, 
a state’s domestic jurisdiction if it amounts to a breach of international law i.e. a 
threat to international peace or gross violations of human rights. In fact the great 
atrocities and massacre committed against civilians since 1990’s in a number of 
non-international armed conflicts led the UN to review its attitude with regard to 
the understanding of the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of the 
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state, when the matter relates to gross violations of human rights of civilians. The 
former General Secretary of the UN in 1991 stated in this connection that “it is 
now clear that the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of states should 
not be used as a protective mechanism to some Governments which violate human 
rights. The principle of human rights cannot be recognized by some one here and 
ignored by the other there out and that it shall not be used in abuse or ignored on 
selective basis, and that any intervention by UN to protect human rights should be 
made in conformity with UN itself, and if the UN organization is bound by its 
Charter to preserve state members sovereignty on one hand, it is bound also by the 
Declaration of Human Rights on the other hand, and as a result the organization 
has to keep the balance imposed between the individual and his state in relation to 
any matter it undertakes”.40 Though this view may be accepted as a principle, 
however it is to be legitimized on the fact that the practice has shown that 
reservation of state sovereignty and human rights at the same time is difficult to 
attain in most cases. In fact this change in the attitude of UN brought with it a need 
for reformulation of the concept of sovereignty, which is to be closely related to 
the protection of human rights. This has been expressed by the Secretary General 
of the United Nations by stating that “The time has come for the international 
community to undertake a contemporary reassessment of the applications of the 
world system of sovereignty, international security will be enhanced only when 
                                                 
40 Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians .UN doc.S/1991/957 p.2. 
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human security is enhanced. Both require democracy and popular participation, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 41  
As a result of changes and to meet with the aspirations of the international 
community and to ensure world security and order there was a need of reassessing 
concepts and principles of international law. These are to respond to such practical 
changes where the general aspiration is the promotion and respect for human 
rights, is the concern of the whole of international community. In view of such 
changes, the principle of the territorial sovereignty of states is no longer sacred and 
inviolable. The growth of human rights reflects the changing trend towards the 
limiting of the sovereignty of states in the interest of individuals which should not 
be invoked as an obstacle in the realization of human rights. No doubt these 
changes rendered the domestic jurisdiction issue as essentially a relative question 
which should take its scope from the general aspirations prevailing. The Permanent 
Court of International Justice stated in this meaning that” The question whether a 
certain matter is not solely within the domestic jurisdiction of state is an essentially 
relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations”.42 As 
a result the issue of the protection of human rights of civilians during armed 
conflicts has been elevated into an international issue of the concern of all and no 
                                                 
41 I Bilder “International Law in the New Worlds Order”, Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, Vol. 
1 (1992), No. 1, p. 13.  
 
42 The Advisory Opinion on the Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, PCIJ, Series, B, No. 4,    
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longer falling essentially and exclusively within the internal affairs of states. This 
fact opened the door for possible intervention based on human rights justification.  
In fact, two main issues i.e. of protection of human rights during armed conflict 
and the protection of civilians have been of particular importance for the concept 
of humanitarian intervention and its applicability to non-international armed 
conflicts. The question which arises in this connection, are violations of human 
rights law in non-international armed conflict justify intervention? Any answer to 
the above question in relation to the lawfulness of such action should be examined 
within the context of the system laid down by the UN Charter first and in relation 
to practice of the UN political organs e.g. the Security Council and then to those 
situations in which states contemplate.  
iii. Humanitarian Intervention and Powers of the Security Council in 
Situations of Armed Conflicts  
The United Nations Charter is the legal basis for assessing any type of intervention 
by the international community. The UN Security Council plays a prominent role 
in this matter. Under Chapter VII of the Charter the Security Council has wide 
discretionary powers to determine whether a situation of conflict which exist, 
constitutes “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, act of aggression” and if 
so decides on the appropriate measures to be adapted to the situation. These 
measures include taking collective military action as may be necessary to restore 
order and peace. In a number of non-international armed conflicts, the Security 
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Council took action under Article 41 described as humanitarian intervention on 
justification to stop gross violations of human rights committed against civilians, in 
that such violations threaten international peace and security. This practice by the 
Security Council exercised under Chapter VII, makes room for collective action 
i.e. use of force which may include humanitarian intervention justified on 
protection of civilians against abuses and serious violations of their human rights. 
In such a case, the Security Council, under Article 43, may call member states to 
make available armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary to carry this action 
to maintain peace. However, the Security Council can authorize a state or states to 
use force, even in circumstances when force would normally be illegal, if the 
conditions under Article 39 and 42 are met. Article 42 empowers the Security 
Council to use force in such circumstances and therefore may be interpreted as 
enabling the Security Council to authorize states to do the same. As to the legal 
effect of such a decision of the Security Council some modern writers like 
Akheurst describes it as a recommendation i.e. it cannot bind member states to 
carry out a resolution to adopt military measures without their consent, while it is 
binding on the state within whose territory the conflict is occurring. The other legal 
effect is that such state cannot invoke self- defense under Article 51 of the Charter, 
or take reprisals or claim reparation in response to the use of force by the member 
states so authorized by the Council.43  
                                                 
43 Akheurst, Modern Introduction to International law, op. cit, pp 389-399.  
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Thus, in principle the decision of the Security Council under Article 42 is a legal 
authorization permitting member states to intervene, at such it justifies in law the 
use of armed force otherwise prohibited by Article 2 (4) of the Charter.44 Example 
when the Security Council has explicitly authorized intervention on humanitarian 
ground i.e. serious violation of human rights and humanitarian law in Somalia in 
1992.45 Also the Security Council authorized Allied forces by Resolution 688 to 
military intervene in Iraq to protect the Kurds in 1991.46 It is to be noted that the 
legality of the decision authorizing intervention in above cases, has not been 
widely challenged. However, although the UN Security Council authorization for 
humanitarian intervention have been accepted by some states yet this practice of 
Security Council has been a subject of disagreement among a great number of legal 
writers. 
Those supporting such practice they base their argument by stating that, the 
Charter may leave scope for humanitarian intervention, first, from its references to 
fundamental human rights, which are proclaimed to be central purposes in Article 
(2), “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                             
44 I.bid p. 390.   
45 Example the operation of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia was authorized in Security Council 
Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992, and of a Multinational Force (MNF) in Haiti in Security Council Resolution 
940 of 31 July 1994.  
46 P. Malanczuk, the Kurdish, Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War – European 
Journal of International Law, 2 (1991), EJIL, pp. 114-132 
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measures to universal peace”. And in Article 2 (3), “To achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, literal or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms, without distinction as to race, sex, language 
or religion”. Supporters of this view maintain that these UN objectives cannot be 
achieved if violations of human rights threatening international peace and the UN 
are unable to stop them.47  
The second case in which the Charter may have scope for humanitarian 
intervention i.e. concerning the possibility of such intervention under the UN 
Security Council auspices is to be concluded from a number of other Articles in the 
Charter. Under Article 39 the Security Council can take action in cases deemed to 
constitute a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. In 
practice, humanitarian crisis within states resulting from armed conflicts can be 
interpreted to include or encompass with, any or all of these threats. In addition, 
Article 2 (7) implicitly recognizes the possibility that the Security Council could 
authorize enforcement measures partially or wholly within a sovereign state in 
stating that “...but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII”. Thus Article 2 (7) expressly refers to measures 
under Chapter VII and excludes them from the principle of non-intervention. 
                                                 
47 Roberts, Adams “The So –called “Right of Humanitarian Intervention”-Year of International Humanitarian, 2000, 
Volume 3 p. 8.    
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Besides, the practice of the United Nations shows that interventions in the filed of 
human rights are admissible in any case if there is a threat to international peace 
and security. Moreover, Article 25 places member states under an obligation to 
accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council in accordance with the 
present Charter”. The above argument points that these provisions particularly 
those in Chapter VII, suggest that in certain circumstances the Security Council 
may be within its powers to authorize intervention on humanitarian grounds. 48 
Finally, they argue that the Charter is not an instrumen protecting a single value, 
that of peace at all costs, but that it has in fact several purposes, one of its 
fundamental values, is the prohibition of the use of force but another is the 
protection of fundamental human rights which is viewed today as core of the one 
elements of the international legal order. Thus in cases of grave conflict between 
the maintenance of peace and respect for human rights and massive cruelties, they 
hold that sovereignty and recourse to force have to yield to humanitarian 
imperatives.49  
The above arguments have been grounded on possible interpretations of the UN 
Charter provisions. However, other legal writers reject such practice of the 
Security Council, like Sandoz in stating that, “the obvious arguments which may 
                                                 
48 Roberts Adams, ibid, p. 10 
 
49 J.P. Fontage, “The customary international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention, its current validity under 
the UN Charter”, California Western International Law Journal, volume 4, 1974, p. 255.  
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be employed against such practices are as follows. To tolerate humanitarian 
intervention would be tantamount to creating great uncertainty in international 
relations, would risk damaging the whole, security system established on the basis 
of the Charter of the United Nations and finally would involve patent risks of 
misuse, since human rights violations can provide a pretext for an intervention with 
different intentions.50 Other writers like Brownlie and Randelzhofoe take an 
absolutist view by arguing that the Charter has made a clear policy choice that the 
use of force by states is prohibited thus humanitarian intervention by individual 
states at such is prohibited under the Charter.51 While some writers go further by 
arguing that Article 2 (7) of the Charter prohibits intervention in the internal affairs 
of states, at such it does not only prohibits military intervention but extends to 
include all that threatens the principle of sovereignty irrespective of an form it may 
take. They maintain that humanitarian intervention if recognized requires the 
authorization and decision of Security Council which is subject to political 
considerations.  
In light of above it is clear there appears to be no agreement among legal writers 
that the Security Council has a legal right to authorize the use of force to prevent 
widespread violations of human rights to justify such intervention. However, with 
                                                 
50 Sandoz, Yves, “The right to assistance, the issues involved”, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 288, 
May 1992, pp. 215-227.  
 
51 Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, “In J.N. Moore (ed), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, Baltimore / 
London 1974, P. 217-Randelzhofer Article 2 (4), in B. Sumaria, (ed), the Charter of the United Nations, A 
Commentary, Oxford 1995, p. 124. 
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break up of the Soviet Union, the changing political conditions seemed to place the 
Security Council, now dominated by the Western Powers, in another critical 
situation in relation to the issue. This fact effectively changed the collective 
machinery into a unilateral system in which the Security Council favours a 
particular intervention while ignoring it in another genuine case of violations, as in 
Rwanda 1994 and Kosova in 1999, thereby denying the very reasons of such of 
protecting civilian victims. In such cases a state or an organization may act 
unilaterally by intervening on humanitarian justifications and without authorization 
from the Security Council. This again raises an important question as to the 
lawfulness of such action which is an issue of great controversy among modern 
legal writers.   
iv. Humanitarian Intervention by a State in Absence of Authorization of 
Security Council 
When there is a humanitarian crisis and massive violations of human rights in a 
non-international armed conflict and when the UN is reluctant to act under Chapter 
VII, a state or some states or an international body may decide to intervene though 
lacking any formal approval from the UN or any regional body.52 This was the case 
                                                 
52 As in the case in Rwanda 1994 and in Kosovo 1999. It is to be mentioned here that in theory in cases where the 
UN Security Council is unable to act, the matter should be addressed by the UN General Assembly, under its 
“Uniting for peace Resolutions” procedure. This requires a two-third majority of the General Assembly. Example in 
November 1950, the Western powers, needing continued support for their military action in Korea, secured the 
passage of General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) Known as “Uniting for peace” resolution. Some writers argue in 
this connection that under Article 55, the duty of the UN to create conditions of stability and well being are 
necessary to promote interalia, the universal respect of human rights. Thus where human rights violations in an 
armed conflict amount to threat or breach of peace, and the Security Council is unable to take action, the General 
Assembly can then do so under the “Uniting for peace resolution. For example Security Council when was rendered 
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in Kosovo in 1999. Though in this case some writers see that the intervention in 
Kosovo have a legal basis in the form of subsequent explicit UN Security Council 
approval, however the question still remains since it is extremely difficult to devise 
a general rule about the authorization of humanitarian intervention in such cases.53  
It is also difficult in such cases to reconcile universal legitimacy and effectiveness 
in defense of human rights. In fact the United Nations Secretary General in his 
address to the UN General Assembly on 20 September  1999 at the NATO 
bombing  campaign over Kosovo referred to this dilemma by stating that 
“………Intervention has cast in stark relief the dilemma of what has been called 
humanitarian intervention on one side, the question of legitimacy of an action 
taken by a regional organization without a United Nations mandate, on the other 
hand, the universally recognized imperative of effectively halting gross and 
systematic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences. The 
inability of the international community in the case of Kosovo to reconcile these 
two equally compelling interests-universal legitimating and effectiveness in 
defense of human rights can only is viewed as a tragedy. This developing norm in 
                                                                                                                                                             
in active by the Soviet vetoes during the Indian invasions of East Pakistan, the Council referred the matter to the 
General Assembly under the uniting for peace resolution. For more information on the issue H. Reicher, The Uniting 
for Peace Resolutions on the Thirtieth Anniversary of its Passage, Columbia Journal of International Law, 20 (1981) 
P. 379.  
53 Roberts, Adam, The so-called right of Humanitarian Intervention, op.cit, p. 40.  
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favour of interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt 
continue to pose profound challenges to the international community”.54  
In fact this issue revived the old question as to legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention justified on stopping gross violations of human rights of civilians in 
non international armed conflicts undertaken by a sate unilaterally without 
authorization of UN Security Council or a regional organization.55  It created 
dilemma and great controversy among legal writers who hold two different views. 
The first view is held by those arguing for the lawfulness of such intervention and 
the second opponents, regarding action by a state without authorization by the UN 
Security Council is unlawful which are to be examined here.  
a. Supporters of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention 
Supporters of humanitarian intervention argue that states are under obligation to 
protect nationals of other states from atrocities base their view on a number of 
arguments. Human intervention is not inconsistent with Article 2 (4) of the Charter 
because what the Article prohibits is not all threats or uses of force, but only those 
actions specifically against the territorial integrity “or ‘political independence” of a 
                                                 
54 UN doc, S/1999/957, 20 Sept. 1999.  
55 Article 52 and 53 of the UN Charter confer the power of a legitimate use of force by regional organization. By 
Article 53 (1) however no enforcement action shall be undertaken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. This means that such organization does not appear to 
have some independent capacity to legitimize certain military intervention on humanitarian ground. But in some 
cases which were originally authorized at regional level may get a measure of subsequent Security Council 
legitimization. Some possible cases of this include the Nigerian Led actions in Liberia from 1990 and in Sierra 
Leone in 1997-99 and NATO action in Kosovo 1999, Roberts, Adams, The so called “Right of Humanitarian 
Intervention, op. cit, pp. 38-40. 
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state. At such force used to stop gross human rights violations and to put an end to 
it, is lawful. Respect of human rights is one of the objectives of the UN.56 Others 
contend that under recent United Nations resolutions, gross or consistent patterns 
of violations of human rights are no longer essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states and therefore the principle of non-intervention is not 
applicable to this. They maintain that the principle of exclusiveness of domestic 
jurisdiction stops where outrage upon humanity begins.57 As to Article 2 (4) which 
is relied upon by opponents they, see that it has developed to meet modern 
changes. The contention that Article 2 (4) is absolute in its prohibition of 
intervention does not reflect the facts. Accordingly, international treaties such as 
the UN Charter should be interpreted in accordance with the present purposes and 
expectations in the international community to them, ‘Article 2 (4) did not ‘Freeze’ 
international law for all time. 58 
Some other writers see that humanitarian intervention comes under one of the 
forms of intervention i.e. including one of the three exceptions on the principle of 
prohibition of use of force under Article 51. This view widens the right to self- 
defense to extend not only in case of aggression but extends to the right of a state 
in adopting necessary measures including intervention to protect the rights of her 
                                                 
56 M.J. Glennon, “The New Intervention, The Search for a Just International Law, 78 Foreign Affairs (May / June 
1999, pp 2-7).  
57 Lauterpachit, The Grotian Tradition in International Law”, ibid, p. 27. 
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nationals abroad which may be subject in human rights atrocities in a non- 
international armed conflict.  However, this protection of nationals abroad is 
something more in the nature of self-defense than purely humanitarian intervention 
breaking out in that state.59 They rely also on Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter 
which recognizes that it is the concern and interest of international society to see 
that human rights are respected in all circumstances. This right was known in law 
and recognized by jurists like Grotious who advocated that it was proper for others 
to take up arms against an oppressor in the context of the rights vested in human 
society. To Grotious individuals like states are part and parcel of international 
society.60 Finally, they concluded by saying that there is a duty at least in the most 
extreme cases to use force. 61 They grounded argument on moral considerations by 
asking “must the international community stand idly by while millions of human 
beings are being massacred just because in the Security Council a permanent 
member holds its protective hand over the culprit?”62 In an international order 
where no effective system of prompt collective humanitarian intervention system 
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62 Kolb, Note on Humanitarian intervention,  o.p. cit, p. 127. 
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exists, it would seem immoral or unconscionable for any one to deny the existence 
of the right of other states to selflessly intervene to protect the endangered rights 
and lives of a people.63  
However, there are other legal writers, who support unilateral humanitarian 
intervention by states but adopt a conditional approach. For example, to Dougal 
and Reisman, humanitarian intervention is conditional upon the absence of 
collective action, to be consistent with the major purposes of the Charter, receives 
substantial support from the conduct of states and the response of the United 
Nations itself i.e. it should not fall short of a consensus approving the action. 64 As 
such Article 2 (4) does not constitute an absolute prohibition against all unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. Nanda taking this approach has suggested four criteria 
by which the legitimacy of a state’s use of force in human rights situations could 
be judged: a specific limited purpose, an invitations by the recognized government, 
a limited duration of the mission, a limited use of force in coercive measures, and 
lack of any other recourse, others add reporting to Security Council. 65 
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b. Opponents of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention 
Opponents to unilateral intervention reject the mere idea of humanitarian 
intervention and consider such concept as inconsistent with the UN Charter; they 
have their own arguments supporting their views.  
They regard the principle of non-intervention a well established principle in 
international relations and practice since the establishment of League of Nations 
and states practice during the Spanish civil war to the Charter under Article 2 (7) 
and Article 3 (2) of Additional Protocol 11 of 1977 supported by a number of UN 
declarations and regional treaties.66  Human rights conventions and international 
treaties do not contain any provision justifying intervention as a guarantee to such 
rights in cases of gross violation in any circumstances. Brownlie considers all 
humanitarian interventions by states to affect the “territorial integrity” or political 
independence of the state against which they are directed and hence to violate the 
Charter.67 By this, they are rejecting argument that what Article 2 (4) prohibits is 
not all threats or uses of force but only those actions specifically directed against 
the “territorial integrity or “political independence of states”. According to 
Thomas, “it is doubtful if the Charter has made my extension of the general 
international law right to intervene for humanitarian purposes, as a matter of fact, 
by prohibiting intervention by force, except collective intervention by the 
                                                 
66 Brownlie, op. cit., p. 222 
 
67 For example the “Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during Twentieth Session”, UN Doc, A/6014, 
1965, pp. 11-124.  
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organization in the event the actions constitute a threat to international peace, it has 
limited the general international law right to intervene for humanitarian purposes.68 
With regard to arguments based on purposes of the UN Charter, opponents see that 
the promotion of human rights ranked far below the protection of national 
sovereignty and the maintenance of peace as organizational goals. As to state 
practice there is not a single case where one state has intervened for the exclusive 
purpose of halting mass murder, much less any other gross violations of human 
rights. 69  Besides, in a unilateral intervention the decision when to take the action 
is left to the intervening state which is always done if the interest of such state 
requires so.  
From the above different views one my conclude that it is common ground 
between legal writers that humanitarian intervention by the United Nations are 
preferable to intervention by individuals states. Under Chapter UN of the Charter, 
action may be taken in situations of violations of human rights which are 
considered threat to international, peace. The recent tendencies of the United 
Nations regards gross or consistent patterns of human rights violations as no longer 
                                                 
68 A. Thomas, Non Intervention, (1956), p. p. 384. 
69 Example the U.S. intervention in Panama and Granada neither could be characterized as a response to mass 
murder, slavery or even widespread systematic torture. Both involved the forcible replacement of de facto 
governments. In each case the U.S. Government listed humanitarian concerns among the reasons for action but in 
neither case it suggests they were a sufficient justification or a primary  cause. Note, The Grenada Invasion. 
Expanding the Scope of Humanitarian Intervention-Boston College International and Comparative law Review, 8 
(1985), p. 413.   
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exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of states and that the principle of non 
intervention is not applicable in such cases. This conclusion raises a question as to 
its compatibility with Article 3 (2) of AP II of 1977 which needs to be examined 
here.  
5. The Principle of Non-Intervention under Geneva Law 
Geneva Conventions do not contain any provision which may be used to provide a 
basis for military intervention. The question of humanitarian intervention arises in 
connection with situations of non-international armed conflicts.70 Common Article 
3 does not provide for any provisions recognizing the principles of non- 
intervention in internal affairs of states. However AP II is the main international 
humanitarian instrument, which expressly excludes the idea that such agreement 
could provide a basis for humanitarian intervention in non-international armed 
conflicts. Article 3 of AP II entitled “Non-intervention”, states “1: Nothing in this 
Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a state or 
the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-
establish law and order in the state or to defend the national unity and fractional 
integrity of the state. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for 
                                                 
70 There is a controversy among legal writers as to whether Article (1) of 1977 of Geneva Protocol 1 applicable in 
international armed conflict can be interpreted as pointing to a basis for humanitarian intervention. The Article  
provides that “The High contracting parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in 
all circumstances” Kalshoven is of view that the negotiators at Geneva in 1964, did not have in mind anything 
approaching a Legal right of states parties to take action regarding violations in conflicts in which they were not 
involved. F. Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and Ensure respect in all circumstances. From Tiny seed to 
ripening Fruit”, 2 Year of International Humanitarian Law (YIHL) (1999) pp. 3-61.  
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intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reasons whatever, in the armed conflict 
or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting. Party in the                
territory of which that conflict occurs”.  
The draft of this Article which was proposed by the ICRC contained a clause 
prohibiting intervention by other states. During discussions states, delegates 
proposed that this prohibition shall extend to include prohibition of international 
organization on the plan that in some cases such organizations have committed 
number of violations under humanitarian cover. However, that proposal was not 
accepted by other delegations claiming this will open the subject in relation to 
jurisdiction of UN and the Security Council which is authorized under the Charter 
to undertake necessary measures in case of threatening of peace and security. 
Finally, the Diplomatic Conference of 1977 adopted a general provision including 
states and others as adopted.71 Article 3 (1) reaffirms the principle of national 
sovereignty, Paragraph 2 of above Article reserves the principle of non- 
intervention in its classical meaning by asserting that the Protocol cannot serve as a 
justification for direct or indirect intervention in an armed conflict or in the internal 
or external affairs of the contracting states. The prohibition is addressed not only to 
states but also to other bodies, international or non-governmental organizations, 
which might use the Protocols as a justification for interfering in the affairs of the 
                                                 
71 Pilloud, Commentary on Additional Protocols, op.cit 1363.  
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state in whose territory the armed conflict is taking place.72 It should be noted in 
this connection that a distinction is to be made between “intervention” and 
interference.  Intervention is applied to mean the use of force.  It is to be mentioned 
here that Article 3 (2) of AP II, was adopted upon request by third world countries 
which feared that the provisions of the Protocol may be used as a reason to justify 
interference in their internal affairs and affect the extent of their sovereignty.73  
This principle of non-intervention is to be found in other humanitarian law 
instruments and in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on 
humanitarian assistance.74 For example, the 1998 Rome Statute of the international 
Criminal Court, in its preamble states that “nothing in this Statue shall be taken as 
authorizing any state Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal 
affairs of any states”.  
The above discussions and the actual cases of intervention of states practice 
mentioned, suggests that this principle of non-intervention in Article 3 (2) of AP II 
                                                 
72 ibid, P. 163- a distinction should be made between humanitarian assistance and humanitarian intervention. The right the Humanitarian 
Assistance has been first proposed by France which became one of the agendas of UN, adopted by unanimous votes, Resolution 13/143 in 8 
DEC. 1988 entitled “Providing Humanitarian Assistance to natural disasters and similar emergency situations. The most important clause in the 
resolutions is that which provides a ground for humanitarian work. i.e. the principle of freedom to reach civilian victim of non international 
armed conflicts which finds its basis in Article 18 of AP11-For information on the subject Denise Platner, Assistance to the civilian population 
the development and present state of international humanitarian law, May-June 1992 ,Extract from International  Review of the Red Cross , No. 
288 pp. 249-263.      
73 ibid, p. 1364. 
 
 
74 For example the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, set up after the Kosovo intervention under the auspices of 
the Canadian government in response to appeals by the Secretary General of the UN, produced a Report on humanitarian intervention affirming 
the principle of non intervention and that each exception to it must be justified according to strict terms adopted in the Report. International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, International Development Centre, December 2001, available 
at http:hwww.icissciise.g.c.ca1report-e.asp. The above report depended on the idea that a set of conditions or criteria that would assist in 
determining whether in a particular case, humanitarian, intervention could be justified. For UN resolution example General Assembly Resolution 
45/100 of 14 December 1990, General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December of 1991, all recognized sovereignty and internal integrity of 
states in relation to humanitarian assistance.   
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is intended to bind contracting state not to use the provisions of AP II, as a 
justification for intervention. However, it would not possibly stop them from 
humanitarian intervention justified on massive violations of human rights of 
civilians during non international armed conflicts referring to states practice. This 
fact raises another important question as to whether such intervention, 
internationalizes internal armed conflicts.  
6.  “Internationalizing” Internal Armed Conflicts  
Various types of intervention can result in rendering an internal armed conflict 
“international” however, the question arises whether internal armed conflict should 
be qualified as “internal” in cases there is outside support from other states. In 
some cases the element of outside involvement or intervention had 
internationalized such conflicts as the Spanish civil war and the revolt in East 
Pakistan where India gave military support to the rebels. However there are no 
specific criteria as to the nature of form or support or assistance given by another 
state which may internationalize such conflicts. Some suggested that assistance 
given by another state to the government side would “internationalize” a conflict 
while others see that any substantial assistance to either the government or rebels is 
sufficient to internationalize an armed conflict. It is difficult to say what type of 
support from outsiders can give this effect e.g. financial support, support to obtain 
weapon, political pressure against the adversary or otherwise.  
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However, any military intervention can be considered a clear type of outside 
support internationalizing the armed conflict. In the Tadic Appeal Judgment, the 
Appeal Chamber of the ICTY stated “……………in case of an internal armed 
conflict breaking out, on the territory of a state, it may become of international 
character alongside an internal conflict if (i) another state intervenes in that conflict 
through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal 
armed conflict act on behalf of that other state”.75 Recent examples of internal 
armed conflicts which have been described as “internationalized” are the NATO 
action against Yugoslavia with regard to Kosovo in 199976 and before, the Yemen 
conflict of 1962-1970 in relation to Egyptian forces.77 However, it is to be noted 
that in most cases of outside support, states insist that a conflict is “internal” in 
order to benefit from the protection under article 2 (7) of the Charter that the 
conflicts falls within the domestic affairs of the said state.78 However, the term 
“internationalized armed conflict” has been used recently to describe internal 
hostilities that are rendered international. The term includes a number of situations 
i.e. armed conflict between two internal factions both of which are backed by 
different states, direct hostilities between two foreign states that military intervene 
                                                 
75 Tadic Jurisdiction Appeal, I.T.941, 1-AR-72, 2 Oct, 1995, Para. 70.    
76 Detter, Ingrid, The Law of War op.cit, p.49  
 
77 K. Boals, “The relation of international law to the internal war in Yemen”, in R.A. Falk, (ed). The International 
Law of Civil War, Baltimore, 1971, p. 306.  
78 Genocide, torture and other gross violations of human rights are not protected by the “reserved domain” under 
UN Charter article 2 (7). On this point, Detter Engrid, International Legal order, 2nd ed. P. 396. (London).  
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in an internal armed conflict in support of opposing sides; and war involving a 
foreign intervention in support of an insurgent group fighting against an 
established government.79 The most recent examples including NATO’s 
intervention in the armed conflict in Yugoslavia in 1999, is the intervention 
undertaken by Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe and others in support of the 
opposing sides of the internal armed conflict as in the Congo in August 1998 80 and 
the United States government’s support of the contra in Nicaragua in 1981.81  
However one of the problematic issues in such situations of the so-called 
“internationalized conflicts” is the failure of the current regime of humanitarian 
law to deal with conflicts that contain both international and non-international 
elements as a result of distinction between international and non international 
armed conflict to which different set of rules apply. The issue is a subject of a 
going debate as to which of the set of rules applicable. The ICRC in 1971 
submitted a draft to the Conference of Government Experts recommending the 
application of the whole body of international humanitarian law to a civil war if 
                                                 
79 D. Schindler “International Humanitarian Law and internationalized internal armed conflicts”, International 
Review of the Red Cross, No. 230, 1982, p. 255.  
80 M. Shaw, “From the Rwandan genocide of 1994 to the Congo Civil War” 
<hp://www.Sussex.ac.uk/users/hafa3/rawanda.htm7. 
81 Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V. United States of America) Merits, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p.  14 
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foreign troops intervened, but was not accepted.82 Some legal writers suggested 
also the application of international humanitarian law.  
The problem is that internationalized armed conflicts have special features, 
characterizing them from both international and internal armed conflicts.83 As 
such, the application of international humanitarian law to such conflicts involves 
characterizing events as either wholly international or wholly non-international 
according to criteria provided for in Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. 
One negative result of this problematic issue is the uncertainty as to of which set of 
rules to be applicable to protect civilian victims in such situation. The difference 
between the set of rules protecting civilians of international armed conflicts and the 
rules applicable in non-international armed conflict widely exists. For example, 
common Article 3 contains few rules to protect civilians against effects of 
hostilities; it also fails to define elaborate rules of distinction between military and 
civilian targets and makes no mention of the principle of proportionality in target 
selection. AP II provides for more detailed rules on the protection of civilian 
population, however it does not provide for prohibitions on indiscriminate attack, 
on methods and means of warfare causing unnecessary suffering and on damage to 
                                                 
82 International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government Experts, 
Geneva, 1971, Para. 284.  
83 H.P. Gasser, “Internationalized non-international armed conflicts: case studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea and 
Lebanon, American University Law Review, Vol. 33, 1983, p. 157.  
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the natural environment that are applicable under Additional Protocol II in case of 
international armed conflicts. 
Different views have been suggested by legal writers as to the law to be applicable 
in situations of humanitarian intervention rendering non-international armed 
conflicts “internationalized armed conflict”, However, the most acceptable view is 
that supporting considerations of a single law of armed conflict which will there 
fore be essential in the development of greater humanitarian protection to civilians 
during such internationalized armed conflicts84.  
Another closely related issue is that concerning other form of UN operations i.e. 
UN peace keeping forces, which raises the question of applicability of international 
humanitarian law to United Nations operations personnel carrying such action in 
non-international armed conflict, to be examined here.  
i. The Nature of United Nations Operations in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts and Applicability of Humanitarian Law  
 
The United Nations Organization main task to maintain international peace and 
security is carried in accordance to the provisions of the Charter. In this connection 
we have to distinguish between actions which the UN is authorized to undertake to 
achieve this task in situations of armed conflicts. There are two situations in which 
                                                 
84 For an extensive survey on the issue relating to the tests for determining whether an internal armed conflicts has 
become international and different views of legal writers and suggestions of the law to be applicable, G. Stewart, 
James, Towards a single definition of armed conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A critique of 
internationalized armed conflicts IRRC June 2003 Volume 85 No. 850 pp 313-350.     
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a Security Council is said to take action to maintain international peace under 
Chapter VII. The first situation, the UN Security Council may undertake 
enforcement action in its own name, in such a case it calls member states to 
provide forces under a unified UN command and control.85   
The second situation, it may call members to undertake enforcement or military 
action to enforce its resolutions, example of such situation when the coalition 
forces carried such operation in Iraq in 1990 which were measures authorized by 
the Security Council to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.86 Unlike, the first 
situations, the military personnel engaged in such cases remain members of their 
own national forces under their own commands. They do not wear the UN emblem 
and they receive their directions from their countries and not from the United 
Nations.  
The military operations undertaken by Security Council as collective measure in its 
own name and where authorized by the Security Council and undertaken by a 
group of member states in accordance with Security Council resolutions, were 
conducted in a number of situations of non-international armed conflicts which are 
likely to endanger international peace. In these cases the Security Council 
described such actions as humanitarian intervention to stop the gross violations of 
                                                 
85 Example in 1950 when North Korea invaded the South, the Security Council called members to provide forces to 
carry the operations in the name of UN, though it entrusted the command to the United States Falk, The 
International Law of Civil War, op.cit, p.413.   
86 O. Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict”, 85, AJIL (1991) p. 452. 
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human rights and of humanitarian law against civilians. However, this should be 
distinguished from other cases in which the UN may authorize action in non-
international armed conflicts which are likely to threaten international peace and 
security as a result of systematic violations of human rights of civilians and 
humanitarian law. In such situations, the Security Council considers that 
deployment of personnel in the name of the UN may help to preserve peace. 
Accordingly, it may pass a resolution to that effect; these forces are called peace 
keeping forces. The Security Council in passing such resolutions calls the 
Secretary General to enter into agreement with a number of states who may 
contribute in constituting such forces by sending national contingents forces. These 
are usually stationed between the two rival forces in cases where safety zones are 
set up to ensure observance of cease fire after hostilities ended, or to separate rival 
national groups in a divided country as in Bosnia. Their role is non-military; their 
presence is expected to stop rival forces from resorting to further hostile action.  In 
some cases the UN called upon member states to provide peace keeping forces 
military personnel to protect the activities of relief organization and to open ports 
and roads so that relief supplies may reach civilian victims. However recently, the 
UN began to address the use of force in UN operations with view to protect 
civilians. The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations states “……..UN peace 
keeping troops or police... who witness violence against civilians should be 
presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means in support of basic UN 
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principles. However, operations given abroad and explicit mandate for civilian 
protection must be given the specific resource needed to carry out that mandate.87 It 
should be mentioned here that rules of engagement, issued by the Security Council 
or their national rules of engagement limit the use of their arms to self defense only 
if they or their objects are attacked by one of the parties to the conflict. Peace 
keeping forces are not permitted under such rules to use force to protect local 
civilians, since this task is humanitarian only. It is to be noted that self defense is 
deemed to include situations which armed persons attempted by force to prevent 
UN troops from carrying their mandate88. However, these peace keeping forces are 
regarded by some as a form of humanitarian intervention which may 
internationalize internal armed conflicts  and as such may not be welcomed by 
states in whose territory the conflict is occurring.  
The issue of whether international humanitarian law applies to UN operations is 
controversial; some writers argue that humanitarian law will apply to both the UN 
forces and the state if the Security Council decides that enforcement measures 
must be undertaken by humanitarian intervention, depending on existence of armed 
conflict. The reason given is that since UN force in such cases use force, to restore 
peace or stop violations, they are considered combatants and involved in the 
                                                 
87 “Quoted by Roberts, Adam, The so called “Right” of Humanitarian Intervention, op.cit, P. 48.  
88 In fact in a number of recent operations, the Security Council exercised its power under Chapter VII to provide a 
mandate for the use of force as protection of safe areas to operation which were not originally enforcement 
operations e.g. in former Yugoslavia N. Rostow, “Until what? Enforcement Action or Collective self Defense? 85 
AJIL (1991) p. 506.    
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hostilities.89  As to UN peace keeping force operations, the issue whether 
international humanitarian law is applicable to such operations is one of the grey 
areas in the law which is still uncertain.90 Different views have been held with 
regard to this issue.91 It is argued that since the Geneva Convention IV of 1949 and 
its Protocols covers persons taking no active part in hostilities, then it is probable 
that members of UN peace keeping forces, being persons taking no active part in 
hostilities, so as cases of falling into the hands of such a party, will be protected 
under Common Article 3 and AP II as civilians. They are considered civilians as 
long as they are not using force when carrying their mandate in a state witnessing a 
non-international armed conflict.92 They are bound, on the other hand, by 
principles in common Article 3 and AP II.  
However, the question becomes more complicated when peace forces act as  
                                                 
89 Leisle, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, op. cit., p. 346 
90 This part examines the issue in general as it is beyond the scope of this study. For more deep study in D. 
Schindler, “United Nations and International Humanitarian Law”, in C. Swaiarki, e.d. studies and essays on 
International Humanitarian Law (The Haque, Martinus Nigoly, 1984, p. 521)-also in Palwankar, “Applicability of 
International Law to United Nations peace keeping force”, 33 International Review of the Red Cross, (1993) p. 227.  
91 More details on this issue-Samir, Siham, The United Nations Peace Keeping Forces Operations and International 
Humanitarian Law, unpublished paper submitted at the Seminar on Humanitarian Law, Institute of Training and 
Legal Reform, Khartoum, November 19, 2003. 
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combatants against armed forces by using force in cases of self defense.93  
Recently, the United Nations recognizing the importance of the issue adopted in 
1994 the Convention on The Safety of United Nations and Associate Personnel. 
The Convention makes attacks upon United Nations and associated personnel 
criminal offences, which all states have a duty to punish. However, Article 2 (2) 
provides that the Convention shall cease to apply when the personnel of a United 
Nations force are engaged “as combatants against organized armed forces and to 
which the law of international armed conflict applies” This Convention increases 
the protection afforded to peacekeepers, under any other international instrument 
as humanitarian law conventions.94 In light of above discussion about the 
uncertainty of the law applicable to UN operations forces one may say in principle 
that, once armed forces under the command of the UN or acting under UN 
authorization become involved in an armed conflict, they are required to observe at 
least the spirit and principles contained in common Article 3 and APII and rules of 
customary international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
                                                 
 
93 The issue also arises in a number of recent operations, the Security Council has used its powers under Chapter 
VII to provide mandate for the use of force in support of certain objectives within the context of an operation, which 
was not primarily an enforcement actions. Example is the operation, in Lebanon in December 1978 and UN 
operation in the former Yugoslavia 1999. Green, Christopher, International Humanitarian Law and United Nations 
Military Operations, Year book of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 1, 1998, p. 11.  
94 Under Article 2 (2), the Convention shall not apply to a UN operations authorized by the Security Council as an 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter, Greenwood, ibid, P. 25, In connection to this issue ICRC, 
Report of Meeting of Experts on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Forces 
(Geneva, ICRC 1995)-Also the Expert meeting on Multinational Peace Operations, Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces, Geneva 11-12 December 2003, 
Editors Alexander Faite et al. Legal Division of the ICRC, International Review of the Red Cross, Geneva, October 
2004, pp. 1-87.       
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conflicts because such rules bind their states. The UN peace keeping forces are 
similarly bound by such principles and rules in cases they use force for 
self defense or otherwise which is comparable to those forces 
established for the purpose of enforcement action. 
Conclusion 
Humanitarian intervention has always been a controversial issue in international 
law. It was obscured by the traditional theory of state sovereignty, which was used 
to curtail any acts of atrocities committed against civilians during civil wars, as a 
matter falling within the domestic jurisdiction of states. However, the emergency 
of new international order based on respect of human rights of persons gave 
priorities to such values, by bringing humanitarian values under the protection of 
international legal order. Additional Protocol II applicable in non-international 
armed conflicts reaffirmed the classic notion of state sovereignty and non-
intervention in domestic affairs. One of the main aspects of this development is the 
expansion of the concept of “international concern”. As a result the United Nations 
has removed individual human rights away from the circle of domestic jurisdiction 
to lay within the sphere of international concern, which provided a certain degree 
of justification for humanitarian intervention in non-international armed conflicts.  
In fact, the debate as to the legality of humanitarian intervention is created by the 
difficulty in reconciling two bodies of law i.e. a body of law restricting the right of 
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states to use force on one hand and on the other hand a body of human rights and 
humanitarian law, providing for protection of human dignity of persons in all 
circumstances.  The problem is more complicated in attempting to resolve the clash 
arising between the principles of non-intervention and humanitarian intervention. 
Attempts to develop a coherent legal concept of humanitarian intervention whether 
exclusively under UN authorization or more generally, failed as a result of 
disagreement among legal writers and states. The reason being that a great number 
of governments see themselves as potential targets of intervention, so opposing any 
such doctrine and oppose all efforts to devise criteria for intervention.  
From above analysis and the 1990s practice, it is clear that the barriers facing 
humanitarian intervention is the lack of an agreed legal criteria of humanitarian 
intervention. Other legal barriers are the doctrine of sovereignty and principle of 
non-intervention. Divergent opinions among legal writers to give an answer to the 
question were made but none gave a clear-cut answer. The majority of 
contemporary legal writers are against the legality of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention having their reasons. However the justifications offered by those 
advocating for such action lays behind the fundamental problem in relation to 
international law in particular human rights and humanitarian law i.e. there is no 
effective means of implementing international law and the need to reduce the 
sufferings of the civilians during conflicts.  
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Discussion of lawfulness of humanitarian intervention poses a number of major 
problems in our opinion, which suggests other approaches may be needed. To 
recognize individual states have a right of humanitarian intervention is problematic 
as there is no general agreement among states or legal writers about the existence 
or the acceptance of such notion. Recently, if humanitarian intervention to be 
accepted in law it could be open to abuse. The motives of states are often mixed 
practice has shown that in some cases when there is a humanitarian crisis, states 
may be reluctant to interfere if they have no obvious and pressing interest e.g. 
economic or power-political motives for their action in the state concerned. This 
problem of self interest of states authorized by the Security Council to military 
action under Chapter VII is clearly shown in Rwanda humanitarian crisis when 
only France intervened responding to the UN Security Council Resolution.  
Some writers suggest that humanitarian intervention should be viewed morally and 
legally, as a duty of states to uphold human rights. However advocacy of a general 
duty to intervene presupposes the right to do so, so the legality of humanitarian 
intervention still has to be addressed first. Moreover, to say it is a general duty of 
states, imply an obligation on all states to support an intervention, states are even 
less likely to accept this. Even if it can be established that there are fundamental 
human rights which states are under duty to protect, it does not follow in our 
opinion, that military intervention is the appropriate means of protecting it. 
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Humanitarian intervention is problematic because it is itself especially liable to 
involve violations of human rights, when carried. 
As a result, one tends to support the overwhelming majority of legal opinion 
against the existence and legality of humanitarian intervention for three main 
reasons. First, the UN Charter and rules of modern international law do not seem 
specifically to incorporate such a right. Secondly, state practice and the experience 
of the 1990’s, does not provides a genuine cases on humanitarian intervention, in 
fact the scope and fear for abuse argues strongly against its support. Thirdly, 
neither the claiming behaviour of the intervening state nor the international 
response to claims nor facts provide strong support to the view that humanitarian 
intervention now enjoys broad acceptance as a concept. States practice is at best 
ambiguous; it provides very weak support for any claim that the restrictions of 
Charter have been superseded by a new consensus concerning the use of force to 
protect human rights of civilians in non-international armed conflicts.  
However, humanitarian intervention might be accepted by more states if they were 
set more explicitly against the background of the still valid norms of non-
intervention and conceptions of sovereignty. At such, intervention may possibly be 
accepted on invitation and acceptance of the state concerned.  Moreover, the 
decision of the ICJ in Nicaragua case strengthens our view.  
The ICJ in this case rejected the justification offered by the United States for its 
intervention in that region, namely, interalia for the protection of human rights. 
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The Court said that “unilateral use of force is not admissible for the protection of 
human rights. As this was no extreme case and no argument of humanitarian 
intervention had been made”. The Court just reaffirmed the general rules, based on 
the protection of territorial integrity.95 
The notable diversity of views on humanitarian intervention among legal writers 
and states, indicate that there would have been no prospect of agreement on the 
principle of humanitarian intervention, which is therefore, best be avoided.  Instead 
there should be alternatives remedies to stop the severity of the human rights and 
humanitarian law violations to protect civilians. We believe that every effort 
should be made to use existing multilateral framework, instead of unilateral 
intervention, within the frame of United Nations and regional organizations. Resort 
to all modes of peaceful means to convince parties to the conflict to stop violations. 
Most important and proved to be more effective is the use of sanctions either by 
the Security Council or third states on regime of states, parties to such conflicts. In 
addition to putting international pressure on both parties to the conflict with view 
to enforce them stop armed conflict and enter into peace negotiations. Efforts to 
enhance the role of the UN and regional organizations should be permitted. 
Effective humanitarian assistance must be pursued by appropriate international 
agencies to lessen the prospects for a direct involvement of big powers in such 
conflicts.  
                                                 
95 Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, pp. 134-5.   
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If the United Nations intervention is to be taken as a step to protect civilians it 
should be only in extreme and exceptional cases. The United Nations Secretary 
General pointed to that meaning by stating “……real dilemma…. The fact that we 
cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when we can. 
Armed intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of 
mass murder at is an option that cannot be relinquished”.96  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 http://www.un.org/millenium/sg/report/ch.3htue.para.218 
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CHPATER 8 
 
The International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals in Non-
International Armed Conflicts:  
Use of Human Rights Norms 
Introduction  
 
The rules of protection contained in both common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II constitute the basic framework of the international regime of 
protection to civilians against atrocities committed during non-international 
armed conflicts. The basic assumption underlying any regime is the existence of 
a duty to prosecute and enforcement of criminal sanctions in cases of serious 
violations of such rules. This duty and criminal sanctions have an important role 
as a means of ensuring respect for the rules of protection to be applicable. 
However, common Article 3 and AP II do not contain any provision stipulating 
for such duty or providing for criminal sanctions. While the law applicable in 
international armed conflicts under four Geneva Conventions contains 
provisions providing for such duty. The essence of such provisions is that all 
states must either prosecute or extradite persons who have committed certain 
listed serious violations. Additional Protocol 1 added a number of violations to 
that list described as “grave breaches”, which entails the individual criminal 
responsibility of those persons who commits such violations on national and 
international level. Neither common Article 3 nor AP II contains specific 
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provisions requiring states to punish serious violations of the applicable norms. 
The reason is that states were reluctant to subject its nationals to be tried by 
international tribunals or other third states based on nationality and sovereignty 
considerations. No doubt, absence of a duty to prosecute and criminal sanctions 
is a serious gap of the regime protecting civilians.   
However, this does not mean that serious violations of the rules applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts cannot be punished under national or 
international criminal law. With the major development in international criminal 
law regarding the applicability of the concepts of international criminal 
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility to prosecute perpetrators of 
serious violations of humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts, a duty to prosecute and impose criminal sanctions is evidenced. The 
objective not to let perpetrators of serious violations of rules protecting civilians 
in internal armed conflicts go unpunished, has been achieved by criminalizing 
such acts on international level, thereby challenging the “culture of impunity” 
and “immunity” as a barrier to prosecute violations of the law. It is this belief 
which led to the establishment of the two ad hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and it is this belief which 
enhanced efforts to establish the International Criminal Court of 1998.1 These 
                                                 
1 The Security Council of the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone concluded an agreement on 
the establishment of a special court for Sierra Leone in January 2002 (http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf. Extra ordinary 
“international” Chambers in Cambodia have been contemplated and special panels for Serious Crimes, 
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tribunals can exercise jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide in non-international armed conflicts. Beside this, state responsibility 
for atrocities committed within its territory and violations of humanitarian law 
by its armed forces, remains crucial for ensuring respect for victims of such 
conflicts. However, both types of responsibility i.e. state and individual 
responsibility when applicable as a sanctions tool for serious violations of 
common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions IV and AP II, a number of basic 
problems rise. As a result of the uncertainty of the nature and scope of the 
concept of international responsibility when applicable to states and non-state 
actors and in relation to offences committed during non-international armed 
conflicts. Another problem regarding the definition and classification of certain 
offences and their border e.g. war crimes and crimes against humanity which 
appears to be vague. However, the particular features it presents, with regard to 
definition and classification of such offences implies a connection with human 
rights norms. The principle of humanity which is the core of both systems 
providing protection against criminal acts committed by individuals during 
armed conflict is now the concern of the whole international community. In fact 
international criminal tribunals played a role in clarifying uncertainties by using 
human rights law and customary international criminal law in such cases.  
                                                                                                                                                        
composed of both national and international Judges, in East Timor-A. Mc.Donald “The Year in Review”, 3 Year 
Book of International Humanitarian Law (YIHL) 2000, p. 170.  
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This chapter examines some of the issues relating to international responsibility 
for crimes committed in internal armed conflict. It is divided into four parts. Part 
1 examines the notion of state responsibility in international law to acts 
committed in violations of humanitarian law rules applicable in non-
international armed conflicts and the basis for responsibility for acts committed 
by members of government armed forces. Part 2 examines the applicability of 
the notion of individual criminal responsibility to offences committed during 
internal conflicts. In doing this, it traces the historical evolution and applicability 
of the notion in relation to crimes within the international legal and jurisdictional 
framework. It also examines whether the acts prescribed by common Article 3 
constitute international criminal offences. The responsibility of non-state armed 
forces will also be examined in an attempt to provide the legal basis for such 
responsibility. Part 3 investigates the areas in which human rights norms may be 
used in relation to such crimes. More specifically it considers the extent to 
which international criminals tribunals rely on the definition of certain 
fundamental human rights norms to provide clarification and eliminate 
uncertainties. It also raises the possibility of international legal accountability of 
rebels groups for human rights abuses in non-international armed conflicts. Part 
4 examines the notion of amnesties as a bar to criminal responsibility and to 
what extent the culture of impunity in some cases of armed conflicts may 
abrogate the very objective of the international sanctioning system in relation to 
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such crimes. A conclusion provides some general remarks on the prospect of 
international criminal system and in relation to the inadequacy of the existing 
legal frame work in identifying areas of weakness and suggesting solutions.  
1. State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Applicable in Non-international Armed Conflicts  
The regime of international responsibility is one of the important guarantees to 
secure application of rules protecting civilian victims in non-international armed 
conflicts. The topic of international responsibility in general and in non-
international armed conflicts in particular is one of the topics which raise a 
number of questions in international law specifically in relation to determining 
the basis of state responsibility of damages resulting from hostile activities in 
such conflicts and also the extent of international responsibility of rebels. The 
reasons for these difficulties are due to the absence of codified rules in 
international responsibility which are still customary rules. However, in 2001 
the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted the “Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”.2 This codification 
applies to violations of all primary rules, except “where and to the extent that the 
conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or content or the 
                                                 
2 This draft is an achievement of 45 years of work by the Commission. The text of the Draft-United Nations, 
International Law Commission, Report of the work of its Fifty-third session (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10, 
August 2001), General Assembly, Official records, Fifty-fifty Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), available 
at :<http://www.un.org.//aw/ilc/reports/2001/2001 report htm) pp. 29-365. The UN General Assembly took note 
of the Draft Articles in Resolution A/RES/56/83 at 12 December 2001.  
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implementation of international responsibility of a state are governed by special 
rules of international law”.3 The Draft refers to the international humanitarian 
law as an example for an exception to rules contained in the Draft Articles. In 
examining states responsibility, it is important to determine for which rules laid 
down in the Draft Articles, international humanitarian law foresees a special 
rules. In the following pages we will examine two basic issues in this 
connection, the basis of state responsibility for violation of humanitarian law 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts and to what extent acts of rebels 
may be attributed for purposes of responsibility.   
i. Basis of State Responsibility  
The rules of general international law relating to state responsibility, provided 
for a single regime of responsibility applying to all internationally wrongful acts 
of the state. In other words, a state commits a breach of customary international 
law or a breach of an obligation of a treaty, commits a breach of international 
law so-called “international wrongful act”. The law of state responsibility is 
concerned with the determination of whether there is a wrongful.  
Acts for which the wrong doing state is to be held responsible and bear the legal 
consequences of such violation e.g. an obligation to restore the previous or to 
pay compensation. However, there is an internationally wrongful act of a state 
when the conduct consists of an action or omission attributable to the state under 
                                                 
3  Article 55 of  the Draft 
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international law and that conduct constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of the state. The state is liable only for its own acts and omissions and 
in this context; the state is identified with its governmental organs which include 
the legislative, judiciary as well as the executive. A state is liable for the acts of 
its officials only if those acts are attributable to the state.4  
However, as a result of massive violence and brutality in the Second World War 
including mass killings, implementation of policies of so called “ethnic cleansing” 
and organized torture and rape, a strong trend of opinion favoring a different 
view had emerged. Accordingly to this new view, general international law 
provides for two completely different regimes of responsibility.5 The first applies 
in the case of a breach by a state of one of the obligations whose fulfillment is of 
fundamental importance to the international community as a whole. For example 
the obligations to refrain from any act of aggression, not to commit genocide, 
not to practice apartheid and organized torture. The other regime applies in cases 
where the state had only failed to fulfill an obligation of lesser general 
importance. On this basis, a distinction is made between two different categories 
of international wrongful acts of the state, a limited category comprising 
particular serious offences called international crimes and a much broader 
                                                 
4 Akheurst, Modern Introduction to International Law, op.ciIt, pp. 254-256.   
5 Sandoz, Yves, Implementation of International Humanitarian Law and Rules of International Law on States 
Responsibility for Elicit Acts, IRRC, No. 261, November- December 1987, pp. 668-670 
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category carrying the whole range of less serious offences.6 An internationally 
wrongful act which results from the breach by a state of an international 
obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the 
international community, that its breach is recognized as a crime by that 
community as a whole, constitutes an international crime. Article 18 (c) of the 
Draft provides that a crime may result from a serious breach, on a wide scale, of 
an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human 
being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and torture.  As regards the 
international criminality of violations of human rights, the article referred to (c) 
to point to this during discussions of the drafting committee’s text.7 In fact the 
general criteria applied in determining violations of human rights which may 
entail states responsibility has been viewed by the Commission on Human 
Rights in 1975, as categories of offences covered by the expressions, gross 
violations of human rights and situations which reveal a consistent pattern of 
human rights and practices which shocked the conscience of mankind.8  
Other international crimes in the breach of obligations relating to the safeguard 
of the human being under humanitarian law which may shock the conscience of 
mankind, covers situations of armed conflicts such as the massacres of prisoners 
                                                 
6  M. Dupuy, The International Law of State Responsibility: Revolution or Evolution?, Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1989,p. 105 
7 Report, on Torture And Other Violations of Human Rights as International Crimes, in The Review of 
International Commission of Jurists  No. 17, Dec. 1976, p. 48.  
8 Report of the Commission for 1975, E/CN. 4/SR. 1307. 
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of war or the deportation of population. The Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol 1, stipulate that there are certain serious violations 
committed in the course of an international armed conflict and must be 
considered international crimes. They list a number of acts that are considered 
“grave breaches” constituting an international crime to be punished at 
international level and national criminal laws9. Such breaches of international 
humanitarian law by members of the armed forces of a state, entail the 
responsibility in international law of the state concerned.10  
In cases of non-international armed conflicts, neither Article 3 nor AP II 
provides expressly for any of such obligations i.e. the obligation to take 
necessary measures to implement Article 3 or provisions of AP II and in 
particular to provide for criminal penalties against those committing such neither 
crimes nor it provides for “grave breaches” like other international treaties.11 
However absence of such obligations does not absolve states parties to such 
Conventions from obligations. It is a customary rule that states are bound to 
                                                 
9 Articles 49, 50, 50, 51, 129, `130, 146, 147, of four Geneva Conventions respectively. And Article 85 of 
Additional Protocol 1. Among these serious breaches of humanitarian law are willful killing, torture or other 
forms of inhumane treatment of protected persons or attacks of the civilian population or individual civilians 
resulting in death or serious injury to the body or health of the victim grave breaches of this kind  are considered 
ware crimes.  
10 Means of redress open to the injured state can issue a protest; require the work of the international Fact-
Finding Commission of Article 90 of Additional Protocol 1 to clarify the facts alleged to be a grave breach of the 
Convention or Additional Protocol 1. The offending state may pay damages to the injured state. Lesile, The 
Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, opcit284.  
11 Article 5 of the Genocide Convention and Article 10 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966 provide expressly for obligation to redress.  
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fulfill its international obligations by reconciling its national laws with such 
obligations. Besides, rules and principles protecting civilians in common Article 
3 and Additional Protocol II are mostly part of customary international law and 
constitute jus cogens rules. This makes it clear that a state is responsible for 
violations of such rules applicable in non-international armed conflicts.12 In 
addition the same criteria for ascertaining the seriousness of a violation of 
3human rights or “grave breaches” classifying an act international crime thereby 
entailing state responsibility, is to be applied here. In both international and non 
international armed conflicts, those rules protect “basic rights of the human 
person”.  
The other issue is whether a state is responsible for all conduct of its armed 
forces. According to Article 7 of the Draft, “The conduct of an organ of a state 
shall be considered an act of the state under international law if the organ 
persons acts in that capacity even if exceeding its authority or contravenes.                       
The absolute or strict responsibility for such acts is justified by the seriousness 
of such crimes and that soldiers are a particular category of state organs in that 
they are always on duty and never act in a private capacity.13  
                                                 
12 Blish Chenko 1, “Responsibility in Breaches of International Humanitarian Law” in International Dimension 
of Humanitarian Law, Geneva, Paris, Dordrecht, Henry Durant Institute, UNESCO, Martinus Ni Jhoft Publishes, 
1988, pp. 283-296. 
 
 
13 However the ILC codifies six circumstances in Article 16 (3) precluding the wrongfulness of an otherwise 
unlawful act, consent, self-defense, counter measures, force majeure, distress and necessity. It also specifies that 
no such circumstances can produce the wrongfulness of a violation of norms of international law. However the 
ICJ and the ICTY and the ILC consider that the basic rules of international humanitarian law are peremptory 
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ii.  State Responsibility and Acts of Rebel Movements 
It has been shown earlier that rebel groups meeting the requirements of common 
Article 3 and AP II possess certain rights on one hand and are subject to certain 
obligations on the other hand under Geneva Law and customary international 
humanitarian law. However, the breach of such obligations may results in 
possible claim of international responsibility of the state. As a general rule this 
takes place after the armed conflict comes to an end, the reason being that there 
are two situations, which may arise from such activities. The first, in cases 
where the government repress such rebels and restore order, then the state as a 
general rule would not be accountable for acts committed by the rebels during 
the armed conflict, unless due to its negligence or reluctance to take necessary 
measures to avoid commission of such acts.14 The second case if the rebels 
succeeded either to replace the government or to separate and establish a new 
state on part of the tenants of the original state. In both cases the new state is 
accountable of the violations of rebels committed during armed conflicts. The 
attribution of the conduct of non-state entities to a state is provided for in Article 
10 of the Draft titled “Conduct of an insurrectional or other movement”. This 
provision states that such conduct is attributable to the state if the movement 
becomes the new government of the state or to a new state if the group succeeds 
                                                                                                                                                        
rules. At such it excludes the defense of necessity for violations, except where explicitly stated otherwise in its 
rule (e.g. Article 59 (2) and (5), 53, 55 (3) and 108 (2) of Geneva Convention IV. Macro, State responsibly for 
violations of international Humanitarian Law, IRRC, June 2002, v. 84, N. 846, p. 613.   
14 Rene Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, op. cit 97. 
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in establishing a new state. For the rules governing state responsibility as for 
international humanitarian law, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the insurrection 
is of no importance but rather the focus must be on the particular conduct in 
question, and an its lawfulness or otherwise under the applicable rules of 
international law.15 In fact this Article reflects the view of the majority of jurists 
on the issue.16  
Serious violations of humanitarian rules constituting international crimes 
committed during armed conflict, entailing the international responsibility of a 
state subjects such a state to sanctions. The reaction of international society to a 
breach of international law is often that of imposing specific sanctions against an 
offending state e.g. embargo, economic or military sanctions, condemnation, 
compensation, legal action. However, individuals committing such crimes may 
be subject to international criminal responsibility by having to answer for 
international crimes committed, before international criminal tribunals.17  
                                                 
15 Report, op.cit, Article 10, para. 11, p. 116 Article 10 para. 9 considers that for defining the types of groups 
encompassed by the term “insurrectional movement” the threshold for the application of the laws of armed 
conflict contained in Protocol 11 may be taken as a guide.  
16 F. Kalshoven, “State responsibility for warlike acts of the armed forces, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Volume 40, 1991, pp. 847-848….. 
Bierzanek, R. The responsibility of states in Armed Conflicts, in Polish Year book of International Law, Vol. 1, 
1981-82 pp. 93-116.  
 
 
17 For the variuos use of sanctions, U. Beyerlin, Sanchans, in Wolfrun (ed), United Nations: Law, Policy and 
Practice 11, pp. 1111-28.  
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2. The Application of Notion of Individual Responsibility to Crimes 
Committed in Non-International Armed Conflicts  
 
i. Historical Evolution 
 
The prosecution of violation of humanitarian law is not a new concept in 
international criminal law.18 During and after the First World War it can hardly 
be said that a general principle of individual criminal responsibility had been 
accepted in international law. It was only after the Second World War that the 
international community started to move towards laying down an international 
criminal system, resulting from need to prosecute serious violations of the laws 
of war. It is then that the traditional notion of responsibility of states and the 
personal responsibility of individuals began to be reformulated. The widespread 
massacres committed during this war against minorities and civilians were 
behind the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military 
Tribunals. These and other courts applied criminal responsibility of war 
criminals for acts considered breaches of 1907 Hague Conventions IV and the 
Geneva Conventions of 1929, despite the fact that none of those treaties 
expressly provided for such an individual international responsibility. War 
                                                 
18 On the comparison between provisions of international humanitarian law and those of international criminal 
law, Ameur Zammali, The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal 
Law.  
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criminals were prosecuted for offences which have no particular geographical 
locations whether they are accused individuals or on their capacity as members 
of organizations or groups or in both capacities.19 The Tribunals had jurisdiction 
to try new categories of crimes besides war crimes i.e. crimes against humanity 
and crimes against peace.20  
The Nuremberg Judgments produced a rich jurisprudence which contributed to 
the forming of a case law in relation to international criminal responsibility in 
international law.21 It is to be noted here that a number of general principles, 
belonging to customary law which the tribunal recognized which were codified 
and incorporated in a number of international instruments in the field.22 For 
example judicial statements in this respect grounded on the criminalization of 
breaches of the laws and customs of war, were later partly codified and partly 
expanded in the Geneva Convention of 1949 provision on “grave breaches” 
However, so far, the whole notion of individual criminal responsibility and 
prosecution and punishment of offenders before an international tribunals was 
                                                 
19 E. Greppi, “The evolution of individual criminal liabilities under international Law, International Review of 
the Red Cross, No. 835, 1999-P. 541.  
20 M.C. Bassouni, Crimess Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, Dordrecht, 1992 
21 The Judgment of the Nurembery International Military Tribunals” reported in the American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 41, 1947, p. 172.  
22 G. Schwarzenberger International Law, Vol. 11. The law of Armed Conflict, Stevens, London, 1968, p. 20-UN 
General Assembly Resolution 95 (1), 16 February 1946, “Affirmation of the principles of International Law 
recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal”. 
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understood to be applicable to those serious crimes committed during 
international armed conflicts.  
The second stage of development took place after the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 by concluding an important human rights 
instruments i.e. the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide in 1948. The importance of the Convention lies on the fact that it 
introduced a new development in the area of international criminal law with 
respect to international offences. It added the crime of genocide to the set of 
international customary crimes existing i.e. war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. It classified genocide whether committed in time of peace or war as a 
crime in international law. It provides a wide definition of the crime of genocide 
in Article 2 as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethical, racial or religious group”, such as killing members of the 
group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to them, deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, 
forcibly transforming children of the group to another group. Such acts are 
punishable as at the various tenets of participation in it i.e. direct acts, 
conspiracy, incitement, attempts and complicity.23  The Convention establishes 
the obligation to punish not only on ‘rulers’ or ‘public officials’ but also “private 
                                                 
23 Article 3 of the Conventions 
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individuals.24 It places the competence to try offenders to both domestic and 
international tribunals. 25 
The importance of the above Genocide Convention lies on the fact that it is the 
first international human rights instrument which provides for the individual 
criminal responsibility for acts constituting genocide, before international 
criminal tribunals. In addition it imposes on states, parties to the Convention an 
obligation to try persons committing genocide during peace or during 
international on non-international international armed conflict. This paved the 
way for other developments, one year after the adoption of Genocide 
Convention, the four Geneva Conventions of August 1949 were adopted. 
Geneva Conventions introduced new concepts in the field within the treaty 
based system providing protection to civilian victims. First, under Article 1 
common to four Conventions, the contracting parties undertake the basic general 
obligation “to respect and to ensure respect” for their rules “in all 
circumstances”.  The second, in introducing the concept of “grave braches” in 
relation to acts considered serious violations of the provisions of the 
Conventions, committed against protected persons which are crimes under 
international law.26 These acts include crimes such as willful killing, torture or 
                                                 
24 Article 4 ibid.  
25 Article 6 ibid 
 
26 These acts are defined in Article 50, 51, 130 and 147 of the four Geneva Conventions respectively.   
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inhumane treatment including biological experiments, willfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or health, extensive destruction or 
appropriation of property, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of 
a hostile power or willfully depriving him of the right to a fair and regular trial, 
unlawful deportation, the transfer or confinement of a protected person, and the 
taking of hostages “not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully 
and wantonly,” The Conventions establish the responsibility of the perpetrators 
of those grave breaches and that of their superiors. The third, is introducing the 
principle of universal jurisdiction over crimes described as “grave breaches” 
under the Conventions. It imposes an obligation on contracting states to try any 
person who have committed or ordered to commit acts of grave breaches 
irrespective of nationality or place in accordance to its legislations.27  
In 1977 and by the adoption of Additional Protocol I the concept of individual 
criminal responsibility was emphasized by stipulating in Article II that serious 
violations constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law. In 
addition Article 85 provides for a number of other violations to those listed as 
grave breaches.  
                                                                                                                                                        
27 The Hague Convention of 1954 for the protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts 
imposes an obligation on contracting states to protect what is called the “Cultural heritage of all mankind”, to 
take within the framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose 
penalty or discipline sanctions upon persons who commit or order to be committed a breach of the Convention.  
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Under the above humanitarian instruments the rule on individual criminal 
responsibility so far is applicable to those crimes committed against civilians in 
international armed conflicts. Neither common Article 3 of four Geneva 
Conventions nor Additional Protocol II referred to such rules from near or far. 
However the real evolution in relation to the applicability of rules on individual 
criminal responsibility in relation to crimes committed against civilians in non-
international armed conflicts took place after the 1990s. An important step in the 
process of developing such rules under international law was taken with the 
establishment of the two ad hoc Tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and of 
Rwanda. The Statues of the tribunals specify their our jurisdiction  to grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the law and customs of 
war, genocide and crimes against humanity.  They have jurisdiction to prosecute 
persons committing or ordering to commit grave breaches. They have also 
jurisdiction to prosecute persons responsible for crimes committed against 
civilians in armed conflicts “whether international or internal in character.28 
The Statutes set out the conditions for individual criminal responsibility by 
providing that anyone who at any stage “planned, instigated, ordered, committed 
                                                 
28 The Statute of the Rwandan Tribunal granted the tribunal jurisdiction only over genocide, crimes against 
humanity and violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, because the conflict was 
considered a non-international armed conflict. However the Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia was given 
jurisdiction in addition to “grave breaches” of Geneva Conventions and violations of the laws and customs 
of war because the conflict was considered international and non-international armed conflict. Paul 
Tavernier, The experience of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda, IRRC, November-December, 1997, No. 321, p. 605-Natalie Wagner, The development of the 
grave breaches regime and of individual criminal responsibility by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, IRRC, June 2003, V. 85, N. 850, p. 351.  
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or otherwise aided or abetted” the three categories of crimes defined may be 
held criminally responsible. It goes to disclaim immunity for government 
officials and Heads of States. It provide for the criminal responsibility of 
superiors in respect of acts of their subordinates of the superior knew or had 
reason to know of such acts and failed to take the necessary measures to prevent 
or punish the perpetrators thereof.29  
The last development, so far, is the establishment of the Permanent International 
Criminal Law (ICC) under the Rome Statute of 1998.30 The ICC has jurisdiction 
over the most serious crimes” and are “of concern to the international 
community as a whole”.31 This definition is said to be broad in that it covers 
both “grave breaches” and ‘serious violations’ of the Geneva Conventions and 
of the laws and customs of war in general. The Rome Statute has adopted four 
categories of crimes instead of three mentioned genocide, crime against 
humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression.32 The major development 
brought under the Statute is that the concept of individual criminal responsibility 
in respect of crimes against humanity and war crimes is applicable without 
distinction between non-international or international armed conflicts under 
                                                 
29 Paul Tavernier, infra, p. 613.  
30 Text of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reproduced in International Legal Materials 
(ILM) Vol. 37, 1998, p. 999 
31 Article 5 of the Rome Statute of 1998.    
32 Aggression envisages state action and therefore results in an international conflict which is not defined in the 
Statute. There is no universal consensus between states as to the definition of aggression. For our purpose, this is 
irrelevant since aggression, is not an offence likely to be committed in a non international armed conflicts.  
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Article 7 and 8 of Statute. This filled the lacunae concerning punishment of 
violations of common Article 3. Crimes against humanity are defined broadly as 
act committed as part of a widespread of systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.33 They are defined as serious 
acts of violence inhumane, which harm the life, liberty, physical welfare, health 
and dignity of human beings which go beyond the limits tolerable to 
international community. Those acts belongs to general customary international, 
include murder, extermination, enslavement deportation, torture, rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual violence, enforced 
disappearances of persons and apartheid”. Article 7 leaves the door open to 
include other acts by stating at the end of list “other in humane acts of a similar 
character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
mental or physical health”,34 such crimes are “widespread” and “systematic” in 
non-international armed conflicts of today. Genocide and crimes against 
humanity may be committed in both types of conflict. The Rome Statute defines 
war crimes as “those acts committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
large scale commission of such crimes”. It classifies several categories of 
crimes. The first is the grave breaches established by the Geneva Conventions; 
the second includes “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable 
                                                 
33 Article 7 The Rome Statute of 1998.  
34 Edoardo, Greppi. The evolution of individual criminal responsibility under International Law, International 
Review of the Red Cross, No. 835, 1999. pp 531-553 available at http://www.irc.org/web/eng/siteengo.nsf.    
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in international armed conflict within the established framework of international 
law”.35 The third refers to serious violations of Article 3 common for the Geneva 
Conventions, pertains to armed conflicts not of an international character and 
covers acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities 
such as violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds mutilation, 
cruel treatment, the taking of hostages and refusal to grant judicial guarantees 
‘recognized as indispensable”. The fourth is related to “other serious violations 
of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international 
character”. This applies to situations of protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups”.36  This is the case in most international conflicts of today.37  
Thus in the light of the above development and practice of international criminal 
tribunals there may develop a well established system of international criminal 
responsibility for the prosecution of individuals for serious crimes committed 
during non-international armed conflicts.  
 
                                                 
35 Article 8 of the Statue.  
36 M.C. Roberge “The New International Criminal Court .A Preliminary Assessment” IRRC, No. 325, December 
1998, p. 674.  
37 A general comment on the Rome Statute is that the Statute confirmed a set of rights of the individuals driving 
from the general principles of law e.g. principle of non-retroactivity, rights and guarantees aimed at ensuring a 
fair trial. An important aspect of the Statute is that it provides for the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC with 
the jurisdiction  of national courts. J. Holmes, “The Principle of Complementarity in R.S. Lee (ed). The 
International Criminal Court, Kluwer Law International, The Hague / Boston / London, 1999 p. 41.   
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ii. Acts Prescribed by Common Article 3 Constituting Criminal Offences in 
International Law  
 
The applicability of international regime of individual criminal responsibility to 
crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts needs some clarification 
as to whether acts violating of principles contained in Common Article 3 
constitutes criminal offences in international law. There is no general principle 
of law recognized on the issue apart from the provisions in the Statutes setting 
up international criminal tribunals above mentioned.  
Under classical international law, an internal armed conflict remains a matter of 
domestic jurisdiction, subject to any obligation arising from customary 
international law. As a result persons committing crimes during such conflicts 
were subject to the laws and jurisdiction of national court of their states, based 
on their nationality and the sovereignty of such states. It is this doctrine of 
domestic jurisdiction long precluded judicial scrutiny of state conduct visa avis 
their own citizens38.  There are two controversial views among legal writers as 
to the issue.  Those supporting the extension of the “grave breaches” regime and 
individual criminal responsibility, they refer to the importance of reinforcing the 
strength of grave breaches provisions. They justify this when giving effect to the 
object and purpose of international humanitarian law, thus giving effect to the 
                                                 
38 A. Bianchi, “Denying state immunity to violators of human rights” ,Australian Journal of Public International 
Law, Vol. 46, 1994, p. 221.  
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drafters intention.39 The second view is held by those legal writers who are 
against such extension based on reasons relating to nationality and sovereignty.40   
However with the developments in the sphere of international law and 
particularly of international humanitarian laws, criminal and human rights law, 
abuses committed within national borders are subject to scrutiny in international 
law. An international conflict may be subjected to control by virtue of a decision 
of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security 
Council control measures may include setting up criminal tribunals to try 
persons committing offences in non-international armed conflicts. As a result 
states and their nationals may be subjected to international sanctions for acts 
considered international offences. These acts which violates the rules and 
principles contained in common Article 3 reflecting minimum standards of 
humanity, are part of customary rules of the traditional law of war. Laws or 
customs of war include prohibition of acts committed in international and non- 
international armed conflicts. These violations of laws of war are commonly 
referred to as “war crimes”. 41 Historically laws and customs of war have not 
                                                 
39 Abi, Saab supports this view, Abi-Saab, “The specifities of Humanitarian Law”, in C. Swimarski (ed.), studies 
and essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross, Principles in Honor of Jean Pictet, ICRC, Geneva 
1984, p. 274.  
40 B.S. Brown,” Nationality and Internationality in International Humanitarian Law”, Stanford Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 34, 1998-p. 294. 
 
 
41 The Trial Chamber in Tadic case finding was that a “……common Article 3 imposes obligations that are 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of Article 3 of the Statute because the obligations are a part of customary 
international law. Further violations of these prohibitions can be enforced against individuals imposing criminal 
responsibility…..” Tadic Case, op.cit, para. 74.  
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been limited to the nature of the conflict they regulate, example the Lieber Code 
which was drafted to regulate the conduct of the United States armed forces 
during the American Civil War contained customary rules of war. As to crimes 
against humanity it has developed far beyond what it was at the time of the 
Nuremberg judgment to cover “gross violations of fundamental rules of 
humanitarian law and human rights law committed by persons during an armed 
conflict irrespective of type of conflict or nationality of the victim.42 As a result 
policies of ethnic cleansing”, mass rape and the like, are crimes under customary 
rules of law of war as international crimes, whether committed in interstate or 
civil war.43  
As such, acts in violation of common Article 3 which is part of customary 
international law are war crimes .This may be defined as, crimes committed by 
any person in violation of recognized obligation under rules derived from 
conventional or customary law applicable to the parties.44 The fact that common 
Article 3 is part of customary international law was decided by the International 
Court of justice in Nicaragua case in which the court applying customary 
international law determined that the rules contained in common Article 3 
                                                                                                                                                        
42 John Duguard,” Bridging the gap between human rights and humanitarian law, the punishment of offenders”, 
IRRC, September 1998, No. 324, P. 450.  
43 Leisle, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflicts, op.cit. p.332. 
44 This was emphasized by the Trial chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal in the Tadic case, The Prosecutor .v. 
Dusko Tadic, It-94-1, T, 10 August 1995 available at <http://www.un.org/ictp/ind-htm,paras 62-74. 
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constitute a minimum yard stick applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflict, thus finding that these principles are part of 
customary international law.45 In addition the court recognized the applicability 
of common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to non-international armed 
conflicts which requires contracting states to respect and ensure respect for the 
Conventions which may include resort to penal measures in case of violation of 
rules of common Article 3. 46 
The fact that acts prescribed by common Article 3 constitute criminal offences 
under international law as a result of applicability of the laws and instructions of 
war to non-international armed conflicts, has been asserted by both ad hoc 
international tribunals of Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.47  
iii. The International Criminal Responsibility of   Members of Non-State 
Armed Forces 
The international criminal responsibility of individuals as well as that of the 
non-state armed forces parties to a conflict is crucial to render the regime 
                                                 
45 Nicargua. v. United States, Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 4. 
46 Under Geneva Conventions, contracting states are under duty to prosecute and punish persons committing 
grave breaches of the conventions; war crimes and genocide are among those offences classified as international 
as well as crime against humanity. They are under duty to enact laws granting its courts universal jurisdiction 
over such breaches to try any person committing such breaches irrespective of nationality and place of 
commission. However there is a debate as whether international law recognize universal jurisdiction for war 
crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. However some countries like Belgium enacted in 1997 a 
law granting its court universal jurisdiction over such crimes which occurs in non-international armed conflicts. 
However domestic legislations of this kind are not common. For more discussion on this issue, Jelena Pejic, 
‘Accountability for International Crimes. From Conjecture to Reality,’ IRRC, March, 2002, Vol. 84, No. 845 pp. 
23-31.  
47 Thomas, Graditzky, Individual criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in non-international armed conflicts “IRRC, No. 322, March 1998, pp. 29-56.  
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effective. However, the issue of the international criminal responsibility of non-
state members of armed forces has been subject to controversory.48 This is 
closely related with two debatable questions i.e. individual responsibility in 
international law and the binding force of obligations for non-state actors under 
common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.  
It has been mentioned earlier that obligations are imposed on states under 
humanitarian law. Acts committed in violation of these obligations may entail 
the international responsibility of such states. This is reflected in the principle 
that the state is responsible for acts of its armed forces and generally of its 
agents. However some acts constituting violations of humanitarian law carried 
out by individuals in a private capacity as in situations of non-international 
armed conflicts where one party or all parties are non-state actors raises a 
question. Divergent views are held by legal writers some supports the traditional 
view that humanitarian law, being a branch of international law, bind states but 
not individuals, thus governing only the behavior of persons acting as state 
organs and that individual remaining a passive subject of responsibility, states 
alone can commit wrongful acts. Thus, the individual is not a subject of 
obligations.49  
                                                 
48 This should be distinguished from a criminal responsibility deriving from domestic criminal Laws-M. Bothe, 
Prevention and Repression of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law, Year Book 1986-87, p. 117. 
 
49 Hanskelsen, Collective and individual responsibility in international law with particular regard to the 
punishment of war criminals, 1943, 31, California La w Review p. 530.   
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Other writers interpret provisions of international humanitarian law as imposing 
obligations directly on individuals, whether acting in a purely private capacity or 
as state organs. For these writers, to say that humanitarian law imposes no 
obligations on the individual visa a visa other individuals would result to the 
non-applicability of its norms to their conduct when carrying hostile activities 
against civilians.50 Among these writers Lauterpact for, him, war crimes can be 
committed by combatants equally when acting under direct orders and 
international obligations attach to the individual regardless of status. 51 
To Pictet, the binding force of these provisions is based on the fact that the 
Conventions are binding not only upon states and also upon everybody in the 
territory.52 Dinstein refers to human rights law to justify his views on the issue. 
He points out that in the field of human rights; the individual is a subject of 
rights and also of duties in international law of human rights. He applied this 
rule to the situations under Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. 53 
According to him this Article creates international rights and duties of human 
rights character for the rebels. In this perspective, Article 3 and AP II are treaties 
that create not only rights but also obligations for rebels.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
50 Rene, Provost, infra, p. 77.  
51 H.Lautherpacht, International Law and Human Rights (London: Stevens & Sons, 1950, p. 39.  
52 J. Pictet, Commentary on Geneva Convention,op.cit.p. 51.  
53 Y. Dainstein,” Human Rights in Armed Conflict,”, in Theodor Meron e.d,” Human Rights in International 
Law, Legal and Policy issues,” (Oxford ,Clarendon, 1984) 11, p. 345.  
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However examination of common Article 3, attitude of criminal tribunals and 
resolutions on the issue with respect of imposition of obligations on non-state 
armed forces and their criminal responsibility offers certainty. The Security 
Council has affirmed on several occasions, that person who commits or orders 
the commission of grave breaches and serious violations of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions in the territory of the state where an internal armed conflict is 
occurring, are individually responsible for such breaches as serious violations on 
international humanitarian law.54 
All prohibitions contained in Common Article 3 intended to cover protected 
persons are obligations imposed on all parties to the conflict. The Article states 
that “each party shall be bound to apply, as a minimum....the following 
provisions......” Similarly provisions under Protocol II are articulated to provide 
for rules binding on both parties to the conflict. Also it has been generally 
accepted that the customary rules of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 
11, bind both the state and rebels groups.55  
Besides, the direct imposition of obligations on the individuals during internal 
armed conflicts is asserted by the recently acceptable principle of international 
                                                 
54 Example of Security Council Resolution acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
establishing The International Tribunal For the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committee in the Territory of the Former Yogoslavia since 1991, Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993), (S / 25704)-Text of the Statute reprinted in Macro Sallosi. How does law protect 
in war, op cit, pp. 1150-1158. 
 
55 Liesbeth Zeyveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, 2002, p. 9.  
Jean Pictet, Commentary IV on the Geneva Convention, 1952, pp. 38-39.  
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criminal responsibility for violations of humanitarian rules during such conflicts. 
The recent practice of two ad hoc tribunals points to the expansion of the 
concept of war crimes to non international armed conflicts. Article 6 of the 
Rwandan Tribunal Statute provides for individual criminal responsibility for 
anyone who committed in any may a violation of, among others, common 
Article 3 and AP II.56 Also in the Tadic case the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber 
found that the customary concept  of violations of the laws or customs of war 
had evolved to cover all serious violations of international humanitarian law 
including those of common Article 3, of customary rules governing international 
armed conflicts and of other agreements binding on the parties.57 The Appeals 
Chambers decision on Tadic case asserted this by stating “It is indisputable that 
the general prohibition of indiscriminate attacks on civilians objects is generally 
acceptable obligations.... As a consequence there is no possible doubt as to the 
customary status of these specific provisions as they reflect core principles of 
humanitarian law that can be considered as applying to all armed 
conflicts....There can be no doubt that common Article 3and relevant provisions 
of Additional Protocol II constitute an appropriate basis to prosecute 
                                                 
56 Frederic Harhoff. The Rwanda Tribunal, A Presentation of Some Legal Aspects, IRRC, November-December 
1997, No. 321, pp. 665-674.  
57 The ICTY Statute provides for jurisdiction of the ICTY in cases of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 in Article 2and for violations of the laws and customs of war in Article 3. But it does not provide 
expressly for violations of common article 3 and Protocol 11 as the Rwandan Tribunal Statute in Article 4-The 
Prosecutor, v. Tadic, 2 Oct. 1995, Case No. IT-94-1AR 72 (Appeals Chamber, ICTY).   
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individuals”.58 Recently the Statute of the ICC codified the extension of war 
crimes to include those committed during internal conflicts.59  
Moreover, the Institute of International Law decided in a resolution of 1971 that 
the Geneva Conventions have become part of general international law, binding 
on all, even on non-contracting parties. Some members had argued that only the 
principles, but not the details of the Conventions had become part of general 
law. However, the Institute found that the Conventions in total had become 
incorporated in the system of international law. It would therefore bind non-
parties. 
While the International Law Commission (ILC) was not concerned with the 
responsibility of subjects of international law other than states, however in 
relation to the issue it stated that “A further possibility is that the insurrectional 
movement may itself beheld responsible for its own conduct under international 
law, for example for a breach of international humanitarian law committed by its 
forces.60 By thus stating, the Commission is pointing to the fact that 
international humanitarian law implicitly confers upon parties to non-
international armed conflicts whether they ultimately succeed or not, the 
                                                 
58 Tadic Case, op.it, para 33 
59 Article 8 (2) (c) and (e) of the Rome Statute of 1998.  
 
 
60 It has been argued that such non-parties may include United Nations forces, Detter, the law of War, op.cit. p. 
410.  
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functional international legal personality necessary to exercise the rights and 
obligations lay down by it, thus entailing their international responsibility.61  
In light of the above, it is clear that the place of individual criminal 
responsibility within the frame work of international humanitarian law has 
grown to become central.  This occurs only with respect to such violations 
which are deemed to be of international crimes under public international law. 
International criminal tribunals played a major role in developing the concept in 
respect to it’s applicability to crimes committed during non-international armed 
conflicts.62 Article 3 common to Geneva Conventions and Protocol II, dealing 
with humanitarian standards in such conflicts, do not contemplate the 
prosecution of anyone who violate these standards. As a result the application of 
the concepts of war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined and applied 
in international armed conflicts to such conflicts was not an easy task. The ad 
hoc Tribunals found in the use of human rights norms a vehicle to develop 
criteria to define the limits of what may be labeled international crimes 
applicable on non international armed conflicts to facilitate task in defining such 
crimes.  
 
                                                 
61 Report on the work of the International Law Commission, op cit, p. 118, para, 16 on Article 10. 
62  Prosecutor .v. Jean Akaseyu, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Chamber, Judgment of June 2001, 
para. 432 available at <http:www. ictr. org. 
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3. International Crimes Committed in Non-international Armed 
Conflicts: Use of Human Rights Norms for Substantive Clarification.  
It has been shown earlier that human rights law protecting basic rights of 
persons does not cease in time of armed conflict. There, is set of conventional 
rules fundamental to the respect of human person and elementary considerations 
of humanity under both humanitarian and human right laws which continue to 
apply in non-international armed conflicts. The International Court of Justice in 
its advisory opinion in Nuclear Case affirmed this, thereby underlying that the 
same fundamental ethical values are shared by both laws. They originate from 
the same source i.e. the laws of humanity and their objective is to protect 
individuals’ human dignity and respect for the right to life. The court confirms 
also the convergence and complementarities of human rights and humanitarian 
law and recognizes the continuing applicability of human rights in time of armed 
conflict.63 The courts recognition of the continuing applicability of human rights 
treaties in time of armed conflict appears important for several reasons on 
substantive level. Provisions of human rights treaties go beyond conventional 
humanitarian law and fill some normative gaps of individual criminal 
responsibility of state agents in the context of non-international armed conflicts 
                                                 
63 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapon, ICJ, Reports 1996, P. 257 Para. 79 
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and on using human rights norms in defining international criminal offences 
committed in non international armed conflict.64 
Human rights acquired this importance as a result of development in recent 
years in international criminal law after the 1990. Before that gross and 
systematic violations of human rights in time of peace or international conflict 
were not deemed punishable under international law.65 Even if were punishable, 
there was no international tribunal before to try such offences. In 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights in its Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action stated, “The World Conference of Human Rights expresses its dismay at 
massive violations of human rights especially in the form of genocide ethnic 
cleansing” and systematic rape of women in war situations, creating mass 
exodus of refugees and displaced persons. While strongly condemning such 
abhorrent practices it reiterates the call that perpetrators of such crimes be 
punished and such practices immediately stopped”.66   
As a result of this development, crimes committed against civilians in internal 
armed conflicts entails international criminal responsibility and are punishable 
                                                 
64 There are certain crimes which may be committed in time of peace and in time of armed conflict, example, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and torture. The human rights instruments that criminalize these acts under 
international law e.g. the Genocide Conventions of 1948 and The Convention against Torture of 1984 requires 
parties to prosecute and punish offenders in all situations.  
65 Human rights treaties are largely designed to deal with individual and not systematic violations of protected 
rights. Redress for the injured person are remedies under national laws-Louis B. Sohn, “The New International 
Law, protecting the Rights of individuals rather than states, 1982, 32, American University Law Review, AP 1-
62.  
 
 
66 The Declaration text reprinted in International Legal Materials, volume 32, 1993, p. 1661.  
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under the broad definition of international crimes. In fact the most significant 
extension of criminal sanctions to acts involving the systematic violations of 
human rights in internal conflicts has been brought about through the 
broadening of the scope of international crimes under the practice of criminal 
tribunals and provisions of the Rome Statute of 1998.67 
There are certain basic rights which are secured or guaranteed under both laws 
to the extent that some of such rights are said to be duplicated e.g. right to life, 
protection to human person physical integrity, fair trial, freedom to practice once 
religion and non-discrimination. There are also categories of offences covered 
by the expression “gross violations” like genocide, slavery, torture, mass 
deportation, and systematic rape, collective murder, described as international 
crimes are considered violations under both laws. What characterizes these 
categories of international crimes under both laws is that they reveal a consistent 
pattern of gross and reliable attested violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law, and that such violations shock the conscience of mankind.68 
The above mentioned facts enable different and independent enforcement 
mechanisms to be activated. The reiteration of rules protecting fundamental 
rights under both laws is a reasonable and convenient means of producing 
effective compliance and eventually determining legal consequences for 
                                                 
67 John Dugard, Bridging the gap between human rights and humanitarian law, The punishment of offenders, 
IRRC, September 1998, No. 324, p. 445. 
68 Ibid, p.447 
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violations. It determines the international individual responsibility of those 
persons committing acts in violations of basic norms secured under both human 
rights and humanitarian law during non-international armed conflicts. In fact 
human rights have been largely taken into consideration by international 
tribunals on the issue, like Rwandan and Former Yugoslavia Tribunals.69 These 
tribunals used human rights norms for the purpose of defining international 
criminal offences.70 One may examine some aspects of the practice of the 
Former Yugoslavian Tribunal to illustrate this fact.  
Although the Statute of the Tribunal defines the Tribunals subject matter 
jurisdiction, however the Tribunal developed its own approach to define the 
constituent elements of serious violations of humanitarian law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts. By redefining and adjust individual criminal 
responsibility while drawing on both human rights and humanitarian law. For 
example in cases where there may exist a partial overlap between the two legal 
regimes in relation to categories of acts which they seek to prohibit like the 
regime of gross and large scale violations of human rights and the law on crimes 
against humanity. This was pointed out by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in 
                                                 
69 Marie-Claude Roberge, Jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda over 
Crimes against Humanity and Genocide, IRRC, November-December 1997, No. 321, pp.651-664.   
70 In Tadic case, the ICTY Appeal Chamber applied four tests for the existence of an international crime (a) the 
infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law (b)  the customary or treaty law character of the crime, 
(c)  the “seriousness” of the violation of humanitarian law and (d)  the establishment of individual criminal 
responsibility by the rule in question,- M.E.O. Connel, New International Legal Process, 93, AJIL, (1999), p. 
347. 
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stating “…with regard to certain of its aspects, international humanitarian law 
can be said to have fused with human rights law.71 By this sentence the tribunal 
wanted to legitimize its approach in using human rights concepts and norms 
while maintaining at the same time the differences of each legal regime. Several 
Trial Chambers of the ICTY judges turn to human rights law to define a criminal 
offence rather than relying solely upon international humanitarian law. For 
example, this is used in defining “torture” and “imprisonment”72 “outrages upon 
personal dignity” in respect of “inhumane treatment” and rape or other serious 
sexual assaults.73 These offences are prohibited implicitly by the general 
provisions in common Article 3 safeguarding physical integrity, while these are 
defined in details under human rights instruments.  
However, recourse to human rights law for definitional purposes does not mean 
in all cases that this common expressions prohibits exactly the same acts under 
both legal regimes, neither has it meant the application of the same law.74 For 
example in respect of torture which is prohibited under both legal regimes, and 
                                                 
71 The Prosecutor V. Kunarac et.al, Judgment, 22 February 2001, Para, 467.  
72 For definition of “torture”, The Prosecutor v. Delalic et.al, Judgment 16 November 1998, para. 446, For 
“imprisonment” The Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Judgment 26 February 2001, Para 302.  
73 The Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, judgment, 25 June 1999, Para 54 in respect of “outrages upon personal dignity”.  
 
 
 
74 A. Edie “The laws of war and human rights” Differences and convergences”, in C. Swinarste, (ed) Studies and 
Essays in International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross, Principles in Honor of Jean Pictet, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Martinus Nighot Publishers, Geneva, The Haque, 1984, pp. 325-342. 
While the individual criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law does not depend on 
the participation of the state and conversely, its participation in the commission of the offence is no defense to 
the perpetrator. The Prosecutor v. Kunarac et.al. Judgment 22, February 2001, Para. 470.  
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in customary law, the Trial Chamber in Furundziga case reviewed the elements 
of this definition of torture in light of human rights law and came to the 
conclusion that humanitarian law, while outlawing torture in armed conflicts,  
does not provide a definition of the prohibition”. Such a definition, the Chamber 
held  ”.. can instead be found in the Torture Convention which must be regarded 
as authoritative, inter alias, because it spells out all the necessary elements 
implicit in international rules on the matter”.75 However the Chamber has been 
criticized in that it adopted the definition of torture contained in the Torture 
Convention without directly testing that definition against the specificity of 
international humanitarian law. The Trial Chamber in Kunara case in criticizing 
this stated that “the definition of torture under international humanitarian law 
does not comprise the same elements as the definition of torture generally 
applied under human rights law.76 The Trial Chamber in view of the differences 
both in terms of structure and scope between those two regimes, and in view in 
particular of the differencing role of the state and individuals and of the nature 
of the prohibitions contained in each regime, it held that” the requirement that 
pain must have been inflicted by or at the instigation of or “with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity 
                                                 
75 The Prosecutor. v. Furundziga, Judgment 10 December 1998, para 160.  
76 The court in such cases and in view of the structure of human rights regime may have to show that the 
offender was an agent of the state to entail criminal responsibility or otherwise the state is responsible for such 
actions. That’s whether a violations of the rights recognized by the HRS Conventions has occurred with the 
support or knowledge of the government, or whether the state has allowed the act to take place without taking 
measures to prevent it or punish those responsible. Thus in such situations, the tribunal task is to determine 
whether the violations is the result of a states failure to fulfill its duty to respect and guarantee those rights. 
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“was not applicable in the context of international humanitarian law and that 
instead, a private individual could be held criminally responsible for torture 
under international humanitarian law”.77 
Other important contribution of human rights law to humanitarian law in the 
area consisted of the recognition that certain acts were to be prohibited 
regardless of the context in which they took place. An example is the prohibition 
of enforced disappearances in human rights law which laid the basis for the 
criminalization of this practice under humanitarian law.78 
The Tribunal in using human rights norms as mentioned above, no doubt in 
doing so it reinforces the objectives of international humanitarian law by 
affording protection to civilians in the maximum possible extent in punishing 
offenders. However, one should mention that the practice in this area is not 
certain to lay down settled rules to govern the issue of use of human rights 
norms in areas of criminal responsibility. This is due to the fact of inconsistency 
in practice of Trial Chambers of the ICTY and scarcity of other practice. It 
might seem appropriate to develop rules that would provide for a more explicit 
basis and of more legal clarity. The ICTY role is still limited and new 
developments in the area may be expected in future practice of international 
tribunals. .  
                                                 
77 Ibid, Para. 496 
78 The offence of “enforced disappearance” of persons is not expressly mentioned among the prohibitions under 
humanitarian law instruments. However it was recognized as international offence in Article 7 (1) of Rome 
Statute of 1998.   
 531
The issue becomes more complicated when the question is in relation to the 
individual criminal liability of members of rebel groups who are responsible for 
the most grave human rights abuses during non-international armed conflicts to 
be examined here.  
i. The International Legal Accountability of Rebel Groups for Human 
Rights Aِbuses  
Strictly speaking, the rule is that rebel groups are not bound to respect the 
provisions of human rights treaties, states are only parties to these treaties.79 The 
issue of accountability of such groups for abuses of human rights in non-
international armed conflicts is closely connected with the issue of individual’s 
responsibility which is subject to divergent opinions among legal writers. Some 
writers are of view that rebel groups are not to be held accountable for such 
abuses under human rights law though such abuses deserve condemnation. They 
based their view on the traditional argument on the subject, that they are not 
properly human rights violations since the legal obligation which is violations is 
one that is only binding on governments of contracting states to such treaties. 
This traditional conception of human rights has not provided adequate 
description of the scope of international human rights concern.80  
                                                 
79 The supervisory mechanisms established by these treaties are not empowered to monitor or take action on 
reports on the activities of armed groups. Daniel O, Downel, Trends in the Application of International 
humanitarian law by United Nations, Human Rights Mechanisms, IRRC, September 1998, No. 324, p. 282. 
 
80 Michael Resiman and Janet Rovan Feuit, Reflections on the problem of individual responsibility for violations 
of Human Rights, in Antonio Cancado Trindade ed. The Modern World of Human Rights-Essays in Honor of 
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The second view which reflects modern tendencies for human rights is 
supported by scholars who argue that armed groups can commit human rights 
violations and should be accountable under international human rights law. They 
argue that the modern concept of human rights is grounded on the understanding 
that these rights are held by individual’s visa avis individuals also and not only 
states. The universal character of human rights as well as the two international 
Covenants, recognize duties on individuals to promote respect for human rights 
in all circumstances in their preambles which state “Realizing that the 
individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which it 
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of 
the rights recognized in the recent Covenant”.81 Advocates of this view rely on 
this to indicate the responsibility of individuals whether rebels or otherwise to 
promote human rights. However, the main issue is whether this imposes on them 
obligations, the violations of which entails criminal responsibility in non-
international armed conflicts. Advocates of such view argue, in connection to 
this issue in theory, that no question here of any agency between the perpetrators 
and the state carrying out the campaign against the civilian population is 
                                                                                                                                                        
Thomas Buregenthal (San Jose, Costa Rica, International American Institute for Human Rights 1996, pp. 419-
430.  
81 Nigel  S. Rodley, Can armed opposition groups violate human rights ?, in Mahoney and Mahoney, Human 
rights, in Kathlean E. Mahoney and Paul Mahoney eds. Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century, A global 
challenge (Dordrecht, Nijhoft, 1993), pp. 297.309.  
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relevant.82 This view leads to the conclusion that the obligations not to commit 
crimes against humanity are imposed directly upon the individual and not only 
through the state. The conclusion is important in that it calls for international 
sanctions of crimes against humanity committed by groups which are unrelated 
to the state for example rebels.  
In consistency with the above view, the International Law Commission in its 
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1991 had 
proposed that the systematic or mass violations of human rights be considered 
international crimes, calling for the individual criminal responsibility of the 
perpetrators. However, the proposal was withdrawn in the force of opposition by 
states that such a proposal did not correspond to customary law.83  
Referring to customary law, there is no broad principle of individual obligations 
corresponding to human rights under general international law.84 Even within 
general international law, there is no general principle of individual criminal 
responsibility for violations of human rights. However the only cases of 
conventional obligations to try or extradite perpetrators of human rights 
                                                 
82 Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law, Oxford, 
Oxford UP, 1997) p. 64.  
83 ILC, “Report of the International Law Commission” on the work of its 47th Session, UN Doc. A/CN/4/4/472 
(1996) at p. 33, para 127.  
84 It is to be mentioned here that acts constituting crimes against humanity and war crimes are generally 
recognized as being covered by customary international law. All persons been guilty of offences against the laws 
and customs of war or laws of humanity are liable for criminal prosecution-E. Schwelb “Crimes against 
humanity, British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 23, No. 8, 1949, p. 181.  
 
 
 
 534
violations are found in specific and limited treaties which provide for individual 
criminal responsibility such as the Genocide Conventions, the Convention on 
Apartheid and the Convention against Torture.85 In light of the above, it seems 
that criminal responsibility for perpetrators of serious violations of human rights 
like rebels in non-international armed conflicts is not contemplated, since this 
requires the reshaping of the whole normative structure of human rights law. 
This fact is to be accounted as a negative characteristic of the structure of regime 
of human rights. However, the adoption of principle of criminal responsibility 
for perpetrators of serious violation of human rights, in our opinion, may be 
adopted by considering such acts international crimes. This could only be done 
by embodying such crimes in separate treaties similar to the Torture and 
Genocide Conventions, imposing direct obligations on all individuals. Such 
crimes do not only affect the victim but when committed systematically and are 
widespread they shock the whole of international community. Principles 
protecting civilian victims by criminalizing such acts are not only to be found in 
treaties and customs and practices of states which gradually obtained universal 
recognition but from general principles of justice. It must be remembered that 
international law is not the product of an international legislature, at such it is 
not static but by continual adaptation follows the need of changing world. In 
fact, in many cases treaties do no more than express and define the principles of 
                                                 
85 Rene Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, op, cit, p. 109.  
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law and justice as based on concept of humanity, which essentially characterizes 
crimes of gross violations of human rights. The criminal responsibility of person 
committing such crimes is the only solution to protect the humanity of such 
victims as required by general principles of justice. The Marten Clause  as 
expressed in the Preamble of Additional Protocol II with its reference “the 
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established 
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanitarian and the dictates of the 
public conscience” is still in force in such cases. Thus, the adoption of a broad 
principle of criminal responsibility for perpetrators of serious violations of 
human rights is possible. In all cases, the above emergence and development of 
international criminal prosecution system for crimes committed against 
civilians, in non-international armed conflicts is a great achievement. However, 
on the other hand a general state practice of amnesties barring the prosecution of 
war crimes had developed, which one may highlight some of its aspects to 
assess its validity.  
4. Amnesty as a Bar to Prosecution of Individuals Committing 
International Crimes  
Amnesty is a general pardon of past offences by the ruling competent 
authority.86 At such it is designed to preclude the prosecution of persons 
                                                 
86 A distinction is to be made between amnesty and a free pardon. The latter is granted by the head of state and 
puts an end to the execution of the penalty; however the effects of the conviction in other respects remain in 
being. In most states national legislations provide for the possibility of a free pardon.  
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suspected or accused of war crimes. Mode of operation and effect differ from 
state to state. It usually takes the form of legislative or constitutional acts of state 
or is provided in treaties or political peace agreements.87 Amnesties for 
international crimes are granted usually when states are in the process of moving 
from armed conflict to peace conclusion.  
The notion of amnesty is provided for in Article 6 (5) of Additional Protocol 11 
in stating “at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to 
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have amnesty participated in 
the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the 
armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained”. This provision of AP II 
gives rise to controversy as to its legal implications in respect of prosecution of 
serious crimes committed by persons in non-international armed conflicts. In 
fact the whole issue of amnesties raises the question of whether amnesty laws, 
agreements or practices may be given international recognition and its binding 
effect before national and international courts. There are two attitudes in relation 
to the issue of international recognition of amnesties one attitude invalidates the 
notion and the other supports its recognition. The first attitude rejects the whole 
                                                                                                                                                        
87 Not only amnesty precludes prosecution of such crimes but sometimes states practice may prevent national or 
international courts from trying such offenders e.g. decisions not to exercise jurisdiction or Security Council 
exemption of one year from the jurisdiction of the ICC for members of peace keeping forces who are nationals of 
non-party states to Rome Statute like U.S. nationals-United Nation Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002), 
UN. Doc S/RES/1422 (2002). Also certain principles of international law may bar prosecuting for war crimes 
such as community for state officials.  For list of states who concluded bilateral agreements with the US barring 
the prosecution of war crimes available at the website<http.//www.iccnow,org/documents/otheissues imunity 
agree.ht.ml.  
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notion of amnesty and its application to international crimes committed in 
internal armed conflicts. Advocates of this attitude have their own convincing 
arguments to support their view. They argue that the granting of amnesty to 
suspected perpetrators of serious crimes under international law violates the duty 
of states, whether the source of such duty is treaty or customary law to bring to 
justice and punish offenders.88 The granting amnesty is incompatible with states, 
obligations to investigate and punish such crimes has been recognized in several 
treaties which imposes on contracting states, such obligations e.g. Genocide 
Conventions 1948, Convention for the Punishment of Torture of 1984 and 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.89 They refer to Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No. 20 which provides that “Amnesties are generally 
incompatible with the duty of states to investigate such acts, to guaranteed 
freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction, and to ensure that they do not 
occur in the future. States may not deprive individuals of the right to an 
offensive remedy including, compensation and full rehabilitation as may be 
possible”.90 On international level the trend is that domestic amnesties for 
crimes under international law are not legally binding at international level. This 
                                                 
88 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Special Problems of a Duty to Prosecute, Derogations, Amnesties, Statutes of 
Limitations, and Superior Order” in Roht, Azziaza Noami., Impunity and Human Rights in International Law 
and Practice . (New York, Oxford UP, 1995), pp. 57, 62.  
89 Jelena Pejic, Accountability for International Crimes. From Conjecture to Reality, IRRC, March 
2002, Vol. 84, No. 845, pp, 28-31.  
 
 
90 Human Rights Committee, ‘Annul Report in the General Assembly on the work of its 27th session, UN Doc. A 
/ 51/40 (1996) Para. 347.  
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has been affirmed by the UN Secretary General in July 1999.91 The preamble to 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also provides at paragraph 
5 that the states parties are “determined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most serious of concern to the International Community and 
thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”. 
The advocates of above attitude are to be criticized in that they do not touch on 
the positive aspects of the notion in practice; they rather rely on legal arguments 
only. The second attitude supports the applicability of the notion of amnesty 
with respect to crimes committed in non international armed conflicts. They 
claim that the main object behind the notion of granting amnesties is to 
encourage efforts of reconciliations which can contribute to the life of one 
nation which has been divided as a result of the conflict.92 As such they call for 
the international recognition of amnesty by giving a number of legal and policy 
reasons. They argue that if all amnesties for war crimes in all circumstances will 
to be considered as invalid and never to be accorded international recognition 
this might seriously abrogate a useful tool for ending or preventing civil wars. 
Such amnesties aid the process of reconciliation. Other policy reasons for the 
international recognition of amnesties include the fact that mechanisms for 
                                                 
91 He instructed his special representative to sign Sierra Leone Peace Agreement “with the explicit provision that 
the United Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty and pardon in Article IX of the agreement shall not 
apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. Seventh report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone, UN Doc. S/1999/836, 30 July 1999-Para-7.  
 
92 Pilloud et.al, Commentary on the Additional Protocol I of (1977), P. 1402.  
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discovering the truth i.e. on condition of full disclosure of rebels involvement in 
the international crime, may be compromised as long as rebels, fears 
prosecutions before international courts. Advocates of the notion argue for a 
broad definition of the parameters of the internationally acceptable amnesty for 
international crimes, which are the concern of the entire international 
community. They point out that amnesties at such of normally have no extra 
territorial effect, as they do not affect treaty obligations or entitlements under 
customary law to prosecute persons accused of international crimes.93  
This leads to another related issue as to whether third states, courts exercising 
universal jurisdiction or international courts are bound by amnesties for 
international crimes. Regarding the first case in relation to foreign courts of third 
states the principle is that states are bound only by their domestic law, by treaty and 
by rules of customary international law. These amnesties which are purely internal 
e.g. those granted in a peace agreement between governments and rebel groups are 
not found binding on other states.94 As to international jurisdiction there are a wide 
variety of legal sources supporting the principle that domestic laws or judicial 
decisions cannot exempt a person accused of international crimes from individual 
criminal responsibility or prevent foreign or international courts from 
                                                 
93 Y. Asmin NA QVI, Amnesty for war crimes. Defining the limits of international recognition, IRRC, 
September, 2003, Vol. 85, No. 851, pp 586-588. 
94 In several cases involving the forcible disappearance of Spanish citizens in Argentina it has been held that, 
Argentina’s domestic amnesty is not binding on Spanish Courts Yasmin, i.bid. p.588.  
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prosecutions.95 However, the only conceivable situation in which a third state could 
be considered legally bound by an amnesty is where the amnesty process has been 
blessed or given approval by the United Nations Security Council for the purpose 
of maintaining international peace and security. Example where non-recognition of 
the amnesty would require that state to act in contravention of its obligations under 
the Charter of the United Nations.96  
In view of the above two attitudes, a question may be raised as to whether 
serious violations of humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts entails a duty to prosecute.  
i. The duty to Prosecute and Common Article 3  
It has been shown earlier that neither common Article 3 non AP II contains 
provisions on grave breaches or enforcement, as a duty to prosecute. However, 
recent developments of courts practice points to the contrary. The Rwandan 
Tribunal was given expressly under its Statute jurisdiction over serious 
violations of common Article 3 and AP II. The ICTY although was not given the 
same Jurisdiction however in Tadic Case, the Tribunal decided that it has 
                                                                                                                                                        
95 Y. Daistee “The Universality principle and war crimes”, in M. Schmitt and L. Green (eds), The law of Armed 
Conflict. Into the Next Millenium, International Law Studies, Vol. 71, Naval War College, New Port, 1998, P. 
17.  
96 In such a case, there should be evidence that going ahead with prosecution would undermine the peace 
agreement and ultimately threaten international peace and security. Those who argue for this situation rely on the 
principle contained in Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations which states “in the event of a conflict 
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and other obligations 
under any other international agreement, the obligations under the present charter shall prevail “Yasmin, 
Amnesty for War Crimes, op,cit. pp. 591-592.  
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jurisdiction over such violations under customary international law which 
imposes criminal liability for serious violations of war crimes of common 
Article 3. In addition, the Rome Statute in Article 8 (2) (c) and (e) provides for 
jurisdiction over serious violations of Article 3. Also based on complementarily 
principle under Statute, states are under duty to prosecute persons committing 
serious violations by enacting laws giving the domestic courts jurisdiction over 
such crimes. All these points to the fact that amnesties are in violation to the 
duty to prosecute under Article 3. 
ii. Article 6 (5) of Additional Protocol II and Amnesty for Serious 
Violations 
Article 6 (5) is sometimes invoked to justify granting of amnesty for 
international crimes in non-international armed conflicts claiming the validity of 
amnesties under international law. However, the exact interpretation of the 
Article is debatable. Some legal writers argue that the Article allows amnesty 
thus supporting the arguments that amnesties are valid in international law.97  
They justify their view by stating that there is a need for reconstruction after 
severe civil war and this cannot be achieved if rebels are not given the 
opportunity to participate in the process of reconstruction.98 However, strong 
argument is invoked against the applicability of Article 6 (5) to international 
                                                 
97 J. Garron, “Amnesties in the light of developments in international law and the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court International and Co-operative Law Quarterly, Vol. 51, January 2002, p. 110.  
98 L. Gibson, “The developing jurisprudence on amnesty, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20, 1998, P. 866.  
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crimes. In all cases, any interpretation of the above Article should be made in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Applying this to the 
Protocol, it is difficult to say that Article 6 (5) is meant to allow grant of 
amnesties that prevent criminal responsibility for persons who committed acts in 
violation of its rules. As such the words “shall endeavor to grant the broadest 
possible amnesty” can be interpreted to mean that Article 6 (5) should be 
employed only when it can be implemented without infringing other binding 
international treaties or customary international law by letting criminals is free.99 
The ICRC pointed to this by stating that ” it should be emphasized that this 
provision essentially, seeks to encourage the release of individuals who might 
be, or are subject to criminal or other proceedings under domestic law for the 
fact of having taken part in hostilities. It should in no way be read as supporting 
amnesties for war crimes or other international offences committed in internal 
armed conflicts”.100 Though one tends to support this interpretation however 
realities of non-international armed conflicts show that if rebel groups know 
before hand that they are going to be prosecuted by the authorities of the 
                                                 
99 The Soviet Delegate at the Diplomatic Conference in the session discussing Article 6 (5) draft stated that this 
“could not be construed as enabling war criminals, or those guilty of crimes against peace and humanity, to 
evade severe punishment in any circumstances whatsoever”…….official records of the Diplomatic Conference 
1974-77, Volume 9, 1978, p. 319.  
 
100 Letter of the ICRC Legal Division to the ICTY Prosecutor of 24 November 1975 and to the Department of 
Law at the University of California of 15 April 1997, Quoted by JELENA PEJIC, Accountability for 
International Crimes, op. cit, at p. 30.  
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government whom they oppose, for crimes committed by them during the armed 
conflict, they would take hundred steps back not to conclude a peace agreement. 
Instead they would prefer to continue their hostilities till the end i.e. by either 
attaining their objectives or give up and be tried. In our view, the issue is not a 
legal issue but rather a matter of reconciling policies to achieve the maximum 
interests of a unified nation.  
Conclusion 
State responsibility is one of the pillars of international law which has shaped 
humanitarian law and human rights law applicable in armed conflicts. Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 provide for a broad principle of state responsibility in 
Article 29 of Geneva Conventions and Article 91 of Additional Protocol I 
applicable in international armed conflict. Despite the absence of similar 
provisions stating a general principle of state responsibility in case of breaches 
under Article 3 common or AP II, the general rule to the effect that every 
internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility of 
these states does apply fully to humanitarian law applicable in non-international 
armed conflicts.  
There is no corresponding principle that every violation of international law by 
an individual calls for individual responsibility. That will occur only with 
respect to violations which are deemed to be international crimes under 
international criminal law. However, individual criminal responsibility for 
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violations of the laws and customs of war has been recognized for some time in 
customary law. The notion of criminal individual responsibility has undergone 
stages of progress before being accepted as a well established principle in 
international criminal law, from being a matter of domestic jurisdiction subject 
to ones state laws and courts jurisdiction based on nationality and sovereignty 
considerations, to be subject to international rules of justice. The list of “grave 
breaches” found in the Geneva Conventions is only criminalizing acts 
committed against civilians in international armed conflicts. Specific treaties 
incorporating the notion of criminal individual responsibility for crimes 
committed in all type of armed conflicts like the Genocide, Apartheid and 
Torture Conventions is a considerable development in the area. The 
establishment of the two ad hoc Criminal Tribunals of 1990, to have jurisdiction 
over crimes committed in internal conflicts in violations of humanitarian law 
applicable in non-international armed conflict, introduced a significant change to 
principles of justice prevailing at the time. The Statute of the International 
Criminal Court of 1998 being the first international instrument to criminalize 
and hold responsible individuals for serious violation of customary and 
conventional humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflict is 
the last but not least victory of international system of justice protecting civilian  
victims.  
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However, acts in serious violations of common Article 3 and AP II are not the 
only crimes committed against civilians during internal conflicts. There are acts 
constituting serious violations of human rights instruments which continue to 
apply during non-international armed conflicts protecting basic rights to 
civilians. Such instruments impose obligations on states as contracting parties to 
it. As a result states are responsible for such breaches before international law. 
However such instruments does not impose obligations on individuals, rebels 
committing crimes constituting serious violations of human rights of civilians, 
as such they are not accountable for criminal responsibility under the present 
rules of international law. This fact creates lacunae in the international criminal 
regime of justice. The reason is that, unlike humanitarian law, the vast majority 
of human rights instruments do not confer power to criminally punish 
perpetrators of serious violations of human rights similar to that in humanitarian 
law conventions. Only in a specific number of treaties related to the protection 
of human rights provide for criminal individual responsibility for such violations 
e.g. Genocide, Torture and Apartheid Conventions. The responsibility in these 
cases is grounded in their collective dimension.  
What distinguishes humanitarian law and human rights in area of criminal 
responsibility is the character of obligations under humanitarian law which 
stands in contrast to human rights law. Under human rights regime of structure, 
obligations are imposed on the state and its agents (i.e. protecting individuals 
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against abuses by the state). While humanitarian law regime imposes obligations 
on contracting states as well as on individuals. However, in our opinion, such 
crimes are of such seriousness and are of the type to shock international 
community, so they are of similar characteristics to international crimes. One 
may suggest in this connection that such crimes may be criminalized on separate 
treaties similar to those of Genocide and Convention Against. Torture when 
committed systematically and on wide scale. Such treaties would accommodate 
as well accountability for rebels for committing such serious crimes. Such 
treaties are to embody norms inspired by human rights but protecting broader 
interests than those embodied in human rights instruments.   
Without undermining the progress having been made in the area of international 
criminal responsibility in respect of crimes committed in non-international 
armed conflicts, through the enhancement of international prosecution of 
violations and accountability, The international criminal system which 
developed to enhance enforcement of humanitarian and human rights, is not 
without weakness. The system is not yet fully equipped to answer clearly all 
questions relating to the nature and extent of criminal responsibility of 
individuals for atrocities committed against civilians. The question of legal basis 
of imposing obligations on rebels entailing their criminal responsibility before 
international tribunals is one of the grey areas in the system. Though the work of 
the ILC, the work of ad hoc tribunals and the Rome Statute of the International 
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Criminal Court laid the concrete basis for the prosecution of such perpetrators, 
however the regime of international justice laid by it has not yet attained full 
maturity.  
There are still uncertainties with respect to specific definitions of certain crimes 
and inclusion of crimes which cause suffering and damage conflicted not only 
upon the civilian victims but also on one’s own soldiers, environment and 
cultural property. Serious violations of human rights committed by rebels are 
outside the international system of prosecution when committed in non-
international armed conflict.  
To have an effective regime of international justice, an adoption of a more, 
unified agreed definition of international crimes should be made. The 
interpretation of the meaning of and elements of an international crime is needed 
to be identified to include all crimes which are serious irrespective of the context 
and structure of their laws including those committed in violations of human 
rights and to prosecute any person committing such crimes irrespective of his 
legal status under the law. Human rights norms are useful in providing 
substantive clarification with regard to definitions, of certain crimes which are 
of similar characteristics.  
International prosecution and punishment of those who violate the law may only 
be effective where the international community is willing to implement and 
support it. States are under duty on domestic level to enact laws empowering its 
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courts to prosecute serious violations of the law, including implementing the 
principle of universal jurisdiction and to adopt national legislation to standards 
of international humanitarian and criminal law is necessary. Furthermore, 
amnesties which is to receive international recognition is that which is 
prescribed to achieve the objective of securing peace and initiating or furthering 
reconciliation and which is approved by international bodies like the United 
Nations. In certain cases peace and justice do not always coincide and that 
where they appear to be in conflict, the objective of securing peace and unity of 
the nation will prevail. Securing peace and unity is another form of justice to all 
in such cases.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
Legal Aspects of Darfur Armed Conflict and the International 
Protection of Civilians: A Case Study 
Introduction  
 
The Darfur conflict is a conflict taking place in the Darfur region of western 
Sudan which has been described by the United Nations Report as the 
world’s worst current humanitarian crisis.1 The conflict in Darfur presents a 
very complicated situation with complex problems. Human rights groups 
from the beginning tended to characterize the conflict in Darfur an ethnic 
struggle between Muslim Arab and non-Arab tribes, as such they label the 
conflict as one of purely racial motivation. They claim that the government 
supported Arab tribes called “Janjaweed” militias attacking “African” Fur or 
“Zaghawa” villagers and criticized government inaction in responding to 
violence.2  These claims are denied by the Government, which attribute the 
causes to competition between sedentary farmers and nomadic cattle-herders 
who compete for scarce resources.3  
                                                 
1 The report is available on the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, web site: at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english.  
The United Nations estimate that there are 1, 65 million internally displaced persons from homes in Darfur 
since 2003 and more than 200, 000 have fled to neighboring Chad as refugees from Darfur.  
http://news.bbc.co.uklzlhiinfrical4349063.stn.  
 
2 http://www/hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/11darfur 9217.htm 
3 http://www.Sudannet/news/press/postedr/289.shmtml 
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Contradictions in reports by human rights organizations about event and 
violence in Darfur aggravated the situation.4  The United Nations noted “a 
lack of accurate information in the conflict”.5 However, irrespective of the 
causes of the conflict, incomplete or inaccurate analysis of events, the 
conflict resulted in large-scale humanitarian crisis to civilians. Allegations of 
human rights and humanitarian law abuses were reported including murders, 
rape, torture of hundreds of civilians, abduction of thousands of under age 
children for use as child soldiers, thousand of children died from 
malnutrition or disease and large scale of destruction of villages throughout 
the three states of Darfur, as a result of burning and bombardment of 
villages.6 The UN Security Council passed a number of resolutions 
responding to the widespread human rights violations and atrocities 
committed against civilians deteriorating the humanitarian situation in the 
Darfur region, condemning attacks on civilians and demanding prosecution 
of perpetrates.   
                                                 
4 The Esclating Crisis-Darfur “News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN offices for 
the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 3, December 2003. For more information on Darfur Crisis, 
“The Darfur Crisis, Looking beyond the Propaganda”-European Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London, 
March 2004, available at www.espac.org.  
5 UN Crisis Centre Darfur: A Humanitarian Crisis (http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus Rel. asp? infocus 
ID=88 & Body=Sulan.  
6 Contradictions in claims by human rights organizations about events in Darfur are clear, while Human 
Rights Watch for example, chose to label the conflict as “ethnic cleansing”, Amnesty International reports 
have said that observers should be “cautions” about describing clashes as ethnic cleansing . Such labels 
have also been challenged by senior and workers on the ground within Darfur. The Darfur Crisis: 
//www.suda.net/news/press/posterdr/289.shtml.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe, analyze and evaluate how 
international law has been relevant to the protection of civilians in Darfur 
Conflict by examining some legal aspects of the conflict. It is divided into 
five parts. Part 1 traces the historical background of Darfur conflict and 
development of events without going into details about causes, only a brief 
outline will be made. Part 2 examines the nature and legal characterization 
of armed conflict. Part 3 examines the international obligations imposed on 
the government and rebels. Part 4 examines the relevant applicable rules of 
international law protecting civilians and conduct of hostilities. Part 5 
discusses the international responsibility for serious violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law and possible mechanisms for accountability.  
1. Historical Background And Development of Events of Darfur 
Armed Conflicts  
Darfur region in Western Sudan is inhabited by 80 tribes and ethnic groups 
divided between nomads and sedentary communities.7 The historic tribal 
structure which dates back many centuries is still in effect in Darfur. 
Distinctions between tribal groups are not clear-cut and tend to sharpen 
when conflicts arise; individual allegiances are determined by tribal 
                                                 
7  The Darfur region is a geographically large area of approximately 250, 000 square kilometers with an 
estimated population of 6million persons. Darfur borders with Libya in the North, Chad in the West and the 
Central African Republic in the South West. The region has been divided since 1994, administratively into 
three states of North, South and West Darfur. Each of the three states, in Darfur is governed by Governor 
(Wali) appointed by the Central Government in Khartoun and supported by a local administration-J.D. 
Fage and W. Tordofl, A History of Africa 4th ed. (London and New York: Rout ledge, 2002).  
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affiliation. Historically land was collectively owned by the members of the 
tribe and its use was determined by the tribal leadership. However during the 
1970s, the land laws were changed and individual ownership became 
possible. Drought and desertification which attacked the entire region of the 
Sahara in the 1970s and 1980s had their impact on Darfur region. This led to 
clashes and tensions between such tribes as some tribes, essentially most of 
the nomadic tribes, do not posses land and have traditionally move through 
land belonging to other tribes. In particular tension between fur farmers and 
Rezaigat Arab Cattle herds increased in 1984 and 85 as drought force of the 
nomads to trespass upon cultivated land in search of pasture and water.8 
The fight for scarce resources became more intensive in recent years. Inter-
tribal conflict became aggravated by an increased access to weapon through 
bordering states like Chad. The conflict in the South of the Sudan also had 
its impact on the tribal conflicts through easier access to weapons. As a 
result, major tribes began to organize militias and villages’ defense groups 
i.e. a group of armed men ready to defend the tribe or the village. The tribal 
clashes in the region have been described as between the Arab nomadic 
                                                 
8 Disputes which occur between nomadic tribes and sedentary tribes e.g. murders and incidents related to 
cattle stealing which may develop into inter-tribal conflicts, were settled peacefully by tribal leaders 
through customary law and the state was regarded as a neutral mediator. However the new structures of 
local administration introduction 1980s had formally abolished the tribal system and the administers of the 
new structures appointed by the Central Government, had executive and judicial powers. A. Mosley Lesch, 
The Sudan-contested national identities (Bloomigtion and Indian police. Indian University Press, 1998, p. 
91. 
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tribes and African group of tribes.9 The conflict was mediated by the 
Government and local tribal leaders in 1990s, but tensions remained during 
the years to come. 
The traditional struggle over scarce resources increased by the process of 
desertification, is one of the basic reasons which gave rise to the fighting 
between Arab nomadic tribes and African farming during last five years 
However, since the beginning of 2003, the conflict has a political basis, 
increased violence and armed conflict. Fighting between two main 
opposition groups: the Sudanese Liberation Movement Army (SLMA) and 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) faction of the Sudan Liberation 
Movement / Army  (SLMIA) and the Government of Sudan (GOS) military, 
and Janjaweed Arab tribes described as Government supported militia 
groups, intensified in the three states of Darfur.10 The rebel groups claims 
about their motivation in taking up arms, since February 2003, is to protest 
at what they belief as the lack of government protection of the settled 
population against attacks by Janjaweed in their massacre of Fur, destruction 
of hundred of houses and thousands of live stock lost. However, the 
government claims its neutrality and says it is fighting “banditry” in Darfur 
and restoring order and security. The rebel groups also claim that the main 
                                                 
9 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Darfur Conflict-http:ue.wikipedia.org/wikil/Darfur conflict 
10 The government denies supporting or training the JanJawed militias as and describes them as “theieves, 
gangsters and crooks” Q & A” Sudan Darfur Conflict (http//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/3496731)-stus) 
(BBC), 7 May, 2006.  
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cause of the conflict is the under-development and marginalization of 
Darfur.11 However since 2003 events occurring in the region has 
characterized the conflict as an armed conflict. In March and April 2003 the 
rebels attacked Government installations in Kutum, Tin and EL Fashir, 
including the military section of the airport in EL Fashir where the rebels 
destroyed several military aircrafts on the ground and killed many soldiers. 
The government response was to launch an aerial bombardment. The scale 
of hostile activities since then increased and reached high level of intensity.  
Both sides have been accused of committing serious human rights and 
humanitarian law violations including mass killing, looting and death of 
thousands of civilians as a result of starvation and disease.12 The United 
Nations estimated that up to 600,000 people had been displaced by the 
conflict since February 2003. Hundreds of thousands of people have been 
forced to flee their homes since fighting broke out in April 2003 between the 
rebel Justice and Equality Movement and governmental forces. The situation 
of women and children is particularly desperate.13  
Regardless of the fighting between parties to the conflict, the most 
significant element of the conflict has been the attacks on civilians. Efforts 
                                                 
11  Global Security. Org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/darfur.htm 
12 http.//www.hrw.org/English/docs/2004/08/111darfur 9217.htm), Human Rights Watch, August, 2004.  
13 http://www.global security org/military/world/paral darfur.htm. 
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by regional and international institutions and states, aim to find a political 
solution to the conflict began since August 2003 with the purpose of   
conflict in the region. The African Union and European Union have sent 
monitors as of 5 July 2004, to observe the Humanitarian Ceasefire 
agreement concluded between the Sudanese Government and JEM and 
SLMA on 8 April 2004. Their mandate did not include the protection of 
civilians. However the attacks against civilians have not stopped. On 30 
July, the UN gave the Sudanese government 30 days, to disarm and bring to 
justice the Janjaweed in Untied Nations Resolution 1556. The resolution 
imposed an arms embargo on the Janjaweed and other militias.  
On August 2004, the African Union sent troops to protect the ceasefire 
monitors; however their mandate did not include the protection of civilians. 
On September 2004, the UNSC passed Resolution 1564 pressing the 
Sudanese government to act urgently to improve the situation and 
threatening the possibility of oil sanctions. The Resolution established 
International Commission of Inquiry to look into violations of human rights 
and to determine whether genocides were occurring. On November 2004, 
the two rebel groups signed two accords aimed to resolve the conflict. The 
first accord established a no-fly zone over rebel, controlled areas to Darfur 
measure designed to end the Sudanese government military bombing of 
rebel villages an the region. The second accord granted international 
 556
humanitarian aid agencies unrestricted access to the Darfur region. The 
African Union sponsoring peace talks in Abogaa began October 25, 2004  
resulted in the above two accords.14  
However, violence in Darfur continued and attack from both sides and towns 
were launched. The African Union in October 2005 accused both rebels 
groups and the Sudanese government of violating the ceasefire agreement.15 
The International Commission of Inquiry made a report to Secretary General 
of UN on January 25 (2005). It found that both the Government of Sudan 
and Janjaweed and rebels are responsible for serious violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law and named 51 persons responsible and 
recommended immediate trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC).16  
However, in March 29, 2005 the Security Council passed a resolution                
strengthened the arms embargo and imposed an asset freeze and travel ban 
on those deemed responsible for atrocities in Darfur. In April 5, it was 
reported that the UN has given the ICC names of fifty one people suspected 
                                                 
14 Darfur Conflict-wikipeihn, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipeida.org/wiki/Dar fur Conflict. 
15 African Union, The situation in the Darfur Region of Enden (http://www.africa union. Org. /Dar fur / 
homedar htm).  
16 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Dar fur in the United Nations Security Council 
summary (http://www.relief web. Int/RWB. NSF/dbgoosid/HMY T-697 TAR? Open document & VC= 1 & 
cc=sdu), 25 January 2005.  
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of war crimes however the Sudan Government has said it will not hand over 
the subjects.17 
Following an increase in fighting in the region, on February 3, 2006 the U.S. 
offered a motion to begin plans to send UN peace keepers to Darfur.   
The Security Council argued to send the troops to come later. It called for 
increase of number of African Union troops already there to incorporate into 
the UN mission stating that they would have a greater mandate to protect 
civilians. However, the Sudanese Government showed opposition to UN- 
peace keeping in Sudan and considered such “step an intervention in its 
internal affairs.18  
On May 5, 2006 the government of Sudan signed an accord i.e. peace 
agreement with the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). However, the agreement 
was rejected by two other, smaller groups, the Justice and Equality 
Movement and a rival faction of the SLA. The accord calls for the 
disarmament of the Janjaweed militia and for the rebel forces to disband and 
be incorporated into the army.19 This did not put an end to the violence and 
                                                 
17 http://new.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/80fc145a4a3a65c 12b6a7747d65c34cohtw. 
18 http/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article 12006/02/03/AR 2006020302570.html.  
19 Main parties sign Dar fur accord (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/africa/4978668.stans)  
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atrocities against civilians in the region by rebels who refused to sign the 
peace agreement and by tribes owing them allegiance.20  
For the purpose of analyzing the application of international rules protecting 
civilians in Darfur conflict, the nature and legal characterization of the 
armed conflict is to be examined first.  
2. The Nature and Legal Characterization of Armed Conflict in 
Darfur Region 
The determination of nature of Darfur armed conflict is important with 
regard to the applicability of the rules of international law relevant to 
protection of civilian victims. The characterization of acts of violence which 
Darfur region is witnessing from the beginning of 2003, is not an easy 
matter since it involves a number of factors, interference of foreign elements 
in a way or another and the inaccuracy of facts reported.21 All these have 
complicated the issue of legal characterization of the conflict as to whether it 
is civil war, rebellion, guerrilla war or mere internal disturbances. The 
fighting in Darfur has not come to the point of armed conflict oversight; the 
fights were of long standing duration which took two phases. The first phase 
of situation may be described as internal disturbances referring to the events 
                                                 
20 http://en.wikipedia,org/wikil/Darfur conflict-Darfur into (http://www.darfur into.org) from the University 
of Pennsylivania African Studies Centre-http://www.darfurinformation.com/if. 
21 The issue of determination of Darfur conflict is complicated since the Darfur region witnesses a number 
of conflicts described as tribal conflicts, conflicts on resources, ethnic conflicts and political conflicts. In 
addition several parties to the conflict are involved.  
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which occurred long before beginning of 2003.The second phase of situation 
is an internal armed conflict occurring since the beginning of 2003. It is 
necessary to examine the characteristics that differentiate such situations.   
Internal disturbances are situations in which there is no non-international 
armed conflict as such, but there exists a confrontation which is 
characterized by certain seriousness or duration and which involve acts of 
violence. In such situations which do not necessarily be an open struggle, the 
authorities in power call upon police force or even armed forces to restore 
internal order and security. Such situations are excluded expressly from the 
scope of application of humanitarian law as not being armed conflicts. 
Instead they are governed by national laws relevant and rules of international 
human rights law applicable.22  
Based on the above facts, one way argue that the violent acts at Darfur 
region occurring prior to 2003 can properly be characterized as a situation of 
internal violence disturbance. Before 2003, there have been attacks in rural 
Darfur carried by criminal armed groups. The scale of violence obliged the 
Government in Sudan to take special measures to face this violence which 
                                                 
22 To strengthen human rights protection in times of internal disturbances, the Declaration of Minimum 
Standards (Turku), was published as a UN document. It is a non-binding code of conduct to ensure respect 
for a “minimum humanitarian standards “embodying basic principles of both human rights and 
humanitarian law to be applicable. Hans-Peter Gasser “A measure of humanity in internal disturbances and 
tensions: Proposal for a  code of conduct”, International Review of the Red Cross, 1988, p. 38. It is to be 
mentioned in this connection that the ICRC in some cases offered its services e.g. to visit detainees 
captured in such disturbances to improve their conditions, however this is done upon consent of state 
concerned-ICRC protection by International Humanitarian Law” in International Review of the Red Cross 
(1988) p. 9.  
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included, murder, tribal clashes, armed robbery and clashes between 
nomadic herders and farmers, to restore order in the region.  
In contrast to the above situation, the acts of violence which occurred in 
Darfur region since the beginning of 2003 are distinguished from internal 
disturbances by the level of intensity and degree of organization, a fact 
which subject the conflict to the application of common Article as a “non- 
international armed conflict”. However the applicability of Article 3 to the 
conflict depends on the interpretation of the term “non-international armed 
conflict” to be adopted. In fact the conflict is described by some a civil war, 
such characterization adopts the restrictive interpretation of the term “non-
international armed conflict” which needs some elaboration. To characterize 
the legal nature of conflict on Darfur or acts of violence as civil war in its 
technical meaning, one has first to determine whether the criteria required by 
international jurisprudence and practice are met by the rebel groups for 
purposes of application of common Article 3. Two criteria are to be met, the 
armed conflict must be general in scale and in geographical scope and the 
rebels must be organized i.e. subject to a command and respect humanitarian 
principles. Applying the above criteria to the event in Darfur, the 
confrontation between the main rebel groups on one side and the “Janjweed” 
and the Government armed forces on the other side is not a general war and 
it is not general in geographical scope since the acts of violence are 
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restricted to the west part of Sudan i.e. Darfur region in specific areas and 
nearby villages. 23 As to the second criteria, the rebel groups are apparently 
organized (administrative and military) so as to exercise power and control 
over acts of its members to enable it to respect humanitarian principles. 
However, in practice their acts of violence reflect the contrary. The method 
of conducting hostilities and barbaric acts of violence points to the fact that 
there is a lack of being organized i.e. committing terrorists’ acts against 
civilians including women and children, thereby violating the minimum 
standards of humanitarian considerations.  
Therefore, if the above restrictive interpretation of common Article 3 is 
applied to the events in Darfur, then the acts of violence are not to be 
characterized as a “non international armed conflict” within the meaning of 
the Article. Such acts then are characterized as internal disturbances which 
subject the conflict to relevant Sudanese laws and human rights laws 
applicable. This characterization would exclude rules of protection under 
humanitarian law, a fact which will adversely affect civilians.  
                                                 
23 The categories of groups participating in Darfur  conflict are: Government Armed forces: militias 
including “ Janjawed” and rebel movement groups. The ICRC has shown on its commentary on the drafts 
of the Additional Protocols of 1977, the distinction between the term ‘armed forces” on one hand and 
armed groups on the other hand. The first term includes all government forces constituted in accordance to 
the law of the state. If part of these forces dissent and take up arms against the government then this is also 
a “non-international armed conflict. The term also includes in its broad sense all forces which are not 
considered armed forces under national guard forces, police forces etc. The “armed groups” are those 
forces constituted by rebels outside the national law of the state______Pilloud et al, Commentary on 
Additional Protocols, op.cit, p. 1351.  
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However, compared to the above, the wider interpretation of the term “non-
international armed conflict” requires the existence of an “armed conflict” 
for purposes of application of common Article 3. The existence of an armed 
conflict requires the satisfaction of certain criteria. The jurisprudence of the 
international criminal tribunals has elaborated on the notion: “an armed 
conflict exists wherever there is resort to armed force between states or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a state”.24  It requires the 
existence of organized armed groups that are capable of and actually carry 
acts of hostilities against each other. It has been shown earlier, that Common 
Article 3 does not define the concept of an “armed conflict of a non-
international character”.25 However it is to be widely applied to include open 
confrontations and degree of intensity between relatively organized armed 
forces or groups within the territory of the state. Common Article 3 covers 
those situations of armed conflicts where two or more armed forces confront 
each other or more armed forces confront one another. Applying the above 
                                                 
24 ICTY Appeals Chamber, Tadic, Interl octory Appeal on Jurisdiction (1995), Para. 70.  
25 The Commission of Experts convened by the ICRC in October 1962, pointed to a number of criteria in 
determining the existence of an armed conflict by stating “………………the existence of an armed 
conflict, within the meaning of Article 3 cannot be denied if the hostile action, directed against a legal 
government is of a collective character and consists of a minimum of organization. In this respect and 
without these circumstances being necessarily cumulative, one should take into account such factors as the 
length of the conflict, the number and framework of the rebel groups, their installation or action on a part of 
the territory, the degree of insecurity, the existence of victims, the method employed by the legal 
government to re-establish order ect. “……………..Commission of Experts for the Study of the Question 
of Aid to Victims of Internal Conflicts (Geneva, 25-30 October 1962), ICRC, Geneva 1962, p.3  
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wider interpretation to the conflict in Darfur, it is an armed conflict of a non-
international character subject to Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions. The scale of violence and fighting’s among the various groups 
within the regions of Darfur which began in 2003, notwithstanding 
temporary cease-fire, indicates the intensity of the situation.26 These 
hostilities are of high intensity i.e., the large-scale violence between the 
rebel groups and government forces and other militias groups that is alleged 
the government is military supporting and number of civilian victims killed 
and displaced. The concreted nature of the hostile acts undertaken by the 
attackers, the direct involvement of governmental armed forces and the 
nature and level of violence all these characterize the events in the regions as 
non-international armed conflicts which entails the application of common 
Article 3 of Geneva Conventions to which Sudan has ratified as well as other 
rules relevant to the conduct of internal hostilities.27  
All parties to the conflict the Government of the Sudan and the SLA and 
JEM have characterized Darfur events an internal armed conflict. In 2004, 
the two rebel groups and the Government of Sudan concluded several 
                                                 
26 The ICRC head of Delegation in Khartoum, Stiuhart, speaking at a press briefing in Geneva in relation to 
Darfur conflict dated 27.08.2004 and pointing to the intensity of violence and its effect on civilian victims 
stated…………….Massive violations of international humanitarian law have taken place and this has 
further exacerbated the suffering of people from all different tribes. This is important because there is an 
considerable simplifications of the conflict that all the victims are African and all the perpetrators are Arab 
and that is simply not true”- http://www.icrc.org/web/Eng/siteengo.nsf/iwplist/432.   
27 Sudan ratified four Geneva Conventions of 1949 in 1957. Sudan acceded Additional Protocol II of 1977 
in 2005..  
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agreements in which they invoke or rely upon the Geneva Conventions. In 
addition, all observes to the events in Darfur region, including UN organs, 
ICRC and human rights bodies are unanimous in characterizing the 
confrontations between the rebel groups and other militias and Government 
forces a non-international armed conflict in calling all parties to the conflict 
to respect humanitarian law rules protecting civilians.28 It should be 
mentioned here that such characterization does not exclude the subjection of 
conflict to domestic laws and human rights law. Instead it adds to rules of 
humanitarian protection of civilians.  
The question of whether Additional Protocol II relating to the protection of 
victims of non-international armed conflicts applies to the conflict between 
regular government armed forces and SLA and JEM rebel groups, needs to 
be examined apart from the conflict between such groups and other 
Janjaweed militants. As stated earlier, Additional Protocol II applies to 
conflict, which take place in the territory of the High Contracting Party 
between its armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 The United Nations Security Council Resolutions adopted in  relation to Darfur conflict e.g. 1547 (June 
2004), 1556 (July 2004) and 1590, 91, 93 (2005), all points to the intensity of violence, persons killed and 
displaced. The 1556 resolution classify the conflict in Dar fur as threatening international peace and 
Security under Chapter VII of UN Charter-http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004 and 2005. It is to be 
mentioned here that at the 1949  Geneva Conference in relation to Common Article 3, it was argued that a 
situation would automatically be considered a non-international armed conflict if it has been labeled by the 
UN General Assembly or Security Council as “threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII 
of UN Charter-11-B Final Record 121-Also Jean Pictel-ed, Commentary on the IV Geneva Convention, op, 
it, 1958 p. 35…… on reports by human rights bodies in relation to acts of violence in Darfur, 
www.espac.org____http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/11 darfur 9217. htm.  
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responsible command exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol.  
Applying the above criteria defined in Article I of the Protocol to Darfur 
conflict is necessary. The Protocol applies in a situation where the parties to 
the conflict will usually either be the government confronting dissident 
armed forces, or the government fighting insurgent organized armed groups. 
The team armed force of the High Contracting Party is to be defined broadly 
so as to cover all armed forces as described within national legislation. This 
requires the condition that the government forces should be a party to the 
conflict. A fact which the Sudanese Government denies by stating that the 
conflict between tribal groups and that its role in using force to restore order. 
However, reality of events shows that the Government is involved if not 
from the beginning of events. This is also evidenced by the fact that the rebel 
groups claim that they are taking arms because the region is underdeveloped 
and marginalized and that the government armed forces are involved in the 
conflict fighting against such rebels.29  
The second requirement is the existence of a responsible command which 
implies some degree of organization. The guerrilla movements in Darfur are 
organized by bodies of military and political management planning conduct 
                                                 
29 http://www.global security. Org/military / world / para / darfur. Htm, 09.05.2006. 
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and execution of military actions. This suggests that they possessed a 
structural leadership which is answerable to command or authority as a 
criterion of control over a part of a territory. It is to be noted that at present 
the rebels exercises a degree of control over certain villages and rural areas 
not fixed from which they conduct their hostilities and violent act and such 
control enable it to counter operations launched by government forces and 
“Janjaweed” militias forces. However, from a military point of view, it is not 
possible to talk of a balanced situation on account of the increased 
effectiveness of the government forces. As to criteria whether military 
operations are sustained and concreted while implying the element of 
continuity and intensity one may dare to say it is satisfied, if we are talking 
about military operations conceived and planned by organized armed 
groups. The ability to implement the Protocol is a fundamental criterion, 
which justifies other elements i.e. being under responsible command and in 
control of a part of the territory concerned, the rebels must be in a position to 
implement the Protocol. These facts enable it to take care of the sick and 
wounded, treat civilian detainees humanely and comply with the other 
provisions contained in AP II such as the prohibition of torture, collective 
punishment, the taking of hostages, acts of terrorism against civilian and 
sexual violence against women. In addition the SLA and JEM, undertook to 
respect a set of principles, notably “the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its 
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two 1977 Additional Protocols” when conducting the Protocol on the 
Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur signed on 8 April 2004 
with the Government of Sudan.30  
If follows from above that the conditions set out in Article 1 are objectively 
satisfied with the result that AP II is applicable for purposes of discussion of 
characterization of the conflict as non-international armed conflict as defined 
in said Protocol. However, in fact AP II is not applicable because Sudan 
ratified it only recently in 2005, a fact which deprived citizens from the 
application of a detailed rules protecting them under the Protocol.  
3. The International Obligations Imposed on Sudanese Government 
and Rebels 
International law protecting civilians in armed conflicts imposes certain 
obligations on parties to the conflict in non-international armed conflicts. As 
such, the Sudanese Government and members of rebel groups are subject to 
obligations to respect these rules. The source and legal basis of such 
obligations stems mainly from human rights and humanitarian law 
instruments to which Sudan is a contracting party.  
 
 
 
                                                 
30 http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki / Dar fur. Conflict-14/12/2005.  
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i. The Source and Legal Basis of obligations of Sudanese Government  
The source and legal basis of international obligations of Sudanese 
Government emanates from two main bodies of instruments applicable to 
the conflict in Darfur i.e. human rights and humanitarian law instruments. 
These instruments imposes obligations on states parties to respect and 
implement a set of rules with the aim to protect human life and dignity of 
civilian and protect them against torture or other cruel or, inhumane and 
degrading treatment and non-discrimination. These instruments impose 
obligations to guarantee safeguards for persons subject to trial for acts in 
relation to the conflict and to ensure a set of basic rights to civilians. These 
obligations include a duty to refrain from any conduct that violates such 
rules. The Sudanese Government has ratified a number of human rights 
instruments which contain provisions applicable during armed conflict to 
protect civilians.31 With regard to international humanitarian law instruments 
the Sudan has ratified and is bound by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
                                                 
31 The Human Rights Conventions which Sudan has ratified and which are applicable in Darfur Conflict 
which imposes on it certain obligations to respect, include, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). However the Sudan has signed but not yet ratified, the Optional Protocol on the 
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. The Sudan has not ratified the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Sudan has ratified the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights.  
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and other relevant instruments.32 As a state party, to these instruments, the 
Sudan is legally bound to respect, protect and fulfill its obligations under 
such instruments.   
ii. The Status of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Instruments in 
Sudan Legal System 
The general rule of international law is that states are required to perform 
their international obligations in good faith and that a state cannot plead a 
rule of or a gap in its own municipal law as a defense to a claim based on 
international law.33 Thus there is a general duty for states to bring national 
laws into conformity with obligations under international law. However, 
states are free to decide how to translate their international obligations into 
internal law and to determine the legal status and binding effect they have in 
its national legal order. As far as the obligation of Sudan is concerned, the 
most important question is with regard to the status of international treaties 
in Sudan legal system since both human rights and Geneva Conventions are 
international treaties binding on Sudan.  
                                                 
32 The Sudan has ratified on 13 October 2003 and is bound by the Ottawa Convention of the Use, 
Stockpilling, Production and Transfer Anti-Personnel / Mines and on their Destruction of 18 September 
1997. The Sudan signed but not yet ratified the statute of the International Criminal Court 1998. As to this 
and other treaties which Sudan signed only, still it is bound to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of treaties.  
33 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. The Sudan ratified this Convention on 
18 April 1990. 
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The Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan 2005 does 
not provide for the status of international treaties concluded by the Sudan 
within the Sudan legal system.34 However, it contains provisions as to their 
conclusion. Article 91, (3) (d) states that “The National Assembly shall be 
competent to (d) ratify international treaties, conventions and agreements”. 
Under Article 109 (2) “The National Assembly may delegate to the 
President of the Republic power to ratify international conventions and 
agreements while the National Assembly is not in session, however such 
ratified conventions or agreements shall not be subject to subsequent 
ratification by the National Assembly and shall be deposited before the 
National Assembly as soon as it is convened”.35  
It follows, that as a matter of constitutional law and in accordance to the 
above Articles, that ratification of international agreements can only take 
place by means of an Act of legislation of ratification passed by the National 
Assembly or a Republican Decree having the force of law. Acts of 
ratifications should be published in the official Gazette of the Sudan as 
legislation. One treaty duly ratified and published in the Gazette shall 
become part of the laws of Sudan and are binding on Sudanese courts. Not 
                                                 
34 Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan….Republic of the Sudan Gazette, Special 
Supplement No. 1722, Dated 10 July 2005, Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Justice.  
35 Article 73 (1) (d) of 1998 Constitution (Repeated), stated that “Function of National Assembly, to pass 
bills ratifying international conventions and agreements”.   
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only have these but they operated laws within Sudan legal system which 
binds all citizens as well as government officials. This has been affirmed by 
the Appeal Court n the case of Ali El Khater Ebrahim vs. Tunisian Airlines 
Co.36 The Court decided in this case that since the Sudan acceded to Warsaw 
Convention on unification of certain Rules Relating to International 
Transportation by Air and to Hague Protocol Amendment 1955, were part of 
the Sudanese Law by Republican order No. 188/1974, as well as ratified the 
treaty as amended on 1955 by Republican order No. 189 for 1974 and since 
the Treaty has been published in supplementary legislation to the Gazette of 
Sudan No. 161 issued in 15/15/1974, the Court decided that Warsaw Treaty 
of 1929 as amended in 1955, is part of laws of Sudan and as such should be 
applied.  
In light of the above decisions, human rights and humanitarian treaties 
ratified in accordance to the Constitution by and Act of ratification and duly 
published in the official Gazette of Sudan they become part of the municipal 
law of Sudan. And any Sudanese legislation inconsistent with the provisions 
of such treaties should be amended and reconciled to that effect on the other 
hand; the above treaties are binding on the Government as well as citizens. 
Consequently both the members of irregular armed forces and all states 
officials particularly all members of armed forces whose duty is to apply the 
                                                 
36  Sudan Law Journal and Reports, 1983-1987, p. 305. 
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humanitarian rules, are under the obligation to respect the provisions of 
international humanitarian law at all times and in all places, not merely 
because they are rules of international law but also because they are binding 
rules of the legal order and must be adhered to by all citizens of the territory 
of Sudan. These rules of international humanitarian law which guarantee 
core of human rights which can on no account be disregarded, even in the 
extreme situation of armed conflict are also binding. Therefore there can be 
no justification whatsoever before the international community or before the 
laws of Sudan for committing acts which are in violation of international 
treaties to which Sudan is a party, such as arbitrary killing, hostage-taking, 
torture, ill treatment, forced disappearances and trial without judicial 
guarantees.   
In addition to international treaties, the Government of Sudan is bound by 
customary rules of international humanitarian law which is applicable in 
non-international armed conflict. These customary rules had evolved as a 
result of mainly states practice, of rebel armed groups decision of 
international and national tribunals.37 The basic customary principles and 
rules which relate to protection of civilians and respect to their dignity are 
binding not only on Sudan government officials but as well on members of 
                                                 
37 Meron, Theodor, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law Oxford: Calendar, 1989.   
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rebel groups and militias that have attained a measure of structure and 
effective control over part of the territory.  
iii. The Legal Basis of Obligations of Rebels 
Under international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts, rules and principles protecting civilians bind also members of rebel 
groups’ parties to the conflict. These groups that have reached a certain 
threshold of organization and have control of territory, posses international 
legal personality under humanitarian law instruments such as Geneva 
Conventions i.e. common Article 3 and AP II. Under such instruments they 
possess certain rights and have certain obligations.38 Similarly members of 
rebel groups possessing limited international legal personality for purposes 
of respecting and be bound by such rules. However, in this connection, it is 
to be mentioned that humanitarian obligations are not subject to reciprocity, 
as they are independently binding on each of the parties to the conflict, being 
designed to protect individuals.39   
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Bugnion Francois, The International Committee of the Red Cross and The Protection of War Victims, 
op.nt, pp 334-336.  
39 Provost, Rene, Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, (1995) 65 British Year Book of 
International Law, p. 383 John, Louis B. The New International Law. Protecting the Rights of Individuals 
rather than States, “ (1982) 32 American University Law Review, p. 1. 
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4. Relevant International Law Rules Protecting Civilians in Darfur 
Conflict  
i. International Humanitarian Law  
 
The conflict in Darfur is governed by humanitarian law rules applicable to 
non-international armed conflicts. The main provision is common Article 3 
of Geneva Convention IV of 1949 which contains a set of principles, 
protecting civilians against atrocities of all parties to the conflict i.e. 
government, militias and rebel groups. Additional Protocol II of 1977 
provisions which are customary rules may also be applicable.  
Common Article 3 contains rules prohibiting certain acts against those 
taking no part in hostilities including civilians. These prohibited acts bind all 
parties in Darfur conflict. They include prohibition of violence to life and 
person, in particular all kinds of murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture, taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, the passing of sentences and the 
carrying of executions without previous judgment provision and by a 
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Though Article 3 does not 
provide for special protection to women expressly, however the cases of 
rape and sexual abuses, reported in Darfur, are implicitly prohibited in the 
Article 3. Rape and sexual abuse constitute war crimes whether or not they 
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take place on a massive scale. They also constitute acts of torture or cruel 
and inhumane treatment. These abuses when committed in a systematic or as 
a matter of policy, the crime turn into a crime against humanity.  
In addition to common Article 3, some provisions of AP II which constitutes 
norms of customary law are applicable. In fact, many provisions of AP II 
can now be regarded declaratory of existing rules or having crystallized 
emerging rules of customary law or evolved as general principles. The basic 
cores of these rules of AP II which are a part of generally accepted 
customary law are those relating to protection of civilians.40 Starvation of 
civilians as a method of combat is prohibited under AP 11 and customary 
humanitarian law, it is also prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render 
useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population such as food stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of 
foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and 
irrigation works.41 Involuntary or forced displacement violates principles of 
international humanitarian law and international standards provided for in 
the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Under, Article 17 of 
AP II the displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for 
                                                 
40 The Prosecutor VS. Jean-Paul Akayesu, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-96-
4, T, September 2, 1998, Para 603. 
41 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, adopted in September 1998 by the UN General 
Assembly reflect both human rights and humanitarian law principles.   
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reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or 
imperative military reasons so demand. The “imperative military reasons” 
refers to movement of civilians as a result of imminent military operations. 
The Article requires that possible measures shall be taken in order that the 
civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, 
hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, should such displacement have to be 
carried out. The importance of applicability of these rules is seen with regard 
to the cases forced resettlement of civilians and forced return to their 
villages in most of the rural areas of Darfur reported.42 These rules are 
applicable and bind parties to the conflict regardless of whether the Protocol 
is ratified by Sudan or not as they reflect customary rules.  Besides these, 
there are other bodies of customary rules regulating non-international armed 
conflicts which may be held to be applicable and binding on parties to the 
conflict. The UN Security Council resolutions passed in relation to Darfur 
conflict, called all parties to the conflict to respect human rights and 
international humanitarian law protecting civilians.43 The Council did not 
mention common Article 3 but referred to the “international humanitarian 
law”, thus clearly articulating the view that there exists a set of general 
principles and norms on internal armed conflicts including common Article 
                                                 
42 Amnesty International Sudan Crisis (http://web.amnesty.org/pages/sdn-nd ex-eng).  
 
43 On these resolutions available on the U.N. web site at http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc-resolutions 04.h 
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3 to be applicable. These evolved as general principles governing all types of 
armed conflicts. In 1968 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2444 
which referred to a set of principles to be complied with in all armed 
conflicts. These principles provides (a) that the right of the parties to a 
conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited, (b) that it is 
prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such, (c) that a 
distinction between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the 
civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as 
possible.44 
In addition other fundamental humanitarian rules of international law 
including those embodied in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its 
Protocols are applicable. In fact, common Article 3 contains not only the 
substantive rules governing internal armed conflicts but also a procedural 
mechanism inviting parties to such conflicts to reach special agreement to 
agree to abide by the rest of Geneva Conventions. The Sudanese 
Government concluded with the two rebel groups SLA and JEM the 
Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur, signed 
on 8 April 2004 stating in Article 10 (2) that the their parties undertook to 
respect a set of principles set out of as follows:-  
                                                 
44 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly during its Twenty-Third Session 24-September 21-
December 1968, General Assembly, Official Records, Twenty-third session, Supplement No. 18, 
Document A17218, pp. 50  
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“The concept and execution of the ‘humanitarian assistance, in Darfur 
will be conform (sic) to the international principles with a view to 
guarantee that it will be credible transparent and inclusive, notably the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and its two 1977 Additional Protocols the 
1948 Universal Declaration on Human  Rights, the 1966 International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the 1952 Geneva 
Convention on Refugees the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (Deng Principles) and the provisions of General 
Assembly resolution 46/182”.45  
It is to be mentioned in this connection that special agreements of this nature 
concluded between the government and rebel groups are not strictly 
speaking treaties. As they are not concluded between entities subject to 
public international law but between parties to an internal conflict which is 
subject to international humanitarian law conferring on rebels this 
personality to conclude such agreement. In fact, the legal validity of the 
humanitarian rules does not depend on the existence of such agreements. 
The practical and effective validity of international humanitarian law 
                                                 
45 This quoted by the International Commission of Inquiry on Dar fur in its Report to the United Nations. 
The Commission was set up by Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September, 2004, Geneva 25 
January 2005, p. 50. The Government of Sudan has signed also the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 
the Conflict, of 8 April 2004, the Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian situation in Dar fur of 9 
November, 2004 and the Protocol on the Establishment of the Security in Darfur in Accordance with the 
N.D. Jamena Agreement, also of 9 November 2004. It is to be mentioned here that the Government of 
Sudan undertook to be bound by rules provided for in two Additional Protocols of 1977 under the 
Humanitarian Assistance Agreement it concluded on April 2004, though at time of conclusion of such 
Agreement it was not a party to the Protocols. 
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depends on a large extent on the resolve and commitment of the parties to 
respect its provisions. 
Customary rules are of particular importance in another area of the law 
governing non-international armed conflicts in relation to conduct of 
hostilities. This covers mainly the use of weapons and the protection of 
civilians from the effects of hostilities.46 In this area the treaty rules 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts are, in fact, very poor. 
Common Article 3 does not provide for such rules and AP II rules are 
incomplete. However, some of these customary rules are relevant and 
applicable to Darfur conflict. These include the prohibition on deliberate 
attacks on civilians47 and the distinction between combatant and civilians. 
The obligation to respect the principle of distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants is a basic principle in international humanitarian law, 
the violation of which gives rise to criminal responsibility. Customary rules 
applicable includes also prohibition on indiscriminate attacks on civilians 
even if there may be a few armed rebels among civilians48, The prohibition 
                                                 
46 These customary rules are embodied in Military Manuals of some states like Britain and Germany-The 
British Manual of the law of Armed Conflict, UK of 2004, Ministry of Defense, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2004, p. 384 on provisions of the German Military Manual, Fleik Dieter, the Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford, University Press 2003.  
47 This was reaffirmed in Tadic Case (ICTY Appeal Chamber), Decision on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, (1995) Para 117.   
 
 
48 Article 13 of Additional Protocol 11, which is to be regarded as a provision codifying customary 
international law, provided for this principle. The same principle was affirmed in Tadic Case, ICTY Trial 
Chamber (Judgment of 7 May 1997, at Para. 643). 
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of attacks aimed at terrorizing civilians; prohibition of attacks against 
civilian objects; the obligation to take precautions in order to minimize 
incidental loss and damage as a result of attacks, i.e. each part must take that 
measures to ensure that targets are military objectives and to choose means 
of combat that will minimize loss of civilians; the obligation to ensure that 
when taking military objections, incidental loss to civilians is not 
disproportionate to the military gain anticipated; the prohibition on attacks 
on works and installations containing dangerous forces, prohibition on the 
distinction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. 
As regards the situation in Darfur, the application of these rules and 
principles by parties to the conflict is particularly binding and important; the 
reason being that the armed conflict taking place in Darfur in the region has 
seriously affected the civilian population. In fact, some of the agreements 
concluded by the Government of the Sudan with the rebels provided for the 
respect of some of these customary rules. For example, under Article 2 of 
the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the conflict in Darfur of 2004, 
each party undertakes to refrain from any violence or any other abuse on 
civilian populations. Also Article 2 (1) of the Protocol on the Improvement 
of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur (2004) sates that, the parties 
undertake to take all steps required to prevent all attacks, the threats, 
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intimidation and any other form of violence against civilians by any party or 
group, including the Janjawed and other militias.49  
Though other basic principles are not provided for in above agreements, 
however being customary rules they are applicable and bind parties to the 
conflict in Darfur.  
ii. Applicability of Relevant Human Rights Instruments  
It has been mentioned earlier that the regime of protection under common 
Article 3, of Geneva Conventions IV of 1949 applicable, provides a 
minimum standard of principles which do not provide sufficient protection 
to civilians. Besides, the lack of provisions providing for rules of protection 
rendered the regime weak compared to atrocities which are committed 
against civilians in Darfur. In addition to customary rules in international 
humanitarian law, human rights instruments contain a number of rules which 
may contribute and strengthen the regime of protection by lessening 
sufferings and addressing some of basic humanitarian problems of civilian 
victims.  
A number of human rights instruments have been ratified by the Sudan 
which contains several provisions that are applicable to the conflict in 
                                                 
49 Quoted from the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Security-Council pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 
http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/comng/darfur) p.50.  
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Darfur.50 They provide for guarantee of certain fundamental rights for 
protection of civilians as human persons, which the Government of Sudan is 
under obligations to ensure its protection during the armed conflict in Dar 
fur. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 1968 provided for 
basic human rights applicable which should be respected during armed 
conflicts to civilian victims. These human rights are embodied basically in 
the International Covenant of Civilian and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCP). 
Under Article 4 of (ICCP) the state party may derogate temporary from part 
of its obligations under the Covenant in cases of emergency which may be 
declared in situation of non-international armed conflicts. However, 
essentially a state’s obligations to respect and apply a core of basic rights do 
not cease during a state of emergency51 Article 4 of the Covenant stipulates 
for a number of measures to be taken when declaring emergency; the state 
reporting requirements, the necessary existence of a genuine national 
emergency threatening the life of the nation, the necessity of proportionality 
as to measures taken by the state and those rights which are non derogable 
even in such situations. Notification by states parties should include full 
                                                 
50 The instruments which Sudan has ratified are mentioned in foot note 31 of this chapter.  
51 Thomas Buergenthal, “To respect and to Ensure, state obligations and Permissible Derogations in Louis 
Henkine,  the International Bill of Rights (New York, Columbia up, (1981) p. 72.  
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information about the measures taken and explanation of the reasons for 
that, with full documentation attached regarding their law.52  
It is to be mentioned here, that the Sudan has been under a state of emergency 
since 1999, in December 2004 the Government announced the renewal of the 
sate of emergency for one year. However in 2005 by a provisional order passed 
in 2005 the Government lifted the state of emergency imposed since 1999 of all 
parts of Sudan with the exception of five states which are North Darfur, South 
Darfur, West Darfur, Kassala and the Red Sea.53 As to whether the Government 
has taken the required measures to derogate from its obligations under the 
ICCPR to invoke Article 4 in Darfur raises a question. In all cases even in 
situations of emergency Sudan Government is bound by a set of non derogable 
rights to be protected. 
The ICCP in Article 4 specifies basic human rights which are non dergoble 
and which must be respected and guaranteed in all circumstances i.e. to be 
guaranteed in Darfur armed conflict to ensure protection to civilians. These 
include; the right to life and not to be “arbitrarily deprived” thereof; the right 
not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention; the prohibition of slavery, 
                                                 
52 This notification is essential to enable the Human Rights Commission to assert whether measures taken 
by the state party were strictly required by exigencies of the situation and also to permit other state parties 
to monitor compliance with the provisions of the Covenant Richard Clayton and Hugh Tonlinson, The Law 
of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 43-58. 
53 http//www.arabicnews.com/.ansub/daily/Darfur050712/12/2005071210 htm/7/13/2005.  
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the slave trade and servitude, the prohibition of torture or cruel inhumane or 
degrading punishment and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  
The Human Rights Committee defined other certain rights as non derogable 
to be protected during armed conflicts which are not expressly provided for 
in Article 4 to be guaranteed which are described as inherent in the 
Covenants as a whole” and laid down in international norms that are 
peremptory in nature jus cognes”.54 These include the right of all persons 
deprived of their liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human persons, the prohibition against taking 
hostages abductions or unacknowledged detention, the right to fair trial, the 
right to effective remedy for any serious violations of human rights55, the 
right to reparation for violations of human rights and the right to freedom of 
movement, to choose one’s own residence and hence not to be displaced 
arbitrarily.  
Other non derogable rights defined by the Human Rights Committee to be 
guaranteed in armed conflicts under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR) include: the right 
to adequate housing and not to be subjected to forced eviction, the right to 
                                                 
54 The Human Rights Committee, General Comment on the ICCPRT, CCPPRT/C/2/Rev. 1/Add. 11, 31, 
August 2001.  
55 Violations of Article 2 (3) of the ICCPR 
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health; the right to adequate food and to water and the right to property 
under the African Charter on Human and Peoples rights.  
The protection of the above non derogable rights require certain procedural 
safeguards including judicial guarantees which include the right of access to 
an independent and impartial court, right to take proceedings before a court 
and to remedies.  
The importance of applicability of human rights law in Darfur conflicts by 
guaranteeing fundamental rights to civilian victims as mentioned earlier, lies 
on the fact that Common Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV of 1949 which 
is applicable does not provide adequate and sufficient protection to civilians. 
As such human rights law may strengthen the international regime of 
protection by providing for rules and filling gaps in the regime.  
The contribution of human rights norms is clearly seen with regard to 
guarantee of certain non dergoable rights, for example, with regard to the 
right to freedom of movement, to choose one’s own residence and not to be 
displaced arbitrarily. This right is of importance to protection of civilians, 
especially in absence of such a provision in common Article 3, because a 
state making a declaration of derogations under Article 4 ICCP, would not 
be entitled to engage in forcible deportation or transfer of persons. The 
guarantee of the right to water is also of importance during armed conflict to 
survival of civilians. This right to water embraces those obligations by 
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which states parties are bound under international humanitarian law while 
includes protection of objects indispensable for survival of the civilian 
population, including drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works, protection of the natural environment against widespread, long-term 
and source damage and ensuring that civilian internees have access to 
adequate water.56  
The importance of contribution of human rights instruments in strengthening 
the regime is also seen with regard to the applicability of Article 2 (3) of the 
ICCPR which requires state parties make reparation to individuals whose 
Covenant rights have been violated. This is to be read with the obligation to 
provide an effective remedy. States are also under obligations to ensure that 
those responsible for violations of these basic rights protecting civilians are 
brought to justice. Failure to investigate allegations of violations and to 
bring justice perpetrators of such violations could in itself give rise to a 
separate breach of the Covenant which entails the international responsibility 
of the state party to the Covenant57. Example of such violations which are 
recognized as criminal under either national or international law include 
torture, cruel inhumane and degrading treatment, enforced disappearance, 
summary and arbitrary killing. The imposition of obligation to make 
                                                 
56 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
op.cit, para 22.  
57 The Human  Rights Committee- UN doc. (CPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, Para 16. 
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reparation to individuals whose rights have been violated under the 
Covenant and the obligation to investigate allegations of violations of such 
rights and bringing perpetrators to justice for prosecution, is essential in 
strengthening the regime of protection of civilians in Darfur conflict in 
absence of such obligations in common Article 3 applicable (and AP II).  
The effectiveness of protection provided for under both human rights and 
humanitarian law instruments is only achieved if such provisions are 
incorporated into the relevant national legislations like criminal and military 
laws58 and its promotion and implementation is ensured.59 It suffices to 
mention here without going into details, that the Sudanese legislations 
relevant are not all reconciled with the obligations Sudan undertook under 
                                                 
58 The Constitution of Sudan of 1998 and the Interim Constitution of 2005, both contains a Bill of human 
rights to be guaranteed and protected under the Constitution, in Chapters Two respectively.  
59 In accordance with provisions of Interim Constitution of Sudan of 2005 and in particular Article 142, the 
National Assembly approved and the President signed and ratified the Act of Human Rights Commission 
for 2005. The main functions of the Commission is promotion and protection of human rights and 
monitoring of application of rights and freedoms provided for in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. The 
Commission acts as an advisory to the Government and government institutions concerned in matters 
relating to promotion and protection of human rights. It draws the attention of the Government in cases of 
violations of human rights in any part of Sudan. Prepare annual reports on situations of human rights in 
Sudan in general. An important function of the Commission is to Promote and ensure consistency between 
legislation, regulations and national practices on an side and international human rights instruments on the 
other side which the state is a party and to work for the active implementation of such laws. To encourage 
the Government to ratify human rights instruments or accede to it of importance is that the Commission has 
the power to in investigate in cases of any human rights violations on its own or on appeal from individual 
or representative or non-governmental or societies etc. it has the power to intiate proceedings before 
national courts in cases of violations. It is to be noted that the above Act does not contain a provision as to 
whether the Commission has a role to play or and function to carry to ensure and promote the fundamental 
and non-derogable rights of citizens during states of emergency and internal armed conflicts. The text of 
the Act published in Al-Sudani News Paper, Monday 8 May 2886, Issue No. 181, p.3_____available at , 
sudani86@maktoob.com.www.alsudani.info.   
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above mentioned instruments.60 This fact in practice negatively affects the 
protection of civilian victims in Darfur conflict and may entail the 
international responsibility of Sudan for not complying with its international 
obligations under such instruments. 
5. International Responsibility for Crimes Committed Against 
Civilians in Darfur and Mechanisms for Accountability  
The armed conflict in Darfur is witnessing large-scale human rights abuses 
and atrocities committed against civilians resulting in serious violation of 
both human rights and humanitarian law. These gross violations which have 
been reported, involve a pattern of indiscriminate attacks on civilians in 
villages in all three Darfur states, the killing of civilians; massacres; 
summary execution; rape, abduction attack on humanitarian workers; 
destruction of property; enforced disappearances of Government officials 
and allegations of the use of child soldiers by the rebels etc.61 All these raise 
the question of whether violations of the rules protecting civilians applicable 
in Darfur entails the international responsibility of Sudan and the individual 
criminal responsibility of persons committing such acts.  
                                                 
60 The Ministry of Justice declared that the Ministry started the revision of a number of laws since 2005, to 
reconcile it with international covenants of human rights which Sudan has ratified and 
acceded____http://www.rayaam.net/news/news/htm.7/13/2005, p.1___________The Minister of National 
Defense declared that the Ministry of Defense is preparing a draft law for the Armed Forces incorporating 
international humanitarian law rules_____AL-SUDANI NEWSPAPER SUNDAY 6 MAY 2886, Issue No. 
188, p. 11 available at website in footnote 2.  
61 Report of the UN International Commission of Inquiry, op. cit, pp 83-98.  
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The government side may claim that acts of repression performed during the 
conflict are nothing more than the maintenance of law and order as required 
by the laws of Sudan and in pursuance of the exercise of its sovereignty. In 
other words, such acts are said to be justified under the law and 
consequently cannot be punished. However, any justification is not accepted 
where the act in question constitutes a violation of international norms 
protecting civilians which entails state responsibility. On the other side 
members of rebel groups might argue that they are not bound by such norms 
and subject only to national criminal laws. However, attention must be 
drawn to the fact that at present there is a well-established general principle 
in international law that serious violation of human rights and humanitarian 
law may amount to international crimes entailing the international individual 
criminal responsibility of perpetrators.62 Of great relevance to the effect that 
serious violations committed in Darfur may entail the criminal responsibility 
of those committing or ordering those violations are certain Security Council 
resolution adopted in Darfur.63 Of importance is the Security Council 
Resolution 1564, adopted on 18 September 2004, acting under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter, the Council requesting inter alias, that the 
                                                 
62 Tadic Case, Case No. 160, ICTY, Prosecutor, v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR 72, Oct. 2, 1995, para 128.  
63 The Security Council adopted a number of resolutions since 2003, expressing its concern about the 
massive humanitarian crisis in Darfur, called all parties to protect civilians, expressing its, deep concern at 
the continuing reports of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and calling the Sudanese 
government to disarm JanJaweed. The full text of such resolutions available on the UN. Website at 
http://www.un.org (Docs/sc/unsc=resolutions).  
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Secretary General ‘rapidly establish an International Commission of Inquiry 
in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine 
also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred and to identify the 
perpetrators of  such violations with a view to ensuring that those 
responsible are held accountable.64 This fact makes it useful to examine the 
legal basis and nature of such responsibility.  
i. Individual Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Committed in Darfur 
Armed Conflict  
In international criminal law, a person to be subject to prosecution for 
violations of international humanitarian rules constituting international 
crimes, certain requirements must be met; the violation must constitute an 
infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law; the rule must be 
customary in nature or belongs to treaty law i.e. any treaty binding on the 
parties at the time of alleged offence and was not in conflict with or 
derogated from peremptory norms of international law as well as customary 
rules of international humanitarian law; it must constitute a breach of a rule 
                                                 
64 The Commission was formed in October 2004, it had three key tasks to investigate reports of violations 
of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine whether or 
not acts of genocide have occurred to identify the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian 
law and human rights in Darfur. The Commission submitted a full report on its findings to the Secretary 
General on 25 January 2005. It examined reports from different sources including Governments, inter-
governmental organizations, United Nations bodies and mechanisms, as well as non-governmental 
organizations. Based on analysis of the information, the Commission established that the Government of 
the Sudan and the Janjaweed and rebels are responsible for such violations.  
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protecting important values and the breach must involve grave consequences 
for the victim; the violation of the rule must entail under customary or 
conventional law the individual criminal responsibility of the persons for 
violating the rule.65 It follows that under international criminal law, all those 
who, individually or jointly take a conduct or commit an act prohibited and 
criminalized, bear individual criminal liability for their conduct, if the above 
requirements are met. Furthermore, a person may ‘commit’ a crime by 
omission, where he or she has a duty to act.66   Then the question is whether 
acts committed by parties to the conflict in Darfur constitute “serious 
violations”. In doing so it is necessary to examine whether above 
requirements are met in relation to acts committed.  
a. Criminal Responsibility and Customary Rules of International 
Humanitarian Law Governing Darfur Conflict 
Common Article 3 and AP II do not contain provisions criminalizing acts 
committed in violation of its provisions.67 However, customary rules 
applicable in providing for the criminal responsibility of those who commit 
                                                 
65 These conditions were set out by the Tribunal in Tadic Case (Appeal), Prosecutor. V. Tadic, ICTY, Case 
No. IT-94-AR 72, October 2, 1996, Para 128.  
66 Tadic Case, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ibid, Para 188. 
 
 
67 Unlike common Article 3 and AP 11, four Geneva Conventions of 1949 applicable in international armed 
conflicts, each contains provisions dealing with acts committed against protected persons described as 
“grave breaches” which entails the criminal responsibility of person’s community such breaches. These 
acts are defined in Articles, 50, 51, 130 and Article 146 of Four Conventions respectively. They include 
crimes such as willful killing, torture inhumane treatment, extensive destruction or appropriation of 
property, unlawful deportation, taking hostages etc. The Conventions established the responsibility of direct 
authors of those grave breaches and that of their superiors.  
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serious violations of common Article 3. The emergency of international 
rules governing internal armed conflicts has occurred at different levels i.e. 
at the level of customary law and at the level of treaty law. Several 
customary rules protecting civilians have been crystallized which 
supplement some of treaty rules which have gradually become part of 
customary law. This is true for common Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV 
of 1949.68 These customary rules of regulating non-international armed 
conflicts impose criminal liability for serious violations of Common Article 
3. They are supplemented by other general principles and rules on the 
protection of victims of internal armed conflict. They are also applicable for 
breaching certain fundamental principles and rules regarding means and 
methods of combat in non-international armed conflicts. Violations of the 
Additional Protocol II rules constitute also violations of the laws or customs 
of war.69 There exists, at present, a body of customary international law 
applicable to all armed conflicts. 
The applicability of these rules has been corroborated by General Assembly 
resolutions 2444 (XX III) and 2675 (XXV), both adopted unanimously in 
1968 and 1970 respectively. These resolutions considered declaratory of 
                                                 
68 This was held by ICJ in Nicaragua case (Nicaragua V. United States of America), Mertis, Judgment of 27 
June, 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, Para 218. 
 
69 This was held by the ICTY in Prosecutor. V. Matric, Rule 61, Case No. 161, 95-4-1, Marcle, 1996, 
Para.8.  
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customary international law applicable in internal armed conflicts. The same 
has been affirmed by the Appeal Chamber in Tadic case. 70 Furthermore, the 
prohibition against attacking civilians’ population and the general principle 
limiting the means and methods of warfare derive from the Martens Clause 
which states that “in cases not covered by (the relevant instruments), 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience”. These 
norms also evolved from the elementary considerations of humanity, which 
constitute the foundation of the entire body of international humanitarian 
law applicable to all types of armed conflicts. These elementary 
considerations of humanity are reflected in Common Article 3 of Geneva 
Convention IV, which embodies those rules of customary international law. 
For example,  the prohibition to attack civilians as a rule of customary law 
must be derived from common Article 3 which prohibits in Para 1 (a)” 
violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation…..” 
Attacks against the civilian population as such and commission of acts 
prohibited under common Article 3 are under customary international law 
                                                 
 70 Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-A 72, October 2, 1995, Para 127.   
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considered infringement of the mandatory minimum norms applicable to 
such armed conflicts, entailing international criminal responsibility.71  
The above rules have been largely codified in the Rome Statute of 1998 
establishing the International Criminal Court. Article 8 of the Statute refer to 
a category of number of acts which constitute international crimes when 
committed in non-international armed conflicts entailing the individual 
criminal responsibility of perpetrators.72 The other category related to ‘other 
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not 
of an international character. It is to be mentioned here that though Sudan 
signed Rome Statute but did not ratify it73, however persons alleged to have 
committed serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law may be 
prosecuted for crimes under Rome Statute before the ICC in accordance to 
the Security Council Resolution which made a “referral” of the case of 
Darfur to the ICC . 
Applying the above rules to the conflict in Darfur, a number of violations 
reported, committed by parties to the conflict may amount to serious 
                                                 
71 Additional Protocol II developing and supplementing common Article 3, reiterates fundamental 
guarantees and embody rules reflecting customary law.  
 
72 Article 8 of the Statute refer to serious violations of Article 3 common in the Geneva Conventions, which 
pertains to armed conflicts not of an international character and covers acts committed against persons 
taking no active part in hostilities such as violence to life and person, in particular cruel treatment and 
torture, humiliating and degrading treatment, taking of hostages and refusal to grant Judicial guarantees, 
recognized as indispensable M.C. Roberge, “The New International Criminal Court, A prevailing 
assessment, IRRC, No. 325, December 1998, p. 674.  
73 Sudan signed Rome Statute of the ICC in on 8 September 2000. 
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violations of the law applicable which may entail the criminal responsibility 
of parties in the conflict to be discussed here.  
b. International Crimes Committed in Darfur against Civilians: 
Report of the UN International Commission of Inquiry  
The various categories of crimes that might be involved in this conflict are 
mostly war crimes and crimes against humanity.74 A general overview of 
which are human rights and humanitarian law serious violations committed 
against civilians the crimes committed and illustrated in the Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General in September 2004 will be discussed here in relation to 
human rights and humanitarian law rules applicable to the situation.75  The 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in its Report submitted to the 
UN Secretary General, enumerated a list of crimes constituting violations of 
                                                 
74 War crime, is an international crime which may be defined as any serious violation of international 
humanitarian law committed in the course of an international or internal armed conflict against civilians as 
well as combatants. Such crimes entail the individual criminal responsibility of the person committing an 
act in violation of the law. War crimes include indiscriminate attacks against civilians, ill-treatment or 
torture of detains or prisoners of war, rape of civilians,  use of unlawful methods or means of warfare, 
reprisals against the civilian population……Tadic case (Interloctory    Appeal) op.cit, Para 94 crimes 
against humanity are serious offences constituting attack on human dignity or a grave humanitarian or 
degradation of one or more human being e.g. murder, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of 
population, torture, rape & and other forms of sexual violence, presentation, enforced disappearance of 
persons etc. What distinguishes this category of crime from that of war crimes is that, crimes against 
humanity is not concerned with isolated or sporadic acts of violations, but rather with violations which, 
may occur either in time of peace or of armed conflict and constitute part of the widespread or systematic 
practice of atrocities on attacks committing against the civilian population. At such the material element of 
crimes against humanity is that the attack must be either widespread or systematic in nature i.e. only the 
attack, not the acts of the accused, must be “widespread or systematic……..Naletilic and Martmoic case 
(ICTY Trial Chamber), 31 March 2003, Para 236…..Akayseu Case (ICTR Trial Chamber), 2 September 
op, cit. Para 579.  
 
75 The Security Council passed a Resolution of “Referral” of persons accused to have committed war 
crimes and crimes against humanity Darfur to be tried before the ICC.  
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both human rights and humanitarian law applicable in Darfur conflict, 
alleged to have been committed by government armed forces, rebels and 
Janjaweed militias as a result of fact finding and investigations made. It 
suffices here to refer to some of these crimes.  
A pattern of indiscriminate attacks on civilians which have been launched in 
villages and communities in all three Darfur states since 2003 involving 
aerial and ground attacks has been reported. It is a fundamental rule of 
international humanitarian law that the civilian population as such as 
individual civilians shall not be the object of attack. There exist general rules 
and principles in customary international law prohibiting such attacks. It is 
to be recalled here that the elementary considerations of humanity reflects in 
Common Article 3 Geneva Conventions IV embody those rules of 
customary international law which should be observed by all parties 
involved in the conflict. Parties in the conflict must at all time distinguish 
civilians from those taking a direct part in the hostilities as well as 
discriminatory civilian objects from military objectives. To ensure that 
attacks on areas where both civilians and combatants may be found, 
international law imposes two main obligations on parties to the conflict. 
First is the obligation to take precautions for the purpose of sparing civilians 
and civilian objects. The second obligation is to respect the principle of 
proportionality when conducting attacks on military objectives that may 
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cause sufferings to civilians. As such, when attacking a military objective, 
parties shall not cause incidental injury to civilians disproportionate to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The precaution to be 
taken to ensure protection to civilians and whether the attacks were 
proportionate to the military objective is a subjective decision in each 
situation.76 The justification that attacks were made on villages because 
rebels were present at the time and had used the villages as a base from 
which to launch attacks or that civilians were providing rebels with support 
suggesting by thus that civilians had lost their legal status as protected 
person, is not acceptable. The Rwandan Tribunal (ICTR) held in this 
connection that “where there are certain individuals within the civilian 
population who do not come within the definition of civilians, this does not 
deprive the population of its civilian character”.77  
Mass killings of civilians in a number of villages was reported as well as 
killing incidents of staff members of persons working with international 
humanitarian organizations. These acts of killing contravene the right to life  
and not to be ‘‘arbitrarily deprive of one’s life’’ guaranteed and protected 
under the ICCP.78 Common Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV of 1949, 
                                                 
76 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, op, cit. p. 587. 
 
77 Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Decision of 2 September 1998, Para 582. 
 
78 Article 6 (1) ICCP.  
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prohibits murder of civilians who do not take active pat in hostilities in non-
international armed conflicts and in Article 42 (a) of Additional Protocol II 
as well as in customary international law. This act may be criminalized as  a 
war crime or a crime against humanity i.e. persecution given the 
discriminating character on political grounds of the systematic and 
widespread murder of civilians.79  
The destruction of property in Darfur was part of a systematic and 
widespread attack on the civilian population, depriving civilians of a number 
of rights i.e. of their liberty, deprived of all necessities of life and involved 
the forced displacements of persons. The destruction was clearly carried out 
“unlawfully and wantonly” Article 11 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that “the states parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to adequate food, clothing 
and housing”. In addition such destruction not justified by military necessity 
is unlawful.80   
                                                 
79 Under Article 7 (2) (g) of the ICC Statute-murder can amount also to extermination as a crime against 
humanity, Extermination is primarily concerned with the mass destruction of a group of individuals, the 
emphasis being placed on the scale of the destruction, unlike murder which may comprise a single incident. 
Extermination generally involves the destruction of a numerically significant part of the population 
concerned”………….Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (RICID) p. 79, footnote 137.  
 
80 Destruction of property includes destruction of towns, villages and other public or private 
property…..Blaskic Case (ICTY Trial Chamber) 3 March 2000, Para. 23.  
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All reports from different source pointed to the fact of the displacement of a 
very large part of the population of Darfur81 a fact which gave rise to a 
humanitarian crisis. As a result the IDPs who remained inside Darfur are 
faced with a number of threats, confined to remain inside the camps or 
certain areas. This forced displacement of civilians violates a number of 
protected rights under human rights instruments applicable to Darfur conflict 
e.g. Article 12 of the ICCP which protects freedom of movement and the 
right not to be displaced arbitrarily. It also violates Article 11 (1) of the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which protects the right to adequate 
housing.  
Widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence committed against 
women, girls and children in pattern ways occurred during the attacks on 
villages and inside various IDP camps. Women and girls were also abducted 
and tortures, rape were used as a means to demoralize and humiliate the 
population. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions IV imposes 
obligations on all parties in the conflict and prohibits violence to life and 
person, cruel treatment, torture and outrages upon personal dignity in 
particular humiliating treatment. The customary rules of Additional Protocol 
II are also binding on parties to the conflict. These rules prohibits rape, 
                                                 
81 UN reports released and reports by international human rights bodes affirms the fact of displacement of 
large number of civilians as a result of effects of military operation in the region. 
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enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault” and slavery.82 A 
number of human rights instruments to which Sudan is a party confer 
provisions prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
as well as torture. 83  
Torture was reported to have been carried out on a large scale and in such 
widespread and systematic manner84 not only during attacks on the civilian 
population but in detention places. The detainees were also subjected to 
inhuman and degrading treatment. Common Article 3 prohibits torture 
absolutely. In addition several human rights instruments prohibit the use of 
torture and is considered non derogable in any circumstances even in 
situation of state of emergency as provided for by the ICCPR, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights contain provisions prohibiting torture.85  
                                                 
82 Article 4 (2) (f) of the Protocol.  
83 Example the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 7, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child Convention states; Parties are under obligation to protect the child from all forms of sexual 
exploitation and sexual violence. The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12. Rape 
is a war crime or a crime against humanity (in time of war and peace) however it may constitute genocide if 
it is part of a widespread or systematic attack on civilians………Akayesu Case (ICTR), op.cit, Para 
597….It is to be mentioned in this connection that the Security Council entrusted the Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur, with a task of legally characterizing the reported violations with view to ascertain 
whether they amount to violations. However the Commission concluded that the Government of the Sudan 
has not pursued a policy of genocide ……..Report of the Commission, op.cit, p. 160. 
84 Torture practiced in systematic and widespread scale amounts to a crime against humanity and if the 
discriminatory nature of the attacks is proved, it may also involve the crime of persecution as a crime 
against humanity………….The Commission’s Report, op.cit, p. 99.  
 
 
 
85 Sudan has ratified all these human rights instruments. 
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Rebel groups have been accused of recruitment children’s soldiers under the 
age of 15 participating in hostilities. A number of international agreements 
to which Sudan is a party, prohibits recruitment and participation of children 
under the age of 15 in hostilities. Sudan has ratified Convention 182 of the 
International Labour Organization concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour. It prohibits 
the ‘forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict”. 
It defines children as all persons under the age of 18. It is to be mentioned 
here that both the Government and the rebels under took by Article 8 of the 
Protocol on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur in 
accordance with the N’ Djamena Agreement, of 9 November 2004, to refrain 
from recruiting children as soldiers.  Under these provisions, “The parties 
shall retrain from recruiting children as soldiers or combatants, consistent 
with the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of Children, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (IRC) and the Optional Protocol to 
the CRC on the Involvement of children in Armed Conflict86.  
Enforced disappearance or abduction, unlawful confinement and detention 
of civilians by parties to the conflict have been reported by different human 
rights bodies working in area of conflict. All these acts violated guaranteed 
rights under human rights instruments. The rights in liberty and security of 
                                                 
86 Quoted by the Commission in its Report, op.cit. at page 107.  
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person are guaranteed under Article of the ICCPR. Any deprivation of 
liberty must be done in conformity with conditions laid in Article 9 i.e. it 
must not be arbitrary it must be based on ground and procedures established 
by law, information on the reasons for detention must be given and court 
control of the detention must be available, in the case of breach, 
compensation is to be made. Detainees should be treated humanly and not be 
subjected to torture or degrading or humiliating treatment as such norms are 
non-derogable87. Common Article 3 of Geneva Convention IV applicable to 
Darfur Conflict provides, protection also to above rights in prohibiting acts 
i.e. acts of violence to life and person, cruel treatment, torture, taking of 
hostages and outrages upon personal dignity. The restrains placed on the 
IDP population in camps by terrorizing women through acts of rape and 
killings or threats of violence to life or person amount to severe deprivation 
of physical liberty in violation of rules of international human rights and 
humanitarian law constituting war crimes. 88  
Reprisal attacks against civilians are prohibited. The General Assembly 
Resolution of 1970 (2675) in affirming the need for measures to ensure the 
better protection of human rights in armed conflicts stated that “civilian 
                                                 
87 Human Rights Committee, op.cit, Para. 16.  
 
88 Article 7 (2) (i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines enforced disappearances 
to means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by or with the authorization, support of a state or a 
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that a deprivation of freedom……with the 
intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of them”  
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populations or individual members thereof, should not be the object of 
reprisals”. AP II contains a customary rule prohibiting reprisals to be 
inferred from Article 4. Reprisals against civilians are contrary to the 
absolute and non derogable prohibitions enumerated in these provisions. 
This is to be inferred from Para. 2 (b) of Article 4 of AP II which includes 
the prohibition of “collective punishment”.89 Therefore, the rule which states 
that reprisals against the civilian population as such, are prohibited in all 
circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful behavior of the other 
party, is an integral part of customary international law and must be 
respected by all parties to Darfur armed conflict. Even if an attack is directed 
against a legitimate military target, the choice of weapon and its use is 
clearly delimited by the rules of international humanitarian law.90  
6.  Mechanisms To Ensure Accountability for Crimes Committed in 
Darfur 
 
The United Nations Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) passed under 
Chapter VII of the Charter entrusted the Commission of Inquiry with a main 
task of “identifying the perpetrators of violations”, with a view to ensuring 
                                                 
89 Prosecutor v. Matric, ICTY, Case No. 161, Rule 61, Decision, 95-11-1, March 8, 1996, para 16. 
90 Ibid, Para 18 
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that those responsible are held accountable and requests the Government of 
the Sudan “to end the climate of impunity in Darfur” and to bring to justice  
“ all those responsible including members of popular defense forces and 
Janjawad militias” for violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law.91 The task of brining alleged perpetrators to justice 
requires first the identification of possible mechanisms for holding them 
accountable. The duty to try those allegedly responsible for crimes 
committed in Dar fur rests primarily on the Government. However, failure 
by the Government to carry this duty entails its international responsibility 
and may open the door for accountability by outside mechanisms. It is 
necessary first to examine mechanisms and measures which have been taken 
at the domestic level to hold alleged perpetrators accountable.  
i. Mechanisms of Accountability Taken at Domestic Level  
The Sudan is a sovereign state and its territorial integrity must be respected. 
It is a general principle in international law that a sovereign state has the 
right to take measures to maintain or re-establish its authority and defend its 
territorial integrity. This right includes protection of its citizen and the right 
to exercise jurisdiction over people and property within its territory and to 
take measures to implement it. However, on the other side, the Sudan is 
                                                 
91 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556 adopted on July 30, 2004, emphasized the urgent 
need to justice and accountability…The full text of the Resolution is available on the U.N. website at 
http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc..resolutions.  
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under obligation to respect international law and to ensure its respect. This 
obligation includes duty to protect and guarantees fundamental rights of its 
citizens and to take necessary measures to ensure accountability for those 
who commit acts in serious violations of both human rights and 
humanitarian law rules protecting rights of civilians. The parties in the 
conflict and in accordance to Security Council requests, undertook to hold 
those responsible accountable for their acts of violations. Article 2 (8) of 
Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, of 9 
November 2004, committed themselves to ‘ensure that all forces and 
individuals involved or reported to be involved in violations of the rights of 
the IDPs, vulnerable groups and other civilians will be transparently 
investigate and held accountable to the appropriate authorities.92 
The Sudanese Government has taken certain measures in relation to bring 
perpetrators to justice on 28 March 2003.  A decree issued by the Chief 
Justice established the Specialized Court in West Darfur and later in the 
North and South Darfur.93 The courts have jurisdiction to try charge against 
the state, of armed robbery, banditry, possession of unlicensed fire arms and 
other crimes.  
                                                 
92 Quoted by the Commission op. cit. p. 144 of the Report.  
 
93 For text of the Decree available at website, http://www.sudanjudiciary.org/news/news/php?id-98 
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Action by other bodies was taken by setting up committees of inquiry. The 
President set up a National Commission of Inquiry (NCI) on 8 May 2004 
consisting of ten members. The commission mandate was to collect 
information of alleged violations of human rights by armed groups in Dar 
fur states, inquire into allegations against armed groups in the area and the 
possible resulting damage to lives and property and to determine the causes 
of violations. The NCI final report states that serious violations of human 
rights were committed in areas of conflict in Darfur, all parties in the 
conflict were involved and that what happened did not constitute genocide. 
Rape and crimes of sexual violence were committed but were not 
widespread or systematic in amount to a crime against humanity. Forced 
displacement is one of the components of ethnic cleansing which implies 
forced or violent displacement of an ethnic group which speaks one 
language or has a dominant culture, from a land on which it settled legally to 
another area and which has been associated throughout history with the idea 
of joining the “Nation State”, is a crime against humanity. In light of this, 
the National Commission found that according to some allegations, forced 
displacement was practiced and recommended that judicial investigations 
should be conducted in this situation. The Committee recommends judicial 
investigations into specific cases and a setting up of a judicial committee to 
investigate property losses. However, this report was criticized in that its 
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findings and recommendations are insufficient and inappropriate to address 
the gravity of the situation.94  
Allegations of rape and cases of sexual violence and abuse of women were 
among the serious violations of human rights reported by different sources. 
As a result, the Minister of Justice under powers rested in him by section 395 
of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1954 issued a decree on 28 July, 2004 
establishing separate Rape Committees for the three Darfur states. The 
mandate of committee was to investigate the crimes of rape in the three 
states of Darfur. However, the mandate of the committees were too narrow 
to address the so many and serious allegations of sexual violence acts 
against women of which rapes is one type. As a result a vast number of 
allegations were left unaddressed. The scope of mandate did not provide for 
means of redress and reparation for the victims. The duty to provide remedy 
for violations is a necessary measure. As a result the committee was 
described as poorly designed and lacked the potential for achieving its 
objective. The UN Commission of Inquiry in evaluating the work of the 
Rape Committee stated that “it does not provide a sound basis for any 
conclusions with regard to the incidence of rape in Darfur nor does it satisfy 
                                                 
94 A parliamentary committee to enhance peace, security and development in the Darfur states was 
established in accordance with National Resolution 38 of December 2003. It made recommendations in the 
areas of security, humanitarian aid, social structure enhancement and seizure of arms in the wrong hands.  
95 The UN Commission of enquiry on Darfur criticized the report in that it attempts to justify the violations 
rather than seeking effective measures to address them. Report of the Commission, op.cit .,p.118.  
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the requirement of state responsibility to investigate cases of serious 
violation of human rights and of accountability of those responsible”.96  
The Government statesmen, while acknowledging that serious violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law took place in Darfur states, however 
they maintained that they have been acting responsible and in good faith to 
stop atrocities committed against civilians in the region, referring to the 
measures taken mentioned above. In fact, this was not regarded by the 
international community effective measures, taken by the Government, 
particularly to investigate these crimes and bring perpetrators to justice 
referring to judicial system and extra judicial measures i.e. National 
Commission of Inquiry and the Rape Committees. A fact opened the door to 
seek international mechanisms.  
ii.  International Mechanisms of Accountability 
Considering the nature of crimes alleged to be committed in Darfur states 
against civilians and the general attitude taken by the United Nations and 
some states that the Government have taken some steps which are not an 
effective and insufficient response to large scale atrocities committed and 
that rebels have failed to take any steps to investigate or punitive action, it 
was necessary to seek other mechanisms. The UN Commission of Inquiry in 
its report suggested two measures to be taken by the Security Council with 
                                                 
96 UN Commission of inquiry on Dar fur Report at page 123.  
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regard to the judicial accountability mechanisms. The first is a judicial 
mechanism recommending the “referral” of the situation of Darfur to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) by the United Nations Security Council. 
The second measure is designed to provide compensation to the victims of 
gross violations of human rights. As such, it proposed that a compensation 
commission be established by the Security Council. The Commission 
justified proposing international mechanisms in stating that “The 
international community cannot stand idle, by while human life and human 
dignity are attacked daily and on so large a scale in Darfur. The international 
community must take on the responsibility to protect the civilians of Darfur 
and end the rampant impurity currently prevailing there”.97 One may 
comment in relation to this issue that though the UN Commission 
recommended the referral of Darfur case to the ICC by the Security Council, 
was not the right mechanisms, in our opinion.98 The best mechanism to 
allow justice to be made for the crimes committed in Darfur in the situation 
which Sudan facing i.e. divergences as to resort to national or international 
courts, was to establish UN-created internationalized court chamber with the 
prosecution of conflict related crimes. This mixed courts mechanism acting 
                                                 
97 Report of the Commission, ibid, at page 145.  
98 The ICC established under the Rome Statute 1998 entered into force on July 1, 2002____U.N. doc. A / 
CONF. 183/9. available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/reomefra.htm For states parties to Rome 
Statue available at ICC website, http//www.icc..cpi.int/states parties. Html# S_. 
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on the borderline between the national and the international legal order were 
set up in East Timor and Sierra Leone conflicts. The UN and the government 
of Sierra Leone have concluded an agreement on the creation of a mixed 
international domestic court to prosecute persons responsible for human 
rights abuses committed in Sierra Leone civil war in 2000. This special court 
is a treaty based institution of mixed jurisdiction and composition including 
judges appointed by the UN Secretary General and domestic judges. Such 
courts are formally part of a domestic court though established by the UN. 
The merits of such courts are that prosecution and justice are not primarily in 
the hands of a foreign international body, it is a national matter. In addition, 
the creation of a mixed national international prosecution bodies operating 
within and in direct connection with the judiciary of the territory concerned, 
no doubt strengthen country’s legal system and preserve the sovereign right 
of the Sudan to exercise jurisdiction over its nationals.99  
a. The International Criminal Court (ICC)  
The ICC which was established under Rome Statute in 1998 is the first 
international judicial mechanisms competent to try individuals accused of 
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 
namely war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. It is to be 
                                                 
99 R. Cryer, “ A Special Court” for Sierra Leone? International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 50, 
2001, p. 435. A. Tejan-Cole” The Special Court for Sierra Leone, conceptual concerns and alternative” 
African Human Rights Law Journal, Vol.1, 2001, p. 109.  
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mentioned that Sudan signed the Rome Statute of the ICC but has not yet 
ratified it and thus is not a state party to the Statute.100 However the court 
may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of a state that is not a party to the 
Rome Statute in three cases specified in the Statute. The first case is that if 
the crime occurred on the territory of a state party to the Statute. The second 
case the ICC may exercise jurisdiction by a referral to the prosecutor, by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, under Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute. The third case if Sudan by 
declaration lodged with the Court’s Registrar, accept the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crimes in question.101  
The first case above is not applicable since the crimes occurred in the Sudan 
and are allegedly committed by Sudanese nationals. As far as the second 
case  in issue, the Commission strongly recommended to the Security 
Council to refer to the ICC the case of Darfur in relation to crimes 
committed against civilians to exercise its jurisdiction under article 13 (b) of 
the Statute.  It based its argument by referring to Security Council 
resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1564 (2004) characterizing the situation in 
Darfur as constituting a threat to international peace and that prosecution of 
persons alleged to commit such crimes would contribute to the restoration of 
                                                 
100 Rome Statute, Article 12 (3).  
 
101 Rome Statute, Article 13 (b) 
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peace. The alleged crimes documented in Darfur meet the thresholds of the 
Rome Statute as defined in articles 7 (1), 8 (1) and 8 (f), that there is 
evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed. Of 
importance is the allegation that the Sudanese Justice system is unable and 
unwilling to address the situation in Darfur. The Commission justified this 
by stating that many laws in force in Sudan today contravene basic human 
rights standards. The Sudanese criminal laws do not adequately prescribe 
war crimes and crimes against humanity and the Criminal Procedure Code of 
1991 contains provisions that prevent the effective prosecution of these acts 
referring to impunity provisions.  
The Security Council adopted Resolution 1593 referring the issue of Darfur 
to the ICC grounded on recommendations of the above UN Commission on 
Darfur.102 It is to be mentioned here that “referral” by the Security Council 
of the situation of Darfur to the ICC by a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter, would have a mandatory effect.103  
                                                 
102 The Sudanese Government submitted a Commentary on the Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur. The Commentary disputed the facts upon which the Commission grounded its recommendations 
and conclusions reached. For a briefing of the content of commentary in “Commentary on the Report 
presented by the International Commission of Inquiry in Darfur to the UN Secretary General published by 
the External Information Council, Publication and Printing Administration, Khartoum, Sudan, available at 
website. http://www.exinfo.gov.sd.  
103 Resolution 1593 was adopted in March 2005, calling for full co-operation by the Sudanese Government 
in implementing the Resolution to refer those committing atrocities in Darfur conflict to ICC. Sudan was on 
a collision with the United Nations after refusing to surrender suspected Darfur war criminals to the 
International Criminal Court for trial as demanded by the Security Council Resolution 
1593, by a 11-0 majority overrode strong opposition from Sudan to impose international trials for the 
51suspects identified by the UN Commission. The Sudan claimed that the resolution was an affront to its 
sovereignty. The ICC prosecutor required the help of Sudan with prosecutions and providing for witnesses, 
security for witnesses, victims and investigations in Darfur. 
http://news.yahoo.com/new?tmp/strong&cid=1514&u=/afp/20050404.  
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It is clear from above that the Commission recommendation for the Security 
Council of referral to the ICC of Darfur situation is based on the assumption 
that Sudanese Courts are unable to prosecute perpetrators. The Commissions 
allegation that Sudan is acting in bad faith and that Sudan judicial system is 
“unable” to prosecute, being weak and nondependent is no doubt, a serious 
accusation. Though the final decision in this regard lies with the ICC Court, 
however an important question may be raised in this connection as to 
whether the principle of complementarity on which the ICC is based would 
be genuinely recognized. Under the principle, the court only steps in when 
the competent Sudanese national courts prove to be unable or unwilling 
genuinely to try persons accused of serious international crimes falling under 
the Courts jurisdiction. However, the notions of “unwillingness” and 
inability as provided for in Article 17 (b) of the Rome Statute, are vague and 
may lead to ambiguity until the Court determines the standards to be applied. 
The provisions in Article 17 (2) and 17 (3) of the Statute are not very helpful 
in clarifying the above notions.104 Instead they add to the complexity of the 
problem by making reference to other subjective notions. Under these 
provisions, the Statute foresees three types of state conduct that may lead the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
104 Paragraph 2 and 3 of Article 17 refer to the criteria that the court should apply in deciding the 
admissibility of a case. Reference is made to proceedings being taken “for the purpose of shielding” a 
person from criminal responsibility “unjustified delay” in the proceedings or acting in a way which “is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice”.  
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Court to rule that a state is unwilling to prosecute; When the proceedings 
have been instituted to shield the person concerned; when an unjustified 
delay is considered inconsistent with a genuine effort to bring a person to 
justice; and when the competent domestic court is not independent or 
impartial. Regarding the “inability” to prosecute the Statute refers to the lack 
of effective mechanisms of the national level to gather evidence and 
testimony or to arrest the accused. The question then to be asked is whether 
above conditions are met with regard to Sudan’s position. The first two 
elements of Para 17 (2) is referring to the concept of bad faith of which 
Sudan was accused i.e. shielding the persons accused or delaying 
indefinitely the proceeding as a way of allowing accused to go unpunished. 
However, the reality of facts is inconsistent with these allegations. With 
regard to the seriousness of the situation in Darfur and its impact on 
civilians, the Government have taken measures to show its willingness to 
prosecute persons accused as mentioned earlier, what is needed ample period 
should be allowed to prove the effectiveness of measures taken and political 
will to stop violations.105  
On the other hand the notion of “inability” refers in the case where a state 
without sufficient means to gather the necessary evidence or to arrest the 
                                                 
105 Special Sudanese Courts which were set up to try alleged Dar fur war criminals i.e. violation of honor, 
murder and looting or property crimes committed in Darfur opened in June 2005. The courts began work 
with internal “committees of inquiry, formed. The Minister of Justice lifted the immunity of a number of 
members of the regular forces accused of rape crimes as a result of investigation made by the National 
Commission....http://news. Yahoo.com/s/afp/20050613/wl.mideastafp/sudandarfurjustice. 
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accused may be deemed unable to carry out on adequate investigation.106 
This question of ability or inability of national courts to try such crimes is an 
objective matter which should be determined by the sovereign state 
concerned, the notion of “inability” is instead clearly seen in cases of a 
failed state where all state structures fail as the case was in Somalia.107 In 
our view, this is not the case in Sudan, the Sudanese courts are able to play 
an important role in bringing to justice persons suspected or accused of such 
crimes in Darfur, what is needed is judicial co-operation from the 
Commission and other UN bodies. Justice cannot be administered without 
the co-operation of such bodies in these types of situations of armed 
conflicts.108   
b. Proposed National Mechanisms  
The main challenge facing the Sudanese Government at present, being given 
notice concerning the alleged serious crimes committed against civilians in 
Darfur and referring the case to the ICC, is to prove its “willingness” and 
“ability” to stop such violations and prosecute persons accused of such 
                                                 
106 Oscar Solera, Complementary Jurisdiction and International Criminal Justice, IRRC, March, 2002 Vol. 
84, No. 845, p. 165.  
107 Daniel Thurer, “The ‘failed state” and International Law”, IRRC, December 1999, Volume 8, No. 836, 
p. 731. 
 
 
108 The chairman of the Special Courts of Darfur, said that, 51 suspects named in January 2005 by the UN 
Commission as possible perpetrators of war crimes would be faced, if they are brought to the court by the 
Sudanese Committee of Inquiry..........http//news.yahoo.com/s/af/2000613/wl.mideastafpa/sudan dar fur 
justice, 05061319263.  
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crimes. This can be done by taking additional measure which will address 
seriously the situation in Darfur. One may propose in this connection certain 
measures which Sudan may take to show its “willingness” and “ability” to 
have primary jurisdiction over crimes committed in Darfur.  
i. Setting up of Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Darfur 
(TRC)  
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are a combined accountability and 
reconciliation mechanisms which the UN has supported its establishment in 
some areas of conflict like East Timor and Sierra Leone.109 These 
commissions are in most cases set up by Republican Decree or passing an 
Act by the legislative. They limit prosecution to the most serious crimes, of 
concern to international community, while forthcoming alternative forms of 
justice in the case of less serious crimes. They are based on the principle that 
there can be no amnesties for serious human rights and humanitarian law 
violations namely crimes against humanity and war crimes i.e. serious 
violations of common Article 3 of Geneva Convention and Additional 
Protocol II.110 The importance of such Commission is that the prosecution of 
crimes by the special courts for Darfur is to be complemented by the 
activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Darfur.  
                                                 
109 Sierra Leone, Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, http://www.sierraleone.org/trc.htmb 
110 Example for the practice of the Commission on Amnesty in some countries is the South African 
Committee on Amnesty, in T. Puurunew, The Committee on Amnesty of theTruth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa Helsinki Forum Luris, Helsinki, 2000, p. 37.  
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The mandate of TRC is to investigate and report on the causes, nature and 
extent of human rights and humanitarian law violations committed during 
the armed conflict against civilians in Darfur. This report to be submitted to 
the Judiciary, can be of importance to later prosecution and its 
recommendations are obligatory.  
The Commission usually have mandate to investigate patterns of abuses over 
a period of time and provides a further account of the pattern of abuses that 
could give rise to individual criminal trials. As such it is a complementary 
mechanism to prosecution. It may recommend institutional or legislative 
reform necessary to avoid repetition of such abuses as well as identifying 
some forms of redress. On the other hand, the Commission is not only to be 
vested with a general mandate to establish the truth regarding the 
commission of serious violations but may also conduct individual 
community reconciliation procedures, allowing participants to gain 
immunity from criminal and civil responsibility for specific categories of 
crimes. The practice of such commission has shown that the fulfillment of 
obligations undertaken in a reconciliation procedure does not release the 
perpetrators from his responsibility for commission of serious crimes.111 
                                                 
111 P.B. Haynner “Fifteen Truth Commissions 1974 to 1994. A Comparative Study, Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 15, 1994, p. 597,  
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That is, no immunity extends to serious criminal offences namely genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, murder and sexual offences.  
This mechanism to work must be linked to the domestic legal system i.e. a 
form of co-operation between the two entities. For example the East 
Timorese Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is authorized to grant 
immunities to individuals for less serious crimes, after completion of a 
reconciliation procedure. The Commission is to depend on the findings of 
the judiciary to determine whether a specific act constitutes a serious crime 
to deal with in a reconciliation procedure.112 Such commission is of 
particular merits to the case of Darfur for several reasons. The commission 
as a complementary measure to criminal prosecution, if set up, could play an 
important role in particular in situations of commission of wide scale crimes 
as in Darfur. Criminal courts may not be in a position, by themselves to try 
all perpetrators, it handle a relatively limited number of prosecutions. 
Limited amnesty by Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a compromise 
formula in Darfur situation, in which the accumulation of human rights and 
humanitarian law violations usually exceeds by far the capacity of the 
judicial system. On the other hand prosecution is confined to cases which are 
of concern to the international community. It also manages to strike 
reasonable balance between the conflicting principles of individual criminal 
                                                 
112 Laura Olson, Mechanisms Complementing Prosecution, IRRC, March 2002, vol. 84, No. 845, p. 173 
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responsibility on one hand and national reconciliation on the other hand. In 
addition this combined justice and reconciliation approach leaves the door 
open for alternative forms of justice such as truth-telling and individual 
amnesty procedures, which are useful in restoring justice after conflict.113  
Finally to ensure better performance of the truth commission, the scope of 
mandate should not be restrictive. It must operate impartially and in good 
faith, independent from political forces to have free access to information for 
full investigations.  
ii.  Sudanese Legal System and Measures to be adopted 
Besides showing its “willingness” to achieve justice, the Sudanese 
Government has to take certain measures to show the “ability” of its judicial 
organs to bring and hold perpetrators accountable for their crimes. The 
Sudanese legal and judicial system should be strengthened so as to be in a 
position to render justice in a manner that is compatible with international 
standards. In doing so, the government may take a number of measures in 
this connection. To set up and increase number of special courts competent 
to try crimes committed against civilians in Darfur states and the adoption of 
penal provisions specifically allowing for the prosecution of serious 
violations of common Article 3 and human rights Courts should be 
                                                 
113 Maryaret Popkin and Naomi Roht—Arriaza “Truth as Justice: Investigation Commission in Latin 
America in Transitional Justice, United States Institute of Peace Press, Vol. 1, Washington 1995, p. 262- E. 
Mendez, “Accountability for past abuses”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 19, 1997, p. 265.  
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competent to try specifically international crimes committed i.e. war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.114  
It should take steps to ensure guaranteed and impartiality of the judiciary. To 
confer and make it possible for national courts to be competent to have 
jurisdiction to try cases of serious violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law rules concerning internal armed conflicts. This is closely 
connected with the requirement that Sudanese laws are to be compatible 
with international standards.115 In this connection measures should be taken 
to in corporate humanitarian law rules and human rights norms into relevant 
national laws in particular criminal penal and military laws. Sudan should 
adopt a comprehensive system for the repression of serious crimes, in 
accordance with the country’s international obligations under the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and AP II Sudan recently ratified. These measures are 
to introduce genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes into the 
Criminal Act of 1991. It should define war crimes and provides for penalties 
for them, namely the killing, injury, torture or other in humane treatment of 
                                                 
114 The Special Court set up in 2005 to try crimes committed in Darfur is criticized in relation to nature of 
crimes and number of crimes tried i.e. only 13 cases were tried since 2005 in relation to ordinary crimes. 
Amnesty report released in June 2006.  
 
115 A Sudanese National Commission for IHL was established on 8 February 2003 by a presidential Decree 
No. 48 / 2003. The Commission mandate is in particular to review national legislation and determine 
whether it is on line with IHL and to suggest possible improvements, to set up mechanisms and measures 
necessary to implement IHL, to monitor the implementation of legislation in this area, to make 
recommendations to the national authorities and assist national authorities in preparing required reports, to 
co-ordinate government efforts relating in IHL and to provide the state with advice on IHL. 
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protected persons, the enforced displacement of civilians violations of norms 
of international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians and 
their property in armed conflict, the destruction of protected objects and the 
use of prohibited methods and means of combat.116  
Immunity from prosecution to any member or collaborator for any act 
connected with the official work of such persons should be lifted where 
serious violations of international and humanitarian law are committed in 
Darfur Conflict.117   
Amnesty is not to be granted in relation to serious violations of Geneva 
Conventions in particular common Article 3 committed in Darfur.118 It is to 
be mentioned in relation to this issue that recent developments in 
international law have increasingly challenged recognition of amnesty with 
regard to serious violations of common Article 3 and other serious violations 
of the laws and customs of war committed in non-international armed 
conflicts which constitute international crimes. The Rome Statute of the ICC 
provides for jurisdiction over serious violations of the rules applicable in 
                                                 
116 Some states have enacted laws specifically providing for such crimes. Example the British Crimes Act 
1991 and the US War Crimes Act 1996-Michael Bothe and Thomas Karzidemn eds. National 
implementation of international humanitarian law The Hague: Nijhofh 1990.  
 
117 Such immunity is provided for in Article 33 of the National Security Force Act 1999.  
118 Amnesties granted for ordinary crimes and for taking up arms against the government to facilitate peace 
process find recognition.  
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internal armed conflicts.119 Given the complementary principle in the Rome 
Statute and the duty to prosecute serious crimes, on the basis of this 
principle, amnesty for such crimes could not normally be recognized.120  
Applying this in relation to crimes committed in Darfur, there has been a 
tendency for the UN to reject the possibility of amnesties for international 
crimes in the process of negotiations with the rebels to conclude a reconciliation 
agreement.121 This attitude is reflected in the Security Council resolutions passed 
in relation to Darfur conflict, requesting the Sudanese government to prosecute 
perpetrations of war crimes and crimes against humanity and recently by the 
referral of the case to the ICC. All these points to the fact that any grant of 
amnesties by the government in relation to these crimes will not find 
international recognition and renders Sudan responsible for failing to fulfill its 
international duty to prosecute persons committing such crimes.  
Therefore the burden is on Sudanese government to show its ‘willingness” 
and “ability” to prosecute perpetrators and hold them accountable before its 
judicial organs. In convincing the ICC that it is “willing” and “able” to 
                                                 
119 Rome Statute, Article 8 (2) © and (e).  
120 Yasmin NAQVI “Amnesty for war crimes. Defining the limits of international recognition, IRRC, 2003, 
September, Volume 85, No. 851, p. 583.  
 
 
121 It is to be noted that Darfur Peace Agreement concluded between the Sudanese Government and the 
Sudan Liberation Army on 05.05.2006 in Abogaa, consisting of 515 Article does not contain a provision 
referring to granting of amnesties. However, the President issued a Republican Decree in 12 June2006, 
granting a general amnesty to all members of armed forces movement who signed the Peace Agreement of 
2006 and to all those who subsequently acceded to it. The Decree was approved by competent authorities. 
It is to be mentioned here that amnesties have been negotiated as part of peace deal in Sudan Peace 
Agreement of 21 April 1997 in the North-South Civil War. And the Agreement was supported by the UN.  
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achieve justice, the Sudan may then claim to have primary jurisdiction in 
implementing the complementary principle.  
Conclusion  
The issue of protection of civilians in Darfur conflict is the primary 
responsibility of Sudan. However the intensity and atrocities committed 
against civilians in addition to other political factors have given the conflict 
an international dimension. The international community has shown great 
concern about the protection of civilian victims and serious crimes 
committed. In Darfur non-international armed conflict, the sole relevance of 
Geneva Conventions is Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions IV of 
1949 which Sudan ratified. The Article provides the basis of international 
protection to civilians; however it contains a minimum standard of 
humanitarian principles. Human rights norms, no doubt strengthened the 
regime of protection to some extent. Before 2003 when the conflict was 
characterized as an internal violence, civilian victims of such violence were 
left under the protection of applicable rules of human rights instruments 
relevant. After 2003 when the armed conflict reached such intensity, 
sufferings became severe; it was characterized as a non-international armed 
conflict under common Article 3. Human rights instruments applicable, to 
which Sudan is a party, filled the gaps and shortcomings of the regime of 
protection under common Article 3 by giving special protection to women, 
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children, displaced persons and guaranteeing protection of basic rights of 
civilians. Human rights bodies played a role by releasing public and periodic 
reports on the human rights situation in Darfur and that of humanitarian law.  
However, the intensity of the conflict and increasing number of civilian 
victims killed and injured indicate that the above rules do not provide 
effective protection to civilians due to a number of reasons. Parties to the 
conflict do not show respect to such rules and repeated serious violations on 
wide scale of crimes committed against civilians are basic factors rendering 
the protection ineffective .As a result the Security Council resolution 1564, 
requested the Sudan Government to ‘identify’ perpetrators with a view to 
ensure those responsible are held accountable and to end the climate of 
impunity in Darfur and to bring to justice all those responsible including 
members of popular defense forces and Janjaweed militias, for violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law.  
The Government of Sudan, in light of the above resolution, is facing two 
challenges with regard to protection of civilian victims in Darfur. First to put 
an end to atrocities and to bear the greatest responsibilities to prosecute 
those who commit atrocities and international crimes against civilians. In 
fact the Security Council by passing a resolution making a “referral” of the 
case of Darfur to the ICC is shifting the burden on Sudan to prove its 
“willingness” and “abilities” to honor its international obligations in taking 
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serious actions to prosecute such persons, stop atrocities and protect 
civilians. In our view, the Government is to reconcile the competing 
needs of the Sudan to move on from the past and to respect the political 
process towards peace reconciliation and those of international community 
to prosecute those accused of international crimes committed against 
civilians. In this connection, it is essential that Sudanese laws be brought in 
conformity with international standards of human rights and humanitarian 
law instruments to which Sudan is a contracting party. This could be made 
by abolishing the provisions that for example permit the prosecution of 
individuals without judicial review and the provisions granting officials 
immunity from prosecutions. Sudan is to investigate and prosecute all 
persons involved in the commission of serious crimes including the 51 
persons identified and accused by the UN Commission on Darfur. To 
criminalize serious breaches of common Article 3 and customary rules and 
general principles applicable in internal armed conflicts. These are to be 
punishable under military and criminal laws. Sudanese courts competent 
should be given Jurisdiction over such crimes. Military Manuals should 
embody humanitarian and human rights rules protecting civilians and those 
in relation to conduct of hostilities.  
Sudan is to increase special courts which are competent and confer on them 
jurisdiction to try international crimes, ensuring judicial guarantees and set 
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up a truth and reconciliation commission as a complementary mechanism to 
trials together with a restrictive amnesty limited to those “least responsible” 
for perpetrating the least serious crimes. Provide reparations and 
compensation to persons victims of human rights and humanitarian law 
violations by government forces or government militias.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations human 
rights bodies should be allowed access and provide them with facilities to 
carry their humanitarian activities and to monitor respect of international 
rules of protection by all parties to the conflict to ensure that all parties to the 
conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of impartial 
humanitarian assistance for civilians in need. Tribal leaders should be given 
the opportunity to participate in reconciliation process as well as civil 
societies to cease any forced return or re-settlement of displaced civilians 
and ensure their only return voluntarily to their places of origin in safety and 
dignity.  
It is the obligation of the Government of Sudan to protect civilian victims 
primarily while the plea of any justification may not be invoked, where a 
violation of rule of international law constitute a denial of fundamental 
human rights and regardless of status of such norms within national legal 
order.  
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If Sudan Government takes these measures, then it can be said that it could 
satisfy the essential purpose of justice and showing its willingness to fulfill 
its international obligations to ensure for victims their rights to justice. 
Sudan government under Article 1 (2) of the National Interim Constitution 
committed itself to achieve justice and protect human dignity in time of 
peace and armed conflict. The said Article provides, “The state is committed 
to the respect and promotion of human dignity and is founded on justice, 
equality and the advancement of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms……….”      
The   protection of civilians is not the sole responsibility of Sudan, though 
the primary responsibility, under present international legal order. 
International law imposes on rebel armed forces certain obligations to 
respect rules protecting civilians under humanitarian and human rights law 
constituting elementary considerations of humanity and protecting the 
dignity of persons as well as customary rules applicable. Violations of such 
rules entail their individual criminal responsibility on national and 
international level. International community has a role to play by putting 
more pressure on those rebels who are reluctant to sign the Peace Agreement 
and continue to fight and commit atrocities against civilians. International 
sanctions should be imposed on them by taking serious action to prosecute 
them for such crimes.  
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The United Nations Peace keeping forces which are to replace the forces of 
the African Union are to be sent with a clear and specific mandate to 
monitor and guarantee the respect and fulfillment of Peace Agreement 
concluded by parties to the conflict.122 A mandate to protect civilians and to 
use force might possibly turn the function of such forces to “enforcement 
measures” under Chapter VII of the Charter i.e. use of military forces as 
happened in Congo armed conflict, a fact which will complicate the situation 
and endanger civilians and most seriously will “internationalize” the 
conflict. To avoid this, the role of UN peace forces is to be strictly defined in 
its mandate as non-military. It is hoped that their presence between the rival 
forces to stop them from resorting to further hostile actions and that they are 
to be under rules of engagement which limit the use of their weapons to self 
defense if they or their stores are attacked. It is to be mentioned here that self 
defense is to include those situations in which armed persons attempt by 
force to prevent UN troops from carrying their mandate but not permitting 
their use merely because there is a revival of hostilities between the 
opposing forces. In such a case they have to operate in accordance with the 
                                                 
122 The UN Security Council adopted unanimously a Resolution in 17 May, 2006, that the United Nations is 
to send a UN peace keeping forces to Darfur replacing those of the African Union in September. The 
Sudanese government refused to give its consent to allow such forces on the plea that such forces are to be 
sent under Chapter VII of the Charter is to be considered military intervention. It is to be noted that the 
resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which can be enforced through the threat of 
sanctions or military force….http://www.http://ww.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudanindex.htm.  
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principles of international humanitarian law and they must operate on a basis 
of absolute non-discrimination among parties to the conflict.  
A final conclusion, Darfur conflict is a case which shows that the protection 
of civilians is not a matter which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
sovereign state. When it comes to protection of civilians an international 
regime steps in to operate. This regime requires the application of common 
Article 3 and other humanitarian law rules relevant. To ensure enforcement 
and respect of such rules by parties to the conflict, the international legal 
order provides various mechanisms i.e. U.N. political organs can play an 
effective role, regional bodies like the African Union and human rights 
bodies has its own means and methods in ensuring respect of basic rights of 
civilians in such conflicts. The ICRC plays major role in providing 
humanitarian services and acting as a guardian to ensure respect of common 
Article 3 by parties to the conflict. Third states can play a role during stages 
of the conflict by exercising political pressure on parties to the conflict to 
stop atrocities and respect rules of protection or by acting as a mediator 
during peace negotiations. International tribunals, like ICC, are the 
enforcement mechanisms of this international regime in prosecuting those 
committing serious crimes against the civilians.  
The whole international regime with all its rules and mechanisms mentioned 
would succeed to protect civilians only, if a real humanitarian and not only 
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political will exists and push parties to the conflict to end atrocities and 
resort to negotiations to settle the conflict instead of arms. Humanitarian 
considerations should be the only and sole purpose for international 
community to offer its help. It is then that one may assure that civilians are 
protected under such regime, Darfur conflict offers an example. On the other 
hand, to be realistic, the international community efforts will not yield a 
lasting peace in Darfur if there is no political and national will from the side 
of all parties to the conflict to eradicate the causes of the conflict and offer 
firm and lasting solutions.  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
Conclusion and Proposals for Reforms 
 
The International regime of protection of civilian victims in non-
international armed conflicts under common Article 3 of Geneva Convention 
IV of 1949 and Additional Protocol II of 1977 constitutes a significant 
progress in humanitarian legal protection to civilian victims. However, the 
above analysis of the distinctive features of the regime has revealed several 
shortcomings and lacunae when compared to the regime of protection in 
international armed conflicts. The basic reasons behind this is the insistence 
of contracting states on the application of the principle of state sovereignty 
as traditionally understood in classic international law and the adherence to 
the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of others states. As 
such, it failed to adequately address several problems arising as a result of 
the new complexity character of non-international armed conflicts in certain 
situations. A detailed analysis reveals the lacunae and shortcomings which 
rendered the regime rather weak.  
Common Article 3 was drafted at a time when the international community 
concern, after the Second World War, was basically directed to protection of 
civilians in inter-state wars. Incidents of civil wars were few. International 
state relations were basically governed by two key principles i.e. the 
principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs of 
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others states. This resulted in adopting common Article 3, described as a 
“mini treaty”, containing a number of shortcomings. Absence of an objective 
and unquestionable standard for defining non-international armed conflicts. 
Protection was limited to prohibition of certain acts only while other serious 
acts were not provided for e.g. compulsory displacement or deportation of 
civilians, absence of detailed criteria and conditions for the granting of 
access to a suffering civilian population; uncertainty as to the distinction and 
separation between civilians and combatants, no special protection to 
vulnerable groups like women and children. The most serious weakness of 
Article 3 is that it does not provide for any international guarantees to ensure 
the implementation of its rules. In addition it does not provide for any form 
of protection to cultural property or civilian objects in general.  
Additional Protocol II, though developed the regime of protection, however 
it has serious shortcomings, reflected basically in the absence of any 
provisions providing general protection to civilian objects, absence of 
international guarantees to implement rules of protection embodied in the 
Protocol which, no doubtely, resulted on serious violations of the rules. The 
criteria provided for its applications are to be determined by governments 
which claim in most cases that the criteria are not met to avoid obligations 
resulting from applicability of the Protocol. Thus leaving civilians 
unprotected under the law. Absence of detailed rules governing the conduct 
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of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts is a serious gap in the 
regime of protection. Further more the unsettled question of legal basis of 
obligation of rebel groups under Article 3 common and AP II is a matter of 
importance to the regime to achieve its objectives.  Absence of a duty to 
prosecute and punish violations of the law and pay reparations is an 
important factor rendering the regime weak.   
The above mentioned weakness and the absence of legal guarantees to 
ensure respect of rules protecting civilians under both Article 3 and AP II 
and with the increasing number of non-international armed conflicts and 
serious violations and atrocities committed against civilians, all these require 
efforts to be enhanced to take steps to remedy the situation. One would 
suggest a number of measures to be taken to remedy such weakness in the 
regime. This includes implementation of the law at the national level which 
require states honoring their obligations by enacting national criminal laws. 
Prosecuting and punishing those who violate the law is an important step in 
rendering the legal regime more effective and redress is crucial to protect 
rights of civilians. Dissemination of the law among all sectors of civilian 
population including rebels is not doubt ensures respect of such rules. The 
role of ICRC proved to be vital in ensuring respect of the law in a number of 
situations by disseminating the law, providing humanitarian assistance to 
victims, advising the government and acting as guardian of international 
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humanitarian law in non-international armed conflicts, to ensure its 
implementation. It is time to give to the ICRC an even stronger legal basis 
and recognize the legal obligation of parties to the conflict to co-operate 
with it. As such, governments are under obligation not to arbitrary refuse 
permission to the ICRC to play its humanitarian role in such cases, both 
parties to the conflict are under obligation to secure and facilitate the 
activities of the ICRC to reach civilian victims in their places.   
The notion of “direct” or ‘active’ participation in hostilities has never been 
precisely defined in treaty law. This has led to divergent interpretation of the 
meaning of hostilities and of the legal criterion for defining “direct” as 
opposed to “indirect” participation. Contemporary internal armed conflicts 
pose new challenges for the implementation of this notion as far as civilians 
are concerned. A specific definition to “civilians” based on the physical and 
direct participation in battlefield is to be adopted, in our view. This will 
broaden the scope of application to include a wide range of category of 
civilians in such conflicts who give support where it is difficult to 
distinguish between civilians and combatants as a result of nature of such 
conflicts. The distinction between military and civilians, between objects 
and objectives open to attack or to be protected is a key issue. The criteria 
and conditions of the application of those issues should be defined to avoid 
dilemmas resulting from differences of opinion. Certain specific rules are to 
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be adopted to provide more protection e.g. rules protecting civilians against 
indiscriminate attacks and rules protecting natural environment against 
effects of hostilities causing damage to environment. These should be listed 
among serious violations of common Article 3 entailing criminal 
responsibility.  The scope of application of common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II is to be determined by defining the criteria to be used 
to characterize a situation, judgments by parties to the conflict alone would 
not be sufficient. International institutions should have a say to make a 
qualification of a situation, for purposes of enforcement of the rules 
protecting civilians. The legal basis of binding force of obligations in 
common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II of rebel groups is an ongoing 
debate, still not clearly answered. However, it is widely accepted that 
specific non-state entities such as recognized insurgents, national liberation 
movements are generally possess such rights and obligations by the fact that 
Common Article 3 and AP 11 provide them with rights as well as 
obligations which endows them with a limited international legal personality 
for the purpose of exercising such rights and fulfill such obligations. They 
acquire this personality if the criteria provided for in Article 3 and AP II are 
met i.e. basically being organized and are competent to respect laws and 
customs of war.  
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The obligation to respect human rights of persons whose liberty has been 
restricted owing to the armed conflict must be confirmed since very often 
victims of such conflicts suffer from bad treatment when in the hands of the 
adversary.  
The principle of non-intervention and international humanitarian law is of 
great importance, when measures under Chapter VII are taken by the 
Security Council. A number of states and legal writers stands in favour of a 
“right to interference” they argue that the principle of non-intervention 
should be overridden in the event of grave and massive violations of 
humanitarian law. The reason being that gross violations of humanitarian 
principles are regarded as matters of international concern and not to quote 
Article 2, Para 7 of the UN Charter, as “matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. It is also stressed that measures taken 
under Chapter VII to stop violations of such principles should not be 
considered as a breach of the principle of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of states. These measures in fact benefit also from the exception 
stated in Article 2, para 7, according to which, “the said principle, should not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII” At 
such humanitarian assistance decided by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII does not conflict with the safeguard of domestic jurisdiction. However, 
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most writers think that the principle of non-intervention is too closely related 
to the notion of sovereignty to be disregarded.  
In our opinion, the recent practices of military interventions by Security 
Council and some big powers in certain incidents of non-international armed 
conflicts, justified on humanitarian considerations proved to be serious 
threat to international peace rather than maintaining peace. The debate in the 
international community up to now has not reached a satisfactory agreement 
on the existence of ‘right to humanitarian intervention’ beyond the United 
Nations Charter. A fact which may increase the suffering of civilian 
population in non-international armed conflicts if used by third states. The 
uncertainty surrounding the principle is a strong justification, in our view, to 
abandon such practice and to search for other mechanisms to stop atrocities 
against civilians in such conflicts; As such we propose exhaustion of 
peaceful means to convince parties to stop conflicts and enter into peace 
reconciliation or exercise political or economic pressure on both sides to 
oblige them to stop atrocities. It might be further noted in this connection 
that the involvement of forces from any of these states in a non-international 
armed conflict within the territory of another state would of course 
“internationalize” that conflict. In such a case the unanswered question of 
what law is applicable in such conflicts will arise, a fact which will 
negatively affects protection of civilians.  
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However, in our opinion, the issue of international humanitarian 
interventions should always be considered with cautions, a number of factors 
should be taken into account when passing a resolution of humanitarian 
intervention by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Political considerations should be put aside, certain requirements should be 
met i.e. humanitarian intervention should be the exception and last resort,  
the humanitarian factor should be the sole reason for passing such a 
resolution, the object of which is to prevent and alleviate human sufferings 
and to protect life, and to ensure respect for the human being. The 
fundamental nature of these humanitarian principles has to be considered by 
the Security Council in passing such resolutions.  
The recent developments in the field of international individual criminal 
responsibility of those who commit serious violations of common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II by prosecuting and punishing them and the 
International Criminal Court, is considered an enforcement mechanism to 
the regime of protection to civilians. However to render such mechanisms 
effective certain measures at the national level should be taken by 
contracting states. This includes enacting national criminal laws satisfying 
international criminal standards requirements. This is done by criminalizing 
serious violations of common Article 3 and AP II provisions, enacting laws 
defining such crimes and granting national courts jurisdiction to prosecute 
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and punish offenders. By authorizing its courts to exercise universal 
jurisdiction to follow such criminals and prosecute them any where.  
The catalogue of offences under the ICC Rome Statute is partially deficient. 
Article 8 (2) (c) and (e) of the ICC criminalize serious violations of Article 3 
common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other serious 
violations of the laws and customs of war committed in non-international 
armed conflicts. Though, this represents a substantial advance as an 
enforcement mechanism to humanitarian law applicable in such conflicts, 
nevertheless, it does not include any provisions on prohibited weapons. Such 
prohibitions are included in Article 8 (2) dealing with customary war crimes 
in international armed conflicts which criminalize the use of four categories 
of weapons; chemical weapons, dudum bullets, weapons projectiles and 
material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury or unnecessary sufferings or which are indiscriminate in violation of 
international armed conflicts. This, no doubt, undermines the effectiveness 
of this mechanism intended to ensure protection to civilians. Nevertheless, 
States should be encouraged to ratify the Rome Statute of 1998 to render 
more effective the role of the Court as an enforcement mechanism to 
prosecute violations of the rules of protection under the law in addition to 
above mechanism parties to the conflict should be strongly encouraged to 
use the Fact-Finding Commission of Article 90 of Additional Protocol I . 
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International humanitarian law during its still brief history has been 
concerned mainly with protection of civilians, Article 3 including minimum 
standards and the set of rules under AP II has made considerable advances 
with respect of its applicability. However, the problem of legal 
characterization resulted to the inapplication of such rules in a number of 
situations. If we are to look forward to further progress, we have to seek it 
through a broader recognition of the applicability of the essential standards 
of humanitarian law to victims from the moment that armed hostilities begin, 
no matter how those hostilities may be classified or characterized. Even 
when the applicability of humanitarian law in non-international armed 
conflict is recognized in some cases, its practical implementation often 
remains uncertain, since there are no rules providing for international   
supervision and sanctions laid in Article 3 or AP II. In addition, grant of 
amnesties in such conflicts bars the prosecution of those who violate such 
rules. Amnesties when granted should not deprive civilian victims for crimes 
committed against them, of their private legal rights to reparations. Amnesty 
should be granted for taking up arms against the state and not for serious 
crimes committed in violation of humanitarian law. In such cases, we 
depend upon the good will of states and the power of judicial authority 
which can impose on them its decision with respect to the application and 
interpretation of the law.  
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Though, the regime of protection as shown, contains certain drawbacks 
which negatively affects the protection of civilian victims, however, 
humanitarian protection to civilian in non-international armed conflicts is 
not confined to the conventional law of Geneva, and must be seen in a 
broader context. There are humanitarian standards based in general 
principles and also in customary law, expressed in the so-called Martens 
Clause expressed in the Preamble of AP II. Human rights instruments 
provide also a source of basis of protection to civilians as stated in paragraph 
2 of the preamble of Additional Protocol II.   
The relevance of human rights for non-international armed conflicts has 
been a subject of controversy. The law of armed conflict was widely 
considered as the lex specials. On the other hand not all human rights 
instruments are considered applicable to non-international armed conflicts 
moreover violations of human rights by non-state actors hardly figure in 
human rights instruments since human rights obligations are imposed on 
governments only.  Also the possibility to declare derogations from human 
rights in armed conflict by declaring state of emergency is another argument 
against the application of human rights in such conflicts.  
Such arguments are not to be accepted in light of the current developments. 
Human rights has a common goal and share common principles, which we 
believe can provide a basis and justification for application of human rights 
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law. As mentioned earlier, it has been affirmed by the General Assembly in 
a number of its resolutions that human rights instruments does not cease to 
apply in armed conflicts and at such they should be respected by parties to 
the conflict. If non-state actors have human rights as individuals, it appears 
logic that they must have responsibilities which are not different from the 
obligations under humanitarian law. In fact there is a trend to subject non-
state actors i.e. rebels to human rights law. Moreover, non-state actors are 
subject to criminal law criminalizing acts of genocide, torture and crimes 
against humanity which are considered violations of both human rights and 
humanitarian law.   
In addition, the world wide and regional mechanism to monitor compliance 
with human rights norms are increasingly being used to day for monitoring 
norms in armed conflicts. Derogations under human rights law are limited 
by provisions of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of 
1966, are subject to the substantial and procedural conditions. States may 
take measures derogating from its obligations under the Convention only to 
the extent strictly required by “the exigencies of the situation” and only, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations 
under international law i.e. under humanitarian law instruments.  
Despites differences, they have common specifities and one basic objective 
i.e. the protection of human person in time of armed conflict based on the 
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principle of humanity. There is no denying, the importance of human rights 
law on the recent development and shaping of international humanitarian 
law. In this connection the classic concept of ‘individual’ as a subject of 
international law enjoying no rights under international law, have been 
changed as a result of changes in international legal order after the Second 
World War by the emergence of an era of recognition of human rights and 
protection of individuals in international law and adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This era had its impact in adopting 
common Article 3 and AP II which constitute the basis of regime protecting 
civilian individuals inspired by human rights principles. Thus international 
law, while of course duly safeguarding legitimate interests of states, after the 
Second World War it gradually turned to the protection of human beings 
irrespective of their place or relation to their state. This gave rise to the 
emergence of the notion of “international protection of civilians in internal 
armed conflicts” where both humanitarian law and human rights instruments 
are applicable. The different contexts in which humanitarian law and human 
rights are applied in non-international armed conflicts, facilitates the 
application of norms which shape every aspect of the international regime of 
protection as shown. As such, both laws tends to limit sovereignty when the 
issue concerns the protection of humanitarian protection of civilian persons 
in armed conflicts.  
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The legal framework of human rights and humanitarian law regime is 
characterized by the centralities of rights and obligations of individuals. Its 
impact on the process of evolution and development of the law is reflected in 
the provisions providing protection which derive its inspiration from human 
rights principles of humanity and dignity of mankind. Despite differences in 
the normative structure of regimes protecting individuals under both laws, 
nevertheless human rights is able to step in during non-international armed 
conflicts and provide contribution with view to strengthen the regime of 
protection of civilians based on this notion of humanity. The nature, extent 
and scope of contribution as shown takes different forms and varies in each 
situation which may be seen in providing, norms filling legal lacunae, use of 
human rights to define certain offences, complementing rules, uncovering 
ambiguities and uncertainties and in some situations monitoring 
implementation of humanitarian rules and co-operating with ICRC in 
providing humanitarian assistance to victims with human rights bodies.  
The legal characterization which may render the inapplicability of common 
Article 3 and AP II, thereby creating legal lacunae, and in absence of a clear 
definition of concept of distinction between civilians and combatants which 
may result in the non-applicability of rules of protection to civilians, in such 
situations human rights rules may step in to fill the lacunae and provide for 
rules protecting civilians. The contribution and impact human rights is also 
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shown in relation to the fact that humanitarian law provides that certain acts 
are to be prohibited regardless of the context in which they took place, 
Recognition of that fact often derives from human rights law by laying down 
the outline of what were to become international crimes under international 
humanitarian law. For example, the prohibition of enforcement 
disappearances in human rights law laid the foundation for the 
criminalization of this practice under humanitarian law. Other provisions 
filling the legal gaps of protection are of importance e.g. slavery, the 
freedom of movement, legal protection of disappearances and destruction of 
homes which violates rights pertaining to protection of private property 
under human rights law. Absence of a provision providing for breaches or 
reparation under Article 3 and AP II in cases of violations is remedied by 
Article 2 (3) of CCP under which states parties, undertake to ensure that 
individuals shall have an effective remedy for violations of such rights, 
though such remedy remain subject to national laws and procedures. This 
Article is of importance in cases of serious violations of rules e.g. in cases of 
“in human treatment” and torture offences which provide for similar 
protection under humanitarian law instruments applicable.  
In this connection also the use of human rights languages and formulation 
for certain similar crimes was relied upon by ad hoc tribunals to provide 
clarification, the common language may have its impact upon the definition 
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of certain acts such as torture or “cruel inhuman treatment” which are known 
to be prohibited under both regimes. Both laws use a common technical 
terminology, for this reason recourse to human rights norms to definitional 
purposes is useful. Trial Chambers of ad hoc international tribunals like the 
ICTY used the language of human rights law providing for a solid standing 
point when attempting to define an international criminal offence. In other 
cases, human rights law has been used as a back up mechanism in having 
defined an international offence e.g. “inhumane treatment” in respect of 
offence of rape where human rights instruments specifically prohibits rape 
or other serious sexual assaults and also torture. These offences are 
implicitly prohibited by the provisions safeguarding physical integrity in 
common Article 3. In Tadic case, the Trial Chamber relied on human rights 
law to extract out its definition of “cruel treatment” under common Article 3 
and AP II as no definition of ‘cruel treatment” is given in common Article 3 
and as to what acts constitutes ‘cruel or in humane or degrading treatment”. 
Moreover, there are a number of protected rights under human rights 
instruments, the violation of which may constitute cruel or inhumane 
treatment. [Another example is the definition of ‘enslavement’ as a crime 
against humanity, which is identical to the definition of slavery used in the 
1926 Slavery Convention. Recourse to such definition is usually made in 
relation to the type and categories of acts which they seek to prohibit i.e. 
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between the regime of gross and large scale violation of human rights and 
the law on crimes against humanity.] However, this does not mean that the 
definition of their respective prohibitions is identical. The use of 
international tribunals of human rights norms in defining serious crimes 
committed against civilians is made with view to determine the criminal 
individual responsibility of the offender. One cannot deny that the attribution 
of internationally recognized human rights and the emergence of 
international criminal responsibility for serious violations of humanitarian 
law played a key role in the empowerment of civilians as victims of such 
conflicts.  
No doubt, the impact of human rights on international humanitarian law in 
this area is increasing common objectives and protected values have bridged 
the gap of differences of both regimes when the issue of protection of 
civilians is a question. However, it should be remembered that in all cases, 
human rights law and humanitarian law remain independent; their legal 
structure is different in respect of the role attributable to the state and its 
origins, the place of individuals, the nature of prohibitions which they 
contain and remedy which they provide as well as in respect of the 
consequences of a breach of one of their rules upon individuals. For 
example, a human rights court will not need to establish that the mens rea of 
the offender, when court may have to show that he was the agent of the state 
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or that the state is otherwise responsible for these actions. The court is to 
determine whether the violation is the result of a state’s failure to fulfill its 
duty to respect and guarantee these rights or that the rights recognized by the 
relevant conventions has occurred with the support or knowledge of the 
government or that the state has allowed the action to take place without 
taking measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible e.g. in cases of 
genocide offences. The reasons that human rights court is dealing with the 
assumption of international responsibility of states for violations of human 
rights conventions and not a case of criminal responsibility of an individual.  
In addition, the use of human rights law should be referred to with cautions 
taking into account the differences and the adoption of legal concepts 
requiring good understanding of both regimes from which the concept is in 
question. As far as the control of human rights obligations is concerned, the 
world wide and regional mechanisms to monitor compliance with human 
rights norms are increasingly being used today to monitor with compliance 
international humanitarian norms in armed conflicts. For example the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, working groups and special 
rapporteurs have developed a settled practice in this field. In fact human 
rights bodies plays a role in uncovering violations and drawing the attention 
of international community to take action by releasing reports of atrocities 
committed against the civilians by both parties in the conflict. This role 
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could be effective only if human rights bodies in doing so are not biased to 
one party of the conflict and take steps to ensure that the reports of 
violations they release reflect the reality of the situation.  
However, the role of human rights in military operations in cases of abuses 
by non-state actors is still controversial. New efforts to provide for remedies 
against such violations of existing rules are to be taken. How to hold armed 
groups accountable under a system of law that was developed as a means of 
placing obligations on governments is not an easy task especially when the 
abuses of armed groups and not just states are a major feature of present day 
conflict. What we need is a specific and legally firm basis to hold such rebel 
groups accountable under both human rights and humanitarian law.  
In light of the above, it is clear we are approaching an individual 
international humanitarian order aiming at the protection of civilians’ 
victims of armed conflicts based on common Article 3, AP II, human rights 
law and customs of war. Human rights law has greatly contributed in several 
aspects to strengthen the regime of protection of civilian victims in non- 
international armed conflicts. However, this contribution and its impact on 
the regime is limited to fundamental rights of civilians as determined and 
defined within the regime of protection under humanitarian law.  
This study maintains that human rights and humanitarian law are two 
independent regimes; each operates within its own norms and legal structure. 
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However as they share common principles, values and objectives, when it 
comes to protection of individuals as human beings in non-international 
armed conflicts, human rights law may offer valuable contributions. The 
situation of civilians in Darfur conflict offers a good example. In light of this 
a number of recommendations and solutions may be suggested to maintain a 
comprehensive and an effective international regime of protection to civilian 
victims in non-international armed conflicts.                    
States should respect rules protecting civilians under both human rights and 
under common Article 3, AP II and customary rules of war applicable. They 
should fulfill their obligations under both laws by enacting laws consistent 
with its international obligations under such instrument; military manuals 
should embody basic rules and principles to be respects by soldiers and 
officers.  
One may propose setting up of an international independent body within the 
framework of the United Nations to supervise and investigate violations of 
rules protecting civilians under both human rights and humanitarian law 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts. This body should have the 
power to supervise implementation of obligations by states rebels and to 
monitor violations of such rules by parties to the conflict. States are to 
submit regular reports on measures taken by them at the national level to 
implement such rules in time of peace and during armed conflict and to 
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submit reports as to the situation of civilians and applicability of rules 
protecting them under both laws.  
The ICRC and human rights bodies to be listed under the measures of 
ensuring respect of the law. They should act simultaneously if protection of 
civilian victims is to be significantly improved. Regional human rights 
organizations are to get involved in supervising the respect of rules 
protecting civilians under humanitarian law by parties to the conflict. At 
such ICRC and human rights bodies are to co-operate to carry its duty in 
ensuring respect by parties in the conflict of rules of protection under both 
laws. To facilitate and secure their activities once the conflict breaks out and 
the moment there are civilian victims. This should be made as long as such 
organizations are working within the mandate of their humanitarian purposes 
and as long as such activities do not constitute intervention in the internal 
affairs of such states. They could co-operate formally by concluding 
agreements of co-operation complementing each others activities.  
As to violations of human rights by non-state actors i.e. rebels, a broader 
interpretation of the state’s duty to ensure and guarantee respect and 
protection of basic rights, may be adopted to expand and include violations 
of basic rights committed by persons in their private capacity, like rebels, in 
the same manner it is responsible for violations committed by its agents.  
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This study has shown the significant contribution of human rights law to the 
regime of protection under both Article 3 and AP II with a view to render it 
more effective. It has demonstrated the fact that human rights and 
humanitarian law remain independent but when it comes to protection of 
fundamental rights of civilians as human persons, human rights law have a 
room to offer contribution and may be useful while at the same time, each 
performs , the task for which it is better suited than the other.  
In light of this, international community is called to make efforts to 
overcome practical difficulties in the implementation of shared principles 
and humanitarian objectives. In this respect, sovereignty of the individual 
citizens is a priority under this regime, accountability of leaders and 
individuals is necessary in cases of violations. The classic understanding of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs is to be integrated 
within the context of a new international legal order, the centre of which is 
the humanitarian protection of individual. The sovereignty of the state is 
reflection of the sovereignty of individual which is achieved only when his 
dignity and humanity is respected and protected in time of peace and 
conflict. The regime of protection under the present law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts i.e. under common Article 3 and AP II simply 
reflects the will of states. In fact, the main challenge facing implementation 
of fundamental rules protecting civilians in today internal armed conflicts is 
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the lack of respect to such rules, this lack of respect is due to the intended 
lack of political will to apply and respect such rules by both parties to the 
conflict. Declarations of intention to respect humanitarian principles is in 
most cases not followed in practice, on the contrary these standards are 
ignored or seriously violated as in Darfur conflict. As a result, pressure 
should be exercised be it of political or moral, to enforce parties to the 
conflict to respect human dignity of victims by abstaining from violating 
such principles, stop conflict and commence peace settlements. Diplomatic 
action of states, individual or group of states, should remain one of the tools 
of advancing the respect for humanitarian law and human rights law 
applicable in such conflicts.  
The United Nations, having assumed the obligation to ensure respect for 
international humanitarian law with view to maintain international peace, 
adopts a number of measures to respect rules into situations of armed 
conflicts where civilians are targeted, within the UN system. The General  
Assembly, the Security Council and the Commission on Human Rights have 
on various occasions condemned violations of humanitarian principles. 
Among the means which are used to deal with such violations are, 
resolutions urging parties to the conflict to respect and abide by existing 
rules, offers of good offices, dispatch of observer missions and initiation of 
operations dedicated to peace-keeping and peace enforcement whose 
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mandate is to include the promotion of humanitarian principles. In fact the 
establishment of the Security Council of the two ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia reflects the collective 
willingness to ensure respect for such international humanitarian principles 
in cases where serious violations occur. The risk that the Security Council’s 
recourse to humanitarian intervention may become of political interests 
increases the suffering of civilians, to prevent this, the obligation to ensure 
respect for humanitarian law should be interpreted in a broad sense. It should 
include the search for peaceful means of conflict, resolutions based on 
respect for the values and principle of the UN Charter, humanitarian 
principles and promoting meaningful negotiations should be taken. 
In conclusion, to be efficient, the regime of protection under humanitarian 
law applicable in non-international armed conflicts must be adapted to 
current conditions and trends of development of the international legal order. 
As a branch of international law, it must be consistent as possible, the 
lacunae to be eliminated, new rules and bodies to be developed. There is also 
a need to clarify several rules which are expressed in general terms but in 
practice allow for different interpretation. The relationship of humanitarian 
law with municipal laws should be provided for in the constitutions of states 
to be part of the law of the land upon ratification. One may also propose the 
inclusion of a chapter in the constitutions of states guaranteeing the respect 
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and protection of basic principles and rights provided for in international 
humanitarian law instruments applicable in armed conflicts. States should 
reconcile its national legislation with its international obligations under 
humanitarian law instruments and human rights. The authorities must adopt 
their own laws and rules of application that will create consistency with 
humanitarian law. Such measures relate to a range of issues which may 
require enactment of specific legislation on war crimes and impose penal 
sanctions. The relationship with other branches touching same questions or 
situations like human rights law must be determined and allowing rooms for 
its contribution so that application of the legal regime of protection can be 
improved and rendered more effective.  
One may conclude also by saying that we are moving from the notion of 
sovereignty as meaning control to sovereignty as responsibility to do all 
measures to protect civilians during non-international armed conflicts. If 
practical results are to be achieved, states must be honest in their acceptance 
of the concept of “international protection of civilian victims in non-
international armed conflict” and show a firm determination to observe the 
principles, embodied in both human rights and humanitarian law.   
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